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ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the second part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session Paris, I
30th November 
- 3rd December 1992 i
MONDAY 30th NOYEMBER
Morning l0 a.m.
Meetings of political groups.
Afternoon 3 p.m.
l. Opening of the second part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by Mr. Colombo, Minister for Foreign Alfairs of ltaly, Chairman-in-Office of the
Council.
5. Adontion of the draft order of business of the second part of the thirty-eighth ordinary
sesslon.
6. Action by the Presidential Committee:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Foschi, Vice-President of the Assembly.
Debate.
7. European security policy 
- 
reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council:
Part One: European Union, WEU and the consequences of Maastricht:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf of the Political Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
TUESDAY Ist DECEMBER
Morning l0 o.m.
l. Election of the Clerk.
2. Turkey:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Moya on behalf of the Political Committee.
Debate.
11. 30 a.m.
3. Address by Mr. Rifkind, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom.
4. Turkey:
Resumed debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation
t4
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Aftornoon 3 p.m.
l. Address by Mr. Melescanu, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania.
2. Defence: Central Europe in evolution:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Cox on behalf of the Defence Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
3. Parliamentary debates on security policy under the Maastricht Treaty:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Nufrez on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary
and Public Relations.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
WEDNESDAY 2nd DECEMBER
Moming l0 a.m.
1. European security policy 
- 
reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council:
Part Two: Europe and the crises in former Yugoslavia:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf of the Political Committee.
2. WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Marten on behalf of the Defence Committee.
Joint debate.
Votes on the draft recommendations.
Afternoon 3 p.m.
l. Address by Mr. Andd, Minister of Defence of Italy.
2. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1993:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the draft budget.
4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year l99l - the
auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts:
presentation of the report by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee for Budgetary Affairs
and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the motion to approve the Jinal accounts.
5. Composition of the political groups - Rule 39, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Procedure:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Thompson on behalf of the Committee on Rules of
Procedure and Privileges.
Debate.
Vote on the draft decision.
15
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6. European armaments co-operation after Maastricht:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. l-apez Henares on behalf of the Technological and
Aerospace Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
7. Anti-ballistic missile defence:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Technologrcal and Aerospace
Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation and draft order.
THURSDAY 3rd DECEMBER
Morning l0 a.m.
l. European security 
- 
reserve forces and national service:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the Defence Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
ll a.m.
2. Address by Mr. Fasslabend, Minister of Defence of Austria.
3. Western European Union 
- 
information report:
presentation of the report tabled by MM. Lopez Henares and Tummers on behalf of the Com-
mittee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.
Debate.
Vote on the draft order.
CLOSE OF THE SECOND PART OF THE THIRTY.EIGHTH ORDINARY SESSION
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WEU Council of Ministen and extaordinary meeting of
thc WEU Council of Ministers witi states of Cenfial Europe
Council of Ministen
Bona, 19th lunc 1992
PETERSBERG DECLARATION
The foreign and defence ministers of WEU member states met in Bonn on lgth June 1992 and
issued the Petersberg Declaration consisting of the following three parts:
I. On WEU and European security
II. On strengthening WEU's operational r6le
III. On relations between WEU and the other European member states of the European Union
or the Atlantic Alliance
I. On WEU and European security
Developments in the security situation in Europe, disarmament and arms control
l. Ministers reviewed the significant changes that had taken place in the security situation in
Europe since their last regular meeting in November 1991. They emphasised the importance of
strengthening the r6le and institutions of the CSCE for peace and security in Europe. They looked
forward to decisions at Helsinki to start new negotiations on measures of arms control and disarm-
ament and to enhance regular consultations and co-operation on security matters. In the light of the
establishment of a new CSCE forum for security co-operation, they considered that decisions to
enhance the CSCE's capabilities for conflict prevention, crisis management and the peaceful settlement
of disputes are of primary importance. They supported the proposal under discussion at the Helsinki
follow-up meeting for the CSCE to declare itself as a regional iurangement under Chapter VIII of the
United Nations Charter. Ministers considered that the CSCE should have the authority to initiate and
pur$ue peace-keeping operations under its own responsibility.
2. As WEU develops its operational capabilities in accordance with the Maastricht Declaration, we
are prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with our own procedures, the
effective implementatioq of conflict-prevention and crisis-management measures, including peace-
ke_eping activities of the CSCE or the United Nations Security Council. This will be done withoul prej-
udice to possible contributions by other CSCE countries and other organisations to these activiliei.
3. Ministers welcomed the decisions taken by the CSCE Council in Berlin and Prague regarding the
relationships between the CSCE and other mutually reinforcing European and transatlantic
organisations including WEU. They declared that WEU, together with the European Union, was ready
to play a full part in building up Europe's security architecture. They likewise reaffirmed their con-
viction that the Atlantic Alliance is one of the indispensable foundations of Europe's security. They
welcomed the ongoing reform process of NATO with a view to establishing a strong new transatlantic
partnership.
4. Ministers welcomed the agteement reached at the CFE extraordinary conference on 5th June
1992 in Oslo which provides the basis for the entry into force of the CFE Treaty which has been and
remains a major objective of their arms control agenda. Its full and effective implementation will
increase stability and open the way to a new co.operative security order in Europe. They call upon the
new states parties to the treaty to ensure its ratification by the time of the CSCE summit in Helsinki.
Ministers attach great importance to the conclusion of an agreement on the limitation of personnel
strengths of ground and air forces (CFE la) in time for the Helsinki summit and to the implementation
of the Open Skies Treaty. They reaffirmed their commitment to the early entry into force of the Open
Skies agreement and invited other CSCE states to accede to the treaty in accordance with its provi-
slons.
t7
DOCUMENT I322
5. Ministers welcomed steps recently taken by the states concerned to allow for the entry into for_ce
of the START Treaty and the importani agleement on further strategic reductions reached between the
United States and Russia in Washington on lTth June 1992.
6. Ministers recalted that the presence of foreign forces on the territory of a sovereign state requires
the explicit consent of that state. They stressed the importance of rapidly establishin-g, t! !h.e negotia-
tions under way, timetables for the wiihdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of the Baltic states.
7. Ministers expressed their conviction that a chemical weapons convention can be reached within
the next few montls. They are confident that this convention can play aq important and pioneering
rOle in worldwide multilat6ral arms control and call on all member states of the Conference on Disarm-
ament to lend their support to the emerging consensus. They repeat their commitment to be among the
original signatories of [tris convention and ask all other nations to follow this course.
8. WEU member states reaffrrmed their resolution to contribute further to the establishment of a
new order of peace in Europe which, in accordance with the Charter of Paris, will be based on
co-operation. Ministers undeilined the valuable contribution of NACC in this connection. In the same
spirit, WEU has invited the foreign and defence ministers of eight states of Central Europe to a special
riiniiterial meeting later today. WEU and the invited countries intend to enhance consultation and
co-operation in the framework of the new European security structure.
Implementation of the Maastricht Declaration
9. Ministers stressed the fundamental importance of the Treaty on European Union and they
looked forward to the further elaboration of the common foreign and security policy at the Lisbon
European Council. They discussed the progress made in developing the r6le of WEU as the defence
component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance in accordance with the Declaration adopted by WEU member states at the Maastricht
European Council in December 1991.
10. Ministers reaffrrmed the importance for WEU to develop close working relations with the
European Union and Atlantic Alliance in accordance with the Maastricht Declaration of [EU. T_hey
adopted a report on the practical measures necessary for WEU to develop these relationsJhey-asked
the Permanent Council to propose to the Council of the Twelve and to the North Atlantic Council con-
crete measures aimed at faciliiating the development of close co-operation between the respective sec-
retariats.
I l. Ministers heard a report from the Secretary-General on the progress made towards the transfer
of the WEU Council and Secretariat-General from London to Brussels. They instructed the Permanent
Council and Secretary-General to expedite the necessary arrangements so that the transfer could
become effective by January 1993.
12. Ministers heard a report from the German Chief of Defence Staff on the meetings of chiefs 
.of
defence staff. Ministers agreed that the chiefs of defence staff should meet twice a year prior to the
regular Ministerial Counci-ls and on an ad hoc basis whenever necessary. Ministers alsoagtreed that, fol-
loiing the transfer of the Council and Secretariat to Bru-ssels, nationaldelegation_s could be reinforced
with ililitary delegates to develop and provide advice for the Cou-ncil, to introduce the views of the
chiefs of defence s--taff to the planning c-ell and to monitor the professional standards of the planning
cell's work.
13. WEU ministers welcomed the IEPG defence ministers' decision, at their Oslo meeting on
6th March 1992,to analyse the future r6le of the IEPG in the new European security architecture. This
represents a positive development fully in line with the objective set by WEU member states in Maas-
tricht furthei to examine enhanced co-operation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a
WEU European annaments agency. WEU ministers propose that both WEU and IEPG experts analyse
this issue in depth, carry out an initial examination of the r6le and functions of a possible European
armaments agency and submit a report for consideration.
14. WEU ministers welcomed the decision of Eurogroup defence ministers at their meeting in
Brussels on 25th May 1992 to consider the possibility, among other options, and if the necessary pre-
conditions are met, of transferring to WEU some or all of Eurogroup's present functions for which
there is still a need.
15. Ministers noted with satisfaction the considerable progress which had been made in setting up
the experimental WEU satellite centre in Torrej6n (Spain), a concrete example of the strengthening of
WEU's operational r6le, and they looked forward to the oflicial inaugpration which would take place
later in the year. They also noted that the contract for the main system feasibility study had been
awarded to a consortium of firms from WEU member states led by a German firm.
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Activities of working goups
16. In the field of verification, ministers noted with satisfaction that a set of rules for the operation
of multinational teams in CFE had been prepared in WEU and had subsequently been adopted in the
alliance. This represented the first example since the Maastricht Declaration of the introduction ofjoint posititions agreed in WEU into the process of consultation in the alliance.
17. Noting the progress which had been made so far, ministers agreed in principle to a feasibility
study to identify the most cost-effective means of implementing the Open Skies Treaty co-operatively
qmong member states. They tasked the group of experts to agxee assumptions for the study, to identify
the options which merit further study and to consider the question of costs, with a view to taking a
decision at their next ordinary meeting to proceed with the study, stressed the readiness of WEU-to
Goperate with third parties at a later stage, and in this context welcomed the contacts which had
taken place with other European allies, as well as with the Russian Federation. They agreed that
experts should investigate the possibilities for intensified co-operation with the Russian Federation,
which could include ajoint feasibility study and/or a trial overflight.
18. Ministers reaffirmed the importance of the Mediterranean Sub-Group's work on security in the
Mediterranean. They adopted terms of reference for the establishment by WEU of a gradual and
phased dialogue with the Maghreb countries, taking into account the political developments both in
these countries and in the region.
WEU Institute for Security Studies
19. Ministers noted with satisfaction the activities of the WEU Institute for Security Studies in
Paris. Its publications, seminars and colloquia had greatly contributed to deepening understanding for
the ongoing development of a European security identity and to enhancing relations between WEU
and other European countries.
II. On strengthening WEU's operutional file
l. In accordance with the decision contained in the Declaration of the member states of WEU at
Maastricht on lOth December l99l to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union
and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, WEU member states have
been examining and defining appropriate missions, structures and means covering, in particular, a
WEU planning cell and military units answerable to WEU, in order to strengthen WEU's operational
r6le.
2. WEU member states declare that they are prepared to make available military units from the
whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of
WEU.
3. Decisions to use military units answerable to WEU will be taken by the WEU Council in
accordance withthe provisions-of the United Nations Charter. Participation- in specific operations will
remain a sovereign decision of member states in accordance with national constitutions.
4. Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington
Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of WEU member
strtes, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for:
- 
humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- 
peace-keeping tasks;
- 
tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making.
5. The planning and execution of these tasks will be fully compatible with the military dispositions
necessary to ensure the collective defence of all allies.
6. Military units will be drawn from the forces of WEU member states, including forces with
NATO missions 
- 
in this case after consultation with NATO 
- 
and will be organised on a multinational
and multi-service basis.
7. All WEU member states will soon designate which of their military units and headquarters they
would be willing to make available to WEU for its various possible tasks. Where multinational forma-
tions drawn from the forces of WEU nations already exist or are planned, these units could be made
available for use under the authority of WEU, with agreement of all participating nations.
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8. WEU member states intend to develop and exercise the appropriate capabilities to enable the
deployment of WEU military units by land, sea or air to accomplish these tasks.
9. A planning cell will be established on lst October 1992, subject to practical considerations,
under the authority of the Council. It will be located with the Secretariat-General in a suitable building
in Brussels. The Council has today appointed Maj. Gen. Caltabiano (Italian Air Force) as its first
Director. The planning cell will be responsible for:
- 
preparing contingency plans for the employment for forces under WEU auspices;
- 
preparing recommendations for the necessary command, control and communication arrange-
ments, including standing operating procedures for headquarters which might be selected;
- 
keeping an updated list of units and combinations of units which might be allocated to WEU
for specific operations.
10. The Council of Ministers approved the terms of reference for the planning cell.
III. On relations between WEU and the other European
member states of the European Union or the Atbntic Alliance
A. Following the Declaration released in Maastricht on lfth December l99l in connection with the
Treaty on European Union, WEU ministers recalled the fundamental principles on which relations
between member states and associate member states should be based:
- 
settlement of their mutual differences by peaceful means, in accordance with the obligations
resulting from the modified Brussels Treaty, the North American Treaty and the United
Nations Charter, the commitments entered into under the terms of the Helsinki Final Act and
the Paris Charter, and the other generally recognised principles and rules of international law;
- 
in their mutual relations, refraining from resorting to the threat or use of force, in accordance
with the United Nations Charter.
They also stressed that the security guarantees and defence commitments in the treaties which
bind the member states within Western European Union and which bind them within the Atlantic
Alliance are mutually reinforcing and will not be invoked by those subscribing to Part III of the
Petersberg Declaration in disputes between member states of either of the two organisations.
B. In their Maastricht Declaration of l0th December 1991, the member states of WEU proposed
that states which are members of the European Union be invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be
agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become observers if they so
wished. Simultaneously, other European member states of NATO were invited to become associate
members of WEU in a way which would give them a possibility of participating fully in the activities of
WEU.
In accordance with Part III of the Petersberg Declaration, ministers agreed that the following
points should be made in extending the invitation to the countries interested in becoming members,
observers or associate members:
Members:
Member states of the European Union which have accepted the invitation to accede to WEU
undertake,
- 
to respect, in accordance with the principles and values adhered to by all WEU member states,
the Brussels Treaty of 1948, modified on 23rd October 1954, its protocols and associated
texts, and the agreements concluded among the member states pursuant to the treaty,
- 
to note with approval the agreements, decisions and rules adopted in conformity with the
treaty, and the declarations starting with the Rome Declaration of 27th October 1984,
- 
to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to
strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance in keeping with the obligation entered
into on lfth December l99l in the Declaration on the r6le of WEU and its relations with the
European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance attached to the Treaty on European Union,
and,
- to accept in full the substance of Part III of the Petersberg Declaration which will form part of
the Protocol of Accession.
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Observers:
Member states of the European Union, which have accepted the invitation to become observers,
- 
Ery, although not being a party to the MBT, attend the meetings of the WEU Council without
prejudice to the provisions laid down in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty; at the
request of a majority of the member states, or of half of the member states including the Presi-
dency, presence at Council meetings may be restricted to full members;
- 
may be invited to meetings of working groups;
- 
may be invited, on request, to speak;
- 
will have the same rights and responsibilities as the full members for functions transferred to
WEU from other fora and institutions to which they already belong.
Associate members:
Other European member states of the Atlantic Alliance which have accepted the invitation to
become associate members of WEU, although not being parties to the modified Brussels Treaty, may
participate fully in the meetings of the WEU Council 
- 
without prejudice to the provisions laid down
in Article VIII of the modiflred Brussels Treaty 
- 
of its working groups and of the subsidiary bodies,
subject to the following provisions:
- 
at the request of a majority of the member states, or of half of the member states including the
Presidency, participation may be restricted to full members;
- 
they will be able to be associated to the planning cell through a pennanent liaison
arrangement;
- 
they will have the same rights and responsibilities as the full members for functions trans-
ferred to WEU from other fora and institutions to which they already belong;
- 
they will have the right to speak but may not block a decision that is the subject of consensus
among the member states;
- 
they may associate themselves with the decisions taken by member states; they will be able to
participate in their implementation unless a majority of the member states, or half of the
member states including the Presidency, decide otherwise;
- 
they will take part on the same basis as full members in WEU military operations to which
they commit forces;
- 
they will accept in full the substance of Section A of Part III of the Petersberg Declaration
which will form part of the association document;
- 
they will be connected to the member states' telecommunications system (WEUCOM) for
messages concerning meetings and activities in which they participate;
- 
they will be asked to make a financial contribution to the organisation's budgets.
Space activities
For practical reasons, space activities will be restricted to the present members until the end of
the experimental phase of the satellite centre in 1995. During this phase the new members and asso-
ciate members will be kept informed of WEU's space activities. Appropriate arrangements will be
made for associate members to participate in subsequent space activities at the same time as decisions
are taken on the continuation of such activities.
Mandate
C. Ministers mandated the Permanent Council to arrange for discussions to start with the states
concerned.
Ministers confirmed their wish to conclude the necessary agreements before 3lst December 1992.
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Council of Ministers
Bona, l9th luae 1992
Declaration on the Yugoslav crisis
l. Ministers recalled the Declaration on Yugoslavia issued by the Community and its member
states on l5th June 1992.
They reiterated their deep concern about the.ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia._In p$-
ticular, i-h6y OeptoieO the desperate humanitarian situation and the continuing use of force in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
2. Ministers stressed the urgency of immediate and comprehensive humanitarian aid especially to
tn" p.opi. oigoiriu-Hirzegoriia. fhey also stressed theimportance of establishing.a selurity.zo:re in
anO'aro:unO Sarajevo, incliding its airport, as en-visaged in United Nations Security Council.Reso'diidt58, 
"nO 
iipress"d theiisupport for'the effortiundertaken to secure such a zone as well as to
iEopi, Suiuii"o;ilp"n. They weliomed and encouraged the active participation of member states in
this operation.
3. Ministers underlined the determination of their states not to tolerate the continued use of force
ai *eU uJ tn" disiegard for CSCE commitments and basic human standards. In this context, they
recalled the recent decisions taken by the CSCE.
4. Ministers appealed to all parties concerned immediately to cease all hostilities and to abide by
tne cease-nie agii;ients. They iecalled that territorial gains or changes prouglt about by violence are
ir""iiepiaUG ild will not be-recognised by the international- commqnity. They also reaflirmed the
;;;A id thi effectiue protection -of trumin rights and fundamental freedoms, including those of
national and ethnic groups.
5. Ministers reaffrrmed their full support for the United Nations peace-keeping operation 
-in
Croatia. All elements of the United Nati6ns peace plan must be strictly observed and fully imple-
mented.
6. Ministers reiterated their full support for the conference on Yugoslavia, including the e$ortg
unoertatin bt 169 European Commuhity in the framework of the discussions on constitutional
arrangements for Bosna-Herzegovina.
7 . Ministers also expressed the determination of their states to abide fully Py ttre Provisions of the
United Nations Securiiy Council Resolution 757 ard to implement colrPrehensively lltg sa1ctign9
which it contains. In thii connection, they noted that the United Nations Security Council has decided
to io"iiOJr immeOiatety, whenever necessary, further steps to achieve a preaceful solution in con-iffirty ;itn iienani rei6tutions of the Securily Council, baled inter alia on Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter.
8. Ministers declared that WEU is prepared, within the bounds of its possibilities, to contribute
to*uror 
"ff..iinoirnptementation 
of uriite-o Nations Security Council resolutions in connection with
i[; ilhi;ii, tt 
" 
foi-.r Yugoslavia. They charged an ad hoC group composed of representatives from
ioi.igr, 
"ffuirs 
and defence riinistries to exaTine WEU.'s possibilities to contribute to the implemen-
tatioi of the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.
Extroordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministen
teith states of Centrul EumPe
Boa4 19th lunc 1992
Decbrution
l. At the invitation of the German Presidency of Western European Union, the Foreign_ and
Defence Ministers of Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Fllnce, G. eryrany, Hulgary,-Italy,
I-"triu, t-itt uania, Luxenibouig, th6 Neiherlands, Poland, Portugal, Roma-nia, Spain and the United
fingO6m met in Iionn on lgth-iune 1992to demonstrate their resolve to enhance the scope of the rela-
tionihip initiated by a decision of the Ministerial Council in Brussels in April 1990.
2. Ministers agreed that, in view of the profound changgs in Europe of th.e last few Yq?.rs, intensi-
iyi"g the ielations-between WEU and the states of Centraf Europe will contribute to stability and the
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emcrgence ofa new peaceful order in Europe based on partnership and co-operation, greater security
and confidence, as well as disarmament.
3. Ministers welcomed the decisions taken by the CSCE Council in Berlin and Prague regarding the
relationships between ttle CSCE and other mutually reinforcing European and transatlantic
organisations including WEU. They underlined that security in its broadest sense encompasses not
only military but also political aspects, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as
economic, social and environmental aspects.
4. Ministers acknowledged that WEU will be one of the essential elements of the future European
security architecture, in accordance with the decisions taken by the European Council in Maastricht in
December 1991. In this context, they noted that the Petersberg Declaration states:
* As WEU develops its operational capabilities in accordance with the Maastricht Declaration,
we are prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with our own procedures,
the effective implementation of conflict-prevention and crisis-management measures, including
peace-keeping activities of the CSCE or the United Nations Security Council. This will be done
without prejudice to possible contributions by other CSCE countries and other organisations to
these activities. "
5. The enhancement of WEU's relations with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland and Romania should reflect the specific relations which exist and are developing
between these countries and the European Union and its member states. Other appropriate forms of
co-operation could be set up as required in the light of the development of these relations.
6. Ministers had a detailed exchange of views on the development of co-operation between WEU
and these states. They agreed to strengthen existing relations by structuring the dialogue, consultations
and co-operation.
The focus of consultations will be the security architecture and stability in Europe, the future
development of the CSCE, arms control and disarmament, in particular the implementation of the
CFE and Open Skies Treaties, as well as the 1992 Vienna Document. Developments in Europe and
neighbouring regions will be of particular interest to the participants.
In this way, WEU's Central European partners will be able to acquaint themselves with the
future security and defence policy of the European Union and find new opportunities to co-operate
with the defence component of the Union and with the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance as these
develop.
7. The Foreign and Defence Ministers adopted the following concrete measures:
- 
Foreign and Defence Ministers will meet once a year. Additional meetings at ministerial level
may be convened if circumstances require.
- 
A forum of consultation will be established between the WEU Permanent Council and the
ambassadors of the countries concerned. It will meet at the seat of the WEU Council at least
twice a year.
- 
These meetings will provide an opportunity to monitor the implementation of the measures
adopted and, where appropriate, to make proposals for the inclusion of other fields of
co-operation.
- 
Consultations at ministerial and WEU Permanent CounciVambassador level on security
issues may be complemented by meetings with an ad hoc WEU troika at senior oflicial level.
- 
The following initiatives will be continued and encouraged:
- 
Regular exchanges of documents and information;
- 
Growing co-operation between the WEU Institute for Security Studies and the corre-
sponding bodies in the countries concerned. An increasing number of seminars and col-
loquia will be organised. The programme of scholarships will be continued.
8. Ministers advocated the development of relations between the WEU Assembly and the parlia-
ments of the states concerned.
9. These measures, conducted in the framework of WEU with the states of Central Europe, and
similar endeavours conducted in the alliance framework, will be mutually complementary and rein-
forcing.
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Extraodinary m?fring of the WEU Council of Ministerc
with states of Central Europe
Boan" lfrh lune 1992
Declaration on Nagoray- Karabolch
Ministers are deeply concerned about the continuing fighting in Nagorny-Karabakh. They reit-
erate their appeal to the parties to the conflict to establish immediately an effective cease-fire and to
take additional steps, including withdrawal from occupied areas. Any action against any state's terri-
torial integrity in order to achieve political goals by force in contradiction with the principles of the
CSCE is unacceptable. Ministers strongly support the peace process which has been launched at the
CSCE Council of Ministers in Helsinki on 24th March 1992. They appreciate the initiative to hold two
preliminary meetings in Rome. They regret that, for a variety of reasons, including the non-attendance
of one of the partiei concerned, the meetings have not yet produced the conditions necessary for the
success of the Minsk Peace Conference. Ongoing efforts must now be intensified in order to open the
way to convening the Minsk Conference as planned on 23rd June 1992. All parties concerned are urged
to continue this process in order to stop further bloodshed in Nagorny-Karabakh and to reach a just
and lasting political solution.
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Information letter fmm Mr. van Eekelen, Sectetary'General of WEA,
on the octivities of the intergovernmental organs
(23d March - 19th tunc 1992)
Dear President,
The foreign and defence ministers of the nine member states of WEU had a particularly fruitful
meeting it the ?etersberg, which demonstrated in the clearest possible terms the determination to
.o"i ineaO energeticalli'with the implementation of the Maastricht Declarations and the devel-
oprini of 
'WfU'iictivities. 
The meetirig produced a set of texts replete-with guidjlines for the future:
tfi p.t"rrU.rg Declaration, the Declaration on relations with the states of Central Europe and two te-xts
on the serioul events afflicting the Yugoslav republics and Nagorny-Karabakh. They are all annexed to
this letter. Their detail and clarity obviates the need for any paraphrase'
I should like therefore to underline for the Assembly the priorities for WEU in the first six
months oitheltalian presidency. Irt it be made quite clear at the outset that the hiccups over the rati-
fr.atiol of the Maastricht Trealy should not have any adverse effect on the work of our organ^isation,
.nin if tt e current discussions aie making a useful contribution to our thinking on procedures for wid-
ening and deepening and on closer links with Central Europe, to quote just two examples.
The first priority is the implementation of the third part of the Petersberg Declaration. Ministers
upproniiltt i"ianOut6r for discussions with the candidates for accession and with the candidates for
uii*iut. memUirstrip. They also took note of the draft protocol of accession, which is a basic doc-
ument for the future discussions with the states applying for full membership.
The second priority concerns the development and strengthenine of Wn-Uls ope-rational r6le.
The Defence Representatives Group has already resumed its work. The senior oflicials of the planning
*U CiriiA Caltabiino and Generil Roux, have been appointed. Everything will be done so that this
"iii'.un U. op.iational 
in Brussels by next October, provided that all the material and administrative
conditions hive been met. The saml caveat also applies to the complex task of transferring the Pe.r-
**.nidouncil and Secretariat to Brussels. At all -events, the establishment of WEU in Brussels will
.ii[ inrU.ginning of new activities geared to the gradual transformation of the organisation into the
deflence arm of the future European Union.
The third and last priority is the development of relations between WEU and eight countriesof
Ce"tra Euiop" *itt in thi framLwork of a " forum of consultation ". It is in the mutual interest of the
NiniunO ine-Eigt t to meet regularly to concert their views on the problems of European-security,. i{e-
;dti". of whai association lrranfements certain countries of Central Europe might have with the
do--urity or ihe uarious institutions with responsibilities in the field of European security- ^In.t!i9il;;;ti"r; ttre afie-oon meeting on 19th June represented the combination of two ytars of fruitful
"r"i""t* Ciearly, the links with t[e Community will take on 
grorring imBortance in the future since
tney 
"ii qriiJ si6cifrc without being discriminalory apart from the 
fact that they seek to avoid dupli-
raiion wiih ttre iVeCC or the CSCp.'tvtinisters ther6fore underlined that, as regards thedevelopm-ent of
WEU u. u" integral part of the European Union, relations_between the Nine and the Eight wouJd have
toiutJ uicount-of thi tint<s between the Eight and the Union. The subjects for future consultations
*ouiO Ue ttre CSCE, arms control and the malintenance of stability both in pgrope and on its-periphery.
Str..r *outO be laid on the complementary nature of the NACC's activities and those of the WEU
forum of consultation, and they would seek to be mutually reinforcing.
These priorities will remain irrespective of whatever other demands may be made by the present
extremely worrying situation, especially in the Balkans and the Caucasus.
*
*{.
Between 23rd March and 19th June, the Permanent Council met six times (26th Marchr 8th and
29th April, l3th May, 4th and 10th June). Its work focused on preparations &r the Ministerial Council
"t tt e 
^Peiersberg and on the close monitoring of the Yugoslav crisis. Developments in Bosnia-
Herzegovina led to a special meeting being convened on 4th June.
On lOth June, the Permanent Council, enlarged to include the political directors and their coun-
terparts from defence ministries, reached broad agreement on the content of the Petersberg Deqlq;
ration and on the draft protocol and mandates for discussions on the enlargement of WEU to new full
members, associate members and possible observers. Several reports to ministers were examined, two
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concerning the implementation of the Maastricht Declarations: one of these concerned practical mea-
sures for co-operation with the European institutions and NATO and the other the transfer of the Per-
manent Council and Secretariat-General to Brussels. Three reports dealt with the development of
WEU's operational r6le: one on the terms of reference for the WEU planning cell, and the two others
on possible tasks for WEU forces and on armaments co-operation. Several other reports were
approved: on WEU's activities in the field of space, on co-operation in the fields of CFE and CSBM
verification and the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty, and on the activities of the Mediter-
ranean Sub-Group.
On 21st May, the Council of Western European Union held its first official meeting at NATO
headquarters in Evdre, with the North Atlantic Council meeting in permanent session. This meeting
took place pursuant to the Maastricht Declarations and enabled the two Councils to take stock of
relations between their respective organisations and to envisage a strengthening of practical
co-operation.
The Council's Special Working Group (SWG) and Defence Representatives Group (DRG) held ajoint meeting on 6th April 1992, to review the progress of the organisation's preparatory work for the
ministerial meeting on l9th June. Discussions centred on the implementation of the Maastricht Decla-
rations and relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Considerable progress was also
made in frnalising the documents dealing with relations between WEU and the other European
member states of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance.
The SWG also met on I lth and l9th May to continue its work on the draft decisions to be sub-
mitted to ministers in these two areas. There was also discussion on the contacts between WEU and the
CSCE.
On 5th June, the SWG held a meeting at the Secretariat with the representatives from the diplo-
matic missions of the countries of Central Europe, at which the draft declaration on relations between
WEU and these countries was presented to them. The meeting generated a lively discussion which led
to a number of passages in the draft being reworked.
Lastly, on 9th June, the SWG met at deputy level to discuss the draft Petersberg Declaration
prior to the meeting of the enlarged Council the following day.
The Defence Representatives Group (DRG) met on 7th April, l4th and l5th May and 4th June.
The meetings provided an opportunity for more detailed consideration of possible tasks to be given to
military units answerable to WEU, particularly in relation to combat tasks and the implications as
regards command structures and rules of engagement. The DRG reached agreement on the terms of
reference and establishment table for the WEU planning cell, which ministers formally set up on 19th
June. A Group of Experts met four times (24th April, 14th, l5th and 27thMay) to finalise the more
technical aspects of this project. Other questions discussed were annaments co-operation and pro-
posals on relations between WEU and the IEPG.
The Chiefs of Defence Staff (CHODs) of the WEU member countries held their second meeting
of the year in Bonn on 2fth May. They exchanged views on developments in the Commonwealth of
Independent States in the wake of the Tashkent Summit and on the worsening Yugoslav conflict. They
discussed their r6le as military advisors and their future responsibilities within the WEU framework
and they endorsed the proposals submitted to them concerning senior staff for the planning cell. Its
functions, particularly as regards the tasks and command arrangements for the multinational and
national forces likely to be made available to WEU were also examined at this meeting.
The Mediterranean Sub-Group met on 3rd April and 5th June. The group continued its
exchanges of view on three topical questions, namely: the situation in the former Yugoslavia, efforts to
resolve the problem in Western Sahara and the Cyprus question. The group concluded its work as
legards the annotated list of principles likely to contribute to a resolution of security problems in theMediterranean. It also took stock of progress in the " Five plus Five' process. iistly, the group
approved 1 draft mandate for future contacts between WEU and the Maghreb countri6s. es tb tne
analysis of risks like_ly to affect security in the Mediterranean and in the Gulf region, the group was
now in possession of a number of detailed national contributions on security in the Maghreb, and of a
study pre_pared by the WEU Institute for Security Studies on the situation in Algeria and its conse-
quences for the Maghreb and Europe.
The Experts Gyoup o_n the verification of arms control agreements held several working meetings
on the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty. On 26th and 27th March, a WEU fact-finding
mission visited Moscow to examine the possibility of using a single type of observation aircraft foi
open skies, as proposed by France. When, in three years' time, the treaty is implemented in full, there
will be a need to use specially equipped aircraft. A fleet of between five and eight aircraft should be suf-
ficient for the 200 observation flights planned each year. A solution consisting ofdeveloping a single
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type of observation aircraft which could also be used for CSCE qansport missions might P. ldqgE9,
and would offer major advantages in terms of cost-effectiveness. The Russians taking part in the WEU
mission suggested two types of iircraft which might be suitable. All the practical arrangements for tech-
nicat co-op=eration were tonsidered during the discussions in order to-provide experts with the nec-
essary information for subsequent feasibility studies on the pooling of aircraft and/or sensors.
At an informal meeting in Vienna on 29th April of heads of delegation, tlrese exploratory talks
on co-operation with Russia were continued and other options were discussed, such as a common
WEU p6ol with national aircraft being used in rotation. Then, on l3th May, experts met in Iondon at
the WijU Secretariat to hear a preseniation on the German national study and to prepare the activity
report for ministers.
The CFE and CSBM VeriJication Experts Group met on 7th May to take stock of the current
stage reached in the CFE Treaty ratification process. As of that date, 17 countries had_deposited their
inJruments of ratification, including Francebn 24th March and Italy on22nd April. Spain was ready
to deposit its instrument of ratification in the very near future.
The experts discussed several aspects of practical co-operation between the member states con-
cerning the ifoplementation of the treity: rulei for the operation of multinational teams, training of
inspectors and bilateral inspection exercises.
The ad hoc Sub-Group on Space met in Madrid on 9th April to hear a report from the Director
on the setting-up of the WEU satLlite centre and to review progf,ess made by the team investig{ing
medium- and long-term studies. The satellite centre project team, for its part, met twice, on 24th
March and on l9t[ and 2fth May. Lastly, on 6th May 1992, a ceremony took place-at the headquarters-
of ttre firm Dornier GmbH in Friedrichihafen to maik the signing of the contract for the first phase of
the main system feasibility study. The aim of this study is to investigate the functional and programme
aspects of a complete system.
+
**
Since the signature of the Paris Charter in November 1990, considerable progress has been made
in developing the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe as gne of the key elements in
Europe's 
-emerging 
security architecture. The security aspects of the CSCI follow-up conference regu-
larly feature on the agenda of the Council and its working groups. WEU member states favour the
strengthening of the eSCE's capabilities for conflict prevention and crisis management. The WEU
Council has welcomed the various initiatives of H.E. Mr. J. Dienstbier, Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, in his capacity as Chairman-in-
Office of the CSCB Council, to promote increased co-ordination between European security
organisations. Several steps have been taken in order to initiate fruitful co-operation between WEU
and the CSCE.
Following an invitation by H.E. Deputy Prime Minister J. Dienstbier, Ambassador Horst
Holthoft, Deputy Secretary-General, attended the Prague Council of Ministers on 3fth-3lst Janua-ry
1992, as mypersonal representative. On lst-3rd April, Ambassador Holthoff participated in.tlrq
plenary session of the CSCE Helsinki follow-up meeting 1992 where, on 3rd Ap!!,he made an initial
iontritiution on behalf of WEU on the subject " the r6le of Western European Union and the archi-
tecrure of European security ". From 4th to 6th March, Mr. Paolo Casardi, Director of Political Affairs,
attended the serninar on armed forces in democratic societies, organised in Vienna by the CSCE Con-
flict Prevention Centre.
The Berlin meeting in June l99l of the CSCE Council of Ministers encouraged the exchange of
information and relevant documents among CSCE and the main European and transatlantic institu-
tions. As a first concrete step towards increased contacts and cooperation between the CSCE and the
main European and transatlantic institutions, the participating states of the CSCE agreed to initiate
this exchange of information and relevant documents. Since February 1992, nublig documents have
been exchanged on a regular basis between the WEU Secretariat-General and the CSCE Secretariat in
Prague.
A request made on 29th April l992by the Chairman-in-OfIice of the CSCE Council for WEU to
give serioui thought to the idea of possible WEU assistance to the CSCE in the event of a CSCE
ironitor mission io be dispatched to Nagorny-Karabakh, was discussed by the Permanent Council.
Should the CSCE decide to send a monitor mission to Nagorny-Karabakh under its reponsibility,
WEU member states would duly consider a request to contribute to this effort. According t-9 the WEU
Council, a mission to monitor a ceasefire in Nagorny-Karabakh would be subject to an effective and
lasting ceasefire in the region as well as to the formal consent of the parties involved.
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At its Prague meeting on 30th-3lst January, the CSCE Council resolved to send rapporteur mis-
sions to the new CSCE member states. The aim of these missions was to evaluate whether commit-
ments entered into under the CSCE had been fulfilled.
Following an invitation by the Czechoslovak presidency of the CSCE for a representative of
WEU to participate in the fifth and last mission, I was authorised by the Permanent Council to make
available a representative of the WEU Secretariat-General for participation in the CSCE rapporteur
mission to Georgia. I designated Mr. C. Bruch from the Policy and Planning Section of the Political
Division to participate in the mission which visited Georgia from l8th-22nd May 1992. On 2nd June,
Mr. Bruch also represented the Secretariat-General at a special meeting of Working Group 3 (Human
Dimension) of the Helsinki CSCE follow-up meeting dedicated to the discussion of the CSCE
rapporteur missions to the new member states, the respective reports as well as a general evaluation of
those missions.
Here is a short summary of the mission's findings during its stay in Georgia: generally, the
mission had the impression that in Georgia the will to reform was real, both at the institutional and leg-
islative levels. It transpired from all the talks and discussions which it had with the competent author-
ities that it was the aim of present office-holders to build the future Georyian society on democratic
principles, ideas and values. Nevertheless, the mission could not fail to emphasise in its report that
there was at present no working parliament, that legislative decrees were being promulgated without
the consent of elected popular representatives and that continuation of martial law limited, at least
partly, the enjoyment by the population of basic human rights. Consequently, the mission expressed
the hope that the present transitory period would be short and that CSCE principles would become
fully applicable as soon as possible.
The mission found the Georgian authorities generally committed to ensuring respect for human
rights. Under the present state of emergency, however, the situation remained tense. Several factions
had weapons at their disposal. Of serious concern especially were interethnic relations in Georgia.
Though the mission concluded that there was full freedom of religion in Georgia, it should not be over-
looked that there are signs of religious intolerance which may cause difficulties in the future unless
steps are taken to encourage an open dialogue and tolerance on both sides. The mission found no signs
of serious curtailment of freedom of expression or information. Under the present state of emergency,
freedom of assembly is limited. While the situation has much stabilised since the consolidation of the
new provisional government, the continuing demonstrations neverthless sometimes result in harsh
intervention by the security forces, occasionally with the loss of life.
Under Soviet rule, three autonomous entities were formed on the territory of the Georgian
Soviet Socialist Republic: the Abkhaz Autonomous (Soviet Socialist) Republic, the Adzhar Auion-
omous (Soviet Socialist) Republic and the South Ossetian Autonomous Region (Oblast).
Tension has been building up in South Ossetia for nearly three years. Numerous violent clashes
between Ossetians and Georgians have occurred in South Ossetia sinCe 1989. Due to a personal initi-
ative and a visit to South Ossetia by the Chairman of the Georgian State Council, Mr. Shlvardnadze, a
{ialogu^e between the two parties has recently started. Howevei, it has been marred by repeated vioia-
tions- of the provisional ceasefire, including the taking of hostages and attacks against -civiiians. On the
day before the.mis-sion's visit to the South Ossetian centrebf Tskhinvali, { very serious incident
occurred, in which 36 Ossetians, including women and children, were killed. The G6orgian authorities
immediately condemned the atrocity and pledged to bring the perpetrators 
- 
who are still unknown 
-
to justice. The incident deeply affected the circumstances under which the visit by members of the
mission to Tskhinvali took place.
The mission also visited the Abkhazian capital of Sukhumi. Due to the Abkhaz' campaign for
the secession of their Autonomous Republic from Georyia and its attachment to the Russi-an Fede-
ration, the situation rem_ains tense. The predominantly Muslim Abkhaz 
- 
as the titular nationality 
-
constitute only !7.8!o of the half million inhabitants of their Autonomous Republic, and Georgiins
account for 45.7Vo of its total population. In its meetings with the representatives of the factions repre-
sented in the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia, the mission emphasised the need for all parties concerned to
collaborate in the search for solutions to problems, the potential danger of which should not be under-
rated.
As far as economic issues are concerned, the mission concluded that Georgia's economy is in
deep crisis. Indeed, the disintegration of the economic structures and the loss of trade links on the ter-
ritory of the_ former USSR qe hlving painful consequences, as Georgia is wholly dependent on energy
imports and also imports 80-9090 of raw materials for its industry.
Georgia is not a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States and has taken the
position that it does not wish to participate in the unified CIS military structures. The CIS troops sta-
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tioned in Georgia are now under Russian jurisdiction and the High Command of the former USSR
Transcaucasian military district remains located in Tbilisi. Georgia is currently actively seeking to
establish its own independent armed forces. Georgian offrcials repeatedly expressed their grave
concern at the ongoing conflict over Nagorny-Karabakh. In this context, they expressed the fear that
this conflict could rapidly escalate with devastating consequences for the Transcaucasus in general, and
Georgia in particular.
The mission stressed the overriding importance of general parliamentary elections to be held on
I lth October 1992, as announced by the State Council of Georgia. By holding these elections in
accordance with accepted democratic standards, legitimacy should be fully restored. In order to ensure
the objectivity and credibility of these elections in a multiparty system, international monitorilrg of the
election campaign and the elections themselves should take place. The mission also felt that
co-ordination should be organised among CSCE member states and international organisations, such
as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, the European Community, the Council of Europe and the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe to offer co-operation and expertise in banking, financial and economic
matters, the organisation of the judiciary and the civil service and the reform of key areas of legislation.
Prarctical measures to ensure implementation should also be devised. The mission also felt it necessary
strongly to urge the parties to co-operate in halting and reversing the dangerous proliferation on
Georgian soil of weaponry held by various political factions and ethnic groups, with a view to defusing
political tension and interethnic strife.
*
*{.
Since Maastricht, it is more important than ever to keep senior American and Canadian offi-
cials, the press, radio and television and academics in these two countries regularly informed about
WEU activities. During recent visits to the United States, I took every opportunity to expl-ain to a very
varied American public the importance of strengthening WEU and the European pillar of the alliance
for the future of transatlantic relations:
- 
on 23rd March, I spoke to students at the National Defense University in Washinglon D.C. on
the r6le of WEU after Maastricht
- 
the same day, I spoke at a lunchtime debate organised in Washington by the Atlantic Council
on the subject " Towards a European defence - and what that really means';
- 
later on that day, in Washington, I gave a talk on the European pillar of the alliance as part of
a programme organised by the World Affairs Council of Washington D.C.;
- 
on 24th March, in Norfolk, Virginia, I took part in a conference entitled 'COMDEF 92 -
international symposia and exhibition on common defence ", this year's theme being sus-
taining public-support for defence spending in the 90s. I spoke about the problems of
European security and the r6le of WEU;
- 
on 25th March, I gave an address on the European pillar to students of the Woodrow Wilson
School of Public and International Affairs at Princetown University (New Jersey);
- 
on24th-26th April, I took part in a symposium on issues and challenges of verification, at the_
Southern Methodist University in Dallas, and I gave a paper on European perspectives of
arms control in the new international environment;
- 
on 27th April in Atlanta, I gave an address at the Center for International Strategy, Tech-
nology and Policy of the Georgia Institute of Technology on the subject " European security
and the new world order: the r6le of Western European lJnion ";
- 
on 28th April, in Monterey, California, I spoke about WEU to students at the Naval Post-
graduate School;
- 
from 3fth April to lst May, I took part in a symposium at Georgetown University of Wash-
ington (D.C.), the theme of which was " the troubled partnership in transition ". This event
had been co-sponsored by the following bodies: Norman Paterson School of International
Affairs, Carleton University, Department of National Defence (Canada), Center for German
and European Studies, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (Georgetown University). The
subject for my talk was Western European Union and the European Union;
- 
on 5th June, I gave an address on the r6le of the European security and defence identity iq qrp
development o-f transatlantic relations during a symposium organised by the West Point Mil-
itary Academy on " the United States and the Atlantic Alliance ".
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These visits also gave me an opportunity to hold detailed exchanges of view with several repre-
sentatives of the administration and to explain to them Europe's common defence objectives and the
new tasks facing WEU. They also provided an opportunity to explain the d6marche underlying initia-
tives such as the establishment of a Franco.German corps.
*
:i d.
In the field of public relations and information on the r0le and current and future tasks of WEU,
my colleagues and I also attended the following events:
- 
from 2nd-3rd March in Athens, I took part in a conference organised by the magazine' Greek
economy', the theme of which was " defence-space: economic opportunities for Greece ". I
gave a paper on co-operative defence and space programmes: WEU in the constellation of
future developments;
- 
on 4th March, Ambassador Holthoff met the members of the European People's Party (EPP)
in Brussels and gave a presentation on WEU;
- 
from 6th-8th March, I took part in a seminar in Ebenhausen devoted to the fifth review on the
future tasks of the Atlantic Alliance: between indifference and engagement 
- 
rOles for the
Atlantic Alliance within the evolving system of multi-institutional crisis management. This
seminar had been organised by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik;
- 
on l2th March, I took part in a seminar entitled " Heeft Nederland nog een eigen buitenlandse
politiek bij een verdergaande Europese integratie? " (Does the Netherlands still have its own
foreign policy as European integration moves ahead?). This event was organised in Utrecht by
the Studentenvereniging voor Internationale Betrekkingen;
- 
on 15th March, at the invitation of the European Club of the Netherlands, I spoke in Maas-
tricht on the r6le of Western European Union: including East or defencing West?;
- 
on lTth March, I gave a talk in Utrecht on Visies op de West Europese Unie na Maastricht:
heeft de NAVO de EG verslagen? (Prospects for Western European Union after Maastricht:
has NATO defeated the EC?). This event had been organised by the Netherlands Association
of Young Europeans for Security;
- 
on 19th March, I took part in a seminar on the new European security policy architecture,
organised in Bolkesjo (Norway) by the Norwegian Advisory Council for Arms Control and
Disarmament. I spoke about the r6le of WEU;
- 
on 23rd-26th March, Ambassador Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, was in Ebenhausen to
monitor the work of the fourth European session for advanced defenoe studies during which
he spoke on the r6le of WEU and the architecture of European security;
- 
on 27th March, at the Secretariat-General, I gave a briefing on WEU to students from the City
University in Iondon;
- 
on 30th March, in Brussels, I gave an address entitled " Security of the new Europe' at a con-
ference organised by the Institut des Relations Internationales de Belgique;
- 
from 6th-8th April, my colleague, Mr. P. Casardi, Director for Political Affairs, took part in a
Eurogroup seminar in Lisbon entitled * Europe 
- 
a new era" at which he spoke on European
security institutions: adaptation and development 
- 
a WEU perspective;
- on 7th April in Brussels, Mr. A. Jacomet, Head of the Policy and Planning Section of the
Political Affairs Division, gave a paper entitled * WEU after Maastricht " to a meeting at the
Centre for Defence Studies of the Institut Royal Sup6rieur de D6fense;
- 
from l0th-l lth April in The Hague, I took part in the seventh round table conference on the
subject " Preventing instability in post-cold war Europe: the institutional responses of NATO,
WEU, the EC, the CSCE and the United Nations ", which had been organised by the Nether-
lands Atlantic Commission. I spoke about WEU's potential r6le in crises outside Europe;
- 
from l3th-l5th April, I took part in a round table on the new Europe 
- 
from self-
determination to integration, organised in Vienna by the Runder Tisch 
- 
Europa Association.
I spoke about WEU's r6le post-Maastricht;
- 
on 15th April, I spoke about WEU's activities and future direction post-Maastricht during a
dinner-debate organised in Paris by the Institut Frangais des Relations Internationales;
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- 
on 23rd April at Wilton Park, I took part in a seminar on planning for security in the changing
international environment. I spoke about NATO and WEU: changing r6les and responsibil-
ities;
- 
on 7th May at the Secretariat-General, Mr. A. Jacomet and Mr. C. Bruch outlined WEU's
activities and future direction to a $oup of senior officials from the Swiss Defence Ministry;
- 
from 7th-8th May at Casteau, I took part in SHAPEX 92, the theme of which was future
European security 
- 
the changing scene;
- 
on 8th May, at the invitation of SHAPE, I gave a paper on the development of WEU to chiefs
of defence staff from Central Europe on the occasion of their visit to Casteau;
- 
from I lth-l3th May in Budapest, Ambassador Holthoff, Deputy Secretaty-General, and Mr.
R. Tibbels, Committee Secretary, took part in the third seminar of the WEU Institute for
Security Studies, which brought together diplomats and Defence Ministry representatives
from WEU countries and several countries of Central Europe;
- 
on 14th May, at the Secretariat-General, I outlined the future direction of WEU's work fol-
lowing Maastricht to a group of senior officials from the Federal Republic of Germany who
were studying security policy and who were on an official visit to the United Kingdom;
- 
from l5th-l8th May, Ambassador Holthoft, Deputy Secretary-General, represented the Secre-
taiat at the spring session of the North Atlantic Assembly in Banff (Canada);
- 
on l8th May in Groningen, I spoke about WEU at the Congres van de Studentenvereniging
voor Internationale Betrekkingen & Europa Dispuut, the theme of which was Europa,
verbreding of verdieping? (Europe: widening or deepening?);
- 
on 22nd May in Brussels, I spoke about WEU's activities post-Maastricht to leaders of the
Comit6 d'Action pour I'Europe;
- 
on lst June, during a seminar on * la d6fense de la France et la s6curit6 de I'Europe ",
organised in Paris by the Forum du Futur, I spoke during the round table on'France and its
alliances ";
- 
from I lth-l4th June, I took part in the ninth NATO workshop on political military decision-
making at Vouliagmeni (Greece);
- 
on 18th June in Brussels, I described the orientation of WEU's work to the Security and Dis-
armament Sub-Committee of the European Parliament in Brussels;
- 
on 20th June in Strasbourg, I spoke about transatlantic relations at an international colloquy
on 1992: Europe and North America, the dialogue of the new solidarities, organised by the
Council of Europe.
Over these three and a half months, I have continued to have regular contacts with the press,
radio and television and with academic circles both in London and on the occasion of other engage-
ments. These meetings have given me an opportunity to clarify the direction of WEU's work post-
Maastricht.
d.
rt*
At the request of the Permanent Council, the Secretariat prepares notes on how the international
press has reacted to WEU's activities and the debates about its r0le. The notes for March, April and
May 1992 are summarised below.
(a)Dnringthe month of March, WEU was mentioned several times in connection with the publi-
cation of an internal Pentagon document, according to which the United States wanted to prevent the
emergence of exclusively European security systems. When questioned on this subject, the WEU Secre-
tary-General, Mr. W. van Eekelen, stated that if such a policy orientation were to be confirmed, it
would be at odds with the alliance's recognition of the European identity.
The question of setting up a peace-keeping force to be used by the CSCE was raised in Helsinki
on 24th March. This initiative attracted the attention of analysts as regards the respective r6les of
NATO and WEU in carrying out such missions.
Furthermore, WEU was mentioned in connection with the Open Skies Treaty which authorises
acoess to the air space from Vancouver to Madivostok for flights to monitor military activities.
Finally, there was some comment in the Belgian press about the transfer of the WEU Council to
Brussels.
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(b)D:udlrngthe month of April,WEU was frequently mentioned along with NATO and the CSCE
in artibles assesiing the rivalry ind complementarity between the various European security institu-
tions.
The establishment of a peace-keeping force under WEU auspices began to attract comment in
the European press. Some commentators questioned WEU's ability to be able to call on sufficient mil-
itary manpow6r and a command and contiol system yliqn would enable it to execute a peace-keeping
opeiation. Other commentators, however, reca[ed WEU's r6le during the Gulf war and advocated its
pirticipation in the deployment of such a force. At the end of the month, a number of commentators
mentioned the possibility of WEU countries becoming involved in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The issues at stake in the ratification of the Maastricht agreements drew increasing comment in
the press, frequent references being made to the WEU declarations and the prosp^ect of its enlargement.
Several articlls were devoted to th1 position of Turkey, the specific problems of neutral countries and
relations between WEU and the countries of Central Europe.
The establishment of the WEU satellite centre at Torrej6n attracted much detailed comment in
the Spanish press.
(c/ During the month of May, the plan to set up a Franco-German anny corp-s drew much
attention in thJpress. There continued to be several question marks about the future links between
WEU's operational structures and the Franco-German corps. Some commentators recommended that
it shouldbe phced exclusively under the control of WEU, whereas others took the view that it should
above all be inade available t6 the alliance. In this connection, several articles underlined the danger of
competition between the two organisations. The willingness signalled by Paris ald Bonn to open !P the
corpi to other member states of WEU prompted Cautious reactions. The favourable reaction of
Belgium and the interest shown by Luxembourg and Spain were duly reported.
Commentators paid particular attention to the strengthening of WEU's operational 
_cability,WEU intervention - occasionally being mooted in connection with the conflict in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
WEU's operational r6le figured prominently in the comments generated_ by the first_keynote
speech by Mr. M. RiftinO on tZth May in Iondon in his new capacity as_Secretary of State {or
Defence.-Indirect references to WEU appeared in some articles in the French press concerning the
future of the IEPG and the proposed European Armaments Agency.
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Extraordhary meeting of WEU Council of Ministers
on the situation in Yugoslavia
(Helsinki, 10th July 1992)
The ministers of the WEU countries, having taken note of the report of the ad hoc Group onYugoslavia, adopted the following decisions:
l. Decision to implement the monitoring at se_a operations as proposed by the ad hoc Group on
lugoslavia at i!-s meeting of 3rd July in Rome. Surveillance of tie elmuargo set ui uniieo Niii*tSecurity Council Resolutions 713 and757-will involve the participation ofat teasf nveioii*iiiips,
four MPA, one support ship, ground base helicopters. Such surveillince will bi carrieO out in interial
tional waters, in the Otranto Channel and on-othel poi_nls off the Yugoslav coast,lnciuairg;ff tft
Montenegro coast, following consultations with LTNPROFOR.
- 
The said naval operations will start at the earliest moment under Italian co-ordination. Theparticip-ation of the member states will be subject to the provisions of their national constitu-
tions. These WEU operations will be open to the participition of other allies and co-ordinated
lp-co--operation with NATO. Rules of engagemenf and operational co-ordination will be eriaU-lished by the competent naval authoritiiiat the initiaiive of the Presidency.
- 
The ad hoc group_will constantly update options concerning naval embargo enforcement for
which a further United Nations Security Council resolutioi would be neiessary.
2. Decision on WEU elforts in theJield of humanitarian aid onthe basis of the recommendations of
the ad hoc group.
- 
The Presidency will-present an inventory of contributions by WEU partners to the competent
United Nations authorities.
- 
The Presidency is also requested to promote a further rapid exploration by the ad hoc group
on the options of ground transport through humanitarian corridors.
- 
In this context the ad ho_c_grouq will identify possible modalities and list logistical and other
means that partners would be willing to make available. The group will alsolonsider, in con-
sultation with NATo, the need for contributions by other alies.
- 
Any operation concerning the establishment of humanitarian corridors would have to be
_sgbj.ect to further decisions by the Security Council and be co-ordinated with the UnitedNations in particular fo-r th9 aspects concerning protection. Appropriate contacts would be
established in a timely fashion.
- 
Co-ordination with United Nations, UNCHR and EC Commission, through the presidency
will also aim at identifying additional needs of the populations and ways tdmeet them more
effectively.
3. 
, .Iry1mellat.e information on our initiatives will be passed to the United Nations Secretary-General
and to the Chairman-in-OlJice of the CSCE.
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DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE DPENDITURE
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1993 
'
submitted on behalf of
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration2
by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapportqur
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Rathboru, Cluinnu otd Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
1. The trend of political events since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty does not yet allow budge!
estimates to be based on definite facts; the process leading to the building of the European Union is far
from complete. However, WEU is playing a r6le in this process and its importance should not be
underestimated since it is the meeting point between European defence and Atlantic defence, the
bench mark for the Eastern European countries and the natural forum for debating the essential
problems of the Mediterranean countries. Here the WEU Assembly has a leadingpafi to play: its very
high level of work during the past year testifies to its will to continue its efforts, the aim of which is to
co-operate in building the European Union and establishing an order of justice and peace.
2. In the present draft budget, the Assembly asks the governments of member countries for the
wberewithal to pursue its action. Its budgetary proposals reflect the financial implications of the
political guidelines laid down by the Presidential Committee and presented to the Permanent Council
in London on 24th June 1992 by the President of the Assembly, together with the Chairman of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
3. These proposals should be analysed in three separate chapters corresponding to the following
three categories of expenditure:
- expenditure relating to permanent staff of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly (Head I of
the budget);
- operating expenditure (Heads II to V of the budget);
- expenditure relating to pensions.
II. Head I 
- 
Expenditare relating to permanent stalf
of the Olfice of the Cler* of the Assembly
4. The draft budget for the financial year 1992 (Document l28l) included the creation of three
grade 83 posts (two had already been requested in the budget for the financial year 1990) and the
regrading of one grade L post and three grade C posts. The WEU Council did not accept these pro-
posals as had already been the case for the budget for the financial year 1991, in spite of the favourable
conclusions drawn in the study on the organisation of the Oflice of the Clerk carried out by three par-
liamentary experts. It seems extraordinary that such expert opinion is discarded and overturned by the
Budget and Organisation Committee.
5. However, the need to apply the changes set out in the organogram of the Oflice of the Clerk
which the Assembly proposed was confirmed in full during the financial year 1992. Corresponding
sums therefore have to be included in the draft budget for 1993 with a reminder of the justifications
which accompanied the presentation of the proposals in question.
6. Regarding the proposal to create three new posts ofassistant, the experts, in their report on the
organisation of the OfIice of the Clerk (Part 3, paragraph 3), expressed the following opinion:
' The creation of three grade 83 posts of assistant is justified by the creation of new senior posts
and the increase in the tasks of the research and administrative services although the Office of
the Clerk proposes only two.
The post of assistant to the Political Committee is essential insofar as the committee would be
run independently of the Clerk Assistant.
While the duties and responsibilities of the administrative Clerk Assistant are not questioned
and must remain as they are, the creation of a post of assistant in the administrative services is
made necessary by the increase in material tasks resulting from the Assembly's opening to the
outside world (mail, printing, etc.).
The third post of assistant should bring the research and documentation service up to strength
and allow it to be equipped with modern documentary data retrieval systems essential for the
smooth running of the Assembly bodies. "
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7. It should also be mentioned that, in the explanatory memorandum to the draft budgets for l99l
(paragraph 13) and 1992 (paragaptr i2), the place o.{t!re two grade 83 assistants in the committeeii*iie 6f tne'Ofiice of thd Cleik is specified: they will be assigned to the two new grade A officials.
According to the opinion of the experts, this service should be able to count on:
" 
- 
a secretariat for the Political Committee consisting of a grade A5 secretary and a grade 83
assistant.
This is essential to allow the Clerk Assistant, now Secretary of the committee, to carry out
his new tasks in full;
- 
a grade A$t4head of the research and documentation service and a.grade 83 assistant. The
crEation of an eflicient research and documentation service specific to the Assembly is
essential to allow the presidency and the committees to give a new dimension to their work.
This service should not have a cumbersome structure but a dynamic organisation using
modern technology for the retrieval and processing of documentation so as, in_ particular, to
ensure a computerised link with existing sources of documentatio-n- (national parh3ments,
specialised insiitutes, etc.). However, the attribution of enough stafffrom the outset is a con-
dition for the success of this operation. "
8. As for the third post of grade 83 assistant for the archives, the Office- of the Clerk of the
Assembly has a true need for this since the archives section is also responsible for sendilg out docu-
ments foi sessions (the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly does not have a dispatching office as is.the
case, for instance, iir tne Council of Europe) and is faced with an increase in the volume sent out since
198i of 250% ard this figure will probably be higher in 1992.It is q-uite clear that the pers.on it the
archires service, in spite df tne occisional issistance of temporary staff and recourse to a mailing firm,
is no longer in a position to carry out all these duties alone.g. Finally, for the regrading of four existing posts, your Rapporteur 91n but- r9{e-r-to the justifica-
tions alread!'given in tfr'e explanatory memorinda to ihe budgets for l99l and 1992, which remain
fully valid and are summarised below.
10. Regarding the regrading, in a personal capacity, of the post of translator-interpreter from glade L3
to grade i+, it sInoUO ble noted that the holder Las thirty ye_qp]_experience as g linguist, sixteen of which
in iUfO (it grade lA for ten years). Transferred to the WEU Assembly after hav[g Yorbeg for the
WEU ageniies-for security quesiions, she has taken over, under_the responsibility of the Clerk Assistant
for Adriinistrative and Financial Questions, the management of the teqms of interpreters and also takes
part herself in the work of these teims, which allows the Assembly to limit recru^itment to twenty inter-
ireters instead of twenty-two for each session and five interpreters instead of six for ottrer meetings-, tfus
inating a considerable -saving. In addition, she also works in conjunction with 
_the French translation
section-, which is particularly valuable since she also translates from Italian 1nq SpqIIlg!. Finally-,. at the
request of the WEU Secretariat-General, the Assembly places the services of this offrcial a! the disposal
of ine Council for ministerial meetingsi the Secretari-at-General recently expressed its oflicial appreci-
ation of the extremely valuable assistance thus provided (greater than the total cost to_the Assembly of
approximately F 12 tilO). fo sum up, the offrcial concerned is at the ceiling of grade L3, which corre-
sponds neith6r to her duties as chief interpreter nor to those of a translator/reviser.
I l. The other regradings concern the posts of three members of the staff responsible for stori_ng and
accounting for equipmen[ and the reproduction service. Several times in its reports- on the budgets of
the minisierial oigans, the Assembly has drawn the Council's attention !o th! problem of the staffs
career possibilitieJ, an essential condition for ensuring maximum motivation. This problem now arises
more specificaly f6r the three grade C officials (one C6 and two C4) who, having reachg{ thg ceiling of
their grades, have no further piospect of advancement, although their workhas changed both-quantita-
tively-and qualitatively. This-regrading is thus fully in line with the principle_ that there should be con-
cordince b6tween duties to be carried out, qualificdtions and the professional category of staff. To give
the three oflicials B grades (B4 for the grade C6 official and 83 for the two grade C4s) is justified by
their increased qualifications and knowledge. It should be recalled that their colleagues in the legroj
duction service of tne WEU ministerial organs already have B gtrades. To give these three oflicials B
grades would, in the immediate future, have financial advantages for only oneof them, who_would
become entitled to the expatriation allowance, but in the years to come they would all be entitled to the
additional steps available for B grades.
12. The estimates under Head I take account of the abovementioned proposals to the sum of
F 950 000 (3. I 2% of the operating budget and 2.82% of the total budget) for the qyerall strength of the
Oflice of the Clerk of the Assembly which, in 1993, should have thirty-seven oflicials in the various
services (see Appendix I and the organogram at Appendix II). They also take account ofrevised salary
scales as from lst July L992 and steps granted to the staff concerned.
13. A comparison of these estimates with those for the previous financial yearshows a total increase
in expendituie chargeable to Head I of F I 662 000, i.e. a growth rate of 10.2V0.
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III. Operating budget
14. Estimates under Heads II to V are calculated in accordance with the directives of the Presi-
dential Committee, which decided on the overall course of the political activities of the Assembly
bodies for 1993. To make an accurate analysis of the financial implications of these directives, they
should be grouped in the following categories:
(a) implications of Greece's accession to WEU;
(b) programme of work of the Presidential and other committees;
(c/ equipment modernisation progxamme;
(d) other operating expenditure.
15. Implications of the accession of Greece to WEU
15.1. The Presidential Committee considered that, in accordance with the decisions taken in Maas-
tricht, it is to be expected that Greece will participate as a full member in both parts of the thirty-ninth
session of the Assembly. The draft budget for 1993 therefore takes this possibility into account and the
following sums have been included under the various sub-heads of the budget for this purpose:
Sub-Head 6.1 
- 
Sittings service(2 Greek sub-editors)
Sub-Head 6.2 
- 
Interpretation service(4 Greek interpreters)
Sub-Head 6.3 
- 
Translation service
(2 translators)
Sub-Head 9.2 
- 
Provident fund for interpreters
F 75 000
F 234000
F 42000
F t7 400
Sub-Head 9.3 
- 
Insurance for interpreters F 600
Sub-Head 12 
- 
Installation of an eighth interpretation booth in the chamber of
the ESC (including the purchase of electronic equipment, building
a dais, labour required for the installation and hire of the booth) F 105 000
Sub-Head 30 
- 
Expenses for political groups
The Greek Delegation will probably have fourteen members
(seven representatives and seven substitutes) F 35 000
Toru F 509 000
15.2. This represents l.67Vo of the total net operating budget and 1.5190 of the grand total budget.
15.3. It should be pointed out that no credit is requested for an office for the Greek Delegation and
temporary staff since, when the time comes, it will be possible to solve this problem only by redistri-
buting offices in the building in agreement with the Secretariat-General.
15.4. In view of prevailing uncertainty about the date of Greece's accession to WEU, the Assembly is
prepared to agree to the sums in question being frozen until that country effectively joins WEU.
15.5. But it must be established quite clearly now that the budgetary problems associated with the
accession of Spain and Portugal cannot be repeated, so the Assembly cannot agree to Greek mem-
bership until the required budget and administrative arrangements are approved and put in hand.
16. Programme of work
16.1. The Assembly's programme of work was examined attentively by the Presidential Committee,
which studied the proposals for meetings and travelling prepared by the various committees on the
basis of the following political guidelines:
(a/ Establishing and maintaining relations betrveen the WEU Assembly and:
(i) the European Parliament;(r, NATO and the North Atlantic Assembly;(iii) the Assembly of the Council of Europe;(iv) parliaments of member countries of the Communities which are not members of WEU;(v) parliaments of member countries of the Council of Europe which are not members of
WEU;(vi) * ottt-of-atea" countries.
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(b) increased contacts between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of member coun-
tries;
(c) work arising from the development of the CSCE and the r6le assigned to WEU in it.
16.2. The financial implications of the very intensive activities planned by the Assembly for 1993
mainly concern three heads of the budget for which it is necessary to propose significant increases over
the financial year 1992, i.e.:
1992 1993 Growth %
Sub-Head 7 - Interpretation staff requiredfor Assembly work between
sessions
Sub-Head 24 - Travelling and subsistence
allowances and insurance forthe President of the
Assembly, chairmen of com-
mittees and rapporteurs
Sub-Head 27 
- 
Offrcial journeys of members
of the Office of the Clerk
618 000
210 000
s90 000
| 242040
506 000
l 178 000
624 W0
296 000
588 000
101.00
140.95
99.66
I 418 000 2926000 l 508 m0 106.34
16.3. It is these increases - which alone produce a growth rate of 106.34% - that have a marked
impact on the overall gxowth rate of the 1993 budget since they represent 4.96% of the net operating
budget, 4.48% of the net total budget and 11.99% of Heads II to V of the operating budget.
17. Programme for the modernisation of equipment
17.1. The five-year programme for the modernisation of equiplnent has been upd_ated 
_for lhe_period
1993-97 (see Aipendix 1$. As a result, there is an increase of F 97 000 under Sub-Head 17, i.e. a
gowth rate of 20.42olo,justified as follows:
(a) urrder the maintenance contracts for the Rank Xerox photocopiers in the reproduction^
service, the cost of maintenance will henceforth be calculated on the basis of the number of
copies over and above the basic number included in the cost of hire. This new criterion
means that expenditure relating to this additional number, previously charged to Sub-Head_
19, will now be charged to Sub-Head 17 (maintenance). This results in a reduction of
F 47 000 in estimates under Sub-Head 19 compared with the financial year 1992 in spite of
the considerable increase in the volume of work;
(b) the paper-cutting machine has been serviced at a cost of F 10 500 (see Appendix IV, item
5.3);
(c) the Assembly's computerised equipment has been modernised by replacing- the old word-
processors by computers. This modernisation, the cost of which is largely offset by lhe can-
iellation of the former maintenance contracts, allows savings to be made that are referred to
in other sections of the budget, in particular in the organisation of the French verbatim
service (see explanations to Sub-Head 6) and in the hire of typewriters (see Appendix IV,
item7.7). The use of word-processing by the French verbatim service will also lead to savings
in printing costs since the cost of traditional photocomposition will be considerably reduced.
It is not yet possible to assess the exact amount of these savings but a fixed sum has been
taken into account in estimates under Sub-Head 20 where only the rate of inflation has been
calculated. In fact, expenditure to cover the increase in the number of documents printed has
been considered as offset by this saving.
17.2. The estimate of F 10000 under Sub-Head 16 - Purchase of reproduction and other office
equipment is for the purchase of two dictaphones for use by the translation service.
17.3. The above considerations bring out the fact that, faced with a considerable increase in its work,
the Assembly is continuing its efforts to rationalise the services of the Offrce of the Clerk in order to
keep budgetary increases as low as possible while achieving maximum cost effectiveness.
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18. Other operating expenditure
18.1. It was in this spirit of economy that estimates under the sub-heads of the operating budget not
spocifically examined above were worked out. In particular, it should be underlined that the increase of
F 30000 requested under Sub-Head 18 
- 
Postage, telephone, telefax and transport of documents is
amply justified by the increase in the volume of communications by telephone and telefax and the
volume of mail sent out.
18.2. The same is true for Sub-Head 29 
- 
Expenditure on information, where the F 15 000 increase
seems quite modest compared with the greater volume of work.
18.3. The increase in the Assembly's work also justifies the increase of F 40 000 under Sub-Head 25 
-
Expenses for representation.
19. Your Rapporteur therefore has to conclude that, in view of exceptional political events, the
Assembly is asking, in its operating budget, only for the resources essential for it to measure up to its
r6le. This is what the President of the Assembly told the WEU Permanent Council on 24th June 1992.(The text of his statement is given at Appendix VII.)
IY. Pensions budget
20. A new old-age pension, which will probably be granted in 1993, is taken into account in the esti-
mates for this financial year which cover all the pensions for l5 retired oflicials (12 old-age pensions, 2
invdidity pensions and I survivor's pension), adjusted as for permanent staff in accordance with the
6.63% increase in salary scales (4.590 as from lst July 1992 and 3.50/o as from lst July 1993).
21. Regarding receipts under this part of the budget, which consist of contributions by the per-
manent staff to the pension scheme (7% of basic salary), account has been taken of the contributions
corresponding to the creation ofthree new posts and the regrading offour existing posts. These contri-
butions amount to approximately F 36 500 and should be withdrawn from the budget if these pro-
posals are not accepted.
Y. Summary of utimates in the draft budga of the
Assembly for 199i (operating and pensions budsas)
22. To sum up, as shown in the table at Appendix V, the grand net total of estimates in the draft
budget of the Assembly for 1993 (operating budget plus pensions budget minus receipts) amounts to
F 33 635 500 which, compared with the grand net total of the budget for the financial year 1992, shows
a glowth rate of 15.28%. As explained above, this figure may be broken down as follows:
2.820,/o for proposals relating to the organogxam of the Office of the Clerk;
1.51% for the implications of Greece's accession to WEU;
4.48olo for the prcgramme of work;
6.470/0 for minor adjustments under certain sub-heads of the budget and adjustments to the
salaries of permanent and temporary staff and pensions and a new pension payable as
from lst January 1993.
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i
Summary of estimates of *penditure and receipts
for the financial year 1993
Details Expenditure Receipts
Pnnr I: Operating budget
Section A:
Head I:
Head II:
Head III:
Head IV:
Head V:
Section B:
Expenditure
Permanent staff
Temporary staff
Expenditure on premises and
equipment
General administrative costs
Other expenditure
Receipts
Ner rorer
Panr II: Pensions budget
Section A:
Head I:
Expenditure
Pensions, allowances and social
charges
Receipts
Nrr rorer
Nrr rornr BUDcET
Section B:
17 949 000
5 04s 000
2072000
2255 500
3 199000
l l0 000
30 520 500 l l0 000
30 410 500
30 520 500 30 s20 s00
4 005 000
780 000
4 00s 000 780 000
3 225 000
4 005 000 4 005 000
33 63s 500
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Budga esfimates
PART I: OPERATTNG BUDGET
Section A 
- 
Expenditure
HeodI-Permanentstalf
Sub-Heads
Estimates
for
l 993
Budget
for
t992
Expected
expenditure
in 1992
Actual
expenditurc
in l99l
Sub-Head I 
- 
Basic salaries
Sub-Head 2 
- 
Allowances:
2.1. Expatriation allowance I 309000
2.2. Household allowance 561 000
2.3. Allowance for children and
other dependent persons 624000
2.4. Rent allowance 55 000
2.5. Education allowance 59 000
2.6. Allowance for language courses 2 000
2.7. Overtime 60 0@
2.8. Home leave 50 000
Sub-Head 3 
- 
Social charges:
3.1. Social security
3.2. Supplementary insurance
3.3. Provident fund
I 740 000
s99 000
198 000
Slrb-Head 4 - Expenses relating to the recruit-
ment and departure of permanent
oflicials
4.1. Travelling expenses of candi-
dates for vacant posts 5 000
4.2. Truvelling expenses on arrival
and departure of permanent
offrcials and their families I I 000
4.3. Removal expenses 70 000
4.4. Installation allowance 43 000
Sub-Head 5 
- 
Medical examination
Tor* or HSAD I
12 549 000
2720000
2 537 000
129 000
14 000
11 360000
2 492000
2 307 000
I l4 000
14 000
il 380000
2 367 000
2260000
101 000
l4 000
10 064 383
2012 557
2029 368
68 642
n 031
l7 949 000 16 287 000 t6 r22040 l4 185 981
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Explanations
Sub-Heads I and 2
Estimates under these two sub-heads cover emoluments (basic salary and allowances) paid to
permanent staffin accordance with Chapter III of the StaffRules of the Office of the Clerk of the WEU
Assembly. They are calculated on the basis of global salaries in application of the scales in force on lst
July l99l r, adjusted in accordance with an expected increase of 4.50/o as from lst July 1992 and,3.5%
as from lst July 1993. These percentages are based on the first results ofthe statistical study carried out
by the Interorganisation Section. They relate only to variations in the rate of inflation and purchasing
power and may be changed in accordance with recommendations to be made on this question by the
Co-ordinating Committee for salaries. These adjustments amount to F 900 000. Conversely, the
increase relating to the calculation of the new monetary parity, which concerns only grades A and L, is
not taken into account in estimates under these sub-heads. Additional sums will consequently have to
be requested when the rate of this increase is decided. Assuming that the rate is 5.590, the estimates
would amount to F 513 000.
These estimates also take account of the financial implications of creating three new grade B
posts and regrading four existing posts. The cost of these proposals is F 724 000.
The table of establishment of the Office of the Clerk, showing grades, is given at Appendix I and
the organogram at Appendix II.
Sub-Head 3
Estimated expenditure for * Social charges' is based on commitments stemming from:
- 
application of the social security agreement signed between Western European Union and the
Government of the French Republic on 2nd June 1979 (Sub-Head 3.1)2;
- 
application of the convention on complementary collective insurance (Sub-Head 3.2)3;
- 
application of Article 27 of the Staff Rules providing for the employer's contribution to the
Provident Fund, amounting to 14% of basic salary, for staff not affrliated to the pension
scheme (Sub-Head 3.3).
Social charges (F 102 000) relating to the creation ofthree new grade B posts and the regrading
of four existing posts are included in the total for this sub-head. Estimates take into account salary
adjustments amounting to F 195 000.
Sub-Head 4
These estimates relate to the new posts included in the organogram of the Oflice of the Clerk.
Sub-Head 5
The sum requested is to cover the cost of the annual medical check-up which all members of the
staffmust undergo in accordance with Article 9 of the StaffRules. Medical check-ups for WEU staffin
Paris are carried out at the OECD medical centre.
l. These scales are worked oul by the Co-ordinating Committee of Goverament Budget Experts and approved by the WEU
Council and the Councils of the other coordinated organisations (NATO, OECD, Council of nurope, ESe1.
2. 
_Under this agreement, WEU staff benefit from the French general scheme, with the exception of family allowances and
old-age pensions.
3. Uqder this convention, WEU staffbenefit from complementary insurance in the event of sickness or temporary or permanent
disability. Furthermore, in the event of the death of an insured pennn, the insurance company pays a lumpsum io the benefici-
aries he has named.
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Heil II 
- 
Temporary staff
Sub-Heads
Estimates
for
1993
Budget
for
1992
Expected
expenditureir 1992
Actual
expenditure
in l99l
Sub-Head 6 
- 
Staffrecruited forsessions ofthe
Assembly
6.1. Sittings service
5.2. Interpretation service
6.3. Translation service
6.4. Other services
1 458 000
893 000
l 094 000
85 000
Sub-Head 7 
- 
Interpretation staff required for
Assembly work between sessions
Sub-Head E 
- 
Temporary stafffor the Oflice of
the Clerk
Sub-Head 9 
- 
Socialcharges
9.1. Insurance for temporary staff
other than interpreters 10000
Provident fund for inter-preters 230000
Insurance for interpreters 8 000
Toret, or Helo II
9.2.
9.3.
3 530 000
1242000
2s 000
248 000 l 56 000
2 988 000
618 000
50 000
164 600
2 880 000
735 000
50 000
154 890
2667 651
624 106
l 16 856
5 04s 000 3 812 000 3 829 600 3 563 503
I
Explanations
SubHead 6
Estimates under this sub-head relate to:
(a) Salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, allowances for travelling time and the
reimbursement of travelling expenses of temporary staff recruited for sessions (sittings, interpretation
and translation services). A list of such staff, showing their respective duties and salaries, is given at
Appendix III. It should be underlined that, with a view to the accession of Greece to WEU, two extra
pirliamentary sub-editors are to be recruited for the sittings service. This increase is offset numerically
by the abolitibn of two posts of assistants for the verbatim report following the computerisation of this
servlce.
(b) Lump-sum payments made to staff recruited for various services during sessions (doctor, post
office technician, iypewriter mechanic, guards for the security service, etc.). The increase in estimates
for these services cbmpared with the previous financial year is due to the recruitment of a fourth tem-
porary security guard to oversee security in the galleries and the television area in the lobby.
Salaries for temporary staffare calculated in accordance with scales in force on lst July 1991,
adjusted in the same way as for permanent staff, the adjustment amounting to F 134000. The
adjustment in respect of monetary parity to be included in an additional budget would be F 90 000.
In application of the agtreement signed between the co-ordinated organisations and the lnterna-
tional Association of Conference Interpreters (IACI), the salaries of interpreters are calculated on the
basis of the scale in force for grade L4.8 staff, increased by 6Vo.
SubHead 7
This sub-head shows the sums paid to interpreters recruited for simultaneous interpretation at
meetings between sessions (salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, travelling time and
travelling expenses).
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Salaries and working conditions are the same as for interpreters recruited for sessions (see
Sub-Head 6 (b) above).
The salary adjustment for 1993 amounts to F 57 000 and the adjustment in respect of monetary
parity to be included in a supplementary budget would amount to F 50 000.
Sub-Head I
A smaller amount than for the previous financial year is shown for this sub-head since the cre-
ation of three new grade B posts will reduce the need to recruit temporary staff.
Sub-Head 9
Estimates under this sub-head correspond to the following social charges:
Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters
Staffrecruited for Assembly sessions are insured with the Van Breda insurance company against
the risks of death, accident or sickness, 6090 of the premium being paid by the Oflice of the Clerk and
40% by staff. The estimates take account of the updating of the capital and premiums as from May
l 988.
Provident fund for interpreters
In accordance with the agreement between the co-ordinated organisations and the IACI, WEU
has to pay into the conference interpreters' fund or, where appropriate, another provident fund, a con-
tribution of l4Vo, which is added to a contribution of TVoby interpreters.
Iwurance for interpreters
A Lloyds insurance policy, taken out through the intermediary of Stewart Wrightson in London,
covers interpreters for accidents, sickness and temporary or pennanent disability preventing them t
from working. The premium of l.l9o of their fees (lower raie) is divided between the-Oflice of the Clerk Iti lo g.'t' r  t l
(0.701o) and the interpreters (0.4Y0).
t
;
l
,]
l
Heod III 
- 
Expenditure on premisa and equipment
Sub-Heads
Estimates
for
1993
Budget
for
1992
Expected
expenditure
in 1992
Actual
expenditure
in 1991
Sub-Head l0 
- 
Share of joint expenditure on
the Paris premises
Sub-Head I I 
- 
Hire of committee rooms
Sub-Head 12 
- 
Technical and other installa-
tions for Assembly sessions
Sub-Head 13 
- 
Various services for the organ-
isation of sessions
Sub-Head 14 
- 
Maintenanceof thepremisesof
the Office of the Clerk
Sub-Head 15 
- 
Purchase or repair of office fur-
niture
Sub-Head 16 
- 
Purchase of reproduction and
other offrce equipment
Sub-Head 17 
- 
Hireandmaintenanceof repro-
duction and other equipment
Torru- op Hreo III
s70 000
10 000
750 000
105 000
l5 000
40 000
l0 000
5720W
540 000
l0 000
587 000
105 000
l5 000
35 000
475 000
5z+0 000
2 500
592 000
102 000
s 000
35 000
470 000
502 989
2272
566 453
73 2t7
t 727
37 209
2007
523 55t
2072000 | 767 000 t 746 500 t 709 425
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Explanations
SubHead l0
Estimates under this sub-head represent the 300/o share of joint expenditure relating to the man-
agement of the WEU premises in Paris. Following the abolition of the agencies, the Council confirmed
the validity of the previous system of sharing this expenditure and made the administrative service of
the WEU Institute for Security Studies responsible for managing joint services.
Sub-Head I I
For meetings outside Paris, Assembly bodies normally have committee rooms with simultaneous
interpretation equipment made available to them by the national delegations concerned. However, in
certain cases the Assembly may have to pay for hiring a room or installing portable interpretation
equipment in rooms not so equipped. Sums requested under this sub-head are to allow the Assembly to
cover such expenditure if necessary.
SubHead 12
As its title indicates, this sub-head relates to expenditure for the installation of simultaneous
interpretation equipment, telephone booths, telefax, screens, a detection gate and other installations in
the premises of the Economic and Social Council during Assembly sessions.
The large increase in these sums compared with the previous financial year is due to the pro-
posed installation of an eighth interpretation booth for Greek (F 105 000) and the installation of a
seventy-five seat television area in the lobby of the Economic and Social Council. This area, for which
the need arose at the June 1992 session, is intended to accommodate guests and the public for whom
there is not room in the galleries because of security measures under which no more than seventy
persons may be admitted to the galleries.
Sub-Head 13
Estimates under this sub-head relate to contracts for the provision of various services during
Assembly sessions (removal of equipment, cleaning of premises, cost of using reproduction machinery
loaned free of charge, etc.) and are based on experienoe.
Sub-Head l4
As in the past, this sum is requested to allow minor repairs to be carried out to the premises of
the Office of the Clerk.
Sub-Heads 15, 16 and 17
Sums under these sub-heads are justified by the five-year maintenance and modernisation pro-
gramme for equipment given at Appendix IV to this budget.
Hetd IY 
- 
General administratite costs
Sub-Heads
Estimates
for
1993
Budget
for
t992
Expected
expenditure
in 1992
Actual
expenditure
in l99l
Sub-Head l8 
- 
Postage, telephone, telefax and
transport of documents
Sub-Head 19 - Duplication paper, headed
writing paper and other office
supplies
Sub-Head 20 - Printing and publication of
documents
Sub-Head 2l 
- 
Purchase of documents
Sub-Head 22 
- 
Offrcial car
Sub-Head 23 
- 
Bank charges
Torer or Hreo IV
630 000
240 000
I 185 000
75 000
125 000
500
600 000
287 000
1 150 500
72000
125 000
500
600 000
250 000
l 150000
60 000
50 000
200
612 867
281 351
| 187 2t2
64 274
104 974
2 255 500 2235 000 2 080 200 2250 678
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Erylanations
Sub-Head 18
Estimates under this sub-head take account of the considerable increase in the volume of docu-
ments being posted and of communications by telephone and telefax.
Sub-Head 19
The reduction of F 47 000 compared with the financial year 1992 is due to the transfer from one
sub-head to anotherof the cost of servicing the photocopiers. This is now charged to Sub-Head 17.
SubHead 20
Estimates under this sub-head take into account the expected increase in prices (30/o).
SubHead 2l
There is a slight increase in estimates under this sub-head as compared with the f,rnancial year
1992 due to the need to purchase a wider range of documentation essential for the preparation of
studies and reports.
SubHead 22
Estimates under this sub-head include the cost of running the offrcial car of the Office of the
Clerk (garage, petrol, servicing, insurance, etc.) and of hiring a chauffeur-driven car for the President of
the Assembly when necessary.
SubHead 23
The estimate of F 500 remains unchanged.
Head Y 
- 
(hlpr expenditure
Sub-Heads
Estimates
for
1993
Budget
for
t992
Expected
expenditure
in 1992
Actual
expenditure
in 1991
Sub-Head 24 
- 
Travelling and subsistence
allowances and insurance for
the President of the Assembly,
chairmen of committees and
rapporteurs
Sub-Head 25 
- 
Expenses for representation
Sub-Head 26 
- 
Committee study missions
Sub-Head 27 
- 
Offrcial journeys of members
of the Oflice of the Clerk
Sub-Head 28 
- 
Expenses of experts and the
auditor
Sub-Head 29 
- 
Expenditure on information
Sub-Head 30 
- 
Expenses for political groups
Sub-Head 3l 
- Contingencies and other expen-
diture not elsewhere provided
for
Sub-Head 32 
- 
Non-recoverable taxes
Torlr or Heeo V
I
506 000
400 000
s 000
178 000
s0 000
460 000
569 000
3 000
28 000
210 000
360 000
s 000
590 000
50 000
455 000
534 000
3 000
28 000
280 000
300 000
760 000
65 000
400 000
534 000
16 105
21 000
153 414
399 828
588 650
3r 028
43396t
484 000
tt 827
26 803
3 199 000 222500o 2 376 rO5 2 129 stl
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Erpbnations
Sub-Head 24
The cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly for sessions and
committee meetings is borne by the governments of member countries, as are those of members of the
Bureau and the Presidential Committee.
The Assembly bears the cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for visits by the President
of the Assembly, rapporteurs and, when appropriate, committee chairmen when these visits are con-
nected with the preparation of a report or the work of the Assembly. Journeys by committee chairmen
and rapporteurs are subject to approval by the Presidential Committee.
SuhHead 25
The participation in sessions of the Assembly of very high-ranking official speakers and the ever-
increasing number of visits by parliamentary delegations from countries of Eastern Europe and the
Mediterranean to the Assembly justify the increase in credits requested under this sub-head.
Sub-Head 26
Sums under this sub-head are to cover extraordinary expenditure for committee study visits. As
these sums cannot be foreseen accurately, the same amount has been requested as last year.
Sub-Head 27
Estimates under this sub-head take into account the variation in per diem allowances provided
for in the sixth report of the Co-ordinating Committee on salaries and the increase in air fares.
Sub-Head 28
This sum is to cover the cost of auditing the Assembly's accounts and the participation of experts
in the symposium organised by the Assembly.
Sub-Head 29
The estimate is unchanged compared with 1992, except for an adjustment to take account of the
trend of prices, mainly in order to give the press service means of developing its action.
SubHead 30
Compared with the previous financial year, there is an increase of 6.5% in the estimate under
this sub-head since, with the accession of Greece to WEU, the Assembly will probably have fourteen
more parliamentarians (seven representatives and seven substitutes).
In accordance with the decisions taken by the Presidential Committeee, each of the political
groups of the Assembly has an equal fixed share and a further sum in prqportion to the number of
mentbers listed. All the groups have to submit a balance sheet at the close of the financial year. All the
balance sheets are appended to the accounts of the Assembly and are consequently subject to verifi-
cation by the auditor.
SuhHead 31
The same amount is requested as for 1992.
Sub-Head 32
The same amount is requested as for 1992.
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PART I: OPERATING BUDGET
Section B 
- 
Receipts
Explanations
Estimates for the sale of publications, bank interest and social security reimbursements are based
on experience.
PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET
Section A 
- 
Expenditure
Head I 
- 
Pensions, allowances and social charyes
Estimates
for
1993
Budget
for
1992
Estimates
for
t992
Actual
receipts
in l99l
l. Sale of publications
2. Bank interest
3. Receipts
(Reimbursements, social security, etc.)
Torer Rrcrprs
40 000
60 000
l0 000
35 000
60 000
l0 000
3s 000
20 000
21 000
42 589
73 866
92087
l l0 000 105 000 76 000 208 542
Estimates
for
1993
Budget
for 1992
(authorised)
Expected
expenditure
in 1992
Actual
expenditure
in l99l
Sub-Head I 
- 
Pensions and leaving
allowances
l.l. Retirement pensions
1.2. Invalidity pensions
1.3. Survivors' pensions
1.4. Orphans' or dependants'
penslons
1.5. kaving allowances
Sub-Head 2 
- 
Family allowances
2.1. Household allowances
2.2. Children's and other
dependants' allowances
2.3. Education allowances
3 l9r 000
469 000
63 000
147 000
32 000
Sub-Head 3 
- 
Supplementary insurance
Tornr- or Hreo I
3723000
179 000
103 000
3 363 000
185 000
107 000
3 407 550
170 650
93 350
3 143 488
145 343
97 084
4 005 000 3 6ss 000 3 67r 550 3 385 915
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Explarutions
SubHeads I and 2
In 1993, the Assembly will be paying fifteen pensions, as follows:
- 
twelve old-age pensions;
- 
two invalidity pensions;
- 
one survivor's pension.
Estimates of expenditure under these two sub-heads are calculated in accordance with the provi-
sions of the pensio-lr scheme rules. The effects of the increase in scales is calculated in the same way as
for.permanent staff on the basis of a rate of 6.3390. This amounts to F 238 OO0. The subsequent appli-
cation of a rate of 5.570 in respect of monetary parity would mean requesting a supplementary sum ofF 134000.
Sub-Head 3
Pensioners are insured against the risk of sickness in accordance with Article 19 bis of the col-
lective convention in force.
Estimates of expenditure under this sub-head correspond to the proportion of the premium paid
by the Assembly.
PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET
Section B 
- 
Rueipts
Estimates
for
t993
Budget
for
1992
Expected
receipts
in 1992
Actual
receipts
in 1991
Contributions by permanent officials 780 000 700 000 698 000 623 441
Explanations
Estimated receipts are calculated on the basis of contributions to the pension scheme paid by the
thirty-five permanent staffmembers of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly (7% of bisic saiary)
affrliated to the pension scheme.
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APPENDIX I
Recapitulatory toblc showing changa in the staff
of the Ollice of the Clerh of the |VEU Assembly
proposed in the 1993 budga
Grade Duties 1993 budget 1992 budget +or-
H.G.
A6
A5
A4
IA
Lzt3
A2
A2
B6
B4
B4
B3
B3
B3
B3
C6
c4
Clerk
Clerk Assistants
Counsellors
First secretaries
Translator-interpreter
Translator-interpreter
Controller; Head of private oflice
Translators; Documentalists
Chief accountant
Qualified assistants
Equipment accountant;
Head of documents reproduction service
Offset operator; Reproduction clerk
Accountant
Bilingual shorthand-typists
Switchboard operator
Head of documents reproduction service
Offset operators
I
2
5
2
I
2
4
I
7
I
2
I
7
I
1
2
5
2
I
2
4
I
7
I
4
I
I
2
+l
-l
+l
+2
+3
-l
-2
37 34 +3
I
l
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ft6ldmual
CommuE
PrNarc Oflie of the Prcsd€nl
Herdofs€Pre (l) Head of Seflrce (4)
Deputy (A2)
Asrsht (4)
Head of the Archrves (84)
Head Srorckeper + (84)
2Assrsranrs. (83)
InsElldnns atentui.
Revr*r (A4l5)
Trmslaror (A2)
Assrstanr (Bl/4)
renporun Stafr.
3 Rev's6
5 TranslatoB
Revrser (A4/5)
Tmnslaror (A2)
Tmslatorlnrerprerer. lU)
AssrsEnt (B3l4l
Tenpora^, Stafr .
5 RevrEre
7 TnnslatoE
5 Assrslats
S
*
ts:
E
s-I
.S
s.G
\! FUN'E
.sz
F=E
sE
*
.S
:FG\b
f-G!g.g
2 Heads of Seton
20 Verbanm reI[(ers
6 Verbd'm wrileB
2 pnncrpal asstshts
l6 Assrstants
Conmr@ for Peluenbry
dd hbfic Relaxons
Serctary (A4)
AsNml (BY4)
Notes
. SeNrce orgdisd/staffrecrurted dunng sesstons of the Assembly
Psts underlined re those rt rs proposd to create rn 1993i Posts prcposed for regmding m the 1993 budget.
l) The dunes of Head of he Commr@ Seflre rc exercsd by fie Cle* Asrs@t for Pohncal
Affarre H$ assrstant helps hrm rn the exeus ofthes dunes
2) ft€ Cle* Md hrs a$rs@t arc rcsponsrble for lhe s$retmal of the Commtrte on Rules of
IMure ild Pnvileges
3) ThBposl rs notmlly fill€d by the Nrsht m rhe Enghsh Tmnslaton Servrce
4) The dut6 ofHcad ofthe Admmrshuon d Rnre Serurce, Had ofthe Pereonnel SdDn,
Secunry Omcer and Serctry of ihe Commfle on Budgeury Affar6 and Admrnrstrabon are
cmed out by the Clerk AssrsEnr for Admrnrshuon md Frmrce Hts ss6hl help6 hrm rn rhe
exercrs ofthese duues
5) Thes duxes are exercrd by the tmdator/rnterpreEr ln rhe Frcnch scrron of rhe Tmslabon
Senre
6) The Dcpury Head of rhe Admrnrshrion and Finoe Sefllce rs responsrbl€ for cenenl
Senrces
7) fre assrsant to the Deputy Head ofthe AdmrnBtmuon and Frnre Snle ls alm the s$sbnt
for the Mail andArchrves Serytce
8) The s6ff rcsponsrble for sronng md accounung for equrpmcnl rs respon$ble for 6e oPeBfion
of th€ pnnxng workshop
9) Tha du@ ot Hed of the TEmlen and Publl@ons Senice m exercrsed by U€ m( sniu
Evrsr who, srre lst Oclob.r 1986. hd b6en tlE Enghsh rcvlsr He rs help€d in rhe exercre of
thee duocs by hrs Nrtut
l0) The ssrstilt in the Pnvile Ofrie of $c Presdenl E rcsponsrble f6 lhc lwpbon desk
Prcsdent
of lhe
H6d of Pnvarc OfEe
Assrshl (10)
(42)
(83/4)
I Had of (5)
(a) Interprete6 Erutrcd
24
(b) lnEErcc recruiled
klwen s$Dns
6 rEqurred
I Swtrchbotrd opedtor (83)
I Cl@lrum atEndet
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APPENDIX III
Sa.bries of stalf recntitet for Assembly sessiozs
l. Sinings scmice
Duties Number No. ofdays
Daily
temu-
neration
F
Total
F
Total
F
Counsellors to the President of Assembly
Heads of sections
Sergeant-at-afins ...
Parliamentary secret;;; . : : : : . . : : . : : : :
Prdcis writers
Verbatim reporters
Editors
Principal assistants
Assistants to the President's counsellors
Assistants assigned to other services . . .
Ushers
Messengers
Installations attendant
Cloakroom attendant
Offset-assemblers .
Adjustment for 1993 (6.33%)....
la
la
rblb
1b
6a
l4b
2a
4b
2a
10a
20blb
5a
3ala
la
8a
la
lb
2a
2b
3a
3b
4b
lalb
t4
l6
8
8
l0
t2
10
8
l0
8
l0
8
l0
8
l0
8
l0
t4
t6
8
r0
t2
8
l0
t4
8
10
I 118
I 944
t 227
t 236
2053
2053
l 820
994
1 820
994
l 820
1 l0l
l 820
994
l 820
685
I 213
742
l 000
601
I t29
I 129
498
498
392
498
498
t5 652
31 104
9 816
9 888
20 530
24 636
18 200
15 904
36 400
23 856
54 600
52 848
254 800
l5 904
72800
l0 960
48 520
6 608
l6 000
48 080
225 800
l3 548
t9 920
t4 940
5 488
3 984
39 840
46 756
64 870
l8 200
52 304
78 456
307 648
88 704
369 516
44 332
39 840
100 I tto 626
46 810
Travelling expenses
I t57 436
300 000
Rounded up to
t 457 436
I 458 000
* In accordance with scales in force on lst July 1991.
a. Recruited locally.
b. Recruited outside Paris.
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2. Intc4ttdolioa scnice
Duties a Number No. of days TotalF
l3all b 8l0 328 640402 3r4
24
Adjustment for 1993 (6.33 %)
730954
41 156
Travelling expenses
772 tto
120 000
Rounded up to
892 l t0
893 000
a. Recruited locdly.
b. Recruited outside Paris.
N.B. On lst July 1991, the daily remuneration of interpreters amounted to F 3160. In addition, interpreters recruited outside
Paris are entitled to payment for time spent in travelling (one or two half days as appropriate), a daily allowance (per diem) cor-
responding to that of a Grade L4 permanent official, plus reimbunement of their travelling expenses.
3. Transloion scnice
Duties Number Dailyremuneration
F
Estimates I Total
F
Revisers
Translators
Principal assistants
Assistants
5a
3b
7a
5b
la
2b
4a
5b
t 248
2074
988
l 814
538
l 066
472
l 000
156 000
155 550
172900
226 750
16 140
63 960
56 640
150 000
3ll 550
399 650
80 100
206 640
Adiustment for 1993 (6.3 %)
32 997 940
45 694
Travelline exDenses
t 043 634
s0 000
Rounded up to
t 093 634
I 094 000
1. Based on 25 days for revisers and translators and 30 days for assistants.
a. Recruited locally.
b. Recruited outside Paris.
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APPENDIX IV
Five-year mdernisaion a.nd maintenance prugnunne for tlw eqtipmcnt
of the Ollice of the Cle*
(The estimates given may fluctuate with the trend of prices)
Ref.
No. Equipment
Modernisation and
equipment programme
Budgets
1993 t994 1995 1996 1997
1.2
1.3
I
l.l
1.4
2.1
3.1
3.2
3.3
4.t
4.2
4.3
4.4
2
3
4
5
5.1
A. Reproduction and
printing equipment
Photocopiersl Rx 1090
2 Gestetner 2382 ZDF
2 RX 5034
I Gestetner 22fi)
Offset machinesI Gestetner 3ll
Electrostatic stereofuers
I fuetner PlW9
I Gestetner DTI
I Gestetner l00PM
Bind@ machinesI Gestetner 100I Orpo PlanaxI Orpo Thermatic
Miscellaneow
eqtipmentI Iqab&\Ordina 7630,
assembling machine
with stapler
Hire since l99l (rate blocked)
Maintenance calculated on the
basis of the number of copies
over and above 240 000 per half-
year.
These are leased for a five-year
period. The contract expires in
April 1996. Cost of hireThe cost of maintenance
depends on the number ofcopies
made.
As from 1992.
One of these photocopiers has
replaced the former RX 3107
now unfit for use. The other has
been assigned to the offrces on
the second floor. Cost of hireThe cost of maintenance
depends on the number of copies
made.
Property of the Assembly. Main-
tenance.
Purchased in 1984.
Maintenance contract (indexed).
Purchased in 1980.
Reserved for sessions.
Purchased in 1985.
Maintenanoe contract (indexed).
Purchased in 1986.
Maintenance contract (indexed).
Property of the Assembly. This
machine is in good condition.
Normal maintenance by the staff
concerned is enough to keep it in
good working order.
Purchased in 1977, this machine is
serviced when required, since the
cost of a maintenance contract is
exorbitant. It is no longer oon-
sidered nece$ary !o re,plaoe it asthe printing worlshop was
equipped in l99l with phote
copiers that assemble. An annual
general overhaul and a single
service ar€ planned for the
machine.
104 s00
32 000
63 s00
21 000
29 000
22000
l 600
9 700
l 600
3 300
8 000
104 500
32 000
63 s00
21 000
29 000
22000
l 600
9 700
l 600
3 300
8 000
104 s00
32 000
63 s00
21 000
29 000
22000
l 600
9 700
l 600
3 300
8 000
104 500
32 000
28 000
21 000
29 000
2200o
l 600
9 700
l 600
3 300
8 000
104 500
32 000
21 000
950
22000
l 700
9 700
l 600
3 300
8 000
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Ref.
No. Equipment
Modemisation and
equipment programme
Budgets
I 993 t994 1995 1996 t997
5.2
5.3
6
6.r
6.2
6.3
6.4
7
7,t
7,2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
I AM International
5000 addressograph
I Fortematic 655
B. Typewriters
and calcllators
OlJice of the Clerk
8 Olivetti ET l2l elec-
tronic typewriters
I ET 22lOlivetti
I ET 2400 Olivetti
3 Olivetti calculators
For use duing sessions
4 RX 6015 electronic
typewriters (Englistr
keyboard)
I IBM electric type-
writer (French key-
board)
2 ET 109 typerwriters(Italian keyboard)
I Editor electric type-
writer (Italian key-
board)
2 Olivetti ET 2400
electronic typewritersI Portuguese key-
boardI Spanish keyboard
Hired typewriters
Property of the Assembly.
Maintenance contract (indexed).
Purchased in 1976, it has to
undergo a general overhaul.
Purchased between l98l and
1983, these typewriters are in
good condition.
Purchased in 1983, it is in good
condition.
Purchased in 1989, it is in
excellent condition.
These machines are in good
working order.
These machines were purchasedin 1986 and are assigned to
session services.
Assigrred to a political group.
Assigrred to the Italian Dele-
gation and the Italian summary
reporters.
Assigrred to the Italian summary
reporters.
Purchased in 1989, they are
assigned to the Portuguese and
Spanish Delegations.
All typewriters and calculators
are serviced by a mechanic twice
a yeat, before each session. A
single lump sum should be ear-
marked for possible repairs at
other times.
To meet the requirements of the
various services during Assembly
sessions, the following hire pro-
gramme is envisaged for each
sessron:
- 
14 electric machines with
English keyboards,
- 
6 electric machines with
French keyboards,
- 
3 electric machines with
German keyboards.
4200
l0 500
9 000
l7 000
4200
9 000
l7 000
4200
9 000
l7 000
4200
9 000
l7 000
4200
9 000
l7 000
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Ref.
No. Equipment
Modernisation and
equipment programme
Budgets
1993 1994 1995 l 996 1997
8
8.1
8.2
9
9.1
9.2
9.3
9.4
9.5
9.6
l0
l0.l
10.2
10.3
10.4
10.5
10.6
ll
Typewriters in reseme
6 Olympia SGE 5l
electric typewriters
2 English keyboards
5 French keyboards(one with long car-
z r 
d6filrpia 
mechanical
typewriters
19 English keyboards
2 French keyboards
C. Miscellaneous
equipment
Dictaphones
2 Uher 5000
Sony BM
l0 Grundig Stenorettes
Sony dictaphone BM
stenotype machine
Grandjean
D. Word ptocessors
and computers
Computers and
word processors
2 Olivetti ETS 2010
6 Olivetti M 300
3 Olivetti M 300/05
l0 computers
and 5 printers
I Olivetti M 24
3 Macintosh
II CI
SE
SE 30
E. OJfice furniture
Office of the Clerk
Purchased between 1966 and
1979, they are kept in reserve
in case of need (e.g. at the
request ofjournalists or in the
event of an electricity cut)
Purchased in 1971, they will
remain in service as long as pos-
sible.
Purchased in 1987, 1990 and
1992. These dictaphones are in
very good working order.
Purchased between 1963 and
1987, they should be replaced
eradually as from 1992.
To replace 2 of the l0 dicta-
phones under item 9.3.
Purchased in 1974, this machine
is in good working order.
Provision for an overall sum in
the budget for possible repairs to
equipment in this category.
These have been hired on a
five-year leasing basis. The con-
tracts expire in July 1993, May
1995 and May 1997 respectively.
Estimates take account of their
replacement on those dates. Cost
of hire
Replace the ETS 2010, no longer
in use. Cost of hire
Property of the Assembly.
Maintenance contract (indexed)
for all word processors and com-
puters described in paragraphs
l0.l and 10.3.
Maintenance contract (indexed)
for all word processors and oom-
puters described in paragraph 10.2.
Purchased in 1988, 1990 and
1991.
Maintenance contract (indexed).
Purchase or replacement of
various items of furniture in the
Oflice of the Clerk.
l0 000
4 000
135 000
45 000
37 000
14 000
40 000
l0 000
4 000
109 000
57 000
37 000
25 000
l4 000
40 000
l0 000
4 000
68 000
57 000
37 000
25 000
14 000
40 000
l0 000
4 000
30 000
57 000
37 000
25 000
14 000
40 000
l0 000
4 000
l7 000
57 000
37 000
2s 000
l4 000
40 000
i
I
I
I
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Brealdown by budga clossiftcation
Budget classification Ref. No.
in programme
Budgets
Head Sub-Head l 993 r994 1995 1996 1997
UI
u
III
15. Purchase or repair of office fur-
niture
Purchase of reproduction and
other office equipment
Hire and maintenance of
reproduction and other office
equipment
16.
t7.
Torer
Rouxpro up
l1
9.4
l.l
1.2
1.3
1.4
2.1
3.2
3.3
5.1
5.2
5.3
7.6
7.7
9.6
l0.l
10.2
10.4
10.5
10.6
40 000 40 000 40 000 40 000 40 000
l0 000 10 000 l0 000 l0 000 l0 000
136 500
84 500
51 000
I 600
9 700
1 600
3 300
8 000
4200
l0 500
9 000
l7 000
4 000
135 000
45 000
37 000
r+ ooo
136 500
84 500
51 000
l 600
9 700
l 600
3 300
8 000
4200
9 000
17 000
4 000
109 000
57 000
37 000
25 000
l4 000
136 500
84 500
51 000
1 600
9 700
l 600
3 300
8 000
4200
9 000
17 000
4 000
68 000
57 000
37 000
25 000
14 000
136 500
84 s00
51 000
l 600
9 700
l 600
3 300
8 000
4200
q 0oo
17 000
4 000
30 000
57 000
37 000
2s 000
l4 000
r36 500
84 500
51 000
l 600
9 700
I 600
3 300
8 000
4200
g 0oo
l7 000
4 000
l7 000
s7 000
37 000
25 000
l4 000
571 900
s72000
572 400
573 000
531 400
532 000
493 400
494 000
480 400
481 000
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APPENDIX V
Trend of the Assembly budgets from 1992 to 1993
t992
a
1993
b
mf;
A. Operating budget
Head I. Permanent staff
Head II. Temporary staff
Head III. Expenditure on premises
and equipment
Head IV. General administrative
costs
Head V. Other expenditure
16 287 000
3 812 000
l 767 000
2235W0
2225000
l7 949 000
5 045 000
2072000
2255 500
3 199 000
+ 10.20
+ 32.34
+ 17.26
+ 0.92
+ 43.77
Total expenditure
Receipts
26 326000
r05 000
30 520 500
I l0 000
+ 15.93
4.76+
Net Total 26 22t 000 30 410 500 + 15.98
B. Pensions budget
Pensions and leaving allowances
Receipts
3 65s 000
700 000
4 005 000
780 000
+ 9.57
+ I1.43
Net Total 2 955 000 322500o + 9.13
GnaNp NEr rorAl (A+ B)
Torer oF HEADS II ro V oF oPERATTNG
BUDGET
29 176000
l0 039 000
33 635 500
t2 571 500
+ 15.28
+25.22
I
I
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APPENDIX vI
Implications of thc various heads for the 1992 and 1993 operuting budgas
t992 1993
Amount
%of
Amount
%of
A B A B
Opcrating budget
Expenditure
HerdI 
-Permanentstaff
Head II 
- 
Temporary staff
Herd III 
- 
Premises and equipment
Head IV 
- 
General administrative
costs
Herd V 
- 
Other expenditure
A. Torer
Receipts
l6 287 000
3 812 000
L 767 W0
2235W0
2225W0
61.87
14.48
6.71
8.49
8.45
62.t1
14.54
6.74
8.52
8.49
l7 949 000
5 045 000
2072000
2255 500
3 199000
58.81
16.53
6.79
7.39
10.48
7.42
10.52
59.02
16.59
6.81
26 326000
105 000
100.00 100.40
- 
0.40
30 s20 500
I l0 000
100.00 100.36
- 
0.36
B. NE'r rorAl 26 221 W 100.00 30 410 500 100.00
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APPENDIX vII
Statement by the Presidcnt of the Assembly at the meeting of
the Permanent Council on 24th Juae 1992
Presentation of the Assembly's stnategl
for the financial year 1993
The Assembly's budget is set in a political context since the Assembly has prepared estimates of
expenditure commensurate with its mission.
This mission was attributed to it by Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty under which it
was given a supervisory task whose coroilary is the right to make recommendationi. Inevitably the
exercise of this mission is possible only if there is an in-depth dialogue between the governmental and
parliamentary bodies. The Assembly therefore wishes to enhance and strengthen its relations with the
Council.
The Assembly can occupy its place in WEU provided it has the wherewithal to follow current
events closely. It is indeed the Assembly that draws public attention to European security problems and
encourages parallel debates in the parliaments of our countries and of our allies and friends. Through
the joint thinking that it organises, the Assembly fosters awareness of the European identity in security
and defence matters and encourages the effort necessary to allow Europe to assert itself in the alliance
as a full partner. The nine WEU countries endorsed this vocation by their declarations which are
appended to the Maastricht Treaty.
It is therefore essential for the Council to grant the Assembly adequate resources to exercise its
rOle. The Assembly worked out its estimates bearing in mind concerns for budgetary stringency similar
to those which guide the Council. However, it cannot allow to pass unanswered the calls it receives
from every quarter, nor can it neglect the vocation that the governments assigned to WEU in the Maas-
tricht agreements or ignore Europe's requirements for planning and organising its security in a new
context.
Yet the Assembly has the same concern as the Council to extend its activities, and hence its rela-
tions, to new areas.
Our security is now one and the same as that of the new Central European democracies whose
peoples are seeking to move closer to us and whose governments are appealing to us. The Assembly,
through its committees and rapporteurs, as well as its President, has already established a network of
relations that was confirmed again with the symposium it organised at the Reichstag in Berlin in the
spring of this year. Other initiatives will be taken whose financial implications will have to be taken
into account in our budget. I am thinking in particular of how to follow up our already long-standing
relationship with the Supreme Soviet and the problems raised by the growing autonomy or indepen-
dence of the Soviet republics. I am also thinking of the solicitations we have received from the Central
and Eastern European countries with a view to arranging closer relations with their parliaments. Thus,
the Assembly was able to respond to the request of the Bulgarian Government by sending observers to
the elections held in that country in autumn 1991. Finally, no one knows what initiatives will have to
be taken in response to requests from several of the republics of former Yugoslavia.
While Europe has to organise itself in order to ensure that an order of justice and peace prevails,
it must also turn its eyes towards the South and South-East where old threats persist but new hopes are
emerging.
- 
Our Assembly intends to develop already long-standing relations. Having received the President
of the Turkish Republic, Mr. Turgut Ozal,it will delegate its Presidential Committee to effect a visit to
the Turkish authorities in response to the invitation received from the Turkish Grand National
Assembly.
More recent links must be consolidated. We shall pay the utmost attention to maintaining our
excellent relations with Egypt.
No* that negotiations are starting in Madrid, for the first time marking a will to establish, on the
basis of an international agreement, more peaceful relations between the peoples of the Middle East,
our Assembly is having to deal even more than in the past with problems facing countries in that
regioq. It took part in the parliamentary dimension of the preparations for a Conference on Security
and Co-operation in the Mediterranean in June 1992 and is continuing to prepare reports on the
subject, which implies journeys by rapporteurs.
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Finally, our Assembly will continue, as each year, to send at least one of its committees to the
United States to strengthentransatlantic relations, and it will tighten still further its relations with the
many countries which see Western Europe as a vital instrument of their own security. The more WEU
asserts itself politically and acquires the means of using its forces to keep the peace, agleater number of
countries will turn to its Assembly to discuss European security in greater detail. It should be noted
that, as well as the three Visegrad countries, the three Baltic countries, Romania and Bulgaria, several
republics of former Yugoslavia and nearly all European countries pursuing a neutral policy have, in
ont respect or another, asked to be associated with the work of the Assembly.
However, it should be underlined that the development of relations with the parliamentary
assemblies of countries which are not members of WEU involves considerable translation and interpre-
tation work and increases still further the burden on the external relations and mailing services. The
Assembly's budget as it now stands no longer allows these new commitments to be met.
The Assembly, which is anxious to deploy all its activities in the directions I have jgst described,
will therefore ask for an increase in real terms in its operating budget (Heads II to V) which may cer-
tainly seem large but is nevertheless small if it is borne in mind that it has not been possible to obtain
an increase in the last two years.
It is also asking that the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk be completed by the creation 
-of
posts of assistant essential for its services and committees and that the classification of certai! p^osts-be
brought into line with the tasks to be carried out. This amounts to very little but it is essential if such a
small secretariat is to be able to cope with its g;rowing burden.
The Assembly's most cherished wish is to establish fruitful co-operation with the Council. We
thercfore wish to avoid our budgetary difliculties being a cause of friction and we hope the problems
will quickly be solved. The draft-budget for the financial year 1993 would thus complete the adaptation
of thi Office of the Clerk of the Assembly to the enlargement of WEU with the accession of Portugal
and Spain. Any subsequent enlargement would most probably make furt!91 adjustments necessary
since ihe composition bf me Assembly and the Office of the Clerk must follow the evolution of the
composition of the Council.
In conclusion, I would emphasise that the Assembly's wish is to co-operate with the Council in
order to tackle the great task of implementing the decisions taken by the Nine in Maastricht since the
Assembly intends to Uring the support of the representatives of the people to the organisation of a
defence Europe.
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Recapitulatory table of budget estimates for 1993 as a result of the opinion of the
Council
Trend of Assembly budgets from 1992 to 1993
Explanatory Memorwtdum
(submittd by Mr. Rathbry Rllppr.tar)
1. . Tne $ryft bupee! for the financial yegr 1993 (Document 1325) was first examined by the WEUBudget and Organisation Committee on 24th Sepiember t992. T[is committee naving OecidedG
revise estimates for the salaries of peryanent and_temporary staffon the basis of infonnat-i;ti;; 6t
lle Co-ordina{ng Committee, the office of the Clerkof th'e Assembly transmitted to thi n"[gei andOrganisation Committee a working paper setting out the new flrnaniial implicaiions.
?. ^ -Atits meeting on l3th November 1992, the Budget and Organisation Committee examined thedraft budget of the Assembly for the financial year1993 as s6t out in Document 1325 and the
abovementioned working pape!. It decided that th6 policy of budgetary limitati,onJn force in memUii
countries did not allow the tgtal growth rate of 17.55% pioposed 6y th6 essembly tobe accepted- (ihi;$owth rate was 15.28% before the revision leqqested-by-the Budget and Orginisation C"..iit*iConsequently, it decided to recommend to the-Council:-
- 
the withdrawal of the proposals 
-concerning the staff of the Office of the Clerk (creation ofthree new posts and regrading of four exisiing posts);
- 
the withdrawal of estimates included with a view to the accession of Greece to WEU since theprotocol ofaccession ofthat country could certainly not be ratified before tte nnanciA v""i1994;
l. Adopted in committee by 9 votes to 0 with I abstention and approved by the presidential Committee.
2r. L(embels 
-o! the commi.ttee: Mr. Rathbone (Chairman) (Alternate: Lord Mackie of Benshie); MM. Lagorce, Maass (yic.e-chairmen); MM. Alvarez (AlternateiRoman), )nrefier,rrin. Drnid, Ir\r. bir.fq*, iiti.rii"i, clirl tnri Jnate: Rubner), curto,?i*, (fltg*"te: Fabral, Eversdijk,_pame peliev FenneilArternn;;^i;ri';jD;;i;;i,-i{M:;'Aili;,b;;i" sanchez (Alternate:Gonzalez-Laxe), Howell, {Ig:oi, Manisco, Teyer zu i}entruf, oetriii Fiiiti, pirr",-nio.".a (iGii,"t., Lord Finsberg\,Regenwetter, Tatarella, Thrssen.
N.B. Ifte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in iralics.
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- to allow the Assembly a growth rate of 6.5Y0 for the operating budget as a whole (Heads I to V
less receipts);
- 
to accept the growth rate of l3.l39o in the pensions budget in which a new pension has been
included.
3. At its meeting on 25th November 1992, the Council decided to accept the recommendations of
its Budget and Organisation Committee, ad referendum in the case of the United Kingdom Delegation.
4. As a result of the reductions made by the Council, the net total budget of the Assembly (oper-
ating plus pensions) is reduced from F 33 635 500 (the total adjusted on the basis ofthe working paper
amotrnted to F 34 298 500) to F 31 268 000. In relation to the financial year 1992, this new total repre-
sents a growth rate of 7.l7olo.
5. The table at Appendix III shows estimates revised in accordance with the opinion of the Council
divided into heads and sub-heads.
63
DocUMENT 1325 noorNpuu npprNorx I
APPENDIX I
Note by the Secmary-General on the WEU Assembly badgu for 1993 -
Document C-B (92) 16
20th November 1992
The WEU Budget and Organisation Committee examined the draft budget of the Assembly for
1993, the broad lines of which were described by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman of the Committee on Budg-
etary Affairs and Administration, at the meeting on 24th September 1992.
The committee noted that expenditure for staffhad been calculated without taking into account
the implications of Paris/Brussels economic parity as agreed by the Co-ordinating Committee.
The Oflice of the Clerk of the Assembly drafted a working paper to adjust the 1993 budget in
accordance with the abovementioned comment.
This revised draft budget was examined at the meeting of the committee on l3th November
1992.
The net total budget proposed by the Assembly was as follows:
A. Operating budget F 30 990 500
B. Pensions budget F 3 308 000
These figures show an increase of 17.55% compared with the net grand total of the budget for
1992.
The Budget and Org;anisation Committee considered that estimates relating to the accession of
Greece to WEU should be withdrawn from the operating budget. A majority of the delegates said the
proposals for creating new posts and regrading existing posts could not be accepted.
After a long discussion, it was proposed to allow a growth rate of 6.5096 in the net total operating
budget of the Assembly, it being understood that the latter would adjust its budget estimates within
these limits on the basis of its own priorities.
The conclusions reached by the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee mean a reduction of
F 3 065 500 in the operating budget.
In regard to the pensions budget, the committee noted that the estimates take account of the
increased scales agreed by the Co-ordinating Committee and a new pension payable as from lst
January 1993.
The table below shows the sums initially proposed and the revised figures recommended by the
committee.
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ANNEX A
Trend of the Assembly budgets from 1992 to 199i
I 993
Original credits
proposed by
the Assembly
F
I 993
Revised credits
recommended by
the BOC
F
A. Operating budget
Head I. Permanent staff
Head II. Temporary staff
Head III. Expenditure on premises and equipment
Head IV. General administrative costs
Head V. Other expenditure
l8 455 000
5 119000
2072000
2 255 s00
3 r99 000
28 035 000
Total exnenditure 31 100 500
1 l0 000
28 035 000
I l0 000Receiots
Nrr rorel 30 990 500 27 925 000
B. Pensions budget
Pensions and leaving allowances.
Reeipts
4 108 000
800 000
4 108 000
765 000
Nsr ror.qr 3 308 000 3 343 000
Nrt- GuNn roul 34 298 500 3l 268 000
t992
a
1993
revised credits
recommanded
by the BOC
c
Vo
cla
A. Operating budget
Head I. Permanent staff
F
16287000r
3 8r2 oool
l 767 000)
2 23s 000 I
222s oool
F
28 035 000
F
6.49
Head II. Temporary staff
Head III. Expenditure on premises and equipment
Head IV. General administrative costs
Head V. Other expenditure
Total expenditure 26 326000
105 000
28 035 000
I l0 000
6.49
4.76Receiots
Nrr rorru (A) 26 221 000 27 925 000 6.50
B. Pensions budget
Penrions and leaving allowances .
Recciots
3 655 000
700 000
4 108 000
76s 000
12.39
9.28
Nrr rorr (B) 2 9s5 000 3 343 000 13.r3
Nrr GneNo rorAl 29 176000 31 268 000 7.17
*
**
Torer oF HEADS II ro v oF opERArrNG BUDcET I to ole ooo I ro 523 o0o | +.az
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ANNEX B
IUEU Assembly budsa 1993
Contrtbufions
In the table below, the contributions to the budget are calculated in accordance with the cost- I
sharing formula applicable to the nine present member states.
Vo
1993
budget
F
l99l
surplus
F
1993
contributions(net)
F
Reloirr 8.35
17.00
17.00
17.00
0.30
8.3s
2.00
13.00
17.00
2 610 878
5 315 s60
5 315 560
5 315 560
93 804
2 610 878
625 360
4 064 840
5 315 560
42 958
87 460
87 460
87 460
t 544
42 958
t0 290
66 881
87 460
2 567 920
5 228 t00
5 228 t00
5 228 100
92260
2 567 920
615 070
3 997 959
5 228 100
Frence
Germanv
Itrl
Lnxemhnrrrs
Netherlands
Portusal
Snai
United Kingdom
100.00 31 268 000 5t4 47 t 30753 s29
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APPENDIX II
Extract from the summary report of the Council meeting
held on 25th November 1992
Asxmbly budget for 1993(c-B (e2) 16)
Subject to the details of the Budget Committee's decision on this subject contained in the
summary ieport of its last meeting on l3th November, the Council can approve the Assembly's budget
for 1993 
- 
ad referendum in the case of the British Delegation.
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APPENDTX III
Recapitulatory tablc of budga esfimates for 1993 as a result of the opinbn of thc Council
Heads - sub-heads
Draft budget
for 1993(Doc. 1325)
Breakdown
of changes made
by the Council
Revised
Budget
Hreo I 
- 
PsnMnNrNrstnFF
Sub-Head:
I 
- 
Basic salaries ...
2 
- 
Allowances
t2 s49 000
2720m/0
2 537 NO
129 000
l4 000
- 
184 000
95 000
28 000
- 
129 000
l 000
12 365 000
2 62s 000
2 509 000
l3 000
3 
- 
Social charges
4 
- 
Expenses relating to the recruitment
and departure of permanent oflicials .
5 
- 
Medical examination ..
Torru- l7 949 000
- 
437 000 17 512 000
Heeo II 
- 
TeuponanY srAFF
Sub-Head:
6 
- 
Staff recruited for sessions
7 
- 
Interpretation staff required for Assem-
bly work between sessions
8 
- 
Temporary staff for the Office of the
Clerk
3 530 000
t 242000
25 000
248 000
- 
308 000
- 
618 000
54 500
3222000
624000
2s 000
r93 5009 - Social charges
Torer 5 045 000
- 
980 500 4 064 500
Hnno III 
- 
ExprNorruRE oN PREMTsEs
AND EQUIPMENT
Sub-Head:
l0 
- 
Share. of joint expenditure on the Paris
570 000
l0 000
7s0 000
105 000
l5 000
40 000
l0 000
s72000
- 
los 000
570 000
r0 000
645 000
105 000
l5 000
40 000
l0 000
572000
1l 
- 
Hire of committee rooms
12 
- 
Technical and other installations for
Assembly sessions
13 
- 
Various services for the organisation of
14 
- 
Maintenance of the premises of the
oflice of the Clerk
15 
- 
Purchase or repair of office furniture .
16 
- 
Purchase of reproduction and other
office equipment.
17 
- 
Hire and maintenance of reproduction
and other office equipment .
Torar 2072000
- 
105 000 I 967 000
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Heads - sub-heads
Draft budget
for 1993
(Doc. 1325)
Breakdown
of changes made
by the Council
Revised
budget
Hrno IV 
- 
GrNrnal ADMINTsTRATTvE cosrs
Sub-Head:
18 
- 
Postage, telephone, telefax and
transport of documents . . . .
19 
- 
Duplication paper, headed writing
paper and other office supplies.. . . . . .
20 - Printing and publication of documents .2l 
- 
Purchase of documents .. . .
22 
- 
Official cars . 
-
630 000
240 000
l 185 000
75 000
125 000
500
630 000
240000
r 185 000
7s 000
125 000
s0023 - Bank charges
Torer- 2 2ss s00 2255 500
Hmo V 
- 
OrHrn ExPENDTTURE
Sub-Head:
24 - Travelling and subsistence allowances
and insurance for the President of the
Assembly, chairmen of committees and
rannorteurs 506 000
400 000
5 000
1 178 000
s0 000
460 000
s69 000
3 000
28 000
- 
260 000
- 
s0 000
- 
s88 000
- 
30 000
- 
3s 000
246000
3s0 000
5 000
590 000
50 000
430 000
534 000
3 000
28 000
- 
Expenses for representation
- 
Committee study missions
- 
Offrcial journeys of members of the
Office of the Clerk .
- 
Expenses of experts and the auditor ..
- 
Expenditure on information
- 
Expenses for political groups
- 
Contingencies and other expenditure
not elsewhere provided for ..
- 
Non-recoverable taxes .
Tornr-
25
26
27
28
29
30
3l
32
3 r99 000
- 
963 000 2236000
Operating budget ..
Riceiptsl. . .... ... . : : ::: :: :
30 520 500
l l0 000
- 
2 485 500 28 035 000
I l0 000
NBr rorer- oPERATTNG BUDGET 30 410 500
- 
2 485 500 27 925 000
Pensions expenditure .. . . .
Receipts
4 00s 000
780 000
- 
103 000
- 
15 000
4 108 000
765 000
Nrr rornl PENsroNs BUDGET 3 22s 000 +118000 3 343 000
Nrr cneNo rorAl . 33 635 500
-2367 s00 31 268 000
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APPENDIX IV
Trend of Assembly budgas from 1992 to 1993
t992
a
l 993
Doc. 1325
b
%
bla
l 993
(estimates
adjusted
by BOC)
c
Vo
cla
1993
Council
opinion
d
%
dla
A. Operating budget
Head I. Permanent staff....
Head II. Temporary staff...,
Head III. Expenditure
on premlses
and equipment ....
Head IV. General
administrative costs
Head V. Other expenditure..
l6 287 000
3 812 000
t 767 000
2 235 500
2225 000
t7 949 000
5 545 000
2272000
2 zss s00
3 199 000
+ 10.20
+ 32.34
+ 17.26
+ 0.92
+ 43.77
l8 455 000
5 119 000
2072000
22ss 500
3 199 000
+ 13.31
+ 34.28
+ 17.26
+ 0.92
+ 43.77
l7 512 000
4 064 500
l 967 000
2 255 500
2236000
7.52
6.62
I l.3l
0.91
0.49
Total expenditure.
Receipts
26 326000
105 000
30 520 500
I 10 000
+ 15.93
+ 4.76
31 100 s00
l l0 000
+
+
18.13
4.76
28 03s 000
I l0 000
6.49
4.76
Nrr ror,ort- . 2622100,O 30 410 500 + 15.98 30 990 500 + 18.19 27 925 000 6.s0
B. Pensions budget
Pensions and leaving allowances
Receipts
3 655 000
700 000
4 005 000
780 000
+ 9.57
+ 11.43
4 108 000
800 000
+ 12.39
14.29
4 108 000
765 000
t2.39
9.2E
Nrr rornl . 2 95s 000 3 22s 000 + 9.13 3 308 000 + 11.95 3 343 000 13.13
Nrr GnaNp rorAl (A + B) 29 176 000 33 635 500 + 15.28 34 298 500 + 17.55 3l 268 000 7.17
*
It*
Tor* oF HEADs II ro V
OF OPERATING BUDGET . . . l0 039 000 12 571 500 +25.22 t2 645 500 + 25.96 l0 523 000 4.82
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Communiqud and statement issued after
the meeting of the enlarged Council
Rome, 16th tuly 1992
WEU enlarged Council, Rome, 16th laly 1992
Guidolims lor Press
Discussions between WEU member states (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom) and the six candidate states to the enlargement of
the organisation (Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Norway and Turkey) began this morning under
Italian presidency.
The procedure begun today follows the decisions taken on lfth December 1991 in Maastricht,
whcre member states of the European Union were invited to accede to WEU or to become observers,
and simultaneously other European member states of the Atlantic Alliance were invited to become
associate members of WEU. Part tII of the Petersberg Declaration adopted by the WEU Council of
Miristers on l9th June 1992 set out the detailed provisions.
The Italian Political Director, Ambassador Vanni d'Archirafi, opened the discussions, stressing
the importance of this step for the development of the organisation along the lines defined in Maas-
tridrt for the construction of a new European security architecture. Replies followed from the delega-
tions of the member states and of the candidate states.
During the meeting, delegations drew up a work progxamme and procedures with the aim of con-
cluding the discussions by 3lst December 1992, in accordance with the wish expressed in the Maas-
tridrt Declaration.
Statement by the ltalian Political Dhector,
Ambassador Raniero Yanni dUrchhafi, at the
muting of the enlarged Council Rome, 16th tuly 1992
On behalf of the ltalian Government, I welcome you all in Rome at this meeting of the enlarged
Council which has been called by the presidency to start the process of discussions in view of the
adhesion to WEU respectively as members, or observers, and associate members of European states
members of the European Union or of the Atlantic Alliance. This is a new, extremely important and
significant step in the development of WEU along the lines defined in Maastricht and in the edification
of a new European security architecture.
I am very conscious of the responsibilities that in this regard befall on the Italian presidency.
Itaty will do its utmost to give the necessary impulse to the process of enlargement in the framework of
developing WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.
The Brussels Treaty, modified in 1954, makes WEU the oldest organisation with a European
oricntation. Although, over the years, a number of functions have been transferred to other European
institutions such as the European Community, the Council of Europe or NATO, recent years have seen
an upsurge in WEU's activities and r6le, as evidenced by the Hague platform of 27th October 1987, in
which ministers declared that they intended to develop a more cohesive European defence identity
which will translate more effectively into practice the obligations of solidarity to which we are com-
mitted through the modified Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties. WEU is also unique as an
organisation bringing together foreign affairs and defence interests. This politico-military commitment
makes WEU a vital component of the European development process. The WEU declaration adopted
at Maastricht on lfth December 1991 confirms this orientation. On that occasion WEU member states
agrced on the need to 'develop a genuine European security and defence identity and a greater
European responsibility in defence matters' .
The relations between WEU and the European Union and between WEU and the Atlantic
AlEance are taking on an entirely new dimension and will have to promote a pattern of stricter
cooperation, transparency and co-ordination.
In fact, the new Europe which is being shaped will demand such growing co-operation between
all the member states of the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance. The Petersberg Decla-
7t
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ration, in the wake of Maastricht, has opened a new phase characterised by the strengthening of
organisation's operational r6le and structure. The development of a defence dimension of European
integration will represent an historic event. It is also a necessity of our time. The political changes
which have taken place in recent years have determined a new ' demand of Europe " and a demand of
a new kind of Europe, capable of playing an increasing r6le for the maintenance of peace and security
in our continent. This is strongly evidenced by the present crisis in Yugoslavia that has clearly deter-
mined the need for Europe to concretely act with effective means to promote a political solution of the
conflict, in support of the United Nations initiatives.
In this context, I wish to recall that in the recent past WEU has seen fit to brief the majority of
the non-member states here present on certain operations carried out by the organisation of direct
concern to them. Accordingly, they were invited to attend a number of meetings as observers, for
example in 1990 and l99l during the Gulf crisis and the Yugoslav crisis itself.
In is in this spirit that WEU decided at Maastricht to demonstrate more fully its commitment to
Europe and to enhance its contribution to European construction and to the effectiveness of its partici-
pation in the European security architecture by inviting the other European member states in the
European Union to become members or observers, and those of the Atlantic Alliance to become asso-
ciate members. In so doing it also strengthens its rOle in the perspective laid down in Maastricht and in
Petersberg of a common defence within the European Union. In fact, the enlargement of WEU is not
merely a political option but is also a vital structural element for the organisation.
The Petersberg Declaration, in its Part III, has clearly def,rned the criteria for the enlargement
decided at Maastricht. The Italian presidency will adhere to those criteria in the conduct-of the
enlargement discussions, since they represent a substantive consensus among the members.
I shall recall that ministers expressed the wish in Maastricht that the dialogue should be held in
parallel with the candidates for accession and observer status on the one hand, and with the candidates
for associate membership on the other. Accordingly, the Permanent Council has planned to invite the
future members and associate members to become active observers in the period between the sigrring
of the protocol of accession and its ratification.
The Italian presidency will exert any effort with the aim of bringing the discussions to a positive
conclusion at the date established in Maastricht, that is at the end of December 1992.
I hope that the dialogue will proceed smoothly and that appropriate modalities can be defined
already today. The presidency proposes that such dialogue be carried out in the framework of the
SWG, possibly by groups of candidate countries, that is respectively candidates for full membership,
observership and associate membership.
I now invite other delegations from member countries and from candidate countries to take the
floor. In the afternoon we might then try to answer specific requests of clarification by individual dele-
gations of candidate countries in the framework of two meetings: one with the countries members of
the European Community at 3 p.m. and one with European members of the Atlantic Alliance at 4 p.m.
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Communiqud issued after the meeting of the WEU
ad hoc Group on Yugoslavia
Rome,24th lugust 1992
Communiqud issued after the meeting of the
extroordinary Council of Ministers
Iandon, 28th August 1992
The WEU ad hoc Group on Yugoslavia, composed of senior officials of the Ministries for
Foreign Affairs and Defence, met in Rome on 24th August to study the report drawn up by the contin-
gerrcy planning group set up at the previous meeting to prepare options for decisions by the Council of
Ministers. The latter is to meet in London on 28th August next and will be attended by Ministers for
Foreign Affairs and Defence. This will be the first concrete action taken following the conference on
Yugoslavia.
The operational hypotheses worked out and discussed in the ad hoc Group relate to the problem
of Lumanitarian convoys in the context of Security Council Resolution 770 all.d the question of moni-
toring heavy weapons in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The speed and efficiency with which the contingency planning group managed to work out
options considered appropriate by all the partners reflect the solidarity in WEU, the determination to
tala joint action and the attention each one accords to the need to facilitate the granting of speedy
assistance to the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
One should view in the same spirit the timeliness with which all partners indicated that they
were prepared to make practical contributions.
At the meeting of the Ministerial Council, it is planned to adopt final decisions on the contribu-
tions of the various member countries intended to facilitate the achievement of the aims of the United
Nations and to instruct ttre Italian presidency to present to the United Nations Secretary-General the
result of the planning work accomplished and the means made available by the member countries in
order to allow the implementation of the measures envisaged in relation to the various problems.
Communiqud issued after the meeting of the
*traordinary Coancil of Ministers
Iandoa, 28th Augast 1992
l. The Foreign and Defence Ministers of WEU member states met in London on 28th August 1992
following the conclusion of the London conference on former Yugoslavia. They expressed their firm
conviction that the principles agreed at that conference should provide the foundations for progress
towards a peaceful and just resolution of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. In particular, they reaf-
firmed the urgent necessity for the parties involved to cease the fighting and the use of force immedi-
ately and strictly respect the agreed cease-fires. They strongly urged all parties involved in the conflict
to adhere to the principles through positive actions and to contribute effectively to the implementation
of specific decisions also adopted by the London conference.
2. Ministers noted and endorsed the contributions which WEU and its member states were already
making and were prepared to make to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia:
Delivery of humanitarian assistance
The delivery of humanitarian assistance to the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina constitutes
one of the most immediate requirements for establishing civilised conditions promoting a political
solution. Ministers approved the planning carried out by WEU experts covering the protection of
humanitarian convoys by military escorts. They welcomed the willingness of the United Nations Secre-
tary-General to recommend to the Security Council that UNPROFOR operations in Bosnia-
Herzegovina be enhanced to provide such escorts, and expressed the view that humanitarian opera-
tiors and associated protective support should be organised by the United Nations. They underlined
tho collective will of the member states of WEU to contribute to such operations by military, logistic,
fimncial and other means and decided to keep the United Nations informed from today of the details
of such contributions. The Nine also decided to offer collectively today through the presidency to the
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United Nations the results of WEU's planning. They asked the Ad Hoc Group and Contingency
Planning Group to elaborate further the necessary planning.
Supemision of heavy weapons
Ministers underlined the importance of the supervision of heavy weapons in Bosnia-
Herzegovina in the overall peace process and for alleviating the suffering of the population. The min-
isters welcomed the conference's decision that all mortars and heavy weapons in Bosnia-Herzegovina
would be subject to international supervision and, as a first step, notified to the United Nations within
96 hours, as a prelude to their disengagement from the conflict. WEU member states are willing to con-
tribute to carrying out supervision operations under the overall responsibility of the United Nations
and in co-ordination with the CSCE and other organisations. Ministers took note of the planning
undertaken by WEU experts and decided to make it available through the Italian presidency to the
United Nations Secretary-General, the Chairman-in-OfIice of the CSCE and the Secretary-General of
NATO.
Strengthening the embargo
Ministers noted the success of operation sharp vigilance to monitor the embargo in the Adriatic.
They agreed that strengthening the effectiveness of the embargo established by United Nations
Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757 would be an important means of promoting a political
solution to the crisis in former Yugoslavia. They welcomed the conclusions of the [,ondon conference
and expressed the willingness of WEU member states to contribute to any further measures necessary
to make the embargo as effective as possible. Member states of WEU could, if requested, offer
expertise, technical assistance and equipment to the governments of the Danube riparian states to
prevent the use of the river Danube for the purpose of circumventing or breaking the sanctions
imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 71 3 and 7 57 . T\ey also support the call by
the london conference to the Security Council to consider further measures to ensure rigorous imple-
mentation of sanctions in the Adriatic. They also decided that the Ad Hoc Group should continue its
work in this field.
3. Ministers decided that the Italian presidency would continue to ensure a full exchange of infor-
mation and the necessary co-ordination with the other organisations involved (United Nations, EC,
NATO and CSCE).
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I*tter from the Praident of the Assembly
to the Auditor submitting the occounts
for the finatciol year 1991
27th Apil 1992
Dear Mr. Arpaillange,
In accordance with Article 14 of the
Financial Regulations of the Assembly of WEU,
I have the honour to submit to you the accounts
for the financial year 1991 in accordance with
the statements attached hereto, which refer to:
Accoants of the dministrative erpenditure of the Assembly
for the financial yar 1991
3rd July 1992
THE AUDTTORS REPORT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Lprrrn FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSTMSI-y TO THE AUolrOn SUBMITTING THE
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LprrEn FRoM THE AUDIToR To rHE PRESIDENT oF THE AssEMBLY - 3rd July 1992
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THE AccouNTs FoR THE FINANcIAL veen l99l - 3rd July 1992
CgnIITIceTE oF THE AUDIToR FoR THE FINANCIAL YENR Ist JANUARY TO 3ISt DECEMBER
l99l 
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APPENDICES
I. Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year l99l -
financial position as at 3lst December l99l
II. Statement ofbudget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits
for the financial year l99l
III. Contributions to the WEU Assernbly budget for l99l
IY. Provident fund - account for the flrnancial year ended 3lst December
l99l
V. l99l balance sheet for the Unified European kft Group
YI. l99l balance sheet for the Federated Group of Christian Democrats and
European Democrats
YII. l99l balance sheet for the Liberal Group
VIII. l99l balance sheet for the Socialist Group
(a/ Summary of income and expenditure
financial position as at 3lst
December 1991 (Appendix I);
(b/ Statement of budget authorisations,
expenditure and unexpended credits(Appendix II);
(c/ Contributions (ApPendix III);
(d) Provident fund (ApPendix IV).
As is customary, after being audited these
tables will be signed by the President of the
Assembly, the Clerk of the Assembly and the
Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary
Alfairs and Administration before being sub-
mitted to the Assembly.
2. The statement of budget authorisations,
expenditure and unexpended credits shows a
saving of F 418 488, whereas the final statement
l.
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of income and expenditure shows a credit
balance of F 514 471. The difference between
these two figures, i.e. F 95 983, shows an excess
of receipts over estimates:
- 
Bank interest
FF
73 866
- 
Sundry receipts 92087
- Sale of publications 42 589
- 
Contributions 7% 623 441
- 
Receipts for l99l
estimated in
the budget
83r 983
736 000
+ 95 983
3. Excess expenditure under Heads IV and V
of the operating budget amounting to F 175 687
has been met by transfers from other heads of
the budget. Excess expenditure under the pen-
sions budget amounting to F 32 000 has been
met by a transfer from Head I.
4. The statement of contributions for the
financial year l99l received from the Secretary-
General of WEU, London, is given at Appeir-
dix III.
5. Amounts in the provident fund of the
Assembly staff are incorporated with those of
the other organs of WEU and the joint fund is
administered by the Secretary-General in con-
sultation with the Clerk of the Assembly.
On 3lst December 1991, these amounts
totalled F 6 535 440 as shown in Appendix IV.
On that date there remained two loans to two
staff members amounting to F 491 000.
The Secretary-General has continued to
receive advice from the advisory panel set up
within WEU and from outside bankers on the
investment of these funds. On 3lst December
l99l the fund was held by Montagu Investment
Management Limited in London.
6. Also appended to the accounts of the
Assembly are the reports on the funds attributed
to the political gf,oups in accordance with the
directives issued by the Presidential Committee(Document A/WEU/CP (86) 39) as follows:
- 
Unified European kft Group;
- 
Federated Group of Christian Demo-
crats and European Democrats;
- 
Liberal Group;
- Socialist Group.
These reports will be considered as an
integral part of the accounts of the Assembly;
they give details of the use of credits included in
Sub-Head 30 of the operating budget of the
Assembly.
Yours sincerely,
Giuseppe SrNrsro
Acting President of the Assembly
Mr. Pierre Anpnu-lexcr
Premier Pr6sident de la Cour des Comptes
13, rue Cambon
75OOI PARIS
I*tter from the Auditor
to the Presideat of tle Assembly
3rd tug 1992
Dear Mr. Soell,
I have the honour to enclose the accounts
of the Assembly of Western European Union for
the flrnancial year l99l together with my
opinion and report on these accounts.
Yours sincerely,
Pierre AnpnureNce
(Premier Pr€sident de la
Cour des Comptes de France,
Commissaire aux comptes)
Mr. Hartmut Sonq
President of the Assembly of
Western European Union
43, avenue du Prdsident-Wilson
75775 PARIS CEDEX 16
Report of the Egernal Auditor
to the Assembly of Western Europun Union
on the occounts for the fiaencial year 1991
ird luly 1992
I have audited the accounts of the
Assembly for the financial year l99l in
accordance with Article l5 of the Financial Reg-
ulations of the Assembly in order to appraise the
correct management of the budget and the book-
keeping.
The final statement of income and
expenditure shows a credit balance of F 514 471
while the statement of budget authorisations,
expenditure and unexpended credits shows a
saving of F 418 488.
The difference, i.e. F 95 983, shows an
excess of receipts over estimates; receipts
amounted to F 831 983 while the corresponding
estimates amounted to F 736 000.
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The saving in the budget may be
summarised as follows:
Total
'l?,0.,I' ..rlf:11*, Barance
transfersFFF
Part I:
Operating budget
Head I
Pernanent staff 14 592 000 14 185 981 406 019
Head II
Temporary staff
Head III
Expanditure on
premises and
equipment I 709 47O
Head IV
Gencral adminis-
trative costs 2250700
3 563 580 3 563 503 77
Head V
Other
expenditure
Head VI
Premises
Part II:
Pensions budget
Head I
Pensions,
allowances
and social
char3es
Total
Final statement
of income
and expenditure 
.SavinB on
oa 3lst December ':xPenditure
of the financial year
1988:+ 6591 + 82179
1989:+106ll3 + 42793
1990: +72O333 +710837
1991: + 514471 +41t488
| 709 425 45
2250678 22
2 t29 750 2 129 stt 239
173 554 173 553 l
3 398 000 3 385 915 12 085
418 488
Difference
between
estimates
and income
- 
75 588
+63 140
+ 9496
+ 95 983
The financial situation compared to that
on 31st December 1990 has therefore declined
slig[tly but remains at a level comparable with
that noted when the accounts for previous
financial years were audited as shown in the fol-
lowing table:
When the 1990 accounts were audited, it
had been noted that the result was not typical
insofar as it had included an exceptional credit
of F 396 000. The result noted in l99l has
changed significantly compared with previous
years, in particular 1989.
Receipts exceeded estimates in the
budgets for three of the four heads concerned:
Estimates Actual receipts
Bank interest
Sundry receipts
(social security
reimbursements)
Sale of publications
Contributions 7%
60 000
l0 000
35 000
631 000
736 000
73 866
92087
42 589
623 441
83r 983
There is a credit balance under these
various heads of F 95 983 (F 9 496 in 1990;
F 63 140 in 1989).
***
Contributions by member states to the
Assembly's budget fell by 13.9o/o in 1991. 1990
was an exceptional year because ofthe work on
reorganising and renovating the building in
which the Assembly has its seat.
It should be noted that there is a tendency
for the rate at which these contributions are paid
to slow down.
At the end of the first half of 1991, the
level of payment of contributions by member
states - based on the dates on which the
Secretariat-General of WEU in London effected
the transfers 
- 
was 20.30lo lower than on the
same date in 1990 (whereas, as stated above, the
annual overall amount of contributions fell by
only 13.9%).
At the end of the first half of 1991, only
5l9o of the annual overall amount of contribu-
tions had bern paid compared with 55Yo the pre-
vrous year.
Should this tendency continue, it would
make the management of the Assembly's budget
diflicult, particularly during the first months of
the financial year.
!f
{. tt
Situation of transfers
between heads in l99l
+-
Part I:
Operating budget
Head I
Permanent staff
Head II
Temporary staff
63 400
r63 965
I 55 400
235 385
56 970
Head III
Expenditure on premises
and equipment 12 440
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Head IV
General administrative
costs
Head V
Other expenditure
Head YI
Premises
Part II:
Pensions budget
Head I
Pensions, allowances
and social charges
Total
r47 420
149 690
6220
n4940
33 500
602 415
65 500
602 415
As in the previous year, two transfers (for
a total of F 92 000) were made in accordance
with Article 6 of the Financial Regulations
(agreement of the WEU Council by a letter
dated 25th October 1991) from Head I of the
operating budget (Permanent staff) to Head II,
Sub-Head 8 (Temporary staff for the Office of
the Clerk) (F 60 000), and to Head I of the pen-
sions budget (F 32 000).
Whereas in previous financial years, and
in particular in 1990, it was noted that a very
large number of transfers had been made
affecting the same heads and sub-heads of the
operating budget and thus significantly modi-
fying the structure of the budget initially
adopted, it should be noted that, generally
speaking and with the exception of Head IV
(General administrative costs), the conditions in
which the budget was implemented followed the
initial estimates fairly closely. In 1991, transfers
amounted to F 207 950 compared with
F I 343 291 in 1990.
However, it should be underlined that
positive transfers are tending to become more
pronounced under two heads:
- 
Head IV General administrative
costs;
- 
Head V 
- 
Other expenditure.
Under Head IV, they amounted to only
F 13 000 in 1990; in 1991, they amounted to
F l4l 200 and related to Sub-Head 18 (Postage,
telephone and telex), with an increase of almostl0% compared with the initial estimate;
Sub-Head 20 (Printing and publication of docu-
ments); Sub-Head 22 (Official cars), where a
further amount of F 59 980 had to be added to
the initial sum of F 45 000. In the two financial
years 1990 and 1991, initial estimates for this
Sub-Head 22 of Head IV amounted to
F 185 000; a further F 138 740 was transferred
to it, making a total credit of F 323 740 for
actual expenditure of F 323734.
Overall, there was a less erratic trend
under Head V than in 1990:
- 
positive net transfers from other heads
amounting to F 34750 instead of
F 315 430;
- 
a slight increase in initial estimates
from F 20220W to F 2 095 000;
- 
a drop in final provisions: F 2 129 750
instead of F 2 337 430.
However, under this head, it should be
noted that there was a spectacular rise in
expenditure under Sub-Head 25 (Expenses for
representation) :
rnitiar estimat. i?Hl"l#3[l'
1990 230000
l99l 260000
266020
399 830
Expenditure under this sub-head
amounted to F 399 E27 compared with
F 266 014 in 1990, i.e. an increase of 5090 from
one financial year to another.
**t
Having completed this audit, I thank the
Clerk and staff of the Assembly for their val-
uable co-operation in the exercise of my duties
as Auditor.
Pierre Anpnu.r-eNcr
(Premier Pr4sident de la
Cour des Comptes de France,
Commissaire aux comptes)
Certiftcate of thc Auditor for the financial year
lst January to ilst Deember 1991
3rd luly 192
In application of Article l5 of the
Financial Regulations of the Assembly of
Western European Union, I have examined the
appended financial statements of the Assembly
comprising the summary of income and expend-
iture for the financial year 1991.
My examination included verification of
the books and other relevant documents that I
deemed necessary.
As a result of this examination, my
opinion is that these statements faithfully record
the book-keeping operations for the financial
year and that these operations were in con-
formity with the budget estimates, the Financial
Regulations, the financial instructions and other
decisions of the legislative authority, and that
they are a correct record of the financial situ-
ation for the year ended 3lst December 1991.
Pierre ARperu-eNcr
(Premier Prisident de la
Cour des Comptes de France,
Commissaire aux comptes)
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APPENDIX I
Summa.ry of income and expenditurc for the financial year 1991
(in French francs)
Per auached statement
Assessments of member states (see Appendix III)
Miscellaneous
(A) Sundry receipts
Bank interest
Sundry receipts
Sale of publications
(B) Pensions
Contributions (7016)
Budget credits
Total expenditure (see Appendix II) .
Excess of income over expenditure .
Financial position os at 31st De*enber 1991
Assets
Contributions received
Miscellaneous debtors
Contributions 7olo
Non-recoverable taxes
Liabilities
Balance at the bank
Miscellaneous creditors
Sums paid
Excess of income over expenditure .
Hartmut Soeu
President of the Assembly
Georges Mouuns
Clerk of the Assembly
CertiJied correct:
Pierre ARpeu,nNce
(Premier Prdsident de la
Cour des Comptes de France,
Commissaire aux comptes)
27 081 054
73 866
92087
42 589
623 44t
831 983
27 913 037
27 398 566
514 47 t
4 040 tt4
85 815
12 089
429 296
4 595 75t
2 335 443
574 672
I l7l 165
514 471
F 4 59575t
Tim RarHsoNr
Chairman of the Committee
on Budgetary Alfairs
and Administration
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APPt
STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITI,II
(in Frtr
PART I: OPERATING BUDGET Total budgetfor l99l
A. l. 
- 
ORonanyExPENDrruRE
Hrno I 
- 
PrnuaNrx-rsrnrn
Sub-Head 1 Basic salaries
Sub-Head 2 Allowances
2.1. Expatriation allowance
2.2. Household allowance
2.3. Allowance for children and other dependent persons
2.4. Rent allowance
2.5. Education allowance
2.6. Allowance for language courses
2.7. Overtime
2.8. Home leave
Sub-Head 3 Social charges
3.1. Social security
3.2. Supplementary insurance
3.3. Provident fund
Sub-Head 4 Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of
permanent officials
4.1. Trpvelling expenses of candidates for vacant posts
4.2. Travelling expenses on arrival and departure of per-
manent officials and their families
4.3. Removal expenses
4.4. Installation allowance
Sub-Head 5 Medical examination
l0 374 000
004 000
456 000
518 000
80 000
55 000
2 000
5s 000
30 000
399 000
429 000
l 84 000
s 400
l6 000
65 000
600ll
I
l
I
Total of Head I 14 684 000
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I
UNEXPDNDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1991
Transfers+-
Total after
transfers
Total
expenditure
Unexpended
credits
I
I
I
I
I
I
t
t
22300
2 000
31 000
8 100
92 000
l7 500
l0 000
l4 300
l2 100
I 400
8 100
10 282 000
986 s00
446 000
503 700
80 000
55 000
2 000
77 3N
32 000
l 386 900
460 000
l 82 600
l3 s00
7 900
6s 000
1l 600
l0 064 383
921 294
422067
4s6 005
49 313
s4 596
77 291
3l 991
I 386 866
459 951
182 551
t3 451
2 808
s2 383
ll 031
zt't 6t7
6s 206
23933
47 695
30 687
404
2 000
9
9
34
49
49
49
s 092
t2 617
569
63 400 155 400 t4 592000 l4 185 981 406 019
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PART I: OPERATING BUDGET Totalfor
budget
l99l
Hrno II 
- 
TruponqnY srAFF
Sub-Head 6 Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly
6.1. Sittings service
6.2. Interpretation service
6.3. Translationservice
6.4. Other services
Sub-Head 7 lnterpretation staff required for Assembly work
between sessions
Sub-Head I Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk
Sub-Head 9 Social charges
9. I . Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters
9.2. Provident fund for interpreters
9.3. Insurance for interpreters
3s0 000
622000
864 000
66 000
568 000
l5 000
l0 000
l 35 000
s 000
I
I
Total of Head II 3 635 000
Hrnp III 
- 
ExprNomuRE oN pREMrsEs AND EeurpMENT
Sub-Head 10 Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises
Sub-Head 11 Hire of committee rooms
Sub-Head l2 Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions
Sub-Head 13 Various services for the organisation of sessions
Sub-Head 14 Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the
Clerk
Sub-Head 15 Purchase or repair of offrce furniture
Sub-Head 16 Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment
Sub-Head 17 Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other
oflice equipment
525 000
l0 000
570 000
65 000
l5 000
3s 000
534 000
I
i
I
Total of Head III I 754 000
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I
+
Transfers Total aftertransfers
Total
expenditure
Unexpended
credits
i
I
i
L
56 ll0
l0l 860
5 995
43 r70
48 550
l4l 955
630
600
480
306 830
573 450
722045
65 370
624 tto
l 16 860
9 400
140 995
4 520
306822
573 437
722029
65 363
624 tO6
I l6 856
9 389
140 992
4 509
8
l3
t6
7
4
I
ll
3
ll
163 965 235 385 3 563 580 3 s63 s03 77
I
I
I
l
i
8220
2 210
2 010
22W0
7 720
3 540
t3 270
t0 440
503 000
2280
566 4@
73 220
t 730
37 2t0
2010
523 560
502 989
2 272
566 453
73 217
t 727
37 209
2007
523 551
ll
8
7
3
3
I
3
l
L2 440 s6 970 L 709 470 t 709 425 45
83
DOCUMENT 1328
PART I: OPERATING BUDGET Total budgetfor l99l
Heap IV 
- 
GrNrns ADMrNrsrRATrvE cosrs
Sub-Head 18 Postage, telephone, telefax and transport of docu-
ments
Sub-Head 19 Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other
oflice supplies
Sub-Head 20 Printing and publication of documents
Sub-Head 21 Purchase of documents
Sub-Head 22 Official cars
Sub-Head 23 Bank charges
s60 000
280 000
154 000
70 000
45 000
s00
Total of Head IV 2 109 500
Hrno V 
- 
Orurn ExPENDTTURE
Sub-Head 24 Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance
for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of com-
mittees and rapporteurs
Sub-Head 25 Expenses for representation
Sub-Head 26 Committee study missions
Sub-Head 27 Oflicial journeys of members of the Oflice the Clerk
Sub-Head 28 Expenses of experts and the auditor
Sub-Head 29 Expenditure on information
Sub-Head 30 Expenses for political groups
Sub-Head 31 Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere
provided for
Sub-Head 32 Non-recoverable taxes
200 000
260 000
5 000
630 000
30 000
455 000
484 000
3 000
28 000
I
rl
I
I
l
Total of Head V 2 095 000 I
Total 24277 500
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I
+
Transfers Total aftertransfers
Total
expenditure
Unexpended
credits
I
52 870
l 355
33 2ts
s9 980
5 720
500
6t2 870
281 355
187 2t5
64 280
104 980
612 867
281 351
t87 2r2
64 274
104 974
3
4
3
6
6
147 420 6220 2250700 2 250 678 22
I
I
i
139 830
l 030
8 830
46 500
5 000
4t 340
21 000
1 100
153 500
399 830
s88 660
31 030
434 000
484 000
1t 830
26900
153 414
399 828
s88 650
3r 028
433 96t
484 000
tt 827
26 803
86
2
r0
2
39
3
97
149 690 tt4 940 2 129 750 2 129 5rt 239
536 915 568 9rs 24 245 500 23 839 098 406 402
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PART I: OPERATING BUDGET Total budgetfor l99l
I
I
A.2. 
- 
ExtReonorNARY EXPENDTTURE
Hrep VI 
- 
Pnrursrs
Sub-Head 33 Reorganisation of the building
Sub-Head 33.1 Feasibility study
Sub-Head 33.2 Work on utilities
Sub-Head 33.3 Prime contractorship
SubHead 34 Installation of committee rooms
Sub-Head 34.1 Interpretationequipment
Sub-Head 34.2 Furnishing committee rooms
Sub-Head 34.3 Furnishing corridor
Sub-Head 35 National delegation offices
SubHead 35.1 Furniture and other offrce equipment
Sub-Head 35.2 Typewriters
Sub-Head 36 Lounge in the first basement
t38 274
35 280
I
Total of A.2 t73 554
Total of Part I 24 45t 054
t
86
I
;t
APPENDIX II
+
Transfers Total aftertransfers
Total
expenditure
Unexpended
credits
I
138 274
35 280
138 273
35 280
173 554 173 553 I
536 9l 5 568 9r5 24 4t9 054 24 012 651 406 403
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I
I
I
I
PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET Total budgetfor l99l
Hrno I 
- 
PrNstotrs, ALLowANcEs AND socrAl cHARGES
Sub-Head I
1. 1.
1.2.
1.3.
1.4.
1.5.
2
2. t.
2.2.
2.3.
3
Pensions and leaving allowances
Retirement pensions
Invalidity pensions
Survivors' pensions
Orphans' or dependants' pensions
kaving allowances
Family allowances
Household allowances
Children's and dependants' allowances
Education allowances
Supplementary insurance
Sub-Head
Sub-Head
2 802 000
258 000
58 000
125 000
30 000
l4 000
79 000
I
I
Total of Head I 3 366 000
Total 27 8t7 054
Hartmut Soru
President of the Assembly
c.S
ctdd
88
APPENDIX II
* 
Transfen Total aftertransfers
Total
expenditure
Unexpended
credits
I
I
45 100
2 300
l8 100
13 100
ll 000
9 400
2 788 900
303 100
58 000
127 300
l9 000
4 600
97 100
2782906
303 060
57 522
127 280
l8 063
97 084
s 994
40
478
20
937
4 600
l6
65 500 33 500 3 398 000 3 385 915 l2 085
602 415 602 415 27 817 054 27 398 566 418 488
lguuns
l,l,ssembly
Tim RcrHnoNp
Chairman of the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration
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APPENDIX III
Contributions to the WEU Assembly budga for 1991
F
26907 500
345 778
F
l99l budget (Sec. Gen. letter 7.10.1991)
Brought over from 1990 C-B (91) 7
Sub-total
Carried over to 1992 NWEU/BA (92) 3
Nrr Tornr.
Contributions received for l99l:
25th February l99l
l3th March l99l
29th March l99l
2nd April l99l
22nd April l99l
l0th June l99l
28th June l99l
l9th August l99l
24th September l99l
l6th October l99l
8th November l99l
28th November l99l
22nd January 1992
3lst January 1992
Brought over from 1990
Sub-total
Carried over to 1992
Tornl PAyMENTs
i1
27 2s3 278
t72 224
27 081 054
t 099 523.12
533 697.73
295 80s.10
1348714.49
4 706 078.25
3 289 569.00
2194 t18.25
3 494095.50
l 097 628.00
l 656 125.00
1097 628.00
t 507 623.50
l 185 889.00
3 026 449.59
720 333.47
27 2s3278.N
- 
172224.00
27 081054.00
l
I
I
I
I
I
90
I
I
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APPENDIX IV
PROVIDENT FUND
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1991
in French francs
Georges Mourns
Clerk of the Assembly
Tim RarHsoNr
Chairman of the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration
Hartmut Soell
President of the Assembly
Balance brought forward:
Accounts of staff members as at lst January
l99l
Contributions of staff members and of the
Assembly of Western European Union
Repayments of loans by staff members
lnterest received during the year
F
5 603 997
278 805
164 540
s93 937
Withdrawals
Accounts of existing staff members as at 3lst
December l99l
Loss on valuation at 3lst December 1991
F
r8 440
6 535 440
87 399
6 641 279 6 641 279
'u
'otr
U
x
Uoo
ETz
-t
r,
N)6
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APPENDIX V
1991 Balonce sheet for the Uaified European Left Gmup
Surplus at 3lst December 1990 (bank accounts, cash).
Interest
Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for l99l
i
I
I
I
Iti
F
l.
2.
3.
Liobilities
I. Expenditure
l. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance)
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, oflice supplies) ..
3. Seminars and meetings ...
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) .
5. Interpretation costs
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners)
7. Sundry expenses
II. Surplus at 3lst December 1990 (bank accounts, cash) .
Total
Signatures of the Treasurer (BrNmsr)
and two auditors of the group (Prcnar,lr, Prccurou)
52 678
r8 140
9 837
t0 263
5 712
4 930
3 700
96
52 678
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l.
)
3.
APPENDIX VI
1991 Balance shea for the Fedemted Group
of Christian Democrats and Europan Democrats
Assets
Surplus at lst January L99l (bank accounts, cash)
Interest
Appropriations ganted by the Assembly of WEU for 1991
Total .
F
9r 284.54
L9 432.26
189 322.00
300 038.80
Liabilities
I. Expenditure
l. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance)
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) ..
3. Seminars, meetings and interpretation costs .
4. Travel and subsistence (members and staff) .
II. Surplus at 3lst December l99l (bank ac@unts, cash) .
Total .
Signetures of the Chairman (Cnno), the Treasurer (JuNc)
and an auditor of the group (LrNrz-ConNrrrr)
66 000.00
549.00
50 000.00
60 36s.9s
123123.85
300 038.80
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l.
2.
3.
APPENDIX vII
1991 Balance shut for thc Liberal Gmup
Surplus at 3lst December 1990 (bank accounts, cash).
Interest
Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for l99l
Total
Liobihfir;s
I. Expenditure
l. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance)
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, oflice supplies) ..
3. Seminars and meetings
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) .
5. Interpretation costs.
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners)
7. Sundry expenses
Total .
II. Surplus at 3lst December l99l (bank accounts, cash)
Total
Signatures of the Treasurer (VonnEn)
and two auditors of the group (Mnnrno, Mervzrl)
F
47 t99.64
t 719.29
82 082.00
l3l 000.93
33 280.00
7 000.00
l l 000.00
5 400.00
9 300.00
65 980.00
65 020.93
l3l 0@.93
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APPENDIX VIII
1991 Bala.nce sheet for tlp Socialist Group
Surplus at 3lst December 1990 (bank accounts, cash)
Interest
Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for l99l
Total
Liabilitics
L Expenditure
l. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance)
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, oflice supplies) .
3. Missions, meetings, seminars
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) .
5. Interpretation costs
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners)
7. Sundry expenses
Surplus at
Total
3lst December l99l (bank accounts, cash) .
Signatures of the Treasurer (Leconcr)
and two auditors of the group (Gennrrr, Tuuunns)
l.
2.
3.
F
l5l 833.58
6 161.50
159 918.00
317 913.08
92 682.00
3130.00
46094.N
33 846.97
285.00
l4l 875.1l
317 913.08
u.
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Accoants of the odminhtrative erpenditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 1991
MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE A,SSEMBLY
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1991 
'
submiaed oa belwlf of
tlp Committee on Budgetary Alfairs and Administrution2
by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur
The Assembly,
Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1991, together with
the auditor's report, in accordance with Article 17 of the linancial regulations,
Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his
financial responsibility.
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Rathbone (Chairman) (Alternate: Lord Mackie of Benshie\; MM. Lagorce, Maass (Yice-
Chairmen); MM. Alvarez (Alternate: Roman), Antretter, Mrs. Durrieu, MM. Biefnot, Biichler, Covi (Altcrnate: Rubner), Curto,
Diaz, (Alternate:, Fabra), Eversdijk, Dame Peggy Fenner (dternate:. Earl of Dundee),MM. de Gaulle, Garcia Sanchez (Alternate:
Gonzalez-Laxe), Howell, Jurgens, Manisco, Meyer zu Bentrup, Oehler, Pinto, Pizzo, Redmond (Alternate: Lord Finsberg),
Regenwetter, Tatarella, Thissen.
N.B. Ifte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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IAEU and the situation in former Yugoslavia
REPORT
submitted on behalf of the Standing Committee
by Mr. Mafien, Rapporteur
RECOMMENDATION 525 
'
The Assembly,
(i) Acting through an urgent meeting of its Standing Committee;(ii) Recalling Recommendations 506, 5ll,5l2 and 519 which have all sought to prompt specific
WEU action to help resolve the Yugoslav crisis;
(iit) Fully endorsing United Nations Resolutions 713,757,770 and 771;(iv) Welcoming the progress made as a result of the London Conference but saddened that in spite of
many attempts, in varying bodies, to find a political solution to the crisis, the suffering of the peoples
concerned is intensifying to a devastating degree, not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina but also in Croatia
where Dubrovnik is still being shelled nightly;(v) Regretting that the United Nations embargo on Serbia and Montenegro is not being applied
effectively, except at sea;(vil Congratulating the ltalian presidency of WEU for its initiatives in convening an extraordinary
Council of Ministers meeting in London on 28th August, as requested on behalf of the Assembly by its
Prerident, and approving the communiqud issued which offers the United Nations assistance in deliv-
ering humanitarian aid, in the supervision of heavy weapons and in strengthening the embargo;
(vit) Pleased that a majority of WEU countries are contributing forces for Operation " Sharp Vigi-
lance " and are prepared to make forces available to support United Nations efforts in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, but also hoping for a more equitable cost-sharing agreement between member countries;
(viii) Welcoming the North Atlantic Council's decision to make NATO's logistical infrastructure
available to co-operate in WEU action in the framework of United Nations Security Council directives
and also welcoming offers by the United States,
Uncsx-rlv REcoMMENDS THAr rnr CouNcrr.
l. Seek immediate United Nations approval to impose a complete and total land, air and sea
blockade of Serbia and Montenegro, the cessation of all financial, economic and other international
assistance and the exclusion of Serbia and Montenegro from all international organisations until such
timc as they comply completely with all United Nations resolutions and the decisions of the London
Conference;
2. Respond favourably to Romanian requests for help in policing the border with Serbia and help
to establish similar arrangements with other neighbouring countries in the region;
3. Insist that Greece give the necessary assurances of total compliance with the United Nations
embargo before continuing the present negotiations for WEU membership;
4. Offer to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to keep WEU forces available to the
United Nations under European command and operational control in order to maintain cohesion and
to carry out Resolution 770 effectively, and in close co-ordination with the United Nations;
5. Ensure that the WEU military planning cell is fully operational when established on lst October
1992 in order to play a specific rOle in the present crisis;
l. Mopted by the Standing Committee on 3rd September 1992.
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6. Institute a formal liaison mechanism with NATO headquarters and appropriate commands and
also with the relevant United States authorities to help promote efficient and cost-effective
co-operation and to avoid duplication of effort;
7. Prepare, in conjunction with other bodies, the future military requirements which may become
necessary should Serbia not respect the London engagements and, in particular, study the need to:
(a) develop the alternative options for action considered on 28th August;
(b) plan appropriate anti-submarine and mine-hunting operations in the Adriatic;
(c/ ensure air superiority in the area of operations and if necessary an air exclusion zone;
(d) take steps to ensure sufficient air protection for WEU forces made available to the United
Nations;
(e) confine all naval assets based in Kotor and Bar;
fi develop electronic counter-measures (ECM) to best effect and, more specifically, jam and
neutralise military communications as well as fire control systems;
(g/ provide military. hospital facilities^in.-[h.e re^gton 
^for the treatment of the wounded, bothservice and civilian, and organise facilities for refugees;
8. Invite non-member nations to co-operate in furnishing military forces to complement WEU
assets;
9. Examine action to be taken, including military action, not only to stop present fighting but also
to prevent present conflicts spreading to Kosovo, Sandjak, Vojvodina and Macodonia and, in con-junction with the CSCE, consider the timely deployment of protective forces.
I
i
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Activitics of tlw IEPG
I*tter from Mr. van kblcn, Suretary-General of WEA,
to Mr. Soell, Prusidcnt of the Assembly
7th September 1992
Dear President,
Further to your acting President's letter of 23rd April 1992,1am pleased to be able to forward to
you an information letter from the IEPG covering its activities since 1991.
You will see that a further information letter should be provided after the Bonn IEPG minis-
terial meeting in December.
Yours sincerely,
Willem van Erx.pr-rN
Mr. Hartmut Sorll
Prcsident of the Assembly of WEU
*
i. rt
Informaion later to the WEU Assembly concerning
tke Independent Eumpeaa Pmgtammc Gmup (IEPG)
Introduction
l. Through its comprehensive membership, the IEPG remains the natural vehicle covering all the
aspects of defence procunement in Europe. Although its basic functioning method is unchanged, the
IEPG has, since 1991, set up two special working groups: the'Ad hoc Group on ECIWEU matters "(on developments in other European fora with possible implications for the IEPG) and the * IEPG
Team " for dialogue with WEU. Both special working groups report directly to the IEPG Chair. The
current structure of the IEPG is attached at Annex A.
2. Since the last statement to the WEU Assembly in January 1991, the defence ministers of the
thirteen IEPG nations met in Brussels on 3rd July l99l and in Oslo on 6th March 1992. On both occa-
sions, besides reviewing the IEPG's traditional activities, ministers focused on the possible implica-
tiqrs for the IEPG of recent evolutions in Europe. The Brussels communiqud is attached at Annex B,
the Oslo communiqu6 is attached at Annex C.
3. At the Brussels meeting, recognising that in other European fora the discussions on the future
security architecture of Europe might have a significant impact on the research, development, pro.
duction and trade in defence equipment, ministers agreed to pursue the exchange of information
through appropriate informal contacts (presidency level) with the European bodies concerned, in par-
ticular with the EC and WEU.
4. At the Oslo meeting, noting that the evolution of a new security architecture for Europe had
gathered momentum, ministers acknowledged that the IEPG nations had to make a contribution in the
field of the future framework for defence equipment co-operation in Europe. In their initial analysis of
the implications for the IEPG of recent developments in Europe, ministers agreed that the IEPG's r6le
and place in the future European security architecture needed further thorough examination.
Future rdle and place in the European security architecture
5. In a time when developments and changes in Europe are taking place which were unpredictable
only a few years ago, various European fora are in the process of debating and adapting their structures
to the new situation. The IEPG is often mentioned. Recognising the IEPG, at present, as the only
European forum with participation of all European defence ministers of the Atlantic Alliance, it seems
appropriate for the IEPG itself to participate in this debate and to evaluate its future r6le in the
changing environment.
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6. At the Oslo meeting, it was stressed that, whatever the future rearrangements might be, the
IEPG's unique r6le at present in defence equipment matters in Europe and its expertise in promoting
co-operation and competition in defence procurement will be an important contribution and will need
to be maintained. The vital importance of ensuring the continued full participation of all IEPG
members in the field of defence equipment ceoperation was particularly underlined.
7. As directed by ministers in Oslo, national armaments directors have now defined and agreed the
basic principles at Annex D to be taken into account during further discussions on IEPG's future.
8. Also following the intentions expressed and the conclusions drawn in Oslo an * IEPG Team "
composed of national representatives of the thirteen IEPG nations (and thus the nine WEU nations)
has now been established. The team has to examine, in dialogue with WEU, the future rOle of the IEPG
in the new European security architecture including an initial examination of the possible r6le and
functions of a future European armaments agency.
Cooperation with other European nations
9. Taking into account the rapid changes in Europe of the past two years, the IEPG needs to be pre-
pared to respond to requests from other European nations for participation, in due time, in the group's
activities. Through the case of Sweden, who applied for co-operation with the IEPG in September
1991, the IEPG had a preliminary exchange of views on the issue. It was agreed that this question had
to be considered in the context of the evolution of the European security architecture.
Traditional octivities
Panel I: harmonisation of requirements and equipment cooperation
10. Harmonisation of requirements remains critical for the achievement of the IEPG goals. Panel I
has established measures to improve the chances of sub-groups carrying through projects to com-
pletion. A list of current projects is at Annex E. The panel has also focused on a revised procedure for
equipment review that so far has proved itself very promising. It allows nations to concentrate work on
potential areas for co-operation, discuss each project in detail and only establish sub-groups where
success is likely. Moreover, it is also aiming at harmonious collaboration with other fora dealing with
equipment programmes.
Panel II: research and technology, notably EUCLID
11. Following the signature of the programme memorandum of understanding (PMOU) for
EUCLID (European co-operation for the long term in defence) by ministers in November 1990, Panel
II has been translating into contractual terms the procedures to manage research and technology
projects (RTPs).
12. The list of RTPs approved for entering the definition phase is at Annex F. The RTP man-
agement groups continue to prepare the implementing arrangements (IAs) for signature by the partici-
pating governments. Until now, seventeen IAs have been signed, the corresponding requests for pro-
posals have been issued and four contracts have been awarded.
13. In addition to EUCLID, a certain number of common technology projects (CTPs) are prG
glressing very well and some have been successfully completed. The expenditure involved in the CTPs,
since the beginning in 1986, amounts to about 100 M ecus.
Panel III: defence economics notably European defence equipment market (EDEM)
14. The IEPG again underlined the significance of its continuing work to establish progressively an
open European defence equipment market. It is important to achieve the most efficient and effective
use of nations' defence budgets which are declining in the light of the changed international security
situation.
15. Also in the light of the recent changes in the European defence and security environment, PanelIII is currently considering and identifying the possible consequences of the implications of these
changes on the EDEM policy as laid down in the IEPG action plan 1988 and in the policy document
approved by ministers in November 1990.
16. Besides finalising procedures for a limited monitoring system for overseeing the development of
a progressively open EDEM, Panel III has produced guidelines in the field of pre-qualification of sup-
pliers. As national procedures vary largely from nation to nation, it could take time to completely
harmonise them.
I
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Transatlantic dialogue including NATO defence trade
17. Defence equipment co-operation NATO-wide remains of major importance. The current partici-
pation of IEPG natirons in the work of the NATO Defence Trade Group indicates their will to improve
lhe conditions of defence trade alliance-wide. The IEPG has reiterated its belief in the fundamental
objectives of avoiding protectionism in all alliance nations and of ensuring that, by applying_lh.e Orin-
cifle of reciprocity, all nations are to benefit from a progressive improvement in the conditions of
defence trade within NATO.
Publicity
18. The IEPG has extended and improved its visibility through representation at European defence
equipment exhibitions in 1991. IEPGitands, in their present " informative " version, will_cont-inue to
be arranged in 1992 and 1993. The attendance of the national focal points is being reviewed in the light
of the experience gained.
IEPG Chairmanship
19. At the end of the year, Belgium will have completed two years as IEPG chair nation and hand
over the responsibility for co-ordinating the IEPG activities to Denmark.
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ANNEX A
Structure of the IEPG
Political level
,i
Ad Hoc Group
ECMEU matters
United Kingdom
Panel III
Operational requirements
and equipment programmes
Research and technology
including the EUCLID
programme
Procedures and economic
matters including European
defence equipment market
Ad hoc Working Group
on Competition and Juste Retour
Ad hoc Working Group
on Technology Transfer
* Chairmanship on a rotational basis (two years)
199l-1992: Belgium
1993-1994: Denmark
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ANNEX B
Brussels communiqud
Brussels, 3rd July l99l
The defence ministers of the thirteen IEPG countries met in Brussels on 3rd July 1991.
Recognising that defence procurement is one of the areas which could be substantially influenced by
the outcome of the debate about a future European security architecture, they reaffirmed the impor-
tance of the IEPG as the main European forum for a comprehensive approach to issues related to
defence equipment co-operation. Ministers also noted that the experience gained during the Gulf crisis
emphasised the importance of interoperability of defence equipment and reiterated the rOle the IEPG
could play in achieving that end.
The European defence equipment market
Ministers reviewed the progress made in opening the European defence equipment market on
the basis of a report from their national armaments directors. Having endorsed at their previous
meeting the broad principles and policies of the open European defence equipment market, based upon
the action plan approved in 1988, ministers noted with satisfaction that the IEPG was now focusing its
efforts on measures to implement these policies, taking into account the experience gained to date.
They also recognised the value of the contribution of the European Defence Industries Group (EDIG)
in the IEPG's work.
Research and technology
Ministers reaffirmed the importance of the EUCLID research and technology programme to
which industry contributes financially. They welcomed the work now in hand to implement the pro-
gramme, in consultation with EDIG. The first governmental implementing arrangements have been
signed today, paving the way for signature ofthe first contracts for research and technology projects. A
significant number of additional projects will follow in the near future.
Harmonisation of requirements and equipment cooperation
Ministers stressed that 
- 
in view of the new politicaUmilitary environment and limited defence
budgets 
- 
harmonisation of requirements and equipment co'operation and standardisation were more
important than ever. Noting that it was an uncertain time for the initiation of new programmes, min-
isters welcomed the measures taken to improve procedures. These measures are designed to help
identify opportunities for increased co-operation based on common requirements and to implement
them more effectively.
DDI countries
Ministers confirmed their commitment to support nations with developing defence industries
(DDIs) and recognised the opportunities provided by those nations'participation in the EUCLID pro
gramme and their involvement in the opening of the European defence equipment market.
The IEPG and EC/WEU
Ministers recognised the profound implications of discussions now taking place on the future
security architecture of Europe, and the significant impact these could have on the research, devel-
opment, production and trade in defence equipment. The unique expertise of the IEPG on defence
equipment matters could be useful to the discussions that are taking place in the Intergovernmental
Conference on Political Union, the European Community and Western European Union. The future
activities and structure of the IEPG is one of the issues linked to the outcome of this debate. Ministers
agreed to exchange information through appropriate contacts between the IEPG on the one hand and,
on the other, the European bodies engaged in the elaboration of the future European security archi-
tecture.
T r ans at lantic di alo gue
Ministers reiterated the importance of defence equipment co-operation among all members of
the North Atlantic Alliance. They underlined their view that the strengthening of European defence
technological capabilities would facilitate transatlantic co-operation. Convinced that protectionism
would be detrimental to all members, they stressed that it should be avoided. Against that background,
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they discussed the impact on IEPG activities of initiatives related to transatlantic defence trade, high-
lighting the need for reciprocity in this field.
Publicity matters
Supporting the continued effort to improve the visibility of the IEPG and its activities, ministers
welcomed the IEPG presence at international defence equipment exhibitions in member countries, in
particular at [,e Bourget exhibition in June 1991. They noted that the IEPG would also be represented
at the international defence equipment and aviation exhibition in Ankara in November 1991.
European sessions for defence equipment managers (SERA)
Ministers confirmed the continuing importance of the seminars for defence equipment man-
agers. They noted that France, Belgium and the Netherlands would organise the sessions in 1992.
Future meetings
Ministers agreed to meet again in the spring of 1992.
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ANNEX C
Oslo commuaiqud
Oslo, 6th March 1992
At their meeting on 6th March 1992 in Oslo, the defence ministers of the thirteen IEPG coun-
tries took stoct of devilopments since their meeting eight months earlier.-They noted that the pace-of
irirto.iiitrurgJremainediapid, especially in Central and Eastern Europe.They recognised that the dis-
roirtion of t[e Soviet Uni6n introduced a number of new challenges. They noted that in Western
E"-pitn. evolution of a new security architecture had Aathered momentum.In that.regard, ministers
r..afoO tnr NATO summit in Romein November, the European Council in Maastricht in December
;;a iG parallel meeting of Western European Union (WEU). They noted the differences in mem-ffihit o'itt osi fora. tvt'inisters acknowledled that the IEPG countries had a contribution to make in
the field of the future framework for defence equipment co-operation.
In their initial analysis of the possible implications for the IEPG of recent developments, ryin-
isters ilrisseO if,e group'i unique r6le at present in defence equipment matters-in Europe and its
;;r;il; il pro-oIing-co-operition and cgmpetition in defence_ pr-oiu.rem.eqt. They considered the
u.ioui 
"rO 
p6t*tiut tiitJU.itr"en the IEPG and other fora and highlighted the-need to avoid dupli-
;ii"" of ifio.t. it ev 
"-pnasised 
the vital importance of ensuring [he.iontinued full participation of
"fiifpC -"*U.rr iil tnifretd of defence equipment co-operation. 
Ministers agreed that the IEPG's
iOfJ 
""4 
pt"ie in tt. future European security architecture need_ed to be examined in depth and tasked
national 
-armaments directors dtAns) to cbntinue their work in this area, and to report accord-
ingly.
Ministers stressed the importance of defence equipment co-operation amongst all members of
tt e Nortti Atlantic Alliance. In that context they reviewed, from an IEPG perspective, pr_o-gris! in.the
.ooti"uit g diii"sions on the feasibility of improving the conditions of defence trade NATO-yide,;hi;[il; procieding in parallel with tlre opening of-the European defence equipment market. They
r.it"iut.a}riir ueiief-in tlie fundamental objectiv6s of avoiding- protectionismin all alliance countries
""J"f irr"ring that, by applying the princiile of reciprocity? qll 
nations benefited from a progressive
,.p;il;t in tii" con.ii^ii6niof d6fence trade within Nn'to' Thev highlighted the value of the
European contribution in this context.
Ministers had a preliminary exchange of views on the possible- participation in due course of
other European countrils in some'of the gr6up's activities and agreed that this question had to be con-
sidered in ihe context of the evolution of the European security architecture.
Ministers emphasised the importance of achieving the most efficient and effective use of
nations' defence budgets, which were declining in the ligh,of the changed..international security situ-
ution.- ft.V underliied the significance of the IEPG.s work to establish progressively an. open
eriop.un,i.f*""rq"ip..nt mirket. They noted that_the previously ?Breed principles and policies forilh;r;p", marke-t -'international comietitive bidding and technology transfer taking into account
transitionil measures such as juste retour ind support to DOI countries - were being turned into prac-
tical reality.
Ministers reaffrrmed the value for Europe of the EUCLID research and technology programme
ana *iiio-eO rigruture by NADs during the- meeting of a further governmental implementing
ar.ang".ent- Thei ,rot"O tt it the first cont;acts for research and technology projects were expected to
b;;igild ;hortly.'Ivlinisters also noted that a number of common technology projects, whose launch
pir.i-A"JtfrJoi BUC1.1D, had been completed successfully and that others were progressing well.
Noting improvements in procedures, ministers stressed again the importance of harmonisation
of requiiem6nts inO ofiquipmint standaidisation. They welcomed the progress made in equipment
collab'oration, notably on-the future large aircraft and the microwave landing system.
Ministers expressed their appreciation for the helpful contributions of the European Defence
Industries Group (EDIG) in the various areas of the IEPG's activity.
Ministers noted the continuing efforts to extend and improve the visibility of the IEPG through
r.pr.riniuiio, t ;";oi e"iop"u, f,efenqe equipment exhibitions. MinisteqaBJegd t9 rnge-t^again
6;;tdJih; enO of tnt iear it o.tty before Denmark takes over the chair of the IEPG for 1993-1994-
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ANNEX D
Basic principlcs which slnuW gaide the discussions oa
a possible association of the IEPG in WEII
The discussions on a possible association/incorporation of the IEPG with/into WEU should beguided by the following basic principles:
l. All IEPG members should be entitled to participate fully, and with the same rights and responsi-
bilities, in any armaments co-operation forum.
2. There should be a single European armaments co-operation forum, there should be no dupli-
cation in this field.
3. The IEPG should continue to operate until any replacement forum was to be operational.
_4._ _ fuy armaments cgoperation forum s!94d take over, as starting point, the agreed policies of theIEPG and maintain existing links with NATO.
5. Armaments co-opgllt{)n activities in Europe should be managed by the national armaments
directors of all current IEPG members, who will- be accountable to-the defence miniiteis oi t[oii
member governments.
6. The existing basic structure of the IEPG stould, initially, be incorporated into any future arma-
ments co-operation structure and the existing linkage betweeii the IEPG and EDIG shbuld be main-
tained.
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ANNEX E
Pancl I Sub-group oveniew
l. Future large aircraft2. Yehicle robotics3. Armoured bridgelayer interoperability4. Maritime patrol aircraft5. 155 mm artillery weapon system6. Aimed control effect-antitank mine7. Third generation antitank weapon8. Microwave landing system9. STINGER
10. Coastal minesweeper
11. Mistral
12. Low caliber/individuaVsupport weapon
13. M483/M864 155 mm arti ammunition dual
14. Submarine advanced propulsion
15. Armoured recce vehicles
16. Meteorological equipment
17. Simulation
18. Combat support ship 2000
19. New logistic vehicles
20. Short-range antitank weapon
21. Stand off air to ground weapons
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ANNEX F
List of RTPs
Modern radar technologyl.l Mission related aspects
Silicon microelectronics
2.2 SOI technology
2.2 lnterc,onnection assembly
2.3 Military qualification
2.5 SOI cell library
2.7 Mixed analog digital design
2.8 Very high speed A./D converters
2.9 User programmable integrated circuits
Composite structures
3.1 Application technology
3.2 Lieht ballistic optimisation
3.5 Development of technology for high temperature composite
3.6 Composites for electromagnetic windows
3.8 Naval application technology
Modular avionics
4.1 Modular avionics harmonisation study
Electric gun (dormant)
Artificial intelligence
6.1 Advanced work station for command and control systems
6.2 High speed pattern recognition environment
6.3 Knowledge engineering
6.4 Combinatorial algorithms for military application
Signature manipulation
7.3 Improvement of RCS prediction codes
7.8 Optimum shape design in electromagnetics
Optoelectronic devices
8.1 Affordable lightweieht IR sensors
8.2 Intelligent sensors
8.3 Solid state laser sources
Satellite surveillance technology, including verilication aspects
9.1 Technology concepts and harmonisation
9.? High resolution optical sensor technology
9.3 Advanced space synthetic aperture radai
9.4 Real time processing and data handling
9.5 Ground segment technology
Underwater detection and related technologies
t9.l L-* frequency undenrater sound propagation10.2 Towed array heading sensors
10.3 Hydrodynamic noise study
Technology_ln lhg field of human factors including simulation for training purposesI l.l Training system concepts
I 1.2 Simulation techniquesll.3 Mission and/or battle simulationll.8 Low cost simulators
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
I l.
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Docrment 1331 23rd October 1992
Composition of the political groaps -
Rulc 39, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Procedure
REPORT
sabmitted on behalf of the Committee on Rulas of Procedure and Privileges2
by Mn Thompso4 Chairman and Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnerr DrctsloN
on amending Rule 39, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Procedure
EXPLANAToRy MruonaNoutvt
submitted by Mr. Thompson, Chairman and Rapporteur
Draft Decision
on amcnding Rute 39, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Procedure
The Assembly,
Dectors
To amend Rule 39, paragraph 4, to read as follows:
" The number of members of a political Broup, representatives or substitutes, may not be less
than one-tenth of the number of representatives to the Assembly. "
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Thompson (Chairman); MM. Amaral, Benassi (Vice-_Chairmen[ Mrl Agu.iar, MJvI..Andr6,
SOhl, Botinaga (Alternate: Mrs. Guirado). MM. Cacci4 Chevalier, Colletle, Cu.co, D.iaz d9 ltera, Filetti, lord Finsberg(nt.*ut.r T6wnbnA, MM. Hughes, Jexel,'lunghanns, Konen, Ottenbour!4, Pasquino, Pistre, Scheer, von Schmude (Alternate:
Mrus\, Mrs. Soutendijk van Appeldoorn (Alternate: Eversdijk\, Mr. Stoffelen, Mrs. Terborg.
N.E. Tlre names of those taking part in the vote are printed in ilalics.
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Explanatory Memorandam
(submitted by Mr. Thonpson, Chairman and Rappofieur)
A! its sitting on lst June 1992, the Assembly adopted the draft order in the report presented to it
by the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges (Document l3l l).
In.this order, the Assembly invited the committee to examine whether there should be a change
in the minimum number of representatives or substitutes required to form a political group, bearing in
mind the ratio to be established between this number and the total numbei of representiiives to the
Assembly.
It should first be underlined that the problem of the composition of the political groups may be
viewed from two standpoints:
- 
the minimum number of representatives or substitutes of which a political group must consist;
- 
the number of nationalities that should be represented.
. 
According to Rule 39 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, a group may not have less than
nine members, but it does not mention the nationality aspect.
. 
Conversely, according to the Rules of Procedure of the Council of Europe, a political group must
consist of'representatives or substitutes of at least three different nationalities; t.
The order just quoted does not invite the committee to raise this matter which, moreover, does
not arise since all the Assembly's political groups include members of several nationalities.
The reasons why a political group should consist of a minimum number of members were set out
in the committee's previous report 'A minimum number of members must continue to be required
for a group, lhrqugh its representation in the Presidential Committee, to be able to play a de jure partin the organisation of the Assembly's work and, 1fu1srrgh its budget, to have practicai faciliiies.;
However, to this-requirement for a minimum number of members in each group should be
added the req-uirement for a small enough number of groups to allow the Assembly to organise its workin the most favourable conditions. But it is precisely the requirement for a ririnimum number of
members that allows it to be guaranteed that the Assembly will at no time be divided into an excessive
number of groups.
To avoid revising the Rules of Procedure when the number of delegations to the Assembly is
increased, this minimum should not be an integral number but a fractional one, i.e. a proportion ofihe
total number of members of the Assembly.
-. 
In liq.report mentioned above, Mr. Grieve, while referring to the example of the European Par-liament, believed that the most desirable proportion would be one-twentieth of representalives*and
substitutes to the Assemb[ olthe Council of Europe, i.e. one-tenth of representativei. This proportion
also seems valid for the 
_WEU Assembly. It is therefore proposed to draft the new paralraptr + ofRule 39 of the Rules of Procedure as follows:
* The number of members of a political Eroup, representatives or substitutes, may not be less
than one-tenth of the number of representatives to the Assembly. ,
At present, the Assembly has 108 members. Since one-tenth of this number is 10.8, a political
grguP could ngt at present, if this provision is adopted, have less than I I members (representitives or
substitutes). This increase of two in the minimum number of representatives of a politiial group would
take into account the enlargement of the Assembly to include Portugal and Spiin.
l. In his rypoft to the Assembly of the Council of Eulope of 3rd, December 1976 (Document 3900), Mr. Grieve invoked, in
support.of-this_requirement, the concern that'the Euiopean character of the Aisembly and its du*iOary unitr.rsi'Ui
emphasised and preserved ", but he mentioned the fact thai the European Parliament admits the possibility 
"i pr*iv ;;ii;""Ipolitical groups.
ll0
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Draft Recommendation
oa European otmamen s co-operution after Maastricht
The Assembly,
(i) Recalling that the new tasks attributed to allied forces in Europe make essential an in-depth
re-examination of defence equipment and technology requirements, taking account inter alia of:
- 
the disappearance of the threat of a mass attack against Europe;
- 
uncertainty about the risk of conflicts and tension that exist or may emerge in several regions
of the world;
- 
reductions in defence budgets in the majority of WEU member countries;
- 
the rapid evolution of advanced technology in the defence area;
(ii) Stressing that the creation of multinational forces in the framework of NATO and WEU shows
how urgent it is to make more effort to enhance the standardisation and interoperability of their
equipment;
(iii) Noting with satisfaction the increased activities of the Independent European Programme
Group (IEPG) in joint research on and development of defence equipment;
(iv) Noting nevertheless with concern the existence of a number of bi- and multilateral equipment
co-operation programmes which are not certain to be either developed or completed;
(v) Welcoming, on the one hand, WEU's Maastricht and Petersberg declarations, in which it is sug-
gested that a deeper study be made of strengthening European armaments co-operation with a view to
setting up a European arnaments agency, and, on the other, the Council's proposal to instruct WEU
and IEPG experts to study this problem together so that it may be settled without delay;(vi) Astonished nevertheless that, more than seven months after the IEPG defined its positions
relating to the conditions for possible association of the IEPG and WEU, the Council has still done
nothing to implement these proposals;
(vii) Convinced that it is the duty of the public authorities, as defence industries'principal customers,
to try to help them to find means of facilitating their conversion and adapting themselves to the new
conditions;
(viii) Convinced that defence industries should not be excluded from the European market but noting
that the Twelve did not reach agreement in Maastricht on abolishing Article 223 of the Rome Treaty,
RrcourrlrNos rHAT rsr CouNclL
l. Speed up its work in order to work out a concept of the r6le and operation of a European arma-
ments agency;
2. Appoint representatives immediately to contact without delay the team made responsible by the
IEPG for the dialogue with WEU with a view to studying together the conditions for a merger between
the IEPG and WEU;
3. Ensure that the future agency has adequate authority and powers to enable it to facilitate the
process of harmonisation, by member countries, of their armed forces' defence equipment in a sen-
sible, not too burdensome manner;
4. Ensure that all the IEPG member countries participate fully in the agency;
5. Reach agreement on its policy towards exports of military equipment and end-destination con-
trols on exports of jointly-produced equipment;
6. Draw up an inventory and a financing plan for all medium- and long-term plans and studies
launched by WEU and the IEPG for equipment, and draw up a list of priorities;
7. Inform the Assembly of the results of its study on Europe's strategic mobility needs;
8. Inform the Assembly of the conclusions it drew from the first stage of the feasibility study for the
creation of a European space-based observation system.
tt2
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. I-opez Henares, Chairman ad Rapprteur)
I. Infioduction
l. Since Sir Dudley Smith's report on
" Aflns and equipment for a European rapid
action force " r, the evolution of the interna-
tional politico-military environment has given a
new dimension to thinking that had been under
way for decades with a view to achieving g;reater
harrronisation of arms and equipment for
armed forces in Europe.
2. Reassessment of the threat and the opera-
tional needs involved was dictated inter alia by a
worsening of the war in former Yugoslavia, the
re-emergence of tension between Iraq and the
United States, the outbreak or pursuit of con-
flicts in several regions of the former Soviet
Union such as Moldova, Ossetia and Nagorny-
Karabakh, uncertainty about the future r6le of
Russia as the Soviet Union's principal successor
and the precarious situation prevailing in
several sensitive areas of the world, including
the Mediterranean.
2. Initiatives taken to set up multinational
forces in the alliance and WEU continued
with:
- 
the creation, on 2lst May 1992, of a
Franco-German army corps with a
European vocation that is to become
operational in 1995;
- 
the official inauguration of the rapid
reaction force (Allied Rapid Reaction
Corps, ARRC) in NATO on 2nd
October 1992; and
- 
the announcement by the Ministers of
Defence of France, Italy and Spain on
7th September 1992 that they intend to
examine the possibility of creating a
European naval aviation force in the
framework of WEU.
4. Furthermore, the obligation for countries
that signed the treaty on conventional forces in
Europe (CFE) to reduce their armaments in
accordance with that treaty and the budgetary
constraints facing all the countries concerned
can but stimulate joint efforts to rationalise
available means to meet remaining legitimate
defence needs.
5. At institutional level, the Maastricht
Treaty, signed on 7th February 1992, requested
WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and
actions of the European political union which
have defence implications. The WEU member
countries have consequently taken a number of
decisions, including that to strengthen the oper-
ational rOle of the organisation and to examine
the possibilities of strengthening co-operation in
armaments matters with a view to setting up a
European armaments agency.
6. At the same time, the Independent
European Programme Group (IEPG) is exam-
ining its r6le in the new European security archi-
tecture, but the conditions for a rapprochement
with WEU 
- 
advocated by the latter in the
Petersberg declaration in the context ofthe cre-
ation of a European armaments agency 
- 
have
not yet been defined.
7. Europe's defence industries, most of
which are suffering from a sharp fall in orders
from states which are their main customers, are
seeking new forms of co-operation among them-
selves and how to adapt themselves to the new
challenges in order to safeguard their competi-
tiveness and ensure their survival. These indus-
tries are following very closely the process of
building Europe and inter-state co-operation
within alliances since these matters have a
crucial influence on decisions to be taken in
regard to industrial policy, particularly as from
lst January 1993, when free movement of goods
within the European Community is to start.
8. However, account must also be taken of
prevailing fears among a large section of public
opinion about the need for and usefulness of
continuing armaments efforts now that the
East-West confrontation has come to an end and
the public is calling for substantial peace divi-
dends. European political leaders should give
the public more explanations about the basis of
their future guidelines in this connection.
9. However, in spite of the many declara-
tions of intention issued in Maastricht and
Petersberg on strengthening armaments co-oper-
ation, the problem does not seem to be a matter
of prime importance for governments and
administrations. For instance, the half-yearly
report of the German Government on the activ-
ities of WEU, published on lSth August 1992
and covering the period from lst January to
30th June 1992, does not even mention the
subject of European equipment co-operation or
the plan to set up a European arnaments
agency.
10. Uncertainty about the ratification of the
Maastricht Treaty following the Danish * No "
and the French people's timid approval have
113
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encouraged some commentators to think that
these results may slow down the progress of
European defence co-operation, thus automati-
cally affecting arrnaments, too. In any event, it
seems necessary to recall that the absence of ajoint policy in respect of equipment affects not
only the operational standard of forces but also
public budgets, research and technological
development guidelines, arms export policy and
industrial and employment policy.
II. Is more armarr.cnls co-operation required
in a lcss thruatencd Europe?
ll. In the alliance's new strategic concept,
approved at its meeting in Rome on 7th and 8th
November 1991, the North Atlantic Council
noted inter alia that:
'The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale
attack on all of NATO's European fronts
has effectively been removed and thus no
longer provides the focus for allied
strategy. Particularly in Central Europe,
the risk of a surprise attack has been sub-
stantially reduced, and minimum allied
warning time has increased accordingly.
In contrast with the predominant threat of
the past, the risks-to allied security that
remain are multi-faceted in nature and
multi-directional, which makes them hard
to predict and assess. "
12. Opinions of all kinds have been expressed
this year on defining the state of European
security two years after the collapse of the Soviet
empire. Mr. Pierre B6r6govoy, French Prime
Minister, described this as follows on 3rd Sep-
tember 19922:
'The unjust Yalta order is no more. A
new international order is announced, butit is far from being achieved. We are
therefore in this intermediary stage, at
one and the same time exulting and dis-
turbing: one major threat has disappeared
but new forms of instability are emerging
with reawakening nationalism, a possible
new source of conflict.
The accession to full and entire sover-
eignty by the republics belonging to the
former Soviet Union has had as a cor-
ollary uncertainty about what is to
become of its nuclear arsenal.
All continents, in a manner that is always
dramatic for their populations, are
exposed to many forms of instability.
2. Speech at the opening sitting of the forty-fifth IHEDN
sessron.
Unfortunately, intolerance, the spirit of
revenge and the reawakening of ancestral
hostility often accompany this movement
of history. This is the reason for confron-
tations in the Caucasus and Moldova. At
our doors, the break-up of the Yugoslav
Federation has made that country a bat-
tlefield, first in Croatia, above all in
Bosnia-Herzegovina today, and tomorrow
perhaps in Kosovo.
However, hotbeds of instability, disorder
and distress are not confined to Europe.
Violence is also killing in Iraq and Sri
Lanka.
....... '
13. Asked about possible threats to the
United Kingdom, Mr. Rifkind, Secretary of
State for Defence, said in an interview in
Defense News 3:
* Russia's relationship with Europe and
the rest of the world has been trans-
formed. But we are anxious of the fact
that even after implementation of [stra-
tegic arms reduction treaty] agreements
with the United States, Russia will come
down from l0 000 strategic nuclear war-
heads to over 3 000, far in excess ofwhatis required for a minimum nuclear
deterrent. They still have massive nuclear
stockpiles, and that is something you
cannot ignore.
Secondly, we have no certainty about
what the future holds for Russia itself,
and we cannot exclude the possibility that
there will be changes in Russia, and one
has to build that into one's policy.
Thirdly, there is the worrying problem of
nuclear proliferation.'
14. Conversely, Mr. Salvo Andd, Minister of
Defence of Italy, now Chairman-in-0ffice of the
WEU Council, said in an interview in Defense
News a:
* The conventional military threat from
the East has practically disappeared, evenif a residual nuclear deterrence is still
needed. But other risks are emerying,
especially from the Southern European
and Mediterranean regions. We do not
fear a massive military attack, but we are
worried about the growing and general
instability, stronger indirect threats
against our security and unpredictable
limited attacks against our territory and
lines of communication.
3. Defense News, 7th-13th September 1992.
4. Defense News, l4th-20th September 1992, page 54.
tt4
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Finally, we worry that nuclear, chemical
and missile proliferation may become the
greatest threat of the future. "
15. Mr. Nevrat Ayaz, Minister of Defence of
Turkey, described as follows the threat to his
country as he now perceives it 5:
* Turkey lies at the centre of a region of
instabilities and uncertainties, from the
turbulent Balkans and Transcaucasia to
the Middle East, which witnessed a major
war only last year. For the 1990s, Turkey
sees the threat against it [in] regional
crises and conflicts rather than a pre-
planned large-scale attack. "
16. The German Government's position was
described on lTth June 1992 in an answer by
Mr. Wilz, Secretary of State for Defence of
Germany, to a question put by Mr. Scheer,
informing him that his ministry had prepared an
analysis ofthe risks at the beginning of 1992 and
this had been adopted by the government:
* It is clear from this analysis ofthe risks
that Germany is not at present under
threat. The military potential of the
former Soviet Union, which still exists
albeit to a lesser degree, is still a serious
danger but it is unlikely that it will be
used at present.
More real currently are risks stemming
from growing political instability, accom-
panied by the latent danger ofrecourse to
military means. This is the case in par-
ticular of South-Eastern Europe and the
crisis area stretching from Morocco to
India.
Political tension prevailing there suggests
that regional wars may break out at any
time and that they are increasingly liable
to involve means of mass destruction. It
cannot be ruled
may spread to
partners.
that such conflicts
southern alliance
This assessment of the risk is shared by
NATO as a whole.
In this context, the Federal Republic of
Germany and NATO can no longer take
as a premise the existence of a one-
dimensional threat consisting of a massive
military aggression in its traditional
meaning. This has effectively made way
for new, less precise, risks which have
emerged in various parts of Europe and
might even lead to kinds of warfare that
were thought to have had their day.'
out
the
5. Defense News, 3lst August-6th September 1992,page 46.
17. The Atlantic Alliance and WEU have
started to learn the lessons of the new situation
in order to adapt their defence instruments, each
within the framework of its own mandate.
In Rome on 8th November 1991, the North
Atlantic Council declared:
* Our military forces will adjust to their
new tasks, becoming smaller and more
flexible. Thus, our conventional forces
will be susbtantially reduced as will, in
many cases, their readiness. They will also
be given increased mobility to enable
them to react to a wide range of contin-
gencies, and will be organised for flexible
build-up, when necessary, for crisis man-
agement as well as defence. Multinational
formations will play a greater r6le within
the integrated military structure. Nuclear
forces committed to NATO will be greatly
reduced.' (Paragraph 5 of the decla-
ration)
18. WEU for its part, learning the lesson of
the Gulf war, the war in former Yugoslavia and
latent regional conflicts in several regions ofthe
world, has taken a few fundamental decisions
made necessary by the new r6le assigned to it by
the Maastricht Treaty.
19. The first fundamental decision was to
strengthen WEU's operational r6le, as a conse-
quence of which member states agreed " to make
available military units from the whole
spectrum of their conventional armed forces for
military tasks conducted under the authority of
wEU " 6.
20. The second was the definition of its
forces' principal tasks, on which member coun-
tries agreed:
" Apart from contributing to the common
defence in accordance with Article 5 of
the Washington Treaty and Article V of
the modified Brussels Treaty respectively,
military units of WEU member states,
acting under the authority of WEU, could
be employed for:
- 
humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- 
peace-keeping tasks,
- 
tasks of combat forces in crisis man-
agement, including peace-making. ?"
21. The third was the decision to organise
these military units on a multinational and
multi-service basis E. It may easily be deduced
that, the more multinational the forces in
question become, the more essential it would
6. Paragraph II.2 ofthe Petersberg declaration of l9th June
1992.
7. Paragraph II.4 ofthe Petersberg declaration of l9th June
t992.
8. Paragraph II.6 ofthe Petersberg declaration of l9th June
t992.
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seem to harmonise their equipment. Greater
co-operation is therefore essential in this con-
nection, which does not mean increasing arms
but, on the contrary, making available by tech-
nological means the capability necessary for new
tasks with smaller quantities of equipment.
22. The principle of multinationality of forces
also implies far greater standardisation and
interoperability of equipment " than was
required in the old days of large, in-place
national forces set out in a layer cake
configuration " e. These considerations therefore
bring us to a problem that has been well known
since the creation of the alliances and to which it
has never yet been possible to find a satisfactory
solution.
III. Operational requirements and the results
of elforts made so far to meet them
with the development of common equipment
23. Although your Rapporteur obtained the
impression from his talks with senior oflicials
responsible for armaments and equipment in
several Western European countries that the
need to harmonise equipment concerned at one
and the same time land-based, naval, air and
space equipment, recent conflicts, particularly
the Gulf war, tend to suggest that attention
should henceforth be concentrated on the
importance of:
- 
intelligence, data-processing and com-
mand equipment, using satellite-borne
means of communication;
- 
space-based observation and electro-
magnetic monitoring devices;
- strategic mobility (air and maritime
transport);
- 
the choice of accurate stealth systems;
- 
the need for anti-ballistic missile
defence, this being the subject of the
report presented by Mr. l*nzer.
24. However, these very specific needs must
not make us forget the multinational forces now
being set up.
25. The national components of these forces
will have to be able to operate together, to com-
municate among themselves, to afford each
other mutual support and undergo joint
training. Non-standardised, incompatible equip-
ment, which was not such a stumbling-block in
the days when strategy was based mainly on
national units, might seriously affect the inter-
operability of multinational, integrated forces.
26. However, none of the efforts made since
the Atlantic Alliance and WEU were set up with
9. See David Cooper, " Allied afins co-operation: need for a
transatlantic political strategy ", NATO Review, October
1991.
a view to harmonising allied forces' equipment
requirements in the framework of various
bodies specialising in equipment matters has
done anything to change the fundamental fact
that all the member countries determine the
needs of their own armed forces on an indi-
vidual basis.
27. Consequently, the degree ofboth bi- and
multilateral co-operation between states in
armaments matters until now depended more or
less on the hazards of ad hoc decisions and
varying relationships between the countries and
industries concerned.
28. After more than thirty years of effort, rela-
tively few European bi- or multilateral projects
have reached the production stage. Mention
may be made of:
- 
Gazelle, Lynx and Puma helicopters
(Franco-German co-operation);
- 
the Jaguar aircraft (Franco-British
co-operation);
- 
the Alpha-Jet aircraft (Franco-Gennan
co-operation);
- 
the Tornado aircraft (co.operation
between Germany, the United Kingdom
and Italy);
- 
Milan anti-tank missiles (Franco-
German co-operation);
- 
Hot anti-tank missiles (Franco.German
co.operation); and
-mine-hunters (co-operation between
France, Belgium and the Netherlands).
29. The two tables hereafter show how far
European production has become diversified in
comparison with that of the United States. In
spite of efforts by European industries, depen-
dence on the United States for military
equipment in 1988 was 89% for Turkey, 7890 for
Greece, 77% for Denmark, 640/o for Nonvay,
53% for ltaly,44Vo for the Netherlands and Por-
tugal,4L96 for Spain, 33% for Germany and 32Vo
for Belgium.
(i) Gruund aad air envimnmcnt
30. Among the areas in which harmonisation
of equipment is the least developed, mention
should be made of tanks, which are designed in
the United States, the United Kingdom,
Germany and France but also in other countries
under the responsibility of national industries. It
would appear that only the latest models of the
French Leclerc tank, the German Leopard 2
tank and the United States MlAl Abrams tank
have interchangeable munitions, while the new
United Kingdom Challenger 2 tank will have a
totally different gun system'0.
ll6
10. Defense News, 29th June-5th July 1992, page 6.
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Tnnlr I
Comparison between the aumber of dilfereat arms
cunently being produced by European indastry
(the Twelve plus EFTA) aad by llnited Stata industry t
Category
Number of arms produced
European producer
countriesEurope UnitedStates
Tank 4
t2
3
7
6
0
7
7
4
ll
4
3
I
0
7
2
I
3
I
5
I
I
3
I
I
I
2
1
I
I
0
I
GB, F, D, I
F (3,), D, GB, (2"), I, S, E
(2,), A, CH
F, D, GB
F (2'), GB, S, D/I/GB,
EIDIGBII
GB, E, I (2,), I/BR, D/F
F (2,), GB, I (2,), D, D/F
B, F, GB, E, D, I, A
F, GB (2'), S
F (3), GB, D (3,), NL, E,
DK, I
F/NL/B, GB, D, I
GB, I, E
F
D (3,), I, NL, GB, S
F, GB
Armoured infantry combat carrier
155 mm self-propelled ....
Fiohter-homher 2
Ground attack/trainer
Sfrateoic homher
Anti-tank helicopter
Assault rifle
Portable anti-aircraft missile
Frigafe 3
Mine-hrrnter
Aircraft-carrier
Fixed-wing aircraft-carrier . . ... . .
Cnri ser/missile-lerrnehino desf rover
Conventional submarine .
Nuclear attack submarine
Source: GRIPDATA. Situation as at lst January 1992.
GB=UnitedKingdom; F=France;D=Germany;I=Italy;S-Sweden;E=Spain;A=Austria;CH=Switzerland;BR=Brazil;
B - Belgium; NL - Netherlands.
l. The only armaments included are those effectively produced or whose assembly lines may be reactivated in the event of new
orders (mainly for export). In this case, the selection criterion is presentation ofthe equipment for export (at shows, exhibitions,
etc.). Nuclear anns are not considered (missiles, missile-launching nuclear submarines).
2. In the air sector, and contrary to European countries, the United States produces strategic bombers (B l, production of which
stopped in 1989, and 82, now being produced).
3. In the naval sector, the United States produces cruiserVmissile-launching destroyers (Ticonderoga and Arleigh Burke classes)
and nuclear aircraft-carriers (T. Roosevelt). In these two categories, only France produces a nuclear aircraft-carrier (Charles de
Gaulle).
tt7
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ia the last twcn$ yeaw
Country Aircraft
Production
National Total
Frc Super Etendard
Mirage Fl ....,
Mirage 2000..,
Rafale
7t
252
20s
336
85
7t5
334
336
Sweden Vissen 330
140
330
140Gripenr
United Kingdom. Sea Harrier
I{errier 60t20
175
86
t20
500*Hawk .....
Average production 294
Co-operation:
trGR I 17Ofi30
r65fi75
3s0t394tro0
700
300
550
551
916*
700
400
F, D ...DGBI Alpha JetTornado
F-FA ID, GB, I, E
I, BR ..... AMX I
Average production 623
United States . Fl4
Fl5
600
t 286
2 000*
l 150
650
59
t 134
679
I 636{'
3 422*
I 600*
650
59
I 134
Fl6
FIR
alo
Fll7.
YF22I
Average production l3ll
TnsI-e 2
Comparison baweca fightt ahcraft pogtutnmes ia Eurupcaa countries and lhc Unitd Statcs
F = France; GB = United Kingdom; D : Germany; I - Italy; E = Spain; BR - Brazil.
l. These aircraft are currently in the development or pre-production stage. The accompanying hgures are estimates worked out
in 1991-92. They are of indicative value only and will very probably be revised downwards in the coming years.
* Aircraft in production for which there may still be export orders.
Sources: GRIPDATA with J.P. Hebert, Stratdgie frangaise et industrie d'armement, FEDN, Paris, pages lOG'lll; Military
Balance l99l-92, IISS, london, l99l; The cost ofpeace: assessing Europe's security options, Harwood Academic Publishers,
London, 1991, page 45; Jane's Defence Weekly, International Defence Review, Aviation Week and Space Technology, years
l99l and 1992; figures communicated by firms.
31. The example of tanks also shows the
importance of more concrete harmonisation of
views on operational needs, which may differ,
not only for purely military reasons. Thus,
Germany's decision not to develop a new
'2000 tank " is largely based on financial con-
siderations and the French decision to produce
the kclerc tank is based partly on the
assumption that it can be exported to third
countries. While several alliance countries have
started to concentrate on lighter, more mobile
forces, in other regions of the world, particularly
the Middle East, some countries are still
modernising their heavy tanks.
32. In the ground armaments sector, it seems
particularly difficult to determine valid require-
ments for everyone. The IEPG's Panel I, now
under Nonregian chairmanship, is responsible for
harmonising operational needs, including equip
ment for NATO's European rapid reaction corps.
33. According to information given by the
chairmanship of the IEPG to the Technological
and Aerospace Committee in Brussels on 9th
February 1992, the IEPG's Panel I has about
twenty projects in hand. The latest report on the
activities of the IEPG, dated 7th September
l992tt, specifies that there are twenty-one
projects, of which thirteen relate to armaments
or the ground-air environment12.
ll. Document 1330.
12. See list at Appendix I.
ll8
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34. Among recent initiatives in the ground
sector, mention should be made of the French,
German and United Kingdom industries, which
are trying to develop a new type of combat
vehicle (modular armoured vehicle), which
seems to follow on from work started in the
fraurework of the defence ministries of the three
countries with a view to agreeing on criteria for
defining their requirements. On the other hand,
it ic not knorvn whether the IEPG is associated
with this project.
35. In the air-ground environment, experts
recognised the need for allied forces to be more
mobile and there is no controversy on the
matter.
36. In the tactical transport sector, four coun-
tries 
- 
France, Germany, Italy and the Nether-
lands 
- 
have at last reached agreement on thejoint production of a new European transport
helicopter, the NH-90, which should be deve-
loped by the European consortium Eurocopter
and be ready for delivery as from 1998. Gov-
efiunent financial contributions are broken
down as follows: France 42.4V0, ltaly 26.90/o,
Germany 24o/o, the Netherlands 6.70/o. The heli-
copter will have to be capable of carrying at least
twenty troops or a combat vehicle over distances
of 900 km at a speed of 280 km per hour 13. The
North Atlantic Council set up NAHEMA(NATO Helicopter Management Agency) to
manage this programme and, on lst September
1992, the agency notified industry of the devel-
opment contract.
37. Development of the Italian-United
Kingdom designed EH-101 helicopter received a
new boost with Canada's decision to buy fifty
for its armed forcesra.
3E. In the framework of efforts to improve the
mobility of ground forces, there is another
example of the difficulties to be overcome in
defining needs, jointly at first, then taking deci-
sims on the choice of options offered by
industry and subsequently on development and,
finally, producing the chosen transport equipment.
39. In the IEPG, eight countries - Belgium,
Frence, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Por-
tugal and Spain - with the United Kingdom
having observer status negotiated for almost a
year before instructing the firm Euroflag to carry
out a prefeasibility study for a future large air-
craft (FLA) programme, this study to be com-
pleted by the end of 1992. To meet the needs
defined in the framework of the IEPG, a con-
sortium composed of A6rospatiale, Aliena,
British Aerospace, CASA and Deutsche Airbus
set up the firm Euroflag SRL, which has subse-
qrcntly been joined by FLABEL (Belgium),
OGMA (Portugal) and TAI (Turkey).
13. Le Monde, 3rd September 1992.
14. Atlantic News, No. 2447,29th July 1992.
40. The call for tenders launched by the IEPG
specifies that the new aircraft should mainly
meet tactical transport needs but must at the
same time be usable for strategic transport pur-
poses. The aircraft, which should replace C-130
and C-160 aircraft in the period 2003-2011,
rnight also be designed in a refuelling version,
maritime patrol aircraft or remote surveillance
and monitoring version, of the AWACS type.
41. According to Euroflag, the planned time-
limits for carrying out the project may be
exceeded because of the slow decision-taking
procedure in IEPG participating countries and
uncertainty about the trend of defence budgets.
However, when it visited the Farnborough Air
Show, the committee was briefed on the
progress of the prefeasibility study by Euroflag
representatives, who said they were confident
that the timeJimits for the project would be
respected, while underlining that the programme
should receive more support from the govern-
ments concerned.
42. The fact that, since 1991, the WEU
Defence Representatives Group (DRG) has also
been examining questions relating to strategic
mobility does not seem to facilitate matters
since studies are progxessing very slowly and
there is no news of the result of the Franco-
German study requested on the subject.
43. The slowness of this process merely
increases doubt, particularly in the United
Kingdom Government, about the usefulness of
the Euroflag programme: the British first
underline the importance of leaving to each
country responsibility for defining its own
needs; second, they are very anxious to remain
free to seek the most economic solution which
might consist either of procuring American air-
craft or of using civilian aircraft or maritime
transport means. In any event, they are not
giving priority to this project, rationalisation
being their essential aim.
44. It is hardly conceivable that all these con-
siderations are not also being studied in other
member countries participating in the project.
The main aim of prior consultations between
governments concerned in the IEPG should be
to study possible options from every angle
before giving a mandate to industry.
45. The committee's previous report on
* Arms and equipment for a European rapid
action force " t5 listed possible candidates for
ensuring air transport capability and, inter alia,
described the performances of the American
C-17 and C-5 Galaxy project. However, it must
be certain that the American transport fleet can
be easily available in the event of a future crisis
compelling American forces to mobilise their
entire capability. The difficulties encountered
ll9
15. Document 1292.
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by the German army in transporting heavy
equipment to Turkey during the Gulf war
because the United States army was incapable of
providing transport aircraft should be recalled.
46. Furthermore, the success of the Euroflag
project aimed at giving Western Europe a large-
capacity air transport system to meet the needs
of strategic mobility tends to show that parallel
co-operation between a large number of
European states and industries can produce
encouraging results, thus contradicting the very
widespread opinion among governments that
the optimum number of participants in a project
is three or four.
47. Euroflag's presentation to the Techno-
logical and Aerospace Committee of the
progress of studies made a very positive
impression on the committee and it would
therefore like the WEU Council to pay more
attention to this project than it has done so far.
48. Some experts consider the need for
long-haul air transport capability to be of such
importance that they are going so far as to
advocate the creation of an air transport
agency.
49. In regard to co-operation on attack and
reconnaissance helicopters, there is an
impressive range of national, bilateral and mul-
tilateral projects, so this means of transport and
armament is not included in IEPG Panel I's list
of requirements.
50. The Franco-German consortium Euro-
copter and British Aerospace have reached
agreement on proposing that the British army
procure the Franco-German Tiger attack
helicopterr6. Even if France were to delay
bringing it into service, British interest in it
might jeopardise the chances of the American
AH-64 Apache helicopter, opted for by the
British anny.
51. However, the future of the German
version of this project, designed as the PAH-2
anti-tank helicopter, is uncertain insofar as a
massive tank attack in Europe has become
increasingly unlikely.
52. In regard to weaponry for combat heli-
copters, the situation has evolved since the last
report by Sir Dudley smithrT in that the United
Kingdom Government is still interested in the
long-range anti-tank missile (Trigat) project in
which France and Germany are cmperatingrs.
53. The programme for the multiple-launch
rocket system (MLRS) of American design,
developed in co-operation with France,
Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, is still
a success although the development of the war-
16. l,e Monde, 26th February 1992.
17. Document 1292.
18. Le Monde, l2th March 1992.
heads is presenting a few problems. In the
meantime, the French army has started to inte-
grate the first units of this system in its
arsenal.
54. The fact that the harmonisation of
equipment is proving particularly diflicult
because of national divergences at the stage
when needs are determined seems to fully justify
the large number of projects now being studied
by IEPG Panel I with the very aim of facilitating
harmonisation in this area. It is interesting to
note that anti-tank weapons still play an
important r6le in the work of that panel and
they are the object of at least four projects, as
follows:
- 
aimed control effect anti-tank mine;
- 
third-generation anti-tank weapon;
- 
short-range anti-tank weapon; and
- 
stand-off air-toground weapon.
55. Where artillery is concerned, a joint
155 mm artillery weapon system and M483/864
artillery munitions are among the projects under
discussion. Two air-to-ground missile systems
such as Stinger and Mistral are also being
studied and a low-caliber individual support
weapon.
56. Three combat vehicle projects are being
studied: vehicle robotics, armoured reconnais-
sance vehicles and new logistic vehicles.
57. It is diflicult to pick out a system in the
list of projects being studied by IEPG Panel I,
but it is certain that efforts are only starting and
that we are still a long way from achieving
standardised or interoperable joint equipment
in every branch of ground armaments.
(ii) Naval and aaval atbtiot envimnment
58. Things are not easy in the naval area, par-
ticularly for submarines, where nearly all
European countries, within the limits of their
budgets, still build several generations of subma-
rines themselves. It is therefore interesting to
know to what extent the proposed definition of
criteria for designing an advanced propulsion
submarine, discussed by IEPG Panel I, will lead
to joint approaches among participating states.
59. Among national programmes, the coming
into service of the Triomphant, the first French
new-generation missile-launching nuclear sub-
marine, has been delayed until July 1995 re,
while the fate of the future German 212 conven-
tionally-propelled submarine is uncertain.
Moreover, France and Spain have started to
study a joint concept of a conventionally-
propelled attack submarine known as Scorpdne,
t20
19. Lr Monde, lTth February 1992.
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which might be procured by the Spanish navy
and would be offered for export by both
countries 20.
60. Except for the projects relating to the
coastal mine-sweeper and the combat support
ship 2000, now being studied by IEPG Panel I,
moit naval programmes are still the responsi-
bility of the national authorities, which
co-operate in only a limited manner.
61. However, the project for the Franco-
British anti-aircraft missile-carrying frigate is
taking shape, the defence ministers of the two
countries having agreed to start preparatory
work on the vessel, which should come into
service after 2000. Italy is now showing interest
in the programme and next year may decide to
participate. The vessel's task will be to escort
naval forces and it will be armed with a FAMS(family of anti-air missile systems).
62. In regard to anti-strip missiles, Franco-
German cooperation to develop a new super-
sonic anti-ship missile system to replace the
Exocet system is still encountering difficulties,
particularly financial.
63. In July 1991, Franoe and ltaly decided to
develop together a light torpedo designed
mainly for submarine attack, to be launched by
aircraft (maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters) or
by surface vessels. It can also be used by subma-
nnes.
64. At the same time, several countries(United States, Germany and Norway; United
States and United Kingdom; Germany, France,
Netherlands and Italy) have started to study an
anti-submarine system and an anti-torpedo
defence system but no joint programmes have
yet been defined.
65. In regard to the AV-8B short or vertical
take-off and landing aircraft programme, negoti-
ations between American, Italian and Spanish
industries are proving difficult because of cuts in
the United States defence budget.
66. Conversely, the development of a new
generation of FSA anti-aircraft missiles. planned
by the EUROSAM consortium comprising-the
Fitnch groups Adrospatiale and Thomson-CSF
and the ltalian group Alenia is looking healthy,
even after Spain's withdrawal, particularly as
Germany is considering returning to the
P,mgfamme 21.
67. In naval aviation, the IEPG's Panel I is
examining requirements for a maritime patrol
aircraft; in paiallel, the principal European air-
craft manufacturers - Alenia, British Aerospace,
Casa, Dassault, DASA and Fokker - have just
set up an industrial consortium Europatrol to
define criteria for a maritime patrol aircraft that
20. Le Monde, lfth SePtembq 1992.
21. Ir Monde, 2lst JulY 1992.
might equip Europe in the next century 22. It
should be recalled that prefeasibility studies
conducted by the Euroflag consortium on the
development of a future large aircraft include
the possibility of producing a maritime patrol
version.
(iiil Air and air defence environmcnt
68. While the IEPG's Panel II23, responsible
for research and technology, in particular the
EUCLID programme (European co-operation
for the long term in defence), is examining inter
alia the harmonisation of modular avionics,
European fighter aircraft programmes continue
to be developed either on a national basis or in
co-operation between a small number of states:
the most celebrated is the European fighter air-
craft (EFa).
69. There has been a serious threat to this
quadripartite project, launched in t!8_!. by-the
German, Italian, Spanish and United Kingdom-
Governments, sinCe the German Minister of
Defence announced, in July l992,that Germany
would not take part in the production stage of
the aircraft and might even withdraw as from
the development stage. It is not yet known
whether Germany will manage to convince its
partners to build a lighter and far less expensive
version of a fighter aircraft to replace the EFA,
whether the United Kingdom Government will
manage to pursue the initial projec! without
Germany's participation but with other inter-
ested countries or whether, if necessary, the
United Kingdom will proceed on its own.
70. Without recalling here the entire history
of this aircraft and all the diverging arguments
about its usefulness and about the operational
requirements of air defence in an international
situation that has changed, it has to be noted
that a definite failure of efforts to find a com-
promise solution would be extremely reqettable
ind merely increase the influence of those
who doubi whether projects carried out in
co-operation are more advantageous than those
carried out in a purely national framework.
71. The example of the EFA shows once again
how difficult it ls to co-operate successfully in
such a specific area as equipment while all the
countries concerned continue to work out their
defence requirements on the basis of different
criteria, to pursue different security policies and
different industrial policies and have different
economic and financial Problems.
72. In regard to equipment for fighter aircraft,
the United Kingdom and France are co-oper-
ating on the development of a neY radar for
nsurlgsneration aircraft in which Germany is
22. lmpact,Ia lettre du SIRPA, No. 48, September 1992.
23. See Appendix II.
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interested. According to unconfirmed infor-
mation, the United Kingdom, French and
German armaments directors are believed to
have reached agreement on the principle of
enlarging the Franco-British project to make it a
trilateral programme 2a.
73. Conversely, where air-to.air missiles are
concerned, the advanced short-range air-to-air
missile (ASRAAM) project, initially a pro-
gramme common to the United Kingdom,
G-ermany, Norway and Canada, is in the process
of being carried out by the United Kingdom
{one, all the other partners having withdrawnfor financial reasons. Anglo-Ameriian co-oper-
ation on the advanced medium-range air-to-air
missile (AMRAAM) came to an end at the end
of July and in the meantime British Aerospace
has 
.started to study a new medium-range- air-to-air missile project with the French and
Swedish industries.
74. In the framework of Franco-German
co-operation, the two countries have concluded
a protocol of agreement for studying an obser-
valion system known as Brevel based on light,
pilotless stealth aircraft equipped with infrared
cameras like the American drones 25.
(iv) Space
75. For a long time, France and the United
Kingdom were the only Western European
countries to carry out, each on a national bisis,
programmes for the military use of space, partic-
ularly in the field of communications.
76. As from 1969, the United Kingdom
developed a series of communication satellites(Skyne| and, as from 1980, France developed
the Syracuse system (a system of radio commu-
nication using a satellite). Other countries fol-
lowed, such as Spain, with the Hispasat pro-
gramme, and Italy, with the Sicral project. At
tlr. e-n_d of 1991, France, the UnitedKingdom,
the Netherlands, Italy and Spain started to
examine the conditions for developing aj.oin_t qilitary satellite communication-system(EUMTLSACOM).
77. It is above all in regard to earth obser-
vation that Europe has started to define the con-
ditions for co'operation of a new type. While the
development of a military observalion satellite
system such as Helios remains limited to
co-operation between France (the initiator of the
systgn),_ Italy and $pain, the decisions taken bythe WEU Council in l99l:
- 
to set up a satellite data interpretation
and training centre in Torrej6n (Spain);
and
- 
to instruct a consortium of space indus-
tries to conduct a feasibility study on
the possibilities of setting up a Euro-
pean space-based observation system
demonstrated the determination of member
countries to bring about the conditions for
institutionalised space cooperation whose
quality and intensity would exieed all forms of
technical co-operation hitherto seen in Europe.
78. The success of such an audacious under-
taking is still far from certain. After the first
stage of the feasibility study, which comes to an
end in December 1992, it will be for the WEU
member countries to decide to move on to the
sccond stage, which will last from February to
October 1993. When representatives of the firm
Dornier, prime contractor for the feasibility
sjudy, briefed the Technological and Aerospace
Committee at the Farnborough Air Show on 9tn
September 1992, they were optimistic about the
ability of the industrial consortium responsible
for the-study to carry out the planned system in
spite of the technical requirements imp6sed, but
it is not certain that all the countries taking part
in the project will be prepared to bear the coit of
investment, then operational expenditure and
then expenditure on running the project.
79. While the fact that about thirty European
firms have agleed to share the task of eitab-
lishing the system is an encouraging example for
industrial co-operation, it would appear that the
choice of which industry should equip the
Torrej6n satellite centre is causing- a few
problems. The offrcial inauguration of the
centre, initially planned for June 1992, has still
not taken place and the decision on its
equipment, expected for 8th September 1992,
has not yet been taken.
80. NATO for its part is devoting much effort
to space-based observation systems, including
the requirements of the observation terminali
on which the NATO Communications and Infor-
mation Systems Agency (NACISA) is working.
81. Another programme in which NATO is
taking part is the improved AWACS system,
examined in the framework of the NATO Air-
lorne 
-Farly-Warning Management Agency(NAP\,IA). Other NATO programmes such ai
BICES (Battlefield Information Collection and
lxploitation Systems) and ACCIS (AlliedCommand Europe C2 Information Systems) are
progressing very slowly because of their tech-
nical complexity.
82. The 'sensitive' programmes carried outin NATO often have to overcome political
problems stemming either from a reitrictive
American attitude in respect of technological
proliferation or from difficulties encountered by
France in gaining access to certain programmes
in view of the fact that it is not part ofthe mil-
itary command structure.
I
I
I
i
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24. Defense News, 7th-l3th September 1992, page 72.
25. Lr Monde, l2th-l3th Janvary 1992.
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83. Your Rapporteur proposes not to con-
sider nuclear or strategic weapons in the present
report because of their specific nature and the
limited number of European countries belonging
to the " club " of nuclear powers. It will be for
the committee to decide whether a special report
should be devoted to the nuclear problem in the
frampwork of a future European Union.
(v) Sunmary
84. The present situation might be defined as
follorvs:
(i) therc is a multitude of unco-
ordinated bi-and multilateral pro-
grammes based on specific agrce'
ments between the states and indus-
tries concerned;
(i/ experience and points of view
diverge about the optimum number
of participants for carrying out a
programme;
(iiil opinions are divided about whether
the development of co-oPerative
prograTmes is more or less
expensive than PurelY national
development;
(iv) the Independent European Pro-
gramme GrouP (IEPG), the onlY
European forum responsible for
harmonising equipment since the
abolition of the WEU Standing
Armaments Committee (SAC) in
November 1989 has, in recent Years,
intensified its efforts to:
- 
harmonise requirements;
- 
draw up a research and tech-
nology programme; and
- 
set up progressively an open
European defence equipment
market,
but it is not possible to see whether
its activities have a direct influence
on co-operation as it is now being
organised between states or on deci-
sions to develoP and Produce a
given piece of equipment;
(v) the process of collective redefinition
of the threat and equipment require-
ments is making slow progress;
(vi) in specific areas such as earth obser-
vation, co.operation has been
institutionalised in WEU;
(viil all public budgets, in particular
defence budgets, are tending to
diminish not only because of eco-
nomic difficulties but also due to
the changing priorities resulting
from the disappearance of the
former threat;
(viii) on the other hand, technical devel-
opments in all armaments sectors
suggests that there will be a rise in
the cost of develoPing new sYstems,
particularly for space;
(ix) there will be no common rules for
exports of armaments outside
Europe, which are now falling
sharply;
(x) there is no common doctrine for
industrial policy (competition or
co-operation?) and the responsibil-
ities of the public authorities vis-
i-vis industry.
IY. Creation of a European armanents agenq
and the futurc of the IEPG
85. While the Twelve, by signing the Maas-
tricht Treaty, aim to take a decisive step towards
European Union, it is not surprising that they
should have recalled the rather unsatisfactory
state of co-operation in armaments matters. In
view of its complexity and member countries'
different positions, it will not be found sur-
prising either that, instead of taking concrete
decisions (e.g. the abolition of Article 223 of the
Rome Treaty), the governments again sought to_
evade the diificulty by proposing the creation of
a new body without specifying its attributions.
86. After the momentum given by the Franco-
German initiative of l4th October 1991, the
nine WEU member countries mentioned in their
declaration appended to the Maastricht Treaty,
among the 'proposals that will be examined
furthei ", * enhanced co-operation in the field of
armaments with the aim of creating a European
armaments agency ".
87. The Petersberg declaration of 19th June
1992 gives no details on this rather timid
wording in the Maastricht text. On the contrary,
it sets ihis project in the context of the future
evolution of the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group (IEPG):
'WEU ministers welcomed the IEPG
defence ministers' decision, at their Oslo
meeting on 6th March 1992, to analyse
the future r6le of the IEPG in the new
European security architecture. This rep
resenls a positive development fully in
line with the objective set bY WEU
member states in Maastricht further to
examine enhanced co-operation in the
field of armaments with the aim of cre-
ating a WEU EuroPean armaments
agency. WEU ministers propose that both
123
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WEU and IEPG experts analyse this issue
in depth, carry out an initial examination
of the r6le and functions of a possible
European armaments agency and submit
a report for consideration. "
88. It should {irst be recalled that the WEU
Council thus followed up several WEU recom-
mendations calling for clarification of its arma-
ments policy, particularly after the ministers
decided, on l3th November 1989, to abolish the
WEU Standing Armaments Committee (SAC), a
subsidiary body of the Council, set up on 7th
May 1955 in application of Article VIII, para-
graph 2, of the modified Brussels Treaty.
89. It is also worth recalling that the purpose
of the SAC, which was composed of representa-
tives of WEU member countries, was to
develop, in close liaison with NATO, consulta-
tions and co-operation in the armaments field
with a view to finding joint solutions which
would assist governments of member countriesin meeting their military equipment require-
ments by agreements or arrangements on such
subjects as the development, standardisation,
production and procurement of armaments con-
cluded between all or some WEU countries and
open to participation by other NATO member
countries. To this end, the SAC was free to set
up any subcommittees and working groups that
might be required and observers from NATO
might be associated with them.
90. In the context of the examination of
arrangements for a future European armaments
agency, it will certainly be useful for the WEU
experts who will have to contact the representa-
tives of the IEPG to discuss this problem to take
cognisance of the experience acquired by the
SAC during its thirty-four years of work both in
order to use it as a guide and to avoid repeating
the shortcomings in the concept of the SAC and
which complicated its work.
91. However, at present the WEU Council
does not give the impression that it is in anyhurry to implement the Maastricht and
Petersberg decisions on this subject. Accordingto information that your Rapporteur has
obtained from the Secretariat-General, the
problem ofthe agency takes second place to the
other projects WEU is to carry out with the aim
of enhancing its operational r6le. It emerges
from the speech by the Secretary-General -of
WEU at Chatham House, London, on 22nd Sep-
tember 1992,that the planned meetings between
representatives of WEU and the IEPG have not
taken place and it is not even known whether
WEU has already decided how it will be repre-
sented on that occasion.
92. On the IEPG side, things seem different.
First of all, the WEU Assembly is gratified to
have received from the Secretary-General ofWEU, last September, further information
about the activities of the IEPG 26, although it
has to note that the Secretary-General's promise
in his previous letter, dated 16th January 1991,
that the presidency of the IEPG would hence-
forth send information letters of this type after
each of its ministerial meetings has not been
kept.
93. It emerges from the last report on the
activities of the IEPG that this group has inter
alia enlarged its structure 27 and that, in 1991, it
set up an * IEPG team " under United Kingdom
chairmanship for dialogue with WEU. Also
under United Kingdom chairmanship, it set up
an * ad hoc group on ECI/WEU matters " to
examine developments in these forums with
possible implications for the IEPG.
94. Finally, at its last meeting in Oslo, the
IEPG approved basic principles which should
guide the discussions on a possible association
between the IEPG with WEU, as follows:
' l. All IEPG members should be entitled
to participate fully, and with the same
rights and responsibilities, in any arma-
ments co-operation forum.
2. There should be a single European
armaments co-operation forum, there
should be no duplication in this flreld.
3. The IEPG should continue to operate
until any replacement forum was to be
operational.
4. Any armaments co-operation forum
should take over, as starting point, the
agreed policies of the IEPG and maintain
existing links with NATO.
5. Armaments co-operation activities in
Europe should be managed by the
national armaments directors of all
current IEPG members, who will be
accountable to the defence ministers of
those member governments.
6. The existing basic structure of the
IEPG should, initially, be incorporated
into any future armaments co-operation
structure and the existing linkage between
the IEPG and EDIG should be main-
tained. "
95. It should be recalled that the IEPG
member countries that are not members of
WEU include Nonvay and Turkey, which belong
to NATO but not to the European Community.
These two countries are invited by WEUto become associate members. Conversely,
Denmark and Greece, which are also members
of the IEPG, are at the same time members of
NATO and of the European Community. These
countries are invited to become members or
observers in WEU if they so wish.
26. Document 1330, 7th September 1992.
27. See Appendix III.
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96. The words in the Petersberg declaration
that observers and associate members " will
have the same rights and responsibilities as the
full members for functions transferred to WEU
from other fora and institutions to which they
already belong " are perfectly compatible with
the first principle laid down by the IEPG.
97. Nor would there be any difficulties in
respect of points 2 and 3 of the basic principles.
Points 4, 5 and 6 will have to be studied care-
fully since they concern the fundamental
question of final aims, the creation of a
European armaments agency in the framework
of WEU and the transfer of IEPG institutions to
WEU.
98. The question whether and to what extent
the IEPG's structure and oryans, in their present
form, could be incorporated in the agency
depends largely on the def,rnition of the aims
and tasks of the agency. In this connection, all
concerned acknowledge that an attempt must be
made to avoid creating new bureaucracies to
carry out tasks already pursued by existing bodies.
99. In the absence of general agtreement on
the tasks of the future agency, it seems that the
most concrete ideas on the subject are now being
worked out in France, which, in co-operation
with Germany, has proposed to the other WEU
countries working guidelines on which the Min-
ister of Defence has given his views several
timcs.
l0O. Recalling the success of the European
Space Agency created to accompany a great
European space progBmme, Mr. Joxe under-
linedinter alia that the context was different for
the European annaments agency. It would come
into being at a time when the various countries
were involved in co-operative programmes that
were already under way. He said the agency
would therefore have to prepare itself and be
ready when the time came, i.e. at the time future
programmes are conceived and launched. He
iaid- the agency might therefore, in a first stage,
play an active r6le in European resear4r policy;
it riigtrt first be instructed to guide the EUCLID
programme and then take responsibility for
ottrer tasks, for instance co-ordinating
investment policies in testing facilities 28.
101. In an article in Le Figaro on 9th See
tember 1992, Mr. Joxe also included among the
proposed tasks the management of co-operative
progtrammes.
102. It would appear that, in Germany,
emphasis is also being placed on equipment Prg
duction problems, while the United Kingdom is
being more cautious. It is advocating a step-
by-step approach, leaving all decisions,
including that of recource to the agency's ser-
vices, to the discretion of member states.
103. If the future agency is not to suffer the
same fate as its predecessors, such as the SAC
and the IEPG, which ran into enormous diffi-
cutties in their efforts to ensure that their work
produced tangible results, i.e. the production of
inrly European equipment, agreement should be
reached on a concept allowing past stalemates to
be avoided.
104. In regard to aims, WEU can take as a
basis the four tasks defined when the IEPG was
created as these are still just as topical, i.e.:
- 
to promote effective use of resources in
the areas of research, development and
procurement of military equipment;
- 
to increase standardisation and inter-
operability of equipment;
- 
to safeguard an adequate industrial and
technical base in Europe; and
- 
to strengthen the European element in
transatlantic relations.
105. To date, the IEPG has hardly gone
beyond the research stage, which is important
but cannot be an end in itself. It is the devel-
opment and subsequent procurement and pro-
duction of equipment in accordance with
previously-defined requirements that are essential.
106. Now that the threat of a massive attack in
Europe has disappeared and in view of uncer-
tainty about the nature ofnew security risks, an
attempt should be made to boost the importance
of defining operational needs, and this is cur-
rently the task of the IEPG's Panel I. The panel
and its various subgroups, whose activities were
analysed in depth in the report presented by Mr.
Wilkinson on the IEPG and WEU 2e, seem to
have concentrated too much on technical details
and suffered from a lack of political guidelines,
starting with the criteria on the basis of which
operational requirements should be determined:
will each member country decide on its own
needs or is this the task of the Atlantic Alliance
as a whole or of WEU in its enlarged form?
107. If common criteria are to be found, either
for the alliance or for WEU (depending on the
breakdown of tasks between the two alliances
which is still to be decided), another problem
arises. Some member countries determine their
military equipment needs largely in the light of
the poisibility of exporting to third countries,
while other countries have adopted stricter legis-
lation for limiting arms exports.
108. The problem of harmonising export pol-
icies is even more acute when it is a matter
of decidinB oil, developing and producing
equipment jointly. It is diflicult to imagine how
the Twelve will manage to agree on common
28. Speech to the IHEDN, l3th May 1992.
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measures 
- 
as provided for in the Maastricht
Treaty 
- 
for controlling transfers of military
technology and weapons exports if Article 223 of
the Rome Treaty remains in force. The German
Government, answering a question put by Mr.
Feldmann on 7th July 1992, states quite plainly
that:
* In the foreseeable future, it is not
possible to count on significant
harmonisation of the various national
authorisation procedures in respect of
exports of military equipment since
several countries are not prepared to
make the necessary concessions. The talks
envisaged in the framework of European
political co-operation have so far pro-
duced very few significant results. Nor
therefore is there as yet unity at the level
of consideration of end-destination con-
trols of exports in the framework of mil-
itary equipment co-operation. "
109. In the absence of common rules, member
states applying the most binding regulations in
respect of exports will have great difliculty in
taking part in projects for the joint development
and production of armaments with countries
having the most lax regulations once the free
market comes into force within the Community
on lst January 1993.
I10. Your Rapporteur is not advocating that
the future agency be made responsible for man-
aging arms exports. However, if equipment
co-operation is not to be paralysed in the future
as a result of disagreement about end-
destination controls of military products in the
framework of the Twelve, it is essential to seek
intermediary solutions.
lll. A WEU group of experts might, for
example, examine on a regular basis the legit-
imate defence requirements of third countries
importing weapons in the light of political and
military assessments by member countries. This
group might draw up and publish recommenda-
tions concerning exports to certain regions.
WEU member countries would follow these rec-
ommendations on a voluntary rather than a
compulsory basis. If a country did not wish to
follow a recommendation, it would have to
consult its co-operation partner or partners, so
the export in question would be ruled out if the
partner or partners were opposed to it.
ll2. In all the agency's areas of activity, in par-
ticular in research and development, emphasis
should not be just on a more rational use of
existing resources; a list should also be drawn up
of the financial means necessary for Europe to
remain technologically competitive and carry
out the various projects now being studied.
l13. It emerges from a study presented at the
second international congress on land-based
armaments in Paris on l9th June 1992 that,
according to an estimate for 1992, the United
States is this year investing F 213 000 million in
weapons research and development, compared
with a total of F 63 000 million for three wEU
member countries 
- 
France, Gertnany and the
United Kingdom.
ll4. All European capabilities should therefore
be pooled to avoid duplication but the list of
priorities should also be revised in the light of
the most important requirements.
ll5. Particularly worthy of attention is the
work started in the framework of IEPG Panel III
on creating a European defence equipment
market (EDEM), intended to facilitate cross-
frontier procurement and allow optimum use of
member countries' defence budgets which are
liable to be cut. Here, for instance, experience
acquired by the IEPG should be examined in
regard to the focal points set up in member
countries and the publication by member coun-
tries of bulletins listing calls for bids that
contain basic information on the possibilities for
foreign firms to take part in national defence
equipment programmes.
116. The future agency should therefore, as the
IEPG has started to do since 1991, establish
close working relations with the European Com-
munity, and the Commission in particular, with
a view to harmonising Europe's industrial pol-
icies. This is particularly important since Article
130 of the Maastricht Treaty 
- 
and this is an
innovation 
- 
encourages the Community and
member states to ensure that the conditions nec-
essary for the competitiveness of the Commu-
nity's industry exist and lists a whole series of
concrete measures to be taken.
ll7. In view of the special situation of the
defence industry, which is not subject to the
authority of the Community because Article223
of the Rome Treaty remains in force, close links
between the agency and the Community are
essential. Similarly, the agency will have to
establish close relations with the European
Defence Industries Group (EDIG), as the IEPG
has hitherto done. However, it must be recalled
that it will not be possible in the long run to
make significant progress towards the estab-
lishment of a European defence equipment
market without working out a joint defence
policy, a task that is incumbent upon WEU.
llq. In regard to the transatlantic dialogue on
defence equipment matters, the future agency
will have to steer a middle course between ihose
wishing to lay emphasis on the opening of the
arms market in all NATO countries and those
wishing to concentrate on creating a European
defence equipment market.
I19. However, the example of the IEPG shows
that the two approaches should be considered to
be complementary, not contradictory. The close
relationship between the IEPG and NATO insti-
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tutions dealing with the arms trade should be
maintained by the agency in a spirit of open-
nesg and compatibility. The strengthening of
Europe's industrial competitiveness, far from
weakening transatlantic co-operation, may on
the contrary enhance it.
l2O. It will be particularly important for the
agency to co-operate very closely with all NATO
bodies responsible for strengthening standard-
isation and interoperability of equipment
insofar as this is a need that concerns the
allirnce as a whole. But the agency should set up
a special working unit to examine the needs of
multinational forces and, in particular, the
Franco-German arrny corps.
l2L. In regard to the structure and duties of the
agency, a compromise will have to be found
between two concepts since some advocate an
agency with considerable authority whose
responsibilities would replace those of national
agencies while others wish its duties to be con-
fined to the co-ordination of national initia-
tives.
122. The IEPG deplored the fact that it cannot
adopt any binding measures because it is not
recognised officially by a treaty. 'How can we
open up one or all of our markets if we have no
recourse against the protectionist attitudes of
other countries? 30'
123. It should also be recalled that the status of
the former WEU Standing Armaments Com-
mittee (SAC), based on a WEU Council decision
in application of Article VIII of the modified
Brussels Treaty, prevented that body too from
going further than the discussion and consul-
tation stage.
124. Simply transferring IEPG structures to
WEU would not eliminate the well-known diffi-
culties. It would be purely symbolic. On the lines
of the European Space Agency, the new body
shorld have a minimum of legal status and a
30. Briefing by General van Diest to the Technological and
Aerospace Committee, Brussels.
right of initiative which may, for instance, allow
it to call for tenders. This would change nothing
in the principle of decision-taking by govern-
ments from the moment it is the WEU ministers
of defence who constitute a supervisory
council.
125. However, even the best juridical structure
will not be enough if it lacks the political will of
all member countries which is essential if they
are to agree on a joint equipment policy.
Y. Conclusions
126. For more than forty years, expenditure on
defence and military equipment in all member
countries of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance has
been a heavy burden on national budgets since
the threat had to be met. The threat having dis-
appeared, the Western European countries are
now faced with new challenges, including the
need to help the recovery of Eastern Europe and
help to ensure their economic, political and
social stability.
127. The number of citizens believing that
larger cuts should be made in defence budgets is
steadily rising. At the same time, Europe is at a
point where the risks of conflict in the world are
increasing without it being possible to define
their nature clearly. While Europeans wish to
follow the evolution ofdefence technology, they
have to grapple with new financial requirements
that they will be able to meet only by pooling
their capabilities.
128. In the circumstances, it is unacceptable to
delay the implementation of more rational, less
costly European co-operation on defence
equipment in the framework of the new r6le
attributed to WEU by the Maastricht Treaty.
129. Furthermore, armaments co-operation is
a means of enhancing and promoting the policy
of European integration in a specific area where
such integration, in spite of the possible tech-
nical difficulties, is undeniably useful.
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APPENDIX I
APPENDIX I
IEPG Panel I
Operutional requirements and equipment pnogrammes
Sub-group oveniew
1. Future large aircraft
2. Vehicle robotics
3. Armoured bridgelayer interoperability
4. Maritime patrol aircraft
5. 155 mm artillery weapon system
6. Aimed control effect-antitank mine
7. Third generation antitank weapon
8. Microwave landing system
9. STINGER
10. Coastal minesweeper
I l. Mistral
12. I.ow caliber/individuaUsupport weapon
13. M483/M864 155 mm arti ammunition dual
14. Submarine advanced propulsion
15. Armoured recce vehicles
I 6. Meteorological equipment
17. Simulation
18. Combat support ship 2000
19. New logistic vehicles
20. Short-range antitank weapon
21. Stand off air to ground weapons
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1.
2.
APPENDIX II
IEPG Panel II
List of RTPs
Modern radar technology1.1 Mission related aspects
Silicon microelectronics2.2 SOI technology2.2 Interconnection assembly2.3 Military qualif-rcation2.5 SOI cell library2.7 Mixed analog digital design2.8 Very high speed A/D converters2.9 User programmable integrated circuits
Composite structures3.1 Application technology3.2 Light ballistic optimisation3.5 Development of technology for high temperature composite3.6 Composites for electromagnetic windows3.8 Naval application technology
Modular avionics4.1 Modular avionics harmonisation study
Electric gun (dormant)
Artificial intelligence6.1 Advanced work station for command and control systems6.2 High speed pattern recognition environment6.3 Knowledge engineering6.4 Combinatorial algorithms for military application
Signature manipulation7.3 Improvement of RCS prediction codes7.8 Optimum shape design in electromagnetics
Optoelectronic devices8.1 Affordable lightweight IR sensors8.2 Intelligent sensors8.3 Solid state laser sources
Satellite surveillance technology, including verification aspects9.1 Technology concepts and harmonisation9.2 High resolution optical sensor technology9.3 Advanced space synthetic aperture radar9.4 Real time processing and data handling9.5 Ground segment technology
Underwater detection and related technologiesl0.l Low frequency underwater sound propagation
10.2 Towed array heading sensors
10.3 Hydrodynamic noise study
Technology in the field of human factors including simulation
I l.l Training system conceptsll.2 Simulation techniques1.3 Mission and/or battle simulation1.8 Low cost simulators
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
I
I
I l.
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Political level
Ministers/State Secretaries
Ad Hoc Group
EC/WEU matters
Panel I
Operational requirements
and equipment programmes
Panel II
Research and technology
including the EUCLID
programme
Panel III
Procedures and economic
matters including European
defence equipment market
Ad hoc Working Group
on Competition and Juste Retour
United Kingdom
Ad hoc Working Group
on Technology Transfer
E Chairmanship on a rotational basis (two years)
199t-1992: Belgium
1993-1994: Denmark
APPENDIX III
Structure of the IEPG
i
/
f
130
I Eu.opean Del-ence II Industry Group I@
Sub-group on Developing
Defence Industry Nations
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Anendments I nd 2 30th Novembet 1992
European armaments co-olreration after Maastricht
AMENDMENTS I and 2T
tabled by Mr. Hardy on behalf of the Srcialist Group
l. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " not too burdensome ".
2. At the end of paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add the words " and retain
records of such exports ".
Signed: Hardy, Thompson
l. See l2th sitting, 2nd December 1992 (amendments not moved).
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Amendment 3
2nd Decembet 1992
European armaments c@operutiott after Maastricht
AMENDMENT 3 
'
tabled hy Mr. Lopez Henares
3. At the end of paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add * and promote the notifi-
cation of such exports to the United Nations Register of International Arms Transfers ".
Signed: Lopez Henares
l. See l2th sitting, 2nd December 1992 (amendment agreed to).
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Dmument 1333 30th Octobet 1992
Parliamentary debates on securtry policy
under the Maastricht Treaty
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations2
by Mr. Nufiex, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnerr RrsolurroN
on parliamentary debates on security policy under the Maastricht Treaty
Expr-eNerony Mr,uonnNoutvl
submitted by Mr. Nuflez, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. Parliamentary debates in the WEU member countries
(a/ Belgium
(b) France
(c) Germary
(d) ltaly
(e/ Luxembourg
(/ Netherlands
(g,) Portugal
(h) Spain
(, United Kingdom
III. Parliamentary debates in Denmark, Greece and Ireland
(a) Denmark
(b) Greece
(c) Ireland
IV. Debates in the European Parliament
V. Conclusions
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: I&lr. Tummers (Chairman); Mrs. Fischer (Alternate: Miiller), Sir lohn Hunt (Yice-Chairmen);
MM. Amaral, Biihler, Caccia, Mrs. Err, Mr. Eversdijk (Alternate: Dees) Sir Anthony Durant, Mr. Fiandrotti, Mrs. Frias(Afternate: Roman), Mr. Ghesquiire, Dr. Godman (Alternate: Baroness Lockwood), MM. Gouteyron, Greco, Sir Russell
Johnston (Alternate: Baroness Hooper),MM. Kempinaire, Lemoine, Lopez Henares, Martins, Nufiez,Pfithl, Reimann, Seitlinger,
Stegagnini, Vial-Massat.
N.B. Ile names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Resolution
on parlianeatary dabates oa security policy
uader the Maostricht Trcaty
The Assembly,
(i) Noting the significant progress in the process of European political integration due to_ the provi-
sions of the Maastricht Treaty concerning the definition and implementation of a common foreign and
security policy;(ii) Aware of the importance of the r6le the Maastricht Treaty attributes to WEU, which will be
required to work out and implement the union's decisions and action in the defence area;
(iiil Bearing in mind the need to ensure that there is a new consensus on the one hand between the
poiitical and social forces and public opinion in the member countries of Western European U_nion
ind, on the other hand, between those countries on questions connected with security and defence
policy;
(iv) Aware that the definition and implementation of a common foreign and security policy is one of
the most difficult challenges to be met by the European Union;
(v) Regretting that, in certain countries, the public was not kept sufficiently informed of the progress
of negotiations on the Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht;
(vt) Noting also the absence of an in-depth debate on the r6le of WEU and on its relations with the
institutions of the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance, a debate that ought to have been
required by the declaration on WEU appended to the treaty,
INvrrss rHE covERNMENTS on WEU MEMBER coUNTRIES
To instigate a parliamentary debate on the common foreigr and security policy provided for in
the Maastrichf Treaty and on the r6le of and its relations with the European Union and the Atlantic
Alliance;
INvrrrs rHE pARLTAMENTs oF WEU urunER coUNTRIES
1. To arouse public interest in the common foreign and security policy provided for in the Maas-
tricht Treaty, the r6le of WEU and its relations with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance;
2. To strengthen their co-operation with the WEU Assembly in particular by increasing exchanges
of information with it;
3. To debate in full the common foreign and security policy provided for in Maastricht, its evo-
lution and the r6le of WEU as specified in the treaty, as well as relations between our organisation and
the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Nufiaz, Rapporteu)
-t
I. Introduction
1. A consequence ofthe radical changes that
have occurred in recent years, mainly on our
continent, is to bring out even more clearly the
contradiction between the economic strength of
Europe, on the one hand, and its lack of political
inlluence, on the other. Events in Yugoslavia in
1991 clearly demonstrated this shortcoming and
consequently the urgency of Europe being as
politically present as possible on the interna-
tional stage.
2. The European Economic Community
trerties have two main goals: a common agricul-
tural policy and the free movement of factors of
production. Europe's founding fathers were
indeed aware that Europe could not be built in
one swoop: it had to be built progressively, cre-
ating solidarity by introducing bases of joint
development.
3. [n force since lst July 1987, the Single
European Act modifying and completing the
treaties setting up the European Communities
has three dimensions characteristic of European
intcgration. First, it institutionalised political
cooperation and the European Council, it mod-
ified the powers and decision-taking mecha-
nisms of the institutions and, finally, it launched
new Community policies.
4. Institutionalisation of political co-oper-
ation, introduced in 1970, and of the European
Council, set up in 1974, gave European inte-
gf,ation a framework different from the one laid
down in the original treaties. The Single
European Act effectively granted both institu-
tions the same juridical and institutional status
as the other Community institutions.
5. The European Council thus became the
main institution of European integration and,
whereas the latter had hitherto been hinged on
he Community, with the Single European Act,it was now organised round two nuclei: the
Community and political co-operation.
6. The Single European Act brought the
Commission general responsibilities for applying
Community regulations and strengthened the
European Parliament's participation in drawing
up these regulations although it was not given
real legislative powers. The Council for its part
was able to take certain decisions by qualified
majority.
7 . This rapid reading of the Single European
Act now comes to the aspects that relate to
European co-operation in foreign policy matters
as provided for in Title III. This is symbolically
limited to laying the juridical foundations for
action. By concerting and harmonising positions
and taking joint action, exchanges of infor-
mation and reciprocal consultations are to lead
to more definite influence in external policy
matters. Nevertheless, such co-operation is not
binding on member countries.
8. Finally, according to the Single European
Act, greater co-operation in European security
matters will make a decisive contribution to the
development of a European identity in external
policy and, furtherrnore, none of its provisions
should rule out the possibility of closer
co-operation between member states in security
matters in the framework of Western European
Union or the Atlantic Alliance. The Single
European Act refers to security solely as a
general strategic concept and to the political and
economic aspects of security but not to its mil-
itary aspects. The foundations have thus been
laid and the ground covered has been neither
unduly long nor as constructive as might have
been wished; it is on the basis of this experience
that, with Maastricht, this title has been revised,
as provided for in Article 30, paragraph 12, of
the Single European Act.
9. First, the Treaty on European Union
replaces political co.operation by common
foreign and security policy and, although it does
not formally change the responsibilities member
states retain for themselves in such sensitive
areas, it nevertheless implies a major qualitative
step in political matters since, for the first time,
these areas are integrated in the union,
implicitly moving towards a full Community,
even if the process has to transmit through inter-
national co-operation.
10. The opening declaration of the Treaty on
European Union says member countries are
" resolved to implement a common foreign and
security policy including the eventual framing of
a common defence policy, which might in time
lead to a common defence, thereby reinforcing
the European identity and its independence in
order to promote peace, security and progress in
Europe and in the world ".
11. These principles, repeated in Article B of
the Common Provisions, are a reflection of the
ambiguity and conditional nature to be found
throughout all the articles relating to the
common foreign and security policy - and in
particular its security and defence aspects -
which are due purely and simply to the need to
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reconcile the parties' different wishes and sus-
ceptibilities. Most certainly parliamentary
debates may bring out differences between those
who wish WEU to be half way between the
Atlantic Alliance and the Union and conse-
quently not integrated in the latter and those
who believe WEU should be fully integrated in
the union, even if it continues to co-operate with
NATO.
12. According to Article J, " a common
foreign and security policy is hereby estab-
lished " and lays down the aims of this policy
and the means of attaining them.
13. These aims, i.e. * to safeguard the
common values, fundamental interests and
independence of the union; to strengthen the
security of the union and its member states in all
ways; to preserve peace and strengthen interna-
tional security in accordance with the principles
of the United Nations Charter as well as the
principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the
objectives of the Charter of Paris; to promote
international co-operation; to develop and con-
solidate democracy and the rule of law, and
respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms ", will be attained " by establishing sys-
tematic co-operation " and " implementing...joint action in areas in which the member states
have important interests in common ".
14. " Loyalty and mutual solidarity " and
refraining " from any action which is contrary to
the interests of the union or likely to impair its
effectiveness " must be the practice in member
states.
15. " Whenever it deems necessary, the
Council shall define a common position " in
foreign policy and security matters which must
be adopted in accordance with the unanimity
rule and * member states shall ensure that their
national policies conform to the common posi-
tions and, to this end, they * shall co-ordinate
their action in international organisations and at
international conferences ".
16. Procedure provided for in Article J.3 for
adopting joint action establishes a delicate
balance between respect for national sovereignty
safeguarded by the unanimity rule required to
approve the principles of joint action and the
ability of the Council to determine the tangible
aspects of this joint action, which may be
decided by qualified majority. The whole of this
article shows us, once again, through the ambi-
guity of the text and the optional nature of its
provisions, the reservations, reticence and
resistance of certain signatories vis-d-vis any
deepening that involves more decision-taking in
common foreign and security policy matters.
17 . Article J.4, after referring to " the
eventual framing of a common defence policy,
which might in time lead to a common defence ",
goes on to say that * the union requests Western
European Union (WEU), which is an integral
part of the development of the union, to elab-
orate and implement decisions and actions of
the union which have defence implications. The
Council shall, in agreement with the institutions
of WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrange-
ments ".
18. It is immediately specified that decisions
and actions are to be governed by the unanimity
rule, that the defence policy will " not prejudice
the specific character ofthe security and defence
policy of certain member states and... respect
the obligations of certain member states under
the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible
with the common security and defence policy
established within that framework ". Finally, it
is underlined that none of the provisions of the
article will " prevent the development of closer
co-operation between two or more member
states on a bilateral level, in the framework of
WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such
co-operation does not run counter to or impede
that provided for in this title ".
19. Articles J.5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 subsequently
specify that * the presidency shall represent the
' union in matters coming within the common
foreign and security policy " and be responsible
" for the implementation of common measures ".
The presidency is to consult the European Par-
liament on these matters and ensure that its
views are taken into consideration. " The
European Council shall define the principles of
and general guidelines for the common foreign
and security policy " and on this basis the
Council is to define and implement common
foreign and security policy. Finally, " the Com-
mission shall be fully associated with the work
carried out in the common foreign and security
policy field ".
20. The WEU member countries endorsed
two non-binding declarations appended to the
Maastricht Treaty that are directly and specifi-
cally linked with Title V of the Treaty on
European Union. These declarations specify the
nature of WEU's participation in European
defence policy and its relations with the
European Union and NATO. They refer to the
accession of new members. The first declaration,
on " the r6le of Western European Union and its
relations with the European Union and with the
Atlantic Alliance ", refers to the agreement of
WEU member states * on the need to develop a
genuine European security and defence identity
and a greater European responsibility on
defence matters " and adds that " this identity
will be pursued through a gradual process ".
21. * WEU ", continues the declaration, " will
be developed as the defence component of the
European Union and as the means to strengthen
the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To
this end, it will formulate @mmon European
defence policy and carry forward its concrete
L
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implementation through the further devel-
opment of its own operational r6le. "
22. The tightening of links between WEU and
the European Union will be encouraged mainly
by ' the synchronisation of the dates and venues
of meetings and harmonisation of working
methods, establishment of close co-operation
between the Council and Secretariat-General of
WEU on the one hand and the Council of the
union and General Secretariat of the Council on
the other ", harmonisation of the respective
presidencies, ensuring that the Commission is
regularly informed and consulted and, finally,
" encouragement of closer co-operation between
the parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the
European Parliament ", a subject that will be
tackled below.
23. On relations between WEU and the
Atlantic Alliance, the declaration states that
" the objective is to develop WEU as a means to
strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance ". Transparency and complementarity
are to be the basis of the development of a closer
relationship, still with a view to strengthening
" the r6le, responsibilities and contributions of
WEU member states in the alliance ".
24. In regard to the operational r6le of WEU,
provision is made for defining " appropriate
missions, structures and means covering... [a]
WEU planning cell, closer military co-operation
complementary to the alliance..., meetings of
WEU chiefs of defence staff" and " military
units answerable to WEU ".
25. " Creating a European armaments agency "
and " development of the WEU Institute into a
European security and defence academy " are
also envisaged in the declaration, which also
provides for the transfer of the seat of the
organisation to Brussels.
26. The second declaration contains an invi-
tation to join WEU (* on conditions to be agreed
in accordance with Article XI of the modified
Brussels Treaty ") to countries which, although
members of the European Union, are not yet
members of WEU. Furthermore, other Euro-
pean states members of NATO may become
assrciate members of WEU, thus playing a full
part in its activities. Hence it is these points,
referred to briefly above, that should be the
subject of the parliamentary debates that are
considered in the next chapter. Logically and
fortunately, these debates have already been
extended to the public and to organisations and
institutions directly affected by common
external and security policy.
27. From these debates, a clearer definition
should emerge of aims that are - as they should
be 
- 
ambitious and means that will have to be
really functional to enable them to be attained.
These, too, will be better understood thanks to
these debates.
28. Referring to the Treaty on European
Union, a Spanish diplomat recently affirmed
that the timidity and slowness of the steps now
being taken in reality concealed the fact that it
was a giant stride forward.
29. Whatever the strength of their impact
may be, steps have been taken and perhaps
the virtue of patience, as shown by Robert
Schuman, thus explaining his obstinate opti-
mism in undertaking the building of Europe, has
already, for the time being at least, already pro-
duced its final and, it is to be hoped, irre-
versible, results. Parliamentary debates in the
various Community countries will probably
remove the shadows that still remain.
\
II. Parliamentary debates in WEU
member countries
(a) Belgium
30. In Belgium, procedure for parliamentary
ratification of the Treaty on European Union
provides that the Chamber of Representatives
and the Senate must approve a bill bringing into
force the treaty, its protocols, the final act and
the appended declarations.
31. Furthermore, the councils of the commu-
nities (i.e. the Vlaase Raad, the Conseil de la
Communaut6 frangaise and the Rat der
deutschsprachigen Gemeinschaft) must also
approve the treaty since some of the matters
covered by it affect areas such as international
co-operation and the conclusion of treaties,
which are within the purview of the three com-
munities (Flemish-, French- and German-
speaking). The communities' international
responsibilities include cultural and educational
matters and certain aspects of health and
welfare.
32. For the same reason, the United Assembly
of the Joint Community Commission, which
exercises community responsibilities in the
bilingual region of Brussels-Capital, also has to
approve the treaty " for matters which concern
if ". Ratification of the treaty also means modi-
fying the Belgian Constitution in respect of the
righi to vote and to stand as a candidate ofcit-
izens ofother countries ofthe union resident in
Belgium. The State Council considers the consti-
tutibn should be revised before the treaty is rat-
ifred but the government ovemrled this opinion,
considering that Article 8b of the Treaty on
European Union was not for immediate appli-
cation and that, consequently, the constitution
could be modified before the article in question
came into force. The government also con-
sidered that, since international law takes pri-
ority over internal law in Belgium, ratification
of the treaty in itself implied acceptance of the
rights provided for in Article 8b.
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33. [n June and July 1992,the External Rela-
tions Committee held a total of seven meetings
to examine and discuss the bill on the Treaty on
European Union. At the close of this series of
meetings, a committee report was approved and
transmitted to the Chamber of Representa-
tives for debate and vote. This report quoted
Mr. Claes, Minister for Foreign Affairs, who
recognised that foreign policy had evolved little
compared with what had been provided for in
the Single Act, unlike defence policy, which he
thought had made considerable progress. As he
said, it was the first time since 1955 that a
European text mentioned defence. The union
would not merely define a joint security policy;
in future, it would also move towards joint
defence. He believed it would be necessary, in
1996, to revise provisions relating to security
policy since application of the decisions taken
was raising questions, in particular about the
definition of a joint security policy at military
level and the effectiveness of the decision-taking
process adopted. He underlined that successes in
this area had not been scored prior to the Maas-
tricht summit meeting but were a result of it.
34. In the general debate that started in the
Chamber of Representatives on l4th July, Mr.
Van Dienderen of the AGALEV-ECOLO parlia-
mentary group expressed the opposition of the
greens to the Maastricht Treaty, particularly
because nuclear war remained a possibility
within the context of the treaty. He believed
Europe, through WEU, could behave like a for-
midable nuclear power. Furthermore, apart
from humanitarian assistance, the creation of
WEU rapid action forces was intended to safe-
guard our economic situation vis-i-vis countries
producing raw materials, thus maintaining an
unfair division of wealth.
35. Mr. Annemans of the Maams Blok, the
Flemish group that is also opposed to ratifi-
cation, believed no progress had been made in
common foreign and security policy; the statusquo ante had been perpetuated which, he
thought, prevented the adoption of flexible,
energetic action.
36. Mrs. Spaak of the Front d6mocratique des
francophones, in favour of ratification, endorsed
the Lisbon declaration on common foreign and
security policy which she considered to be a con-
siderable improvement on political co-operation
because of the common action envisaged. The
co-operation between the CSCE, NATO and
WEU that had been decided in Helsinki was a
practical example of this and showed, according
to Mrs. Spaak, that the European security archi-
tecture was capable of working with due respect
for the principles ofco-operation and openness.
37. Mr. Van der Maelen of the Socialistische
Partij considered common foreign and security
policy revealed one of the treaty's shortcomings:it was not included in Community structures
and was subject neither to serious parliamentary
control nor to scrutiny by the European Court of
Justice, thus increasing the democratic deficit.
38. Mrs. T'Serclaes of the Parti social chrdtien
spoke in similar terms; she said the pillared
structure of the treaty left foreign and defence
policy outside the field of application of Com-
munity regulations.
39. Mr. Matagne of the Front national was in
favour of transferring sovereignty to the
European Union in areas such as foreign policy
but added that his party was insisting on a refe-
rendum on the treaty. Although the Front
national was in favour of European unification,
the presence of other negative elements in the
text led him to abstain when the vote was taken.
40. All these speeches were made in the
general debate preceding the debate on the
various articles. When dealing more specifically
with common foreign and security policy, the
Rapporteur, Mr. De Decker, first declared that
Maastricht gave the European Union instru-
ments that would allow it to assert its own
identity in future. The process was thus under
way. It would be re-examined in 1996 in the
light of progress and experience.
41. During the last forty years, European uni-
f,rcation had made war impossible between its
members and twelve-power Europe had become
the main factor of stability on the continent. Mr.
De Decker considered this to be its great merit
and he also underlined that procedure agreed
upon for defining common positions that should
lead to further joint action would not be as
effective as had been intended. He thought the
twofold rule of unanimity and qualified
majority would undeniably be a handicap to the
implementation of a common foreign policy.
42. Mr. De Decker also referred to the task
assigned to WEU by the Maastricht Treaty and
the measures agreed upon to enhance its opera-
tional rdle. In this connection, he mentioned the
transfer of the Secretariat-General to Brussels,
the setting up of the planning cell, co-operation
with the alliance, the meetings of WEU chiefs of
defence staffand the formation of military units
under the aegis of WEU. In relation to the latter
decision, he said the creation of the Franco-
German arrny corps might be the nucleus of the
future European army.
43. Our colleague Mr. Kempinaire of the
Parti de la libertd et du progrds spoke of the
need for the European Community to have a
coherent, operational instrument to draw up
guidelines for the political and military aspects
of European policy. He said Maastricht had
restored the balance between economy and
security in the framework of the European Com-
munity. Nevertheless, he expressed concern at
the gap separating the political world and the
people and his fellow citizens' ignorance of
I
I
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Maastricht, due partly to the diffrculty of under-
standing the text of the treaty. He therefore
calkd for a clear, intelligible information cam-
paign to reduce the gap between citizens and
politicians.
44. On lTth July 1992, the Chamber passed
the bill ratifying the Treaty on European Union
by 146 votes to 33 with 3 abstentions.
45. The ratification process, which is still
under way at the time of writing, will be com-
pleted in October or November in the Senate,
ihe Community Councils and the Assembly of
Brussels-Capital.
(b) France
46. On I lth March 1992,the President of the
Republic submitted the Treaty on Furopean
Unlon to the Constitutional Council, thus initi-
ating the process leading up to its ratification by
parliament by 3lst December of this year.
47. On 9th April, the Constitutional Council
decided that authorisation to ratify the Treaty
on European Union by law could be given only
after revision of the constitution. There were
very precise reasonsjustifying the decision taken
by ihe Constitutional Council: these were voting
rights for foreigners (nationals of other Com-
munity countries), the single currency and Com-
munity policy towards third countries in respect
of visas.
48. The Constitutional Bill adding a new
chapter on the European Communities and
Eurbpean Union to the constitution was passed
by the National Assembly on l2th May after a
first reading and then examined and amended
by the Senate in June. The National Assembly
passed it without amendment after a second
ieading and the President of the Republic then
convened parliament in congress (in accordance
with one of the methods of revising the consti-
tution) at the chdteau of Versailles on 23rd June.
49. Of the 665 votes cast, 592 were in favour
of adopting the constitutional reform required
by the treaty (the majority needed being three-
fifths, i.e. 399 votes) ard 73 against. Most
Socialist Party and UDF members and the
Union des rdpublicains et inddpendants, the
Rassemblement des ddmocrates europ6ens, the
Union centriste and the Union du Centre voted
for, the Communist Party against and the RPR
was absent when the vote was taken, having left
the sitting immediately after it was opened.
50. The constitutional reform was therefore
approved and opened the way to ratification of
the Maastricht Treaty. In the midst of the
trouble caused by the result of the Danish refe-
rendum, the President of the Republic decided
to submit ratification of the treaty to refe-
rendum, thus triggering off an intense, impas-
sioned debate in the country that divided parties
and public opinion and kept European govern-
ments and citizens in suspense until the evening
of 20th September. The referendum thus placed
the fate of European political and monetary
union in France's hands, a fact of which those
for and against the treaty were well aware.
Before examining the various positions adopted
by the parties and some of their leading
members, your Rapporteur thought it useful to
analyse the information reports on the Treaty on
European Union prepared in the National
Assembly and the Senate by their delegations to
the European Communities.
51. The National Assembly's report saw an
improvement in the chapter on common foreign
and security policy and considered that, while
more modest than expected, it would produce a
mobilising, dynamic movement. According to
this report, progress in defence matters,
unthinkable a few years earlier, was due to the
Gulf war.
52. The report also indicated that the plan
submitted in Maastricht on the basis of a text by
the Luxembourg presidency provided that the
area of application of foreign policy would be
defined unanimously, while methods of appli-
cation would be decided by a majority.
However, the text approved in Maastricht
increases the use of unanimity for the principles
and form of common action while, under the
terms of the treaty, the practical content of such
action would be subject to qualified majority
voting.
53. The report considered that the practice
followed at meetings of the Council of ministers
for foreign affairs would be decisive: would
unanimous decision-taking continue or would
there be an evolution so that minority countries
would resign themselves to endorsing a joint
decision? Where European defence was con-
cerned, the treaty contained the first signs of
such a movement; although no directly appli-
cable measure had been taken, there had been a
move towards developing co-operation between
WEU and the European Union. Finally, the doc-
ument underlined that common foreign and
security policy was set in an intergovernmental
rather than Community framework and that the
Commission played no part and was merely
fully associated with such work. On the
European Parliament, as well as the provisions
already provided for by political co-operation,
there were consultations by the presidency on
the principal aspects of foreign policy and the
possibility of putting questions, making recom-
mendations and holding an annual debate.
54. Furthermore, the National Assembly dele-
gation for the European Communities, at a joint
meeting with the Foreign Affairs Committee on
22nd [pril1992, was addressed by Mr. Klepsch,
President of the European Parliament. On
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common security policy, he believed the forth-
coming deadline for the WEU treaty would
provide an opportunity to define and complete
it; moreover, the neutrality of certain present or
future member states of the Community was
not, he thought, an obstacle to the definition of
such a policy. Finally, he said he was in favour
of holding joint meetings between the Foreign
Affairs and Security Committee of the European
Parliament and the Political Committee of the
WEU Assembly. Your Rapporteur does not
quite see the point of holding such meetings
with a body which, according to a questionable
statement by Mr. Klepsch, is destined to dis-
appear in the near future particularly if, as he
said, this would facilitate a more precise defi-
nition and a deepening of common security
policy.
55. Where the Senate report is concerned, Mr.
Gudna, Rapporteur, underlined the approximate
nature of the text and subsequent difficulty of
interpreting it. He thought the treaty also bore
the mark of suspicion of national policies.
Common foreign and security policy being a
particularly changing area, the procedure laid
down was cumbersome and hence liable to
hamper action. The unanimity rule might lead
governments to decide action on the basis of the
lowest common denominator existing between
states. Mr. Gu6na was also astonished that com-patibility with the strategy of the Atlantic
Alliance was specifically stipulated in such an
institutional treaty that included an aflirmation
of the identity of the European Union on the
international stage.
56. In regard to the Commission's power to
make proposals in this area, Mr. Poniatowski
recalled that it had been opposed to intervention
in lraq; the senator believed acts of war were the
responsibility of governments and not of the
Commission.
57. The Rapporteur, too, was surprised at this
recognition of the Commission's power to make
proposals but considered the latter would
probably carry less weight vis-i-vis the heads of
state and of government.
58. To return to the vast national debate
stemming from the calling of a referendum, in
the ranks of the Socialist Party, there was not
complete unanimity. Mr. Chevdnement, former
Minister of Defence, said he had scruples about
the Maastricht agreements and this prevented
him supporting the government position. He
believed the treaty, far from being a step
forward, was on the contrary a move backwards
since the cold war was over; moreover, it would
lead to a two-speed Community and a three-
speed Europe. Max Gallo, a Socialist member of
the European Parliament, adopted a similar
position and rejected the theory that what was
right for Germany was right for Europe and
what was right for Europe was right for France.
59. The President of the Republic, who had
described France as the driving force ofEurope,
said that if the " Noes " won it would put an end
to forty-five years of French foreign policy; it
would stop the building of Europe and it would
also destroy everything the Community had
done to date. Mr. Mitterrand tried to remove
any links between the referendum and a per-
sonal plebiscite, but many of those in favour of
voting * No " had been unable to avoid this
latent link.
60. The President considered the treaty to be
confederal with states remaining states and
entrusting to the Community the r6le of settling
a number of problems. He thought a move to
federalism would be an unduly hasty step for
Europe.
61. The President affirmed that the Single
European Act by which it had been decided to
abolish frontiers and internal barriers would
have deprived us of means of ensuring our own
security had it not been completed by the rel-
evant provisions adopted in Maastricht.
62. The referendum was called because there
was a wish to change a spontaneous but vague
pro-European feeling into reasoned, lasting
accession. Moreover, the President of the
Republic believed the referendum would make
it necessary to remedy part of the public's lack
of information and the lack of interest of others.
The Prime Minister affirmed that, in defence
and security matters, France would be stronger
with its partners than on its own. Mr. Bdrdgovoy
made the following statement at the opening of
the forty-fifth session of the Institut des hautes
dtudes de ddfense nationale:
" Defence is at the heart of state sover-
eignty. Whatever may have been heard in
certain quarters, it is not true that the
Maastricht Treaty, by including security
among European ambitions, calls in
question state sovereignty. The truth is
quite the opposite.
On the contrary, the treaty shows that
EtIope is walking on two feet: while pur-
suing economic integration it is adding
political co-operation between member
states, particularly in security matters,
responsibility for which it assigns not to
an administrative body but to intergov-
ernmental institutions, democratically
answerable to their respective peoples and
supervised by the national parliaments.
Sovereignty is intact, while co-operation
increases strength. "
63. Mr. Giscard d'Estaing for his part con-
ducted a convincing campaign in favour of a
" Yes " vote, his first argument being the main-
tenance of peace. On the left, some advocates of
a " No " vote held that the Europe of Maastricht
was the liberal Europe of Giscard. The latter has
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never concealed his satisfaction at this com-
parison. He was certainly one of the main
winners in a referendum that he considered dan-
genous because ofthe unpopularity ofthe person
who called for it.
64. In the RPR, the organisation of a refe-
rendum opened a wide split between those for
and against the treaty. The former included Mr'
Chirai, for whom a " No " victory would mean
the collapse of Europe, and the latter included
Mr. Pasqua, former Minister of the Interior, for
whom Europe should be built on states and
peoples and not on risky federalist theori-es like
itrose of Maastricht, and Mr. Seguin, former
Minister for Social Affairs, who, in a debate
with the President of the Republic, made
national sovereignty a decisive aspect of his
position.
65. The Communist Party, consistently fol-
lowing its traditional line, advocated voting
" No'i in the referendum. Mr. Marchais asserted
that the treaty bore the mark of Germany and
that its economic and monetary provisions
alone justified a negative vote; then there was
the federal trend which would lead to the abdi-
cation of a large part of national sovereignty.
66. The personality of General de Gaulle was
also recalled during the referendum campaign,
both by those in favour of voting * No ", such as
thc General's son, Admiral Philippe de Gaulle, a
senator, who had no doubt whatsoever that his
father would have voted'No ", and by those in
favour of a " Yes " vote, such as Mr. Chaban-
Delmas, former Prime Minister, who said Mr.
Pasqua and Mr. Seguin, both members of his
partt, had understood nothing about the Gen-
eral's way of thinking.
67. General Maurice Schmitt, who was army
chief of staff from 1987 to 1991, wondered
whether the treaty involved France's indepen-
dence and whether its provisions might improve
the conditions in which peace and freedom in
France were guaranteed and its interests
ddended. General Schmitt thougltt there was
nothing in the treaty that might hinder French
policy br create more commitments than those
that 
-had been freely entered into when the
Brussels and Washington Treaties were signed.
Conversely, he thought the Maastricht Treaty
offered an opportunity to build a solid European
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance that France had
wanted for so long. The General added that, in
this way, the weight and responsibilities of Euro-
peans in the alliance would be increased as they
were going to have to take account of many new
problems relating to their security and the pro-
tection of Europe's interests. Finally, after
affirming that Europe must unite to be certain of
ensuring its security and defence, the General
conclud-ed that nothing in the treaty-qleated new
commitments for France or limited its freedom
of action; on the contrary, the treaty provisions
would strengthen the security of Europe and
hence of France.
68. When the referendum was called, about
600/o of the electorate intended to vote " Yes "
but this percentage fell steadily until it almost
equalled ihe percentage that would vote * No ".
TLe htter drew ahead at the beginning of the
campaign on 7th September. The final result,
510/t foi and 490/o against, meant the victory,
however slight, of " the most French idea that
has ever existed ", to quote Jean Daniel,
Director of Le Nouvel Observateur.
69. The result of the French referendum is
probably a key factor in general thinking on the
iuture oithe European Union. While the " Yes "
victory suggests that the lines laid down in
Maastricht are still largely valid, it is never-
theless impossible to ignore the high percentage
of " no " votes. If forgotten, this would lead to
public opinion being distanced from the
building of Europe; this danger is moreover a
threat in France and also in the other Com-
munity countries. Most of the lessons that can
be drawn from this referendum are applicable to
the rest of the Community: your Rapporteur will
therefore return to this point in his general con-
clusions, where he will analyse them in greater
detail.
70. The French people's approval of the
Treaty on European Union in the referendum
brought the ratification process to a con-
clusion.
(c) GermaaY
71. Procedure for ratifying the Treaty on
European Union relates to two bills. The first is
the bill on the ratification of the treaty proper'
creating the necessary conditions for the Treaty
on European Union to come into force. In view
of the fict that the Treaty on European Union
contains provisions which, to be applicable at
national level, require a change in the Basic Law
(constitution), the Federal Government tabled a
second, parallel bill modifying the Basic Law.
72. The latter bill provides for the modifi-
cation of Article 28 by adding a phrase to the
effect that, when local elections are held, the
nationals of a member state of the European
Community also, in accordance with European
Community law, have the right to vote and
stand for election and of Article 88 on the
European central bank, together with the
incluiion of an article on Europe making pro-
vision inter alia for extending the Bundesrat's
right to take part when sovereign rights are
trinsferred to ihe Community and confirming
European integration as an aim of the state.
73. Under this proposed new article (Article
23.2, laying down that the Bundestag and,
t4t
DOCUMENT I333
through the intermediary of the Bundesrat, the
Uinder will take part in examining matters
relating to the European Union, and Article
23.4, laying down that if a matter that is the
exclusive responsibility of the federation affects
the interests of the Uinder and in all cases where
the federation has the right to legislate, the
Federal Government will ask the Bundesrat for
its opinion), the Bundesrat, the chamber that
represents the Liinder, will have to be consulted
on each transfer of national sovereignty to the
Community, including areas outside the
purview of the Ldnder. It should be added that
the Ldnder have adopted a reticent approach to
the ratification of the treaty, mainly because
they think there is a lack of clarity in regard to
the application of subsidiarity to attributions at
national and Land level.
74. For instance, the parliament of Rheinland-
North Westphalia, in a resolution on the result
of the European Council meeting in Maastricht,
while recognising the complexity of the negotia-
tions and the ensuing obligation to reach com-
promises, considered the result obtained fell far
short of what the Lflnder wanted. To this end,
the parliament in question recalled a resolution
that it approved in 1990 calling for the union to
have a federal structure and a detailed decla-
ration concerning the breakdown of responsibil-
ities with a view to enhancing the r6le of the
regions in Europe.
7 5. The proposed constitutional reform,
moreover, reflects the Lflnder's proposals on
extending their rights to participate when sov-
ereign rights are transferred to the Community
and guaranteeing Germany's rights in the
Council through the presence of a representative
of the Uinder appointed by the Bundesrat.
76. The Basic Law might also be amended by
the creation of a Committee on European Union
that would be better able to guarantee the
Bundestag's right to be kept informed and its
participation in European affairs than has
hitherto been the case. Consideration is also
being given to the possibility of allowing the
Bundestag, in exchange for major transfers of
responsibility to the Federal Government in
European affairs, to have increased rights to
receive information and to participate.
77. On 2lst July, the Federal Government
adopted unanimously the bill on the ratification
of the Treaty on European Union and the
related bills on constitutional law. Germany
thus started the procedure for ratifying the
treaty. Both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat
have to approve the treaty. Any law modifying
the constitution has, moreover, to be approved
by two-thirds of the members of both the Bun-
destag and the Bundesrat, while, for the law rati-
fying the treaty a simple majority in both houses
is sufficient.
78. Chancellor Kohl described the ratification
of the Maastricht agreements as by far the most
important bill of the current legislature. He
thought the European Community would thus
be. completed by an economic and monetary
union, major common foreign policy provisions
and joint procedure for certain specific areas
relating to internal policy. The Chancellor said
the European monetary union would set up an
independent European central bank on the lines
of the Bundesbank so that German political
interests relating to stability would continue to
be guaranteed in full.
79. The Bundesrat gave its opinion on 25th
September 1992. While declaring itself on the
whole in favour of the Maastricht Treaty, it
nevertheless made its approval subject to a few
conditions. For instance, it asked that the Bun-
destag and the Bundesrat be consulted before
moving on to the third stage of the European
economic and monetary union. In regard to the
adaptation of Article l04e of the treaty setting
up the European Community (budgetary disci-
pline), the Bundesrat insisted that the Liinder be
able to intervene in the framework of existing
co-ordination instruments (financial planning
council); it also insisted that the government
clarify and enter into commitments vis-i-vis the
composition of the regional committee that hadjust been set up, and more specifically on the
participation of representatives of the Liinder in
the Council of the Community.
80. On lst October 1992, the Federal Gov-
ernment placed these two bills before the Bun-
destag, accompanied by the opinion of the Bun-
desrat, itself accompanied by the government's
opinion on it. The first reading in plenary sitting
of the Bundestag was planned for 8th October
1992.The committee competent to examine the
bill amending the constitution is the Juridical
Committee of the Bundestag; in regard to the
bill on the ratification of the treaty, the com-
petent committee has not yet been named(Foreign Affairs Committee or Committee on
European Community Affairs). Both bills will
then have to be passed by the Bundestag at the
latest during the plenary session to be held from
7th to I lth December 1992. Finally, the vote in
the Bundesrat is planned for l8th December
1992.
81. Since the major political groups in the
Bundestag are in favour of the early ratification
of the Maastricht Treaty 
- 
as confirmed on 25th
September 1992 by a government declaration
followed by a debate on the future of Europe 
-
the two bills should be passed as planned by the
Bundestag before the end of the year.
82. During the abovementioned debate, the
SPD and Biindnis 9O/Griine Groups asked that
a referendum be held on the Maastricht Treaty.
Even if the majority of the political parties
agreed (although there does not seem to be a
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majority at present), the request tabled by the
two political groups would be out of order since
the Basic Law, in its present form, would not
allorv a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty.
(As indicated above, constitutional amendments
require a two-thirds majority in both houses.)
However this may be, opinion polls conducted
in Germany all reveal that, in the hypothetical
event of a referendum, there would be a
majority of more than 5090 in favour.
83. The German public followed the cam-
paign for the referendum in France with
remarkable interest, including the televised
debate between the President of the Republic
and Mr. Seguin in which Chancellor Kohl took
part. This debate satisfied the media and public
opinion because it was not centred on the fears
and apprehensions aroused by the spectre of
greater Germany. The Chancellor himself
thought the establishment of the European
Union was the best way of allaying these fears
and linking his country firmly with Western
Europe.
84. Moreover, because of the federal structure
of Germany, the evolution of the European
Community towards what some may consider to
be a federal European Union is perceived by the
Germans as a natural process. Germany is not
afraid of losing its identity in the future union;
the most it may fear is that it will lose its Mark.
The principal German parties, the government
coalition and the SPD agree that European inte-
gration is the proper response to German unity
or, to quote Adenauer, that the achievement of
German unity is possible only within European
unity.
(d) Itaty
85. On lTth September 1992, the Italian
Senate passed the Bill on the treaty on European
Union with the seventeen protocols and thirty-
three declarations contained in the Final Act.
86. The Senate Foreign Affairs and Emi-
gration Committee discussed the Maastricht text
. at three meetings on 3rd, 8th and l4th Sep-
'' tember. At the first of these meetings, the
Rapporteur, Mr. Orsini, said the political devel-
opment of European integration was quite clear
in the definition of a common foreign and
security policy and in the hint of joint defence.
The Rapporteur also said that, in spite of the
treaty's limits, it was quite certain that, after
Maastricht, Europe could and should speak with
a single voice on the world stage. He considered
the common foreign and security policy to be so
significant that it would have to lead to a
decisive change in relations between European
peoples and states. He concluded that all these
factors constituted real progress towards a
federal-type European Union. The Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Colombo, underlined that
the treaty was perfectly coherent with the evo-
lution of the building of Europe in view of the
new circumstances prevailing on the continent
since 1989. The Minister added that the treaty
was a stabilising factor in face of a disintegrating
situation and also wondered what agreement
could replace it and when in the event of the
tr€aty not being ratified. Mr. Colombo recalled
the experience of the fifties, when the EDC was
not ratified.
87. Senator Staglieno of the Northern League,
announced that his group was in favour of ratifi-
cation because of its European, federalist
leanings, but he admitted his perplexity at the
wish to pursue the process after the unfa-
vourable result of the Danish referendum.
88. Senator Benvenuti (PDS) expressed his
group's support for the treaty. In view of the
revival of nationalism, or even racism, in certain
countries, early ratification was required in
response to the disturbing signs of this cultural
and political development.
89. Senator Arduino Agnelli regretted that
not all the aims previously proposed by the
Italian Parliament had been included in the
fieaty: he referred in particular to the lack of a
real federal framework, which most ltalian
political forces wanted.
90. For Senator Vittorino Colombo, the end
of bipolarisation had given rise to a polycentric
structure grouping, on the one hand, the United
States, Canada and Mexico and, on the other
hand, Japan and South-East Asia. Europe
should therefore be made the third pillar of that
structure. In this context, the senator thought
the security and defence policy embodied in the
Treaty on European Union was inadequate.
91. Meeting on 16th September, the Defence
Committee also discussed the bill: several sen-
ators expressed their discontent at not having
had enough time to analyse the text. The same
complaint was made in the Foreign Affairs
Committee and then in plenary sitting in the
Senate. The Republics, the PDS, MSI and the
Northern kague believed Mr. Amato's cabinet
had tried to take advantage of the date of the
French referendum so that the Senate would
ratify the treaty as a matter of urgency, thus
giving a sign of support for advocates of the
" Yes " in France.
92. Mr. Cappuzzo, Vice-Chairman of the
Committee, said the horizon had been darkened
by the emergence of phenomena of regression,
including separatist tendencies that might lead
to nationalisation of defence policies. If this ten-
dency were confirmed, the presence of two
member countries with nuclear weapons plus
Germany's economic expansionism would con-
tribute to the revival of hegemonic leanings in
complete contradiction with the European ideal.
However, Mr. Capptzzo thought the treaty
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could effectively counter such tendencies. The
Vice-Chairman added that the Franco-German
agreement on a joint anny corps in part reflects
this search for hegemony.
93. Senator Zamberletti recalled that WEU
had been formed for a priority aim, i.e. to
control possible German rearrnament, while
today, with the Maastricht Treaty, it was on the
point of becoming an instrument supporting
Germany. He said it could not be forgotten thattwo Community countries, France and
Germany, had strategic weapons and that the
treaty did not say whether the nuclear com-
ponent would or would not be taken into
account when working out the model of joint
defence. The parliamentary Assembly of WEU
must not overlook this aspect.
94. Closing the committee meeting, Mr.
Cappnzzo regretted that it had been so short and
added that the questions raised might be dealt
with during a subsequent discussion on the
defence model that should be brought about by
the innovations adopted in Maastricht in this
atea.
95. During the debate in the Senate in plenary
sitting, the majority Rapporteur, Mr. Orsini,
started his address by declaring that the treaty
did not pave the way for the United States of
Europe, an idea for which some Italian political
and cultural forces had fought for a long time.
Nevertheless, the treaty introduced European
integration with sufficient supranational institu-
tions, standards and powers to guide the Com-
munity towards a common destiny. From Maas-
tricht onwards, the Twelve would have to speak
with a single voice on the international stage and
adopt similar positions. Mr. Orsini added that,
fifty years after the collapse of the EDC, there
were signs not merely of the possibility of joint
defence but a real prospect, involving complex
procedures and obstacles that would have to be
overcome.
96. Mr. Vinci, minority Rapporteur, a
member of the Rifondazione Comunista Group,
described the treaty as anti-social, anti-demo-
cratic, militarist and hostile to the developing
world. He said that, for the benefit of the
European Union, Maastricht had taken over
WEU's offensive-type military system in tune
with NATO, opposed to the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries and now converted to act as a police force
in current and future crises in the third world
and Central and Eastern Europe in order to
protect the economic, political and strategic
interests of the principal Western European
countries.
97. Mr. Pozzo, also a minority Rapporteur
and a member of the MSI national right-wing
group, underlined the lack of information given
to public opinion on the treaty, a subject which
the major media organs themselves had not gone
into. He then regretted the speed with which the
debate in the Senate had been held on the
pretext that reasons of state made ratification
prior to the French referendum essential at any
cost. Mr. Pozzo also referred to the loss of
national sovereignty that would ensue from the
treaty which he thought could not be ratified
without prior modification of the constitution.
98. Senator Acquarone answered the last
speaker that the Italian constitution favoured
European integration and consequently con-
tained nothing that might prevent ratification of
the treaty.
99. Speaking of defence policy, Mr. Migone(PDS) held that the fall of the Berlin wall had
removed NATO's raison d'6tre and that nothing
therefore stood in the way of Europe's right and
duty to have its own defence with the aim of
security and legitimate defence in conformity
with the provisions of the Italian constitution.
100. Senator Molinari of the Rifondazione
Comunista Group, said the security policy
foreseen in the treaty was an essential military
policy whose main aim was to defend Europe
against the third and fourth world. As compared
with the treaty, the speaker described his group's
concept of security based on disarmament, pao.
ifism and co-operation with other nations.
l0l. Senator De Matteo (Christian Democrat!
although in favour of ratification, expressed
doubt about the seriousness of the procedure
laid down for joint action and its implemen-
tation.
102. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr.
Colombo, affirmed that WEU, which was the
security arm of the European organisatiorL
pursued no offensive aims, contrary to what had
been said earlier. The Minister added that
foreign and defence policy should be the trug
authentic sign of the move to political union. He
considered foreign policy had without any doubt
come within the purview of the Community but
that it would be implemented partly in
accordance with the principle of co-operation ,
and partly in accordance with that of inte-
gration. This way of operating would not be suf.
ficient to solve or help to solve crises in Europc
and outside, he said, referring specifically to the
Balkans and the Middle East.
103. In the final vote, the Senate passed the bill
on ratification by 176 votes to 16 with I
abstention (the necessary majority being 96[
Opinion polls conducted in Italy had always
given a high percentage for those in favour of
ratification: over 7090. Nevertheless, the possi-
bility of calling a referendum did not exist since
the Italian constitution allowed referenda only
by special derogation and on internal policy
matters.
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104. On 29th October 1992, the Chamber of
Deputies approved the Treaty on European
Union by 403 votes to 46 with l8 abstentions.
(e) hxembourg
105. The Luxembourg Parliament was the first
to ratify the Treaty on European Union.
106. On 26th May 1992, the State Council
expressed its opinion that the treaty should be
approved by a bill passed by qualified majority
of three-quarters of the Chamber in view of the
fact that, as a result ofthis treaty, the exercise of
attributions assigned by the Constitution to the
legislative, executive and judiciary authorities
devolves temporarily upon institutions under
international law. The State Council also con-
sidered that Article 8b.l of the treaty meant
amending the Constitution, although this did
not have to precede ratification. It should be
recalled that Luxembourg has a total population
of tt00 000 and that about 100 000 nationals of
other Community countries live there.
107. In respect of the chapter on common
foreign and security policy, the State Council
also said that the planned process would be
unable to attain its aims without there first being
effective political determination. Finally, the
State Council approved the broad lines of this
essential chapter of the treaty insofar as it was to
make the Community a more influential and
active actor on the international stage.
108. The special Maastricht Treaty Com-
mittee, whose members include Mrs. Err, Mrs.
Lentz-Cornette and Mr. Goerens, all members
of the WEU Assembly, submitted its report on
24th June 1992. This report, together with the
assessment of provisions concerning common
foreign and security policy, underlined, among
the principal innovations in the treaty, the
concept of joint action and the Commission's
right of initiative that it did not have in the
framework of political co-operation. Moreover,
the report regretted the lack of precision in the
definition of areas in which joint action might
be cnvisaged, the fact that the European Par-
liament was not associated with common
foreign and security policy other than to express
its opinion and that the Court of Justice of the
Communities had no competence in this matter,
thus revealing the democratic deficit that was
chanacteristic of this sector.
109. The report aflirmed that the European
defence identity would be the result of an evo-
lutive process and that the intergovernmental
structure 
- 
to take a particularly sensitive area
that is a matter for national sovereignty 
- 
was
explicable during a transitional period. Finally,
the report found it particularly regrettable that
no serious progress had been made for con-
trolling the arms trade.
110. In his speech to the Chamber of Deputies,
meeting to ratify the bill on the Treaty on
European Union, the Prime Minister, Mr.
Santer, referred to the end of the empire that
had separated Europe into two parts: its fall had
released many forces, some dynamic but others
harmful, and it was therefore necessary to find a
new balance for Europe. Mr. Santer said we
were currently passing through a period of
uncertainty rather than certainty: close to home,
it must be ensured that Germany was firmly set
within a union of states with equal rights and
duties. He said the fall of the Berlin wall, reuni-
fication and the growing power of Luxembourg's
neighbour had raised many questions.
I I l. He believed that development of political
integration in our countries, on a basis of
oquality, provided the answer to these questions
and was the best way to ward off reductive
nationalism whose effects mught be devas-
tating.
ll2. The Prime Minister thought the economic
and monetary union would not last without
political union. Europe must 
. 
therefore be an
economic power with political personality,
capable of gathering together its resources and
defending its own interests: for this purpose, it
should set priorities, define objectives and have
the ability to attain them. These means of action
were provided for in the Treaty on European
Union through common foreign and security
policy, which he said was a decisive step on the
way to a single foreign and security policy.
I 13. Mr. Santer stressed that, for the first time,
majority decision-taking was being introduced
for carrying out joint action and he considered
this to be modest but real progress. Joint actions
could be implemented in areas relating to the
CSCE process, disarmament policy and nuclear
non-proliferation as well as the economic
aspects of security.
ll4. The Prime Minister concluded the part of
his speech devoted to common foreign and
security policy by saying that Luxembourg's
security could no longer be ensured except
within a wider entity. He said history had shown
us that, by trying to play the national card or the
card ofneutrality, his country lost at every level.
115. As the text of the debate following Mr.
Santer's speech is available only in the Luxem-
bourg language, your Rapporteur was unable to
understand it. In the final vote, the bill was
passed by 5l votes (45 were needed as the
Chamber has 60 members) to 6 with 0 absten-
tions.
(J) Netherlands
I16. On 3rd June 1992, the Netherlands Gov-
ernment handed the Second Chamber of the
States-General (the lower house of the Nether-
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lands Parliament) the bill ratifying the Treaty on
European Union accompanied by an explan-
atory memorandum in which the government
said it considered the treaty was in conformity
with the constitution, which would not therefore
need to be revised.
ll7. The Standing Committee on European
Community Affairs of the Second Chamber held
a first reading of the text and drew up a provi-
sional report, which was transmitted to the gov-
ernment at the beginning of September. The
government will have to answer it in a document
known as an answering memorandum, after
which the committee will draft its final report. If
the government considers it expedient, it may
send the Chamber a note on the final report.
Once the preparatory stage has been completed,
the bill can be debated by the Second Chamber.
This debate will be held at the end of October
and the beginning of November and will be
wound up by the vote on motions, any amend-
ments and the bill itself.
I 18. The debate will then be pursued in the
First Chamber of the States-General (the upper
chamber) in accordance with the same pro-
cedure, the only difference being that the
First Chamber does not have a right of
amendment.
I19. The D-66 and Groen Links parties are in
favour of a referendum on the treaty, for which
there is no provision in the Netherlands Consti-
tution which would thus have to be revised. The
government coalition parties 
- 
Christian Demo-
crats, Liberals and Social Democrats 
- 
are
against holding a referendum.
120. Moreover, in her speech from the throne
opening the annual session of parliament a few
days before the French referendum, Queen
Beatrix said the text signed in Maastricht made
it possible for all member countries to safeguard
their own identity and she expressed the hope
that the 'Yes " vote would win in France.
France and the Netherlands could contribute to
unity and the building of Europe.
(g) Portugal
l2l. In Portugal, ratification of the Treaty on
European Union required prior revision of the
constitution. The decision to revise the consti-
tution has to be taken by a four-fifths majority
of the members of the Assembly of the Republic.
On l2th June 1992, that Assembly, having
obtained the necessary majority, had the power
to revise the constitution. Such revision has to
be approved by a two-thirds majority of the
Assembly.
122. A total of six bills on revising the consti-
tution were tabled in the Assembly, by the Social
Democrat Party in power, by Mr. Tom6, an
independent member, and by the Socialist,
Communist, Democratic and Social and
National Solidarity Parties.
123. The bill tabled by the Social Democrat
Party, the government party that has an absolute
majority in the Assembly, contains the wording
of a new article laying down that Portugal may,
subject to reciprocity and with due respect for
the principle of subsidiarity, share the exercise
of the powers necessary for building Europe.
Furthermore, and still subject to reciprocity,
foreign residents in Portugal have the right to
vote and to stand for election in local and
national elections and in elections to the
European Parliament. Finally, Article 105 is
amended and provides that the Bank of Portugal
will cooperate in the definition and implemen-
tation of monetary and financial policy in
accordance with the law.
124. The Socialist Party's bill, similar to that of
the Social Democrat Party, also contains a pro-
posal by which the autonomous regions
(Madeira and the Azores) may give their views
on matters within their purview.
125. The Communist Party, considering that
the Treaty on European Union involved the
partial relinquishment by states of their sov-
ereign powers in fundamental areas such as
foreign and defence policy, which guaranteed
independence and national identity, tabled a
draft revision to the constitution allowing a refe-
rendum to be called on the Maastricht Treaty.
126. In its proposed revision of the consti-
tution, the Democratic and Social Centre
included, with slight variations, the provisions
set out in the texts by the Social Democrat and
Socialist Party to which it added the constitu-
tional obligation to hold a referendum for all
treaties involving the attribution to an interna-
tional organisation of the exercise of responsibil-
ities of the Portuguese state. The National Soli-
darity Party's proposed constitutional revision
follows the same line.
127 . On 20th October 1992, the parliamentary
committee responsible for revising the consti-
tution had only decided the procedure its work
should follow. At the time of writing, there is no
idea what the parliamentary time-table will be
for this revision and for the ratification of the
Treaty on European Union.
128. There is every sign that the constitutional
revision in question will be closest to the bill
tabled by the Social Democrat Party and that
the possibility of allowing a referendum to be
called has been dropped completely. Finally, it
should not appear that ratification ofthe treaty
will encounter the slightest difficulty when sub-
mitted to the Assembly of the Republic.
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(h) Spoin
129. On lTth December 1991, the Spanish
Herd of Government, Mr. Gonzdlez, addressed
the Congress of Deputies meeting in plenary
session to which he had just reported on the
mecting of the European Council in Maastricht.
Mr. Gonz6lez, who considered the results of the
summit meeting satisfactory, nevertheless
believed the debate on that occasion about the
common foreign and security policy " pillar "
had been complex and difficult, particularly
froft a semantic point of view. He thought the
most remarkable aspect of the treaty was the
affrrmation that common foreign and security
policy covered " all questions related to the
security of the union, including the eventual
framing of a common defence policy, which
might in time lead to a common defence " com-
patible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. Mr.
Gonrzdlez said the latter area remained the
responsibility of the Council which defined the
principles and general guidelines of common
foreign and security policy and decided unani-
mously on joint action and by qualified majority
on its implementation. He added that, for such
matters, decision-taking swung between the
understandable fear of member states to lose
control offoreign policy decisions and the need
to mntinue to make progress in this area. Spain
had proposed reaching unanimous agreement on
which questions should be decided by qualified
majority, said the Head of Government, in
order to * get out of the mess ", since there was
no means of reaching agreement.
130. In his opinion, political co-operation had
produced far more results than had been
expected in the Single European Act, thus cre-
ating a sort of case law, which was not binding
where decision-taking was concerned, but that
no one had failed to respect in recent years.
l3l. According to Mr. Gonziiez, the most
interesting pan of the treaty was where pro-
vision was made for the eventual framing of ajoint defence policy, which would probably take
some time to achieve, but the fact that it was set
down as an aim amounted to qualitative
progress of great importance, particularly since
the present period was of historical importance.
The Head of Government stressed that it would
be for the European Council to define the prin-
ciples and general guidelines of the common
foreign and security policy but that the Com-
mission would be fully associated with work in
this area and the European Parliament would be
consulted and informed.
132. Answering Mr. Gonzfllez, Mr. Aznar,
Leader of the Popular Party, quoted, in regard
to the positive aspects of the treaty, the
remarkable positions adopted on defence. They
were very close to those adopted by the Popular
Party in respect of the Atlantic Alliance, WEU,
joint defence policy and the possible linkage of
WEU and the Community with a joint defence
policy. He said this was a coherent approach
that strengthened security.
133. For the Izquierda Unida spokesman, the
chapter relating to common foreign and security
policy was a major step forward, but procedure
for adopting joint action seemed to him far too
complex and its future effectiveness was a
matter of concern.
134. The representative of the Democratic and
Social Centre aflirmed that some British ana-
lysts were heaving sighs of relief on noting
the lack of pragmatism in the agreements on
common foreign and security policy, but to his
great regret these impressions were close to
reality.
135. Finally, the spokesman of the Basque
Nationalist Group also expressed doubt about
the real effect of the provisions relating to
common foreign and security policy.
136. When briefing the Senate Defence Com-
mittee on 30th March 1992 on the security and
defence aspects of the Maastricht agreements,
the Minister of Defence said it was essential to
take advantage ofthe sound experience acquired
by the Atlantic Alliance but without restricting
the area of action and responsibilities of other
organisations, in particular WEU. Circum-
stances made it crucial to draw up a common
foreign and security policy, otherwise the
political union would not have the necessary
autonomy. [n its defence-related provisions, the
agreement reached was realistic in view of the
well-known initial antagonism.
137. Once both houses had been informed of
the agreements subscribed to by the government
in Maastricht, the process of ratifying the treaty
started.
138. According to the Spanish Constitution,
approval of an international treaty containing
provisions contrary to the constitution means
the constitution has to be revised first. For this
purpose, the government (or the two houses of
parliament) may turn to the Constitutional
Council to express a prior opinion specifying
whether or not there is contradiction. On 24th
April1992, therefore, the government asked the
high court to give its views on the subject. On
lst July, the Constitutional Council decreed that
Article 8b, paragraph l, of the treaty was con-
trary to the Spanish Constitution as it gave
non-Spanish citizens of the European Union
" passive " voting rights in municipal elections(i.e. the right to be elected, the right to vote
already being provided for in the constitution).
The Council also said procedure for constitu-
tional reform should be conducted in a parlia-
mentary framework, which does not require a
referendum unless one-tenth of deputies or sen-
ators call for one. This was not so and Congress
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approved the constitutional reform on 22nd
July, followed several days later by the Senate,
the votes in both houses being unanimous. This
opened the way for parliamentary ratification of
the treaty.
139. The results of the Danish referendum and
the fact that one was to be held in France
encouraged the Izquierda Unida coalition to call
for a similar consultation in Spain. Under the
Spanish Constitution, political decisions of
special importance may be the subject of a con-
sultative (i.e. not binding) referendum, but the
government, using the words attributed to
Giulio Andreotti, said it did not consider such a
consultation necessary and that * anything thatis not necessary is, in the best of cases,
harmful ".
140. A poll conducted by the daily paper El
Pais and published early in July showed that
37o/o of the population was for ratifying the
treaty and l7o/o against. 460/o werc undecided.
l4l. At the same time, the division was
growing in Izquierda Unida between those
against ratification (in the majority) and those in
favour. At the meeting of party steering bodies
intended to find points of agreement, it was
agreed that parliamentarians from the group
would abstain from voting when the text came
before parliament. Nevertheless, some of these
parliamentarians said they did not feel bound by
this decision and announced that they would
vote in favour. The leader of the pro-Maastricht
group even proposed, if invited, to campaign for
a " yes " vote in France, like the Prime Minister
in Strasbourg and the President of the Catalan
Government, the liberal Jordi Pujol, in Tou-
louse. Members of the European Parliament
belonging to the Izquierda Unida coalition had
moreover already voted in favour of the Maas-
tricht Treaty on 7th April 1992.
142. Furthermore, the country's two main
trade unions, the General Workers' Union
(socialist) and the Workers' Commissions (com-
munist) demonstrated their support for the
treaty, as had earlier been the case of the
European Trade Union Confederation, to which
both movements belong.
143. At the beginning of September, the gov-
ernment asked the Congress of Deputies to
adopt urgent procedure for ratifying the Treaty
on European Union so that ratification might
take place before 20th September, the day of the
French referendum. The Prime Minister thought
Spain's ratification would be a positive gesture
vis-i-vis public opinion, particularly in France.
The presidency of the chamber decided the
normal procedure would be adopted, which
meant the debate in the Congress of Deputies
would start on lst October. Although the pro-
cedure provides for a full debate in the chamber
in plenary sitting, its referall to the Foreign
Affairs Committee and its return to the
chamber, followed by the same procedure in the
Senate, nothing must prevent the ratification
process being concluded by 3lst December
1992.
144. The narrow * yes' margin in France and
the economic crisis in the Community did not
initially significantly change political positions
towards the treaty in Spain. The government's
attitude was to approve the treaty in its present
form and to reconsider its renegotiation impos-
sible. It was said that the aim was to avoid a
setback to the building of Europe while influ-
encing the aspects that the government had
defended the most strongly: cohesion, European
citizenship and common foreign and security
policy.
145. On lst October 1992, the Congress of
Deputies started a debate on the Maastricht text
and three amendments were tabled relating to
the treaty as a whole. The first emanated from
the Izquierda Unida coalition and was based on
the idea that the Spanish people should make its
opinion known by referendum prior to parlia-
mentary ratification. In his speech, the
Chairman of that group also raised a series of
points relating to various aspects of the treaty.
He said the common foreign and security policy
had been defined in vague, not very enthusiastic
terms and believed that, from a democratic
standpoint, it was unacceptable for WEU, to
which important defence responsibilities were
delegated, to escape any kind of control by the
European Parliament. He also thought it unac-
ceptable to try to set up a European defence
system in the framework of NATO. The
Chairman of Izquierda Unida went so far as to
assert that WEU was part of the NATO
structure and dependent upon it.
146. The second overall amendment was
tabled by Mr. Mur, a member of the Aragon
Regionalist Party belonging to the mixed group
of parliamentarians not members of a political
group. The reason given for this amendment was
the need, justified by events in Europe after the
signing of the treaty, to postpone the debate
until more was known about relevant decisions
that might be adopted by other countries.
147. The third amendment was tabled by the
Democratic and Social Centre. Its spokesman
said that, while fully accepting the treaty, his
group wished to remedy the democratic deficit
in the text, guarantee that the policy of cohesion
was given adequate financial support and ensure
that the convergence programme was applied
with due respect for a fair sharing of the sacri-
fices asked of the Spanish people.
148. Before these three amendments were
tabled, the Minister for Foreign Affairs had,
moreover, declared that the treaty gave the
union a common foreign and security policy that
148
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would eventually include joint defence, thus
remedying the imbalance between complete eco-
nomic integration and inadequate political inte-
gration that was more than ever necessary.
149. In the grouped vote, the three amend-
ments were negatived by 281 votes to 25 with 4
abstentions. The amendments to the text as a
whole having been negatived, the bill is now to
be referred to the Foreign Affairs Committee
and will follow the process described above.
150. Since the treaty attributes to an interna-
tional institution the exercise of constitutional
responsibilities, this bill is an " organic " one
requiring an absolute majority of Congress (176
votes) in the final vote on the bill as a whole.
l5l. On 29th October 1992, the Congress of
Deputies approved the ratification of the Treaty
on European Union by an overwhelming
majority: 325 of the 350 deputies were presentin the chamber; 314 voted for ratification
(Socialists, Conservatives, Centrists, Basque and
Catalan Nationalists, 8 of the 17 lzquierda
Unida deputies and most members of the mixed
group of members not belonging to a group), 8
members of Izquierda Unida abstained and 3
members of the separatist Herri Batasuna coa-
lition group (linked with the ETA terrorist
organisation) voted against.
152. The Socialist Group spokesman, Miguel
Angel Martinez, stressed the significance of the
" no " votes in view of their origin.
G) aaitd Kiagdom
153. Of all the Community countries, the
United Kingdom is probably the one whose par-
liarnent has paid the most attention to the Maas-
tricht Treaty, as testified by the number and
extent of debates on the matter. The first was
held on 20th November 1991, a few days after
the meeting of the European Council in the
Netherlands city. Immediately after that
meeting, on l8th December 1991, the Treaty on
European Union started on its parliamentary
peregrination.
154. The ratification process requires the
passing of the European Communities (Amend-
ment) Bill by the House of Commons. This bill
will carry into law the amendments the treaty
makes to the Rome Treaty and other Com-
munity treaties. It also contains a provision to
require a separate act of parliament to be passed
before the United Kingdom can move to the
third stage of economic and monetary union.
155. The European Communities (Amend-
ment) Bill had a second reading on 2lst May
1992, giving approval to the principle. As is cus-
tomary with constitutional matters, consider-
ation of the detail of the bill will be undertaken
on the floor of the house in committee of the
whole house. However, consideration of the bill
in committee was delayed as a result of the
Danish referendum and the narrow * Yes "
victory in France. The subsequent economic
crisis in the United Kingdom in particular and
in the Community in general led the Prime Min-
ister on the one hand to delay parliamentary rat-
ification ofthe treaty until next year and on the
other to convene an extraordinary summit
meeting of Community heads of state or of gov-
ernment in Birmingham on l6th October 1992.
156. Your Rapporteur thought it appropriate
to mention in the present study, apart from the
debates already referred to, the Queen's
speeches opening the United Kingdom Par-
liament and to the European Parliament, the
debate in the House of Commons on 3rd June
on the result of the Danish referendum and the
extraordinary debate on the Maastricht Treaty
on 24th and 25th September 1992.
157. When presenting the text of the Maas-
tricht Treaty to the House of Commons on 20th
November 1991, the Prime Minister underlined
that the text submitted by the Netherlands in
September brought all the elements of the treaty
under a unitary structure. That would have
brought foreign, defence, interior and justice
policy under the Rome Treaty and within thejurisdiction of the European Court of Justice.It would have been a massive stride towrds
a centralised federal structure. The United
Kingdom's refusal of that text led to it being
modified. The new text created what have
become known as separate pillars. Some of
these, notably foreign and security policy, would
be conducted on an intergovernmental basis so
that they would remain outside the Rome Treaty
and the jurisdiction of the European Court of
Justice; nor would the Commission have the sole
right to make proposals. The Prime Minister
recalled that intergovernmental co-operation in
foreign policy, security and defence was a result
of the Single European Act, in the interests of
the country and had been successful. Mr. Major
said he was in favour of the concept of joint
action which, he said, had been introduced by
the Single European Act; nevertheless, the
United Kingdom retained the possibility of
taking separate decisions and acting separately
and unilaterally even after adopting a joint
action if the country's interests required. On the
fact that majority voting should be used for
implementing decisions, the Prime Minister
said: " We see great difficulties in that proposal.
What, for example is the difference between a
decision of principle taken by unanimity and an
implementing decision to be taken by majority
vote? That seems to be a recipe for muddle and
confusion. "
158. *On defence", continued the Prime
Minister, " the position is clear. We have in
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NATO the means of our defence. At the recent
summit all the members of NATO were clear
that we must do nothing to call in question the
continuing American and Canadian presence in
Europe... We need to develop a policy that is
consistent with our existing obligations and
arrangements through NATO and Western
European Union. It is for that reason that
Britain and Italy put forward proposals which
would build up WEU, not as the European alter-
native to NATO, but as the European pillar of
NATO. " Throughout his speech, the Prime
Minister insisted on the need to safeguard
NATO against 'competing security struc-
tures ".
159. Learning that WEU was to be the
European pillar of NATO and that there shouldbe no incompatibility between the two
organisations Mr. Wilkinson asked the Prime
Minister to describe the government's aims. Mr.
Major's answer was brief and clear: * The gov-
ernment's aims are... to build up WEU and to
ensure that it has an adequate relationship with
NATO and the European Council but is not sub-
ordinate to either NATO or the European
Council. " In any event, he added, the gov-
ernment would not accept any treaty that made
WEU subordinate to the European Council.
160. Sir Patrick Duffy, former President of the
North Atlantic Assembly, enquired what was
happening about the Franco-German proposal,
which competed with the British-Italian pro-
posal. Was that not still on the European
security agenda? Mr. Major told him that the
Franco-German proposal had suffered a rebuff
as a result of the NATO meeting in Rome and
said the government could not accept WEU
being subordinate to the European Council -
that was the essential core element of the
Franco-German paper. The Prime Minister
added that there were many in Europe who
wanted to set everything in a Community legal
framework for fear that if they did not old
nationalisms might reassert themselves.
16l. Mr. Kinnock, then Leader of the Oppo-
sition, disagreed with the idea that that the
European political identity would be
strengthened by adopting common foreign and
security policies with qualified majority voting.
On the contrary, he believed it would weaken
the Community and its ability to act;
co-operation and consensus therefore remained
the most reliable arrangement for Community
foreign and security policies.
162. Mrs. Thatcher said 'countries with a
history and a tradition such as Britain's cannot
allow their hands to be tied on defence and on
foreign policy ". On this point, she agreed with
the Prime Minister but not with the Foreign Sec-
rctary, Mr. Hurd, who had suggested in The
Hague that there might be majority voting for
implementating joint action. She preferred the
Prime Minister's opinions. The member for
Finchley warned her audience that by removing
the word * federal " from the treaty would not
stop the European Community coming back
with new demands for more power for the Com-
mission that she called * the conveyor belt to
federalism ".
163. Mr. Ashdown, Leader of the Social and
Liberal Democrats, having listened to Mrs.
Thatcher's views on the European Union, was
delighted that the present Prime Minister was in
his seat and that Mrs. Thatcher was in another.
Being resolutely in favour of the process of
European Union, Mr. Ashdown bore in mind
recent progress made in this direction by both
Mr. Major and the Labour Party but attributed
their previous lukewarm attitude to the fact that
the United Kingdom had been the laggard in
Europe instead of being among the leaders. The
United Kingdom should share Europe's institr>
tions instead of submitting to institutions
shaped by others.
164. Turning to common foreign and defence
policy, Mr. Ashdown underlined the need for
Europe to speak with a single and powerful
voice. Yugoslavia might well be the first
example of threats that might be followed by
others: they would come not from border con-
flicts but from religious, ethnic and cultural con-
flicts and we should be prepared to cope with
them. A strong Europe, speaking with a common
voice, would be a rock of stability at the end of a
sea of confusion and potential chaos. The
presence of United States and Canadian troops
on the mainland of Europe was one of the condi-
tions for such stability, although it could not be
ruled out that those countries might one day
wish their troops to leave Europe. An integrated
European pillar within NATO therefore made
good sense for today and provided a sensible
preparation for what might happen tomorrow.
165. Mr. Ashdown said the battle over the
word " federal " was ludicrous since the rest of
Europe knew the word meant, not concentrating
power, but spreading power. He referred to the
paradoxical situation in which the government
had placed itself by demanding decentralisation
while dismissing out of hand any notion of a
parliament for Scotland and Wales.
166. Finally, Mr. Ashdown was in favour of
organising a referendum on the Treaty on
European Union which would allow a vast
national debate once parliament had expressed
its opinion.
167. Sir Geoffrey Howe stressed that the r6le
of NATO must be preserved while Western
European Union should be developed as the
European pillar. He illustrated the divisiur
within his own party (Mrs. Thatcher was won-
dering how the people could express themselves
when all the parties were split by internal divi-
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sio,ns) between those for and those against the
Maastricht Treaty, the Euro-sceptics (Europhobes
or Euro-separatists, to use Mr. Ashdown's
words) : the latter were tending to increase or at
least to speak more loudly, as shown by the
debates, and henceforth were not confined to a
single party since ambiguity over or even radical
opposition to the treaty found a response even
on the Labour benches.
168. Mr. Benn considered the argument was
not about sovereignty but should be seen in
terms of democracy, since the treaty implied
that the nation would be governed by people it
did not elect and could not remove.
169. Between those for whom foreign, security
and defence policy is a fundamental aspect of
national sovereignty and independence, which
consequently cannot and should not be trans-
ferred to another body 
- 
unless there is a desire
to wipe the country off the map 
- 
and those for
whom this policy has been controlled by the
United States for forty-five years and who are
thus not afraid to follow the same course as their
European partners, there is a wide spectrum of
opinion: however, the leitmotif of criticism con-
cerns majority voting for the implementation of
any joint action.
170. One argument has been used regularly
against the treaty provisions relating to common
forcign and security policy: if a common policy
had existed when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the allies
would not have intervened and the United
States would have had difliculty in acting alone.
For some, therefore, the course proposed offered
no solution but, on the contrary, placed
obstacles in the way of settling Europe's
problems.
l7l. Finally, answering some of the speakersin the debate, Mr. Hurd said the United
Kingdom's aim was a common foreign and
security policy on issues where there was unan-
imous agreement, always allowing for national
freedom of action in other matters. No one was
proposing a system that would have prevented
Britain from liberating the Falklands, or
Belgium and France from sending paratroops to
Zaire to rescue their fellow citizens. No one,
acoording to Mr. Hurd, was attempting to foist a
foreign policy on the United Kingdom. Here, he
said he was not persuaded that the distinction
between the original agreement, which must be
taken unanimously, and the implementing mea-
sures (by a majority vote) could be made to
stick.
172. The possibility having been put to him
that France might attempt to separate Europe's
defence responsibilities from NATO, Mr. Hurd
said first that any common defence policy must
be compatible with NATO, second, that WEU,
the instrument of the European defence identity,
should be linked to common foreign and secur-
ity policy and the alliance, but be subordinate to
neither, and, third, that European defence
co-operation should not marginalise other allies,
i.e. the United States.
173. Reticence about Germany and, above all,
France, suspected of leading a movement that
accepted only minimum, not to say zero, partici-
pation in Europe's security and defence also pro-
vided grist for the debate, as did the underlying
fear that this attitude might help to weaken the
Atlantic organisation.
174. The debate closed with a vote on the
motion endorsing the government's negotiating
approach to the Maastricht negotiations (ayes
351, noes 250).
I75. About 150 members put their names
down to speak during the debate on l Sth
December following the meeting of the
European Council. The Prime Minister, after
saying that the word " federal " had been
removed from the text of the treaty, said the
most significant agreement of the treaty was the
agreement to co-operate in a legally binding
framework in the key areas of law and order,
foreign policy and defence policy.
176. He also believed United Kingdom wishes
had been met in regard to making WEU the
defence pillar of the European Union while pre-
serving the primacy of NATO. This was a vital
national interest for the United Kingdom that
had been secured.
177. On common foreign and security policy,
there had also been agreement to United
Kingdom proposals for a common foreign and
security policy going beyond the Single
European Act, but remaining outside the Rome
Treaty and beyond the reach of the European
Court of Justice.
178. In his speech, Mr. Kinnock, Leader of the
Opposition, made no reference to foreign,
security and defence policy, and this was almost
so in the speech by Mr. Ashdown, Leader of the
Social Liberal Democrats. Subsidiarity, eco-
nomic and monetary union, social aspects and
the Commission were most frequently raised
during the debates. When speakers referred to
defence, it was to say that, even if WEU were
not subordinate to the union but independent of
it, the tendency towards " Communitisation "
was inevitable: this would lead inevitably to an
effective loss of national sovereignty in one of
the key national issues, i.e. defence. Mr. Hurd
insisted once again on the possibility of
co-operating with other member countries of the
Community without necessarily having to do so
within Community institutions, thus avoiding
the Commission having a monopoly of initia-
tives and avoiding the juridiction of the
European Court. Once what was now commonly
called a pillared architecture had been achieved,it should be possible to show that such
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co-operation between governments could be as
effective as action through Community institu-
tions.
179. Other speakers considered the final
drafting of the chapters of the treaty of concern
to the present report was a victory for the views
of pro-Atlantic tendencies, supported by the
United Kingdom, over those of pro-Europeans,
supported by France with the complicity of
Germany, and this victory must be maintained
during the future renegotiation of the treaty.
One parliamentarian said: " We must not allow
salami slicing of NATO powers gradually to
transfer them to Western European Union so
that WEU does not function, as we hope, as a
bridge between NATO and the European Com-
munity. " Your Rapporteur considers this
opinion to be purely anecdotal and consequently
of no interest. It may rightly be assumed that,
apart from speakers who expressed a positive
opinion on aspects of the treaty relating to
security and defence policy, there are others who
refrained from criticising those aspects and are
thus assumed to be in favour of them.
180. The House closed its debate by agreeing,
by 339 votes to 253,to a motion congratulating
the Prime Minister on achieving all the negoti-
ating objectives set out in the motion that was
supported by the House on 2lst November.
l8l. After the April general elections, when the
Conservative Party retained a majority in the
House of Commons, the Queen's speech at the
state opening of parliament included the fol-
lowing paragraph on security and defence:
'My government attach the highest
importance to national security. They will
continue to give full support to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and will
work with our allies to adapt it to
changing risks. They will aim to develop
Western European Union as a means of
strengthening the European pillar of the
alliance and the defence component of the
European Union. The United Kingdom's
armed forces are being restructured to
reflect these changes. Britain's minimum
nuclear deterrent will be maintained. "
182. The Queen's speech to the European Par-
liament on l2th May 1992 was more contro-
versial. It reopened an impassioned debate on
relations with the European Community and did
little to calm the Euro-sceptics in the United
Kingdom Parliament. The Queen paid tribute to
diversity, which was rewarding, asked that deci-
sions be taken at a level as close as possible to
the people, stressed Europeans' ability to act
together when the nature of the problems
involved required a European response, recalled
that the strengthening of the Community had
always accompanied enlargement and, referring
to the debates in parliament, affirmed that dif-
ferences of style and opinion were of little
importance compared with Europeans' con-
firmed vocation for conciliation and democracy.
The day before, part of the speech had been
leaked. This considered that different national
parliamentary traditions were considered of no
importance compared with the values of concili-
ation and democracy. Neither the subsequent
correction of the paragraph in question nor the
explanation that the differences in question
referred to those that existed between national
parliaments could prevent the Euro-sceptics'
conviction that the treaty implied a lack of
importance of Westminster's sovereignty and a
relinquishment of powers to Brussels. It was
therefore in a heated atmosphere, with the
prospect of the coming Danish referendum and
in anticipation of its result that the second
reading of the European Communities(Amendmen| Bill opened in the House of
Commons on 20th May. In moving the bill, Mr.
Major said:
'The bill contains no provision for those
aspects of the Maastricht Treaty which
cover foreign and security policy, andjustice and home affairs issues. If it did,
we would have failed at Maastricht to
meet the commitments that we gave this
house last November. The virtue of those
provisions in the Maastricht Treaty is that
they are outside the Treaty of Rome,
outside the competence of the Com-
mission, and wholly for agreement
between governments, on a case by case
basis. They need to be put to the house,
but quite specifically have no direct effect
in United Kingdom law... There is no
social chapter, there is no diminution in
the r6le of NATO, there is no power for
the European Parliament to approve deci-
sions rejected by the Council of Ministers,
no weakening of our power of national
decision-taking in foreign policy, no word
'federal'and no commitment to a federal
- 
by which I mean a centralising 
-
Europe. "
This was a further attempt to convince national
sovereignty die-hards that national sovereignty
was not affected in respect of matters of such
importance. This attempt was in vain since
opposition to the treaty seemed to increase from
day to day or at least was becoming increasingly
evident.
183. Mr. Major held that * for the first time in
a single treaty, agreements between governments
are given equal standing with action under Com-
munity law. In foreign and security policy, and
in justice and interior matters, the member
states will work together when it is in their
common interest to do so.... Where such
co-operation is helpful to this country, we shall
co-operate with our partners in Europe. It also
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means that we cannot be forced into policies we
do not approve of ". The Prime Minister con-
sidered that a new era in the history of the Com-
munity was beginning.
184. Mr. Kinnock, then kader of the Labour
Party, again proclaimed the (far from unan-
imor,rs) agreement of his party with the treaty in
spite of his criticism of the United Kingdom's
opting out of the social chapter and monetary
union (which, according to him, mean that
neither the European Monetary Institute nor the
European Central Bank could be located in the
United Kingdom). Here, mention should be
made of the support for the treaty from the
United Kingdom's trade unions, the driving
forcc behind the Labour Party and a decisive
factor when the latter's policy is worked out.
185. Mr. Ashdown also confirmed that he was
in favour of the bilt, in spite of the democratic
deficit of the European institutions that the
treaty had been unable to remedY.
186. The rest of the debate was confined to
consolidating previously-expressed opinions and
to showing once again the strength of opposition
to the treaty among the Conservatives and, to a
lesser degree, the Labour Party.
187. Finally, the Maastricht Treaty's approach
to common foreign and security policy was seen
as a solution mid-way between the federalists,
who had advocated these questions being sub-
mitted to European institutions, and, at the
other extreme, those who would have liked to
maintain the situation prevailing before
European political co-operation. The vote held
at the end of this second reading of the bill
resulted in 336 votes for and 92 against.
188. The first consequence of the negative
result of the Danish referendum was the post-
ponement of the bill of ratifltcation, first until
autumn 1992 and more recently until 1993, in
liaison with the trend of the process in
Denmark. The request for a postponement ema-
nated from the Labour leader and was accepted
by the Prime Minister, who said on that
occasion that ratification and implementation of
the treaties was of national interest.
189. The Danish " no " also showed that a
growing number of Conservative members of
parliament wished to make use of the breach
ihus opened to amend a text with which they
deeply disagreed. During the parliamentary
debate held after the Danish referendum, about
a hundred members of parliament tabled a
motion calling for the revision of the United
Kingdom position towards the Community.
ThiC motion, because of its moderation and lack
of precision, attracted many members not
belonging to the group of Euro-sceptics. The
division of the parliamentary group also seemed
to have spread as far as the government
benches.
190. Pressure for a referendum, fuelled by the
Danish result and the prospect of the French ref-
erendum and by the attitude of the Labour
Party, anxious not to refuse its support for the
initiative, has increased. The Prime Minister has
said that he is firmly opposed to a referendum.
Opinion polls show, on the one hand, that, if
one were held, the majority of the population (as
in the rest of Europe) would be in favour of
organising a referendum and, on the other, that
if - one were held the " noes " would win,
although more than 300/o of those questioned
had not yet taken a decision.
l9l. After the postponement of the parlia-
mentary debate and in view of the position
adopted by the United Kingdom Government,
which was determined to withdraw immediately
the bill ratifying the treaty if the result of the
French referendum were to be negative, since
this, in Mr. Major's own words, would mean the
death of the treaty, attention turned towards
France.
192. The economic storm raging in Europe and
the narrowness of the " yes " victory in France
led to the convocation of an extraordinary
session of the House of Commons at which the
Prime Minister had to face renewed attacks
from Euro-sceptics and his own party and strong
arguments from the new Leader of the Oppo-
sition, Mr. Smith.
193. The Prime Minister again proclaimed his
support for European Union but was unable to
avbid giving an impression of some confusion;
the same is probably true of his European col-
leagues. A few days later, the Labour Party
national congress rejected overwhelmingly the
possibility of holding a referendum.
194. An opinion poll published in The Times
early in October revealed that opposition to
Maastricht had grown, this probably being con-
nected with the pound's difficulties and its with-
drawal from the European monetary system:
68Yo of those questioned were against ratifi-
cation of the treaty.
195. These were the circumstances in which
the Prime Minister addressed the annual con-
ference of the Conservative Party and affrrmed
that he would never let Britain's distinctive
identity be lost in a federal Europe. Mr. Major
recalled the exemption clauses the United
Kingdom had obtained in Maastricht in respect
of sbcial policy and the single currency and
declared that the centralising tendency that had
prevailed in the Community in recent years had
now been reversed with the agreements reached
in Maastricht. The Birmingham summit meeting
would also be a move towards decentralisation.
However, Mr. Major added that a United
Kingdom * No' to Maastricht would be a his-
toric mistake and that the first reason for sup-
porting European unity was in order to safe-
guard peace.
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196. The hearty applause of members at the
conference during speeches by Euro-sceptics
gave way to approval by the majority of the
position adopted by Mr. Major. As the prime
Minister himself said, the applause had come
from the heart but delegates had supported him
with their head.
III. Pailiamentary debates in Denmarl;
Greece and Ireland
(a) Denmark
197. On l2th May 1992, the Bill ratifying the
Tre-aty on European Union was passed by a large
majority in the Danish parliament (130 votes io
25). Among those voting against were the
members of the right-wing Progress party and
the extreme left-wing Popular Socialist Party.
Those voting for the treaty included tlie
members of the minority coalition governmentparties (Conservatives and Liberals) and
members of other opposition parties, mainly
Social Democrats.
198. However, the referendum campaign that
b,egan immediately after the parliamentary vote
showed that the results of this consullation
would not reflect those of the vote. The opinionpoll published on 8th May by the daily news-
paper Boersen showed that 4lo/o of Danes were
in favour of the treaty, 37.9V0 against and 20o/o
still had not made up their minds. This poll was
also revealing since it showed that most bf those
who were undecided were among the Centrists
and Social Democrats. 50Yo of the latter said
they were hostile to the treaty. In the refe-
rendum held in Denmark in 1986 on the Single
European Act, which was approved by 56Vo-of
the.votes, the Social Democrat Party had voted
against the text. Another poll by the Gallup
Institute, published on the day of the electioni,
also gave the * yes " votes a lead over the
* noes " (47o/o), while a poll conducted two days
earlier had shown that the " noes " were
increasing. The final results confirmed the
victory of the " no " vote (50.790) over the
iy.-r_'l vote (49.30/o), by a narrow margin of
40 000 votes.
199. Although the Danish Governmenr
decided not to debate joint defence policy until
1996, when the treaty is due to be revised, this
matter was the main source of controversy
throughout the campaign because of the interest
of opponents of Maastricht in tackling it.
200. On the one hand, the parliamentary
qajority in favour of the Treaty on European
Union does not exactly coincide with the groups
supporting Denmark's accession to WEU; theie
9qr^"9 i, the minority. The Minister for ForeignAffairs considers it absurd to support a
European Union including common foreign and
security policy while refusing accession to-WEU,
which will be responsible for carrying out deci-
sions taken in the framework of that policy. yet
this is the case of the Social Democrats (with 69
of the 179 seats in the Folketing), who refuse
such accession. Rivalries in its midst have not
helped to clarify the situation in the party or,
consequently, among the public.
201. Moreover, the possibility ofjoining WEU
was considered by some of the population,
marked by a strong tradition of neutrality, as
abandoning the sacrosanct principle of non-
interference. Maintaining transatlantic links in
defence matters and fear of seeing the r6le of
NATO diminish in terms of European defence
brought grist to the debate for those who
believed WEU would act exactly contrary to
their wishes. Mr. Elleman-Jensen, Ministei for
Foreign Affairs, in commenting on Canada's
decision to withdraw the I 100 men of its opera-
tional force from Europe as from 1994, said this
withdrawal should mean Europeans would be
given greater responsibilities in NATO. It also
showed the need for WEU to play a new r6k
and for Denmark to join that organisation. The
decision would have to be taken during the year.
202. Another point must be taken into accountin the result of the referendum: this is the
forecast of opponents ofa Europe that they con-
sider would be dominated by the larger states
such as France and, in particular, Germany, and
the ensuing loss of decision-taking power for the
smaller countries. Where Germany is concerned,
the spectre of the past for the older generations
and the imagg 
. 
of an economically strong
Germany exercising hegemonic power for the
younger generations also influenced the state of
mind of a large part of the Danish electorate. It
should also be pointed out that a majority in
areas along the frontier with Germany vilted
" yes'.
203. Quite apart from any other reasons, the
arguments set out above had a particularly
strong impact on the result of the Danish refe-
rendum; whatever solution Denmark may
choose for solving the serious internal crisii
caused by the referendum and the no less serious
crisis from which the Community is suffering,
common foreign and security policy will be ii
the heart of the debate.
rl
I
I
I
I
I
(b) Gnece
204. On 3lst Jlly 1992, the Greek Parliament
passed the Bill ratifying the Treaty on European
Union. 295 of the 3@ members-of parliament
were present and 286 of them voted for the
treaty. One member of the PASOK abstained
and the votes against emanated from the Com-
munist Party (KKE) and the Ecologist member.
The party in power (the New Democracv Con-
servatives), the PASOK Socialists and members
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of the Left-Wing and Progress Coalition voted
in favour of the treaty. Although the main oppo-
sition parties voted in favour, this vote, as they
themselves admit, was critical approval because
of the social cost of the measures that would be
necessary in the context of the economic and
monetary union in a country already suffering
from serious economic problems. Speaking of
the Danish referendum, the Greek Prime Min-
ister, Mr. Mitsotakis, affirmed that, if a similar
consultation had been held in Greece, 9090 of
the electorate would have voted in favour. The
overrvhehning victory of those in favour in par-
liament probably proved him right. In the same
stat€ment, the Prime Minister included a word
of warning: his country's pro-European feelings
might change if the Community decided to
suport Yugoslav Macedonia's claims to retain
its name once it became an independent state.In fact, members of the Community were
shoving growing irritation at the blockage of
common foreign policy by the Greeks, who
refuse to recognise the right of the Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia to retain its name after
independence.
205. In other statements to the press last June,
Mr. Mitsotakis held that the use of the name of
Macedonia by a new Slav republic in the
Balkans was unauthorised assumption of the
name of a Greek republic that had borne it for
3000 years and an attempt to steal the Hellenic
patrimony and culture of that territory and its
population. He added that Skopje's insistence
betrayed territorial claims and undermined the
prospects of peace throughout the region.
205. Parliamentary ratification of the Maas-
tricht Treaty was initially programmed for
November but was brought forward to prove
Greece's gratitude at the Community's support
for its position vis-d-vis the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia.
207. Unfortunately, the report of the debates
on the Treaty on European Union in the Greek
Parliament exist only in Greek and attempts to
obtain accurate information, even verbally, on
this text have been unsuccessful. Your
Rapporteur is therefore unable to express an
opinion on these debates.
(c) Irelod
208. The result of the referendum on the
Trcaty on European Union held in Ireland on
l8th June 1992 to some extent restored the
balance that had been upset by the Danish refe-
rendum. With 57Yo of the electorate voting, 690/o
were in favour of the Maastricht Treaty and 310/o
against.
2W. According to the Prime Minister, Mr.
Rerynolds, the electoral campaign had revealed a
shortage of information. The campaign had
perhaps done little to remedy this because of the
determination of certain ultra-Conservative
C-atholic $oups to assimilate the Maastricht
Treaty with the introduction of abortion in the
Republic of lreland. The possible convening of
another referendum on the subject this autumn
did not discourage the pro-life movement from
pursuing its campaign, basing it solely on the
legalisation of abortion in Ireland through the
Maastricht Treaty.
210. Moreover, the left-wing and green groups
concentrated their attacks on the Treaty on
European Union on what they considered to be
the threat of the treaty provisions relating to
common and foreign security policy for Irish
neutrality. Some went so far as to refer to the
hypothetical recruitment of a European anny,
and tne image spread throughout the country of
young Irishmen called up for that army and
laking part in far-off missions. The Prime Min-
ister had aflirmed, on the one hand, that none of
Maastricht's defence implications would be felt
before 1996, when another referendum on those
matters would be organised, and, on the other,
thanks to the referendum, Ireland might be able
to maintain its traditional neutrality within a
Europe pursuing a common foreign and security
policy.
2ll. The green paper published by the lrish
Government with the intention of making an
objective, balanced assessment of the treaty
makes the following precisions in the chapter on
common foreign and security policy: " The dis-
tinction between security and defence drawn by
Ireland in the negotiations is upheld. Security
issues are matters for the European Union.
Where these have defence implications, a r6le
for WEU may arise. Moreover, any decision by
the European Union to refer matters with
defence implications to WEU for elaboration or
implementation requires unanimity. "
212. The treaty includes a provision that is of
particular importance for Ireland since it lays
down that the union's security policy " shall not
prejudice the specific character of the security
and defence policy of certain member states ".
This guarantees that the union's actions or deci-
sions-will not be able to prejudice the specific
character of the security and defence policy of
Ireland, which is outside the military alliances.
213. In regard to the declaration appended to
the treaty in which the member states of WEU
invite states members of the European Union to
accede to WEU or to become observers if they
so wish, the abovementioned gtreen paper says
Ireland has already accepted invitations to
attend, as an observer, three ministerial
meetings of the WEU Council, two of which to
discuss the Yugoslav crisis and the third, in
Maastricht, when WEU examined its future
relations with the European Union and the
abovementioned invitation to member states of
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the European Union. The green paper adds:
" Membership of WEU or attendance as
observers at WEU meetings are not required by
the treaty. Nonetheless the government believe
that attendance at future meetings of WEU as an
observer would have a number of advantages for
Ireland. It would ensure that Ireland is fully
informed of developments in WEU which might
have a bearing on discussions in the European
Union when issues with defence implications
arise. It would place Ireland in a better position
to formulate appropriate policies and responses
on such issues within the European Union. It
would better enable the government to decide
on any vote in the European Union on the ref-
erence of defence matters to WEU. Finally, it
would enable lreland to follow the subsequent
course of discussions in WEU.'
214. The green paper goes on to say: * It is
important to note that attendance as observers
would not require Ireland to become a member
of WEU, to accede to the Brussels Treaty estab-
lishing WEU, to take up any obligations under
the Brussels Treaty, or to subscribe to policy
positions or platforms adopted by WEU. Ireland
would not become a party to WEU as an alliance
or undertake any mutual defence commitments
or military obligations under the WEU treaty. "
215. Finally, the text specifies that the treaty
provides for the common foreign and security
policy to be revised in 1996. Article J.4.6 of the
treaty provides that the conference convened in
accordance with Article N may revise the provi-
sions of the common foreign and security policy
relating to security, including the possible estab-
lishment of a joint defence policy. The result of
the intergovernmental conference would have to
be the subject of unanimous agreement and any
changes to the treaty ratified by member states
would have to be in conformity with their
respective constitutions and legislation.
216. The problem of Ireland's neutrality
having thus been deferred to a possible refe-
rendum in 1996 and that of abortion to a similar
consultation to be organised before the end of
the year, the number of 'yes " votes recorded in
the referedum on l8th June exceeded all esti-
mates. The government coalition parties(Fianna F6il and the Progressive Democrats)
were in favour of ratification as were the Fine
Gael and the Labour Party (the latter with some
reservations, however), while the pro-life
movement mentioned above, the Democratic
Socialist Party and the Greens were against. The
" yes " vote triumphed in every constituency in
the country, including the western rural areas.
The highest percentage of 'no " votes core-
sponds mainly to the working-class districts of
Dublin, which are particularly affected by
unemployment. This referendum, in which the
Irish people expressed themselves on the subject
of Europe, was the third of its kind, following
the ones in 19'12 on joining the Community and
in 1987 on the Single European Act.
IY. Debates in the htropean Parliament
217. The President of the Commission of the
European Communities, Mr. Delors, addressed
the European Parliament on l2th February 1992
on the occasion of the presentation of the text
entitled " From the single Act to Maastricht and
beyond: the means to match our ambitions'
and of the Commission's programme of work
for 1992. In his address on * 1992: a pivotal
year ", Mr. Delors said, on common foreign and
security policy, that its functioning depended on
decisions to be taken by the Council of Ministers
on its implementation. In this area, he added,
everything still had to be invented in order to
benefit from the process of simple, effective
assessments and decisions. In regard to the
Commission he said that, because it was granted
a shared right of initiative in those areas, it must
also organise itself accordingly and adjust its
own methods to those that the Council of Min-
isters would have. Referring to the Council's
decision to prepare a report on the Community's
foreign policy priorities, Mr. Delors stressed that
these priorities also corresponded to the need
for coherence between foreign policy proper and
economic and financial actions obeying Com-
munity rules. The existence of different pillars
should not, he thought, preyent foreign policy
being handled globally, coherently and effec-
tively.
218. For Mr. Delors, the Community's contri-
bution to international stability must first be
through the strengthening of security and sta-
bility in Europe, in view of developments in the
Central European countries which affect the
Community's immediate environment and
political, economic and military problems in
Russia and the other states of the new Common-
wealth of Independent States. Secondly, the
Community must assume special responsibilityin the Mediterranean and in countries with
which it has historical and geographical links,
most of which are faced with serious problems
of political instability, very high birth rates and
vast migrations of populations due to a particu-
larly high unemployment rate among young
people.
219. Finally, Mr. Delors said the Community
should not forget its responsibilities to Africa,
South America and Asia and these should
remain essential aspects of foreign policy.
220. In the text from the Commission men-
tioned above, it was considered that it would not
be easy to have a common foreign and security
policy in view of the trend of the discussions
that dominated the interyovernmental oon-
ference on political union. However, it was of
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litflc importance that some considered the pros-
pects offered by the new treaty satisfactory while
others thought they would cause paralysis; the
main thing was to follow the course laid down
and seek to solve the problems that arose
bearing in mind priorities already indicated by
the President of the Commission.
221. On 7th April 1992, the European Par-
liament debated the Institutional Committee's
Martin report and approved Resolution
A3-D123192 on the results of intergovernmental
conferences by a large majority: 226 to 62
(Greens, French Communists and the European
extneme righrwing) with 3l abstentions (RPR
and Conservatives).
222. The resolution adopted recalled that the
Parliament had previously affirmed that a
common foreign policy including joint exami-
nation of matters relating to peace, security and
arms control was one of the fundamental ele-
ments of the European Union.
223. After noting that the Maastricht Treaty
contained provisions that contradicted the
requirements laid down by the Parliament and
underlining that the treaty provided for the con-
vocation of an intergovernmental conference in
1996, which amounted to taking note of the
inadequacy of its results, the European Par-
liament urged national parliaments to ratify the
treaty and ensure that their respective national
governments fill in the principal gaps as soon as
possible.
224. Among these gaps are the fact that
common foreign and security policy is not
included in the European Community treaty,
thus implying that the Commission and the Par-
liament play a less important r6le in this area
and ruling out any possibility of recourse to the
Court of Justice, and also that the treaty
entrusted defence matters to WEU without pro-
viding for adequate parliamentary control of the
activities of that organisation.
225. The European Parliament has probably
forgotten that, on the one hand, Article IX of the
modified Brussels Treaty lays down that the
WEU Council has to present to the Assembly an
annual report on its activities and, on the other,
that, insofar as defence remains a matter for
statcs, the WEU Assembly, composed of repre-
sentatives of national parliaments deciding their
respective defence policies and approving the
corresponding budgets, is the only body capable
of filling the gap referred to in the European
Parliament's resolution.
226. A working paper of the Foreign Affairs
and Security Committee of the European Par-
liarnent relating to the establishment of common
foreign policy for the European Community,
dated 8th April 1992, holds, in regard to parlia-
mentary supervision of the activities of the
WEU Council, that it is for the European Par-
liament, the only democratically-elected body,
to exercise such supervision and that the par-
liament should consquently replace the WEU
Assembly in all respects, the latter being com-
posed of parliamentarians who must, statutorily,
be members of national parliaments and of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe. The text concludes by inviting the WEU
Council to take an official political undertaking
to answer questions by the Parliament, to
present its activities in plenary sitting or in com-
mittee and, in short, to apply procedure in force
for foreign policy matters.
227. Your Rapporteur considers the strength-
ening of co-operation between the parliamentary
Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament
as envisaged in the declaration on WEU
appended to the Maastricht Treaty should over-
come the inadequacies of the abovementioned
European Parliament texts.
Y. Conclusions
228. Generally speaking, the relative difference
between the degree of approval obtained by the
Treaty on European Union in the various parlia-
ments and among the public should be under-
lined, whether the latter expressed itself in a
referendum or through opinion polls.
229. Probably a cause of this dissonance
between parliaments and public opinion is due
to what some considered to be the democratic
deficit of the Community institutions. Com-
munity Europe has been built on agreements
between governments with no direct partici-
pation by the public. The institutions and bodies
which have absorbed some of the responsibil-
ities of state do not enjoy the same level of rep-
resentativeness and legitimacy as the corre-
sponding national institutions and bodies.
230. In some cases, the absence of an in-depth
national debate and the lack of detailed, clear
information have influenced those citizens who
were tempted to reject what they did not know
or did not know well enough. A referendum is
not always the best means of solving the
problems referred to above, partly because this
type of consultation implies an answer based not
so much on the question put as on the person
who puts it, thus adding to the debate a whole
series of factors, most of which are alien to the
subject of the consultation. In any event, it is
when parliamentary forces are the most deeply
divided that a referendum seems the most
appropriate solution.
231. Moreover, because of its imprecision, the
model of a supranational institution proposed as
an alternative to the national model has not con-
vinced the public that it would offer adequate
guarantees of participation, viability and effec-
tiveness.
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232. However this may be, the shortcomings
noted should not serve as a pretext for pre-
venting ratification: the treaty is an attempt,
insufficient perhaps but no less real, to remedy
these shortcomings. Ratification certainly does
not mean that present diffrculties will be
overcome completely but it is also sure that
failure to ratify would increase these same difli-
culties and start a period ofgreat instability and
uncertainty.
233. In regard to the common foreign and
security policy provided for in the Treaty on
European Union, rejection of the present text
would not result in a better, clearer and more
ambitious text; on the contrary, it is to be feared
that integration would not go so far, that it
would be more acceptable to the United States
and Japan as our political and economic rivals
and that it would consequently be less Euro-
pean. Furthennore, it would heighten natio-
nalist tension on our continent and return us to
positions held prior to Maastricht.
234. Moreover, it is clear that there is an
immediate need for national parliaments to
debate in extenso, at sessions devoted solely to
the matter, the common foreign and security
policy provided for in Maastricht, its evolution,
the r6le of WEU as set out in the treaty and rela.
tions between our organisation and the European
Union and the Atlantic Alliance. The path has
already been traced, but to embark upon it will
mean follow-up action, assessment and contri-
butions by the various national parliaments in
full consultation with the WEU Assembly.
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Western European Union (WEU)
(Draft of a new booklet)
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations2
by Mr. I-opeq, Henares and Mr. Tummers, co-Rapportears
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnerr Onpnn
on the draft of a new booklet on Western European Union
ExpLnuetoRv MEuonnNourrr
submitted by Mr. Lopez Henares and Mr. Tummers, co-Rapporteurs
Draft Order
on the draft of a new booklet oa ll/cstera European Union
The Assembly,
(i) Noting the report on the draft of a new booklet on WEU submitted by its Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations;(ii) Considering that this text is an appropriate basis for the general information of parliamentarians
and the public in member countries,
INsrnucrs rrs CoruumtEE FoR Pnnr-nurNtARy AND Pueuc RrmrroNs
1. To ensure that, with the aid of national delegations, a booklet based on the report submitted is
published in the seven languages of the WEU member countries;
2. To ensure that the text of this booklet is brought up to date in the event of major developments
in WEU prior to its publication.
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the commiltee: Mr. Tummers (Chairman); Mrs. Fischer (Alternate: Milller),Sir John Hunt (Yice-Chairmen); MM.
Amaral, Biihler, Caccia, Mrs. Err, Mr. Eversdijk (Alternate: Dees), Sir Anthony Durant, Mr. Fiandrotti, Mrs. Frias (Alternate:
Roman), Mr. Ghesquiire, Dr. Godman (Alternate: Baroness Lockwood), MM. Gouteyron, Greco, Sir Russell Johnston(Alternate: Baroness Hooper), MM. Kempinaire, l*moine, Lopez Henares, Martins, Nufiez, Pflhl, Reimann, Seitlinger,
Stegagrini, Vial-Massat.
N.B. Tia names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Explanatory Memorandum
qubmilted by Mr. I-opez Henares and Mr. Tummen, co-Rappaeun)
Introduction
The Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations thought it necessary to replace the
booklet entitled * Western European Union " published in 1990 because of the development of the
organisation, particularly following the Maastricht agreements, followed by the Petersberg declaration:
the two events indeed make the modified Brussels Treaty topical again in view of the realities of the
new Europe.
The purpose of this text is the same as that which guided the preparation and distribution of its
predecessors: to provide accurate, up-to-date information about WEU and to make the necessary effort
to ensure that a wide public is contacted so as to rectify our fellow citizens' lack of knowledge of
European security and defence matters.
It is well realised that the present text can but be provisional in the present transitional period
for WEU after the Maastricht agreements and in view of the sometimes unpredictable international
situation.
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Document 1335 lgth October 1992
Communiqtd issued after the meeting of the WEIJ Permanent Council
at Ambassador level with colleagues of eight
Central and Eastern European countries
London, 14th October 1992
The WEU Permanent Council met in London today at Ambassador level with colleagues of eight
Central and Eastern European countries. The WEU Secretary-General was in the chair.-
This was the first meeting of the WEU Forum of Consultation which was set up by an extraor-
dinary WEU ministerial meeting with these countries in Bonn on lgth June 1992.
Participants exchanged views on the enhancement of their relations within the WEU forum and
within the wider CSCE framework. They also discussed topical security questions of common concern.
The next meeting of the WEU forum will take place in 1993 at WEU's new headquarters in
Brussels.
l6l
Document 1336 5th November 1992
Defence: Central Europe in evolution
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee2
by Mr. Cox, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnerr RrcouueNonrloN
on defence: Central Europe in evolution
Expr.eNntonv MruoneNouu
submitted by Mr. Cox, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. WEU initiatives
III. The political situation in transition
IV. Economics
V. Security questions
VI. Foreign policy developments
VII. Armed forces and defence
- 
* Berlin revisited "
YIII. Defence industries
IX. Conclusion
APPENDIx
Glossenv
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the commit ee.' Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. de_Puig (Alrernate: Moya) (Yie'
Chairmen); MM. Aloncle, Bassinet, Boideras, Brito, Caigha. Chevalier (Alternate: Sargns), Cox, De De9k9r, Dees, Durand,
Fernandei'Marques,Fiandrotti, Fioret, Fourr6, Hardy, Irmer, Jung, Klechtermans, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. van der Linden-,
Marten, Lord N-ewall, MM. Pecchioli, Perinat (Alternate: Czco), Reis kite (Alternate: Mrs. Aguiarl, Scheer, Sinesio,Sit Keith
Speed, I['lJ[/. Steiner, Yazquez (Alternate: Bolinaga), Ziercr.
N.B. The names of lhose taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft recommendation
on defence: Central Europe in evolation
The Assembly,
0 Welcoming progress made in establishing a formal relationship between WEU and the states of
Central Europe;(iil Welcoming the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers together with the
Foreign and Defence Ministers of Central European states on 19th June 1992;(iiil Welcoming the declaration agreed at the same meeting and aiming " to strengthen existing rela-
tions between WEU and the Central European states by structuring the dialogue, consultations and
co-operation ";(vil Welcoming the Council's largely positive replies on those aspects of relations with the Central
European states stressed in Recommendations 518 and 524;(v) Welcoming the various initiatives taken under the aegis of the WEU Institute for Security
Studies to deepen the discussion with the Central European states;(vil Determined to maintain the momentum of its own relationship with the governments and par-
liaments concerned;(viil Recalling Recommendation 510 on "Defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and
Poland " and extending the recommendations to include reference also to Bulgaria and Romania,
RrcoulvrpNos rHAT rur CouNcII-
l. Fulfil the expectations of the Central European states by regular and relevant dialogue and
timely discussion of current issues;
2. Follow closely possible moves in the European Community to create the new status of " affiliate
member " which could have implications for the formal relationship between the Central European
states and WEU;
3. Include the Central European states in appropriate seminars to provide an opportunity for
debate on subjects of mutual interest, such as national service and conscription;
4. Invite the Central European states to observe the exercises to be co-ordinated by the WEU
planning cell;
5. Encourage member states as appropriate to develop relations with the Central European states in
the realms of:
- 
higher staff training;
- 
budgetary management;
- 
procurement (especially for air defence);
- 
personnel exchanges;
- 
language training;
- 
military survey and mapping;
- 
command and control (C2) and identification friend or foe (IFF) systems;
6. Explore ways in which the Central European states might be associated with the development of
a European armaments agency;
7. Seek the opinions of the Central European states on matters scheduled for discussion in the
CSCE and NACC and wherever possible co-ordinate positions;
8. Institute regular meetings of the " Seventeen " in the context of the Vienna Forum for Security
Co-operation;
9. Ensure that accounts of consultations with the Central European states at ministerial and WEU
Permanent CounciVAmbassador level and meetings of senior oflicials or seminars organised by the
Institute for Security Studies are included in the annual report to the Assembly;
10. Establish information points in the capitals of the Central European states, by using the good
offrces of the embassies of WEU members.
163
DOCUMENT 1336
Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Cox, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
1. In preparation for the present report, the
Defence Committee and your Rapporteur have
been fortunate to have had a number of oppor-
tunities to meet a series of individuals from the
Central European states: ministers, diplomats,
military men, parliamentarians, who have all
gone to great lengths to explain the hopes and
aspirations of their countries and peoples and to
discuss the possibilities for defence co-operation
for the future.
2. The leading authorities of their countries
consulted have included:
Bulgaria
The Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr.
Valentin Dobrev.
Czechoslovakia
The Chief of the Defence Staff, General
Pezl.
Hungary
The Defence Minister, Mr. Lajos Fiir.
Poland
The Foreign Minister, Professor
Krzysztof Skubiszewski;
The Defence Minister, Dr. Janusz
Onyskiewicz.
Romania
The Foreign Minister, Mr. Adrian
Nastase;
The Defence Minister, Lt. Gen. Niculae
Spiroiu;
The Secretary of State for Defence and
Chief of the Defence Staff, Lt. Gen. Dumitru
Cioflina;
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Teodor Meliscanu.
3. In addition, the respective Defence and
Political Attach6s in the embassies of the coun-
tries concerned, both in London and in Paris,
have been particularly helpful in answering a
multitude of questions and arranging meetings:
the committee and your Rapporteur wish to put
on record their gratitude to all concerned.
4. The evolution of matters concerning
defence is of course inextricably linked with
political considerations and your Rapporteur
makes no excuse for devoting part of the present
report to the political and indeed the economic
situation which dominates the Central European
scene.
5. Every country is of course striving for
political and economic stability, but the path is
decidedly uphill for all, and positively moun-
tainous for some, with a multitude of crevasses
on the way. The worst potential dangers perhaps
being the impending split of the Czech and
Slovak Republic and the ethnic problems which
bedevil a number of states.
6. The member countries of Western
European Union have a specific interest in
maintaining and developing a good working
relationship with Central Europe and are very
fortunate in the range of contacts which are now
possible in a number of international organ-
isations: the United Nations, the Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe, the North
Atlantic Co-operation Council, the Council of
Europe and now, since the Bonn meeting on
l9th June 1992, our own consultations at " Sev-
enteen ".
7. The present report concentrates on the
five Central European states which have a fully-
established defence structure where it is compar-
atively straightforward to discern and quantify
current evolution in defence policy, military
hardware, etc.
8. As for the Baltic states the immediate
necessity is to establish a defence structure
where no indigenous oryanisation has existed
hitherto.
9. For Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the
first priority is the policing of frontiers and
therefore initial efforts at defence are giving pri-
ority to establishing border troops in all three
countries, and in the case of Estonia and Latvia,
also forming a coast guard. In due course each
nation is keen to establish rapid reaction units to
provide a defensive 'fire brigade " capability,
but progress in establishing forces has been slow,
mainly because of a lack of finance and also a
lack of expertise.
10. The WEU and the North Atlantic
Co-operation Council have been instrumental in
providing moral support but of course the major
preoccupation in the Baltic states has been the
uncertainty regarding Russian troop with-
drawals.
164
I
I
I
DOCUMENT 1336
II. WEA initiatives
ll. The WEU Assembly has taken various
special initiatives with regard to Central
European security and in helping to build the
relationship between WEU and the states con-
cerned. Likewise the Council. In practical terms
this has meant:
- 
invitations to ministers to address
meetings of the Assembly or its com-
mittees;
- 
regular invitations to the parliaments of
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Poland and Romania to send delega-
tions to attend the Assembly's plenary
sessions;
- 
study visits by the Assembly's com-
mittees and rapporteurs;
- 
visits by the_Secretary-General, usually-
accompanied by the representative of
the current presidency;
- 
a series of serninars on a variety of
themes organised by the WEU Institute
for Security Studies;
- 
contacts between officials working on
specific research or initiatives such as
open skies or arrns control verifi-
cation.
12. The present report is a follow-on from
those presented hitherto:
- 
Consequences of developments in
Central and Eastern Europe for
European securityt;
- 
Defence industry in Czechoslovakia,
Hungary and Poland 2;
- 
A new security order in Europe 3,
and the main aim is to bring colleagues up to
date, especially where the evolution of security
perceptions and defence structures are con-
cerned. The draft recommendations are
designed to complement the Council's initia-
tives vis-i-vis the Central European states which
were formalised in the declaration adopted in
Bonn on l9th June this year by the extraor-
dinary meeting of the WEU Council of Min-
isters with states of Central Europe which
reads:
* l. At the invitation of the German pres-
idency of Western European Union, the
Foreign and Defence Ministers of
Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
l. Document 1263, 27th March 1991, Rapporteur: Mr.
Caro.
2. Document 1289, 8th November 1991, Rapporteur: Mr.
Atkinson.
3. Document 1309, l3th May 1992, Rapporteur: Mr.
Caro.
Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Spain and the United Kingdom met in
Bonn on l9th June 1992 to demonstrate
their resolve to enhance the scope of the
relationship initiated by a decision of the
Ministerial Council in Brussels in April
1990.
2. Ministers agreed that, in view of the
profound changes in Europe of the last
few years, intensifying the relations
between WEU and the states of Central
Europe will contribute to stability and the
emergence of a new peaceful order in
Europe based on partnership and
co-operation, greater security and confi-
dence, as well as disarmament.
3. Ministers welcomed the decisions
taken by the CSCE Council in Berlin and
Prague regarding the relationships
between the CSCE and other mutually
reinforcing European and transatlantic
organisations including WEU. They
underlined that security in its broadest
sense encompasses not only military but
also political aspects, respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms, as well
as economic, social and environmental
aspects.
4. Ministers acknowledged that WEU will
be one of the essential elements of the
future European security architecture, in
accordance with the decisions taken by
the European Council in Maastricht in
December 1991. In this context, they
noted that the Petersberg Declaration
states:
" As WEU develops its operational
capabilities in accordance with the
Maastricht Declaration, we are pre-
pared to support, on a case-by-case
basis and in accordance with our own
procedures, the effective implemen-
tation ofconflict prevention and crisis
management measures, including
peace-keeping activities of the CSCE
or the United Nations Security
Council. This will be done without
prejudice to possible contributions by
other CSCE countries and other
organisations to these activities. "
5. The enhancement of WEU's relations
with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and
Romania should reflect the specific rela-
tions which exist and are developing
between these countries and the European
Union and its member states. Other
appropriate forms of co-operation could
be set up as required in the light of the
development of these relations.
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6. Ministers had a detailed exchange of
views on the development of co-operation
between WEU and these states. They
agreed to strengthen existing relations by
structuring the dialogue, consultations
and co-operation.
The focus of consultations will be the
security architecture and stability in
Europe, the future development of the
CSCE, arms control and disarmanent, in
particular the implementation of the CFE
and Open Skies Treaties, as well as the
1992 Vienna Document. Developments
in Europe and neighbouring regions will
be of particular interest to the participants.
In this way, WEU's Central European
partners will be able to acquaint them-
selves with the future security and defence
policy of the European Union and find
new opportunities to co-operate with the
defence component of the Union and with
the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance as these develop.
7. The Foreign and Defence Ministers
adopted the following concrete mea-
sures:
- 
Foreign and Defence Ministers will
meet once a year. Additional
meetings at ministerial level may be
convened if circumstances require.
- 
A forum of consultation will be
established between the WEU Per-
manent Council and the ambas-
sadors ofthe countries concerned. It
will meet at the seat of the WEU
Council at least twice a year.
- 
These meetings will provide an
opportunity to monitor the imple-
mentation of the measures adopted
and, where appropriate, to make
proposals for the inclusion of other
fields of co-operation.
- 
Consultations at ministerial and
WEU Permanent CounciVambassador
level on security issues may be com-
plemented by meetings with an ad
hoc WEU troika at senior official
level.
- 
The following initiatives will be con-
tinued and encouraged:
- 
Regular exchanges of documents
and information;
- 
Growing co-operation between
the WEU Institute for Security
studies and the corresponding
bodies in the countries concerned.
An increasing number of seminars
and colloquia will be organised.
The programme of scholarships
will be continued.
8. Ministers advocated the development
of relations between the WEU Assembly
and the parliaments of the states con-
cerned.
9. These measuries, conducted in the frame'
work of WEU with the states of Central
Europe, and similar endeavours conducted
in the alliance framework, will be mutually
complementary and reinforcing. "
13. It will be remembered that the extraor-
dinary meeting had originally been scheduled
for an earlier date but that certain practical con-
siderations, coupled with the reticence of a
number of member countries to create another
forum for consultation which might duplicate or
conflict with NACC initiatives, had led to post-
ponement. It was good to see, therefore, that the
declaration once adopted made reference to spe-
cifics and that these were again emphasised by
the Council on l6th October 1992 in its reply to
Assembly Recommendation 518 on WEU: the
operational organisation a.
14. By putting the emphasis on the strictly
" European " aspects of European security, the
Council of WEU, together with the Central
European states concerned, have pre-empted the
criticism which would have resulted had the
Forum for Consultation merely replicated what
is being tackled in the broader setting of the
NACC. All the Central European states are
closely involved with moves towards European
Union and therefore have a legitimate interest
in the detail of the security and defence aspects
as they evolve. The practical dimension of such
a theory is being given substance by the various
association agreements already in place or pres-
ently being negotiated. Should European Com-
missioner Frans Andriessen's ideas on creating a
sort of " afliliate membership " for those in the
queue for full membership of the Community
come to pass, then our newly-established
agreement with the Central European countries
would be considerably reinforced.
15. Such moves must of course be seen in
context. The Council is at present hard pressed
to implement the decisions announced in the
WEU declaration at Maastricht to create asso-
ciate membership and observer status for
certain countries which are currently members
either of NATO or the EC but not of Western
European Union. Fortunately the thorny
problem of accepting as a full member of WEU a
country which is not already a member of
NATO does not appear to be looming, although
possible now in theory: Ireland is likely to opt
for observer status only.
16. Once other sometime neutral nations or
even former Warsaw Pact members are in the
Community, or Ireland ever wishes to take full
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WEU membership, the paradox would be com-
pletc, considering that WEU's modified Brussels
Treaty is so much stronger than NATO's Wash-
ington Treaty.
17. The logical conclusion to such considera-
tions is examined further in Chapter IX. For the
present the practical aspects of WEU's
enlargement are examined in detail in a report
for the Assembly's Political Committee on the
enlargement of WEU (Rapporteur: Mr. Ward).
18. On l4th October, the WEU Permanent
Council met in London at Ambassador level
with colleagues from the eight Central European
statcs 
- 
the first session of the WEU Forum for
Consultation. Views were reportedly exchanged
on the enhancement of relations within the
forum and within the wider QSCE framework.
* They also discussed topical security questions
of common concern ". Your Rapporteur trusts
that the Council will give the Assembly an
account of this and future meetings.
III. The political situation in transition
19. Although desovietisation was effected in
accordance with a process specific to each
country insofar as the social incentives of each
one traced the parameters of the transition to
democracy, two patterns may be distinguished:
- 
countries having lived in a reform
context for several years in which the
opposition was able to become even
slightly organised managed to withdraw
from the communist r6gime through
progressive, peaceful compromises
between the 6lite of the old r6gime and
the opposition: this is the case of
Poland and Hungary;
- 
features of countries where revolutions
spread, mainly by contagion, is the
absence of real democratic traditions,
the absence of organised opposition or
dominant social institutions and the
distingegration of a society lacking
social solidarity: this is the case of
Romania and Bulgaria.
Czechoslovakia lies between the two.
(i) Bulsada
20. The Bulgarian Communist Party retained
control for a very long time. This is due to the
special links between Bulgaria and the Soviet
Union, the Communist Party's grasp on political
life as a whole and to the non-existence of
change-generating opposition, but above all to
the fact that, in Bulgaria, the idea of a nation
was seen vis-i-vis Turkey, a context in which the
former Communist Party represented a guar-
antee that national interests would be
defended.
21. The fall of the communist r6gime on 10th
November 1989 gave an impression of a wise
revolution closely surveyed by the army. The
alliance between the army and reformers
ensured a smooth transition.
22. To put it briefly, until summer 1991, the
political scene was marked by the struggle
between two parties, the Bulgarian Communist
Party, which became the Bulgarian Socialist
Party (the majority) and the Coalition of Demo-
cratic Forces, a coalition of sixteen opposition
organisations, set up in 1989.
23. On 12th January 1992, the first presi-
dential elections by universal suffrage brought
victory to Jelio Jelev, a dissident intellectual, the
candidate of the Coalition of Democratic Forces
(44.8Vo of votes in the first round, 530/o in the
second).
24. However, the good score of Valko
Valkesov, an independent candidate having the
support of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (3090 in
the first round, 400/o in the second) demonstrates
the division in Bulgarian society.
(ii) Czpchoslovakia (Czpch ard Sbwk Fedeml Republic)
25. The " velvet revolution' was marked by
the real participation of the Czechoslovak
people and dissidents in overthrowing the
rdgime. Student demonstrations that started on
lTth November 1989 became a non-violent rev-
olutionary movement, spread to the entire
country and compelled those in power to agree
to negotiations and then reforms. The Czecho-
slovak army and Soviet forces on Czechoslovak
territory did not intervene.
26. On 29th December 1989, Yaclav Havel
was elected President of the Czechoslovak
Republic. Czechoslovakia returned to demo-
cracy after two previous experiences from l9l8
to 1938 and from 1945 to 1948. Many political
parties resurfaced, including Vaclav Havel's
Civic Forum.
27. The legislative elections on 81ft and 9th
June 1990 marked the victory of democracy
(960/o of the electorate voted). This was a
crushing victory for the Czech Civic Forum and
its counterpart in Slovakia, Public against Vio-
lence. However, the disbandment of the two
winning movements called in question further
transition.
28. The legislative elections on 5r& and 6th
June 1992 marked the victory of the separatists.
In the Czech Republic, the conservative coa-
lition (Civic Democrat Party and Christian
Democrat party) won with 34o/o of the votes.
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29. In the Slovak Republic, the Movement for
Democratic Slovakia won with 37% of the votes.
This victory of the nationalists, even the most
moderate, jeopardised the future of the fede-
ration and the division into two separate states
is likely now to become de facto on lst January
1993.
(iii) Hangary
30. In Hungary, the transition to democracy
was a moderate, progressive rejection of the
system as the culminating point of a slow move
towards political maturity.
31. The absence of a state-party imposing
totalitarian power and the existence of a tole-
rated opposition allowed political reforms to be
carried out.
32. Although Hungary had no unifying social
movement or charismatic leader, it nevertheless
had the most developed party system of all the
Central and Eastern European countries. In
autumn 1989, an institutionalised round-table
dialogue was held between the party (Hungary
Workers' Socialist Party) and the government,
on the one hand, and the opposition movements
acting in concert, on the other.
33. The elections in March and April 1990
produced two major political formations.
- 
the majority, comprising the Demo-
cratic Forum (42.90/o), the Small Land-
owners' Party (11.4%) and the
Christian Democrat Party (5.4o/o),
obtained 600/o;
- 
the liberal opposition, comprising the
Alliance of Free Democrats and the
FIDESZ, formed a minority of 29.3Vo.
The Communist Party, which, in
October 1989, decided to call itself the
Socialist Party, progressively lost its
importance.
(iv) Poland
34. This was the country that opened the way
to democratisation in Central and Eastern
Europe.
35. There were two principal actors:
- 
the Church: as from 1980, very deeply-
rooted and majority Catholicism
formed a rampart against communist
ideology,
- 
the Solidarity movement: initially a
well-structured structure opposition, it
is the expression of the emancipation of
Polish society vis-i-vis the authorities.It then became the symbol rallying
almost the entire opposition. Under its
pressure, the transition was effected
through a dialogue between representa-
tives ofthe authorities and ofthe oppo-
sition, leading to the historic com-
promise, round-table negotiations on
6th February /989. This event created a
precedent that was to become a
catalysing factor for other countries.
36. However, what had been Poland's strong
point tended to become an obstacle to the
pursuit of democratisation:
- 
the dispersal of Solidarity's leaders in
the various political parties that were
being set up deprived the country
increasingly of a symbol around which
to rally;
- 
the Church tried to safeguard its power
by interfering in political activities,
thus provoking anticlerical reflexes
among the younger generations.
37. Three types of electorate voted in the
presidential elections on 25th November 1990;
- 
supporters of Walesa, a popular elec
torate very attached to the Solidarity
movement and strongly influenced by
the Catholic Church;
- 
supporters of Mazowiecki from the
middle and well-to-do classes wishing
to remain apart from Solidarity,
- 
supporters of Timinsky, mainly
workers.
38. 1991 witnessed the re-emergence of
diverging social and political interests.
(v) Romaaia
39. In Romania, 1989 and 1990 witnessed the
ideological apogde of a strong central power
opposed to the liberal western world and to the
environment of socialist countries subscribing to
Gorbachev's reformism. In this country there
was neither a true organised dissident
movement nor political parties.
40. The popular revolution in which the
people clashed with the army led to the leaders
of the National Salvation Front taking power
with the support of part of the army and of
Securitate, hitherto at Ceausescu's service. The
opposition was extremely fragmented (there
were I 15 official parties at the last elections).
41. On 20th May 1990, general elections con-
firmed the legitimacy of the National Salvation
Front, which obtained 85% of votes cast in the
presidential elections and 63.30/o in the legis-
lative elections.
42. This result underlined a degree of conser-
vatism among the population, who are reticent
about change, particularly as fear of political
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and social destabilisation in view of the reforms
sometimes made the new powers restore order
by force (violent repressions of the opposition
through the intermediary of " miners " on l3th,
14th and 15th June 1990).
43. ln May 1992, Prime Minister Roman,
who was in disagreement with President Iliescu,
left the NSF and set up the Democratic National
Salvation Front.
44. In the presidential elections on 27th Sep-
tember 1992,Lon Iliescu had a strong lead with
4890 of the votes in the first round. However,
mention should be made of the good score (330/0)
of the Democratic Convention (opposition coa-
lition) of Emil Constantinescu and there is cause
for concern at the rise of the nationalists since
Funar, the candidate of the Romanian National
Unity party, obtained almost 100/o of the
votes.
45. In the legislative elections on the same
day, Ion Iliescu's party, while obtaining the best
score (27.50/o of the votes), was to find it hard to
form a majority coalition.
46. ||th October 1992: President Iliescu is
re-elected with 610/o of the votes cast. At the time
of writing, efforts are in hand to try and form a
coalition.
IY. Emnunics
47. The dismantling of the Soviet Union and,
on 28th February 1991, the winding up of the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance(CMEA) plunged the Central European coun-
tries into a serious crisis because of their inter-
dependence. Priority had to be given to
modernising their economies and radical solu-
tions were consequently adopted. The initially
inevitable negative effects had a strong impact:
high unemployment rate, fall in production, etc.
48. They all took the EEC as a model. On
16th December 1991, an agreement of associ-
ation was signed between Czechoslovakia,
Hungary and Poland and the EEC that is to
come into force at the end of 1992.It establishes
a framework for political and economic inte-
gration at the end of a ten-year transitional
period.
(i) Bulg@ia
49. Considerable economic dependence on
the CMEA (8090 of its trade of which 660/o with
the Soviet Union) almost cut Bulgaria off from
extcrnal trade. The reduction in oil exports as
from July 1990 followed by the Soviet Govern-
ment's decision to be paid in dollars at the world
market rate added to an external debt of almost
$11000 million inherited from the communist
r6gime. This situation was aggravated by the
radical reforms carried out by the new gov-
ernment as from March l99l in order to curb
the accelerated deterioration of the economy: in
one year, national production fell by 200/0, indus-
trial production by 300/o and investmeqf by 35%;
inflation rose to 400o/o, salaries fell by 200/o in
real terms and unemployment affected about 870
of the active population.
50. There are still many obstacles:
- 
very high interest rates (they have risen
from 15 to 4590) which discourage any
effort to privatise (only 2olo);
- 
non-existence of small- and medium-
sized flrrms in the food and agricultural
sector, electronics and light industry.
Barely 100/o of the economy has been
privatised.
51. Bulgaria wishes to establish economic
links with its former partners to replace the
CMEA and is trying to increase the number of
bilateral agreements with a view to attracting
foreign investment. Its long-term priority aim is
accession to the EEC.
(ii) Czechoslovakia
52. After initial hesitation, Czechoslovakia
started to carry out its economic reform policy
on 1sl January 1991.lt made progress in areas
such as the freeing of prices and monetary
reform:
- 
keeping inflation down was one of the
first successes of the reform. A strict
incomes policy (a reduction of 300/o in
the purchasing power of the people)
helped to bring the inflation rate down
to 3090 in l99l;
- 
stabilisation of the exchange rate was
also a success.
53. In other sectors, including the law relating
to businesses, privatisation and financial institu-
tions, it has not yet got into its stride:
- 
fiscal reform should have led to VAT
being introduced on lst January 1993.
However, because of the slowness of the
reform of the fiscal system, foreign
investors are rather slow in coming
forward;
- 
privatisation has hardly started. In
Czechoslovakia, the private sector is
less developed than in Hungary and
Poland. Until 1989, 970/o of total pro-
duction was under state control. The
government was giving priority to a
gradual approach that distinguished
between small-scale privatisation(shops, restaurants and small- and
medium-sized firms) and large-scale
privatisation (large frrms);
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- 
at the same time, Czechoslovakia has
to completely overhaul its banking
system. Customer-oriented service is
non-existent. It is not yet known how
the investment funds will work.
54. ln January l99l the IMF approved the
economic reform programme and granted loans
of $l 700 million, to which has been added a
loan of $500 million by the EEC and $450
million by the World Bank. Now, however, eco-
nomic development will have to await the
outcome of the country's split into two.
(iii) Hungary
55. Hungary is the Central European country
that has made the best start with the transition
towards a market economy. It was slightly ahead
because timid reforms had already been made in
this sense as from 1968.
56. However, the new government had to take
infinitely more radical decisions. Like its neigh-
bours, the aim is to reduce inflation (expected to
be about 200/o in 1992), create monetary balance
and carry out a structural reform. It is the only
country whose external trade has increased in
value (400/o in 1990-91, with 47Vo of exports
going to the EEC and Germany replacing the
Soviet Union in f,rrst place), in spite of the neg-
ative impact of winding up the CMEA which cut
exports to its former partners by almost 400/0.
57. Like its neighbours, the unpleasant effects
of the reform policy are making themselves felt:
an unemployment rate of 7.3o/o at the end ofl99l and a fall of 3090 in industrial pro-
duction.
58. However, Hungary is the preferred
country for foreign investors ($300 million in
1990 and $l 500 million in l99l). It has the
largest number of joint ventures with western
participation and a credit standby of $l 600
million over a period of three years was
approved by the IMF on 6th February 1991.
59. In spite of the satisfactory influx of
western investment, the Hungarian Government
is determined not to jeopardise its trade with its
former partners, the main reason being the lack
of natural resources and raw materials in
Hungary. For instance, on l4th June 1991
Hungary concluded a bilateral agreement with
Russia guaranteeing the delivery of consumer
goods in exchange for raw materials. This
agreement is of great importance to Hungary
since Russia's share of total trade between the
former Soviet Union and Hungary is 800/0.
60. However, integration in the EEC is still
the main target. On 6th October 1991, at a
summit meeting with Poland and Czechoslo-
vakia, Hungary opposed Poland's proposal to
set up a free trade area in Central Europe.
(iv) Poland
61. The austerity policy started in 1990 is
bearing fruit and considerable progress is now
being made.
62. The main aims are:
- 
to privatise the economy by encour-
aging private enterprise. The private
sector now depends largely on newly-
created firms (more than 400 000 since
lst January 1990). The economy is now
largely in the hands of the private
sector: 75 to 8090 oftrade in l99l conr
pared with 7 to 8qo in 1989, 2OVo of
industry in l99l compared with 290 in
1989 and 850/o of agriculture. It is esti-
mated that about 40 to 450/o of workers
are employed in the private sector,
which represents about 400/o of GDP.
However, only fifteen major state firms
have been privatised;
- 
to reduce the galloping inflation. This is
well under way since it reached 2 00096
at the end of 1989 and is believed to
have been 80 to 9090 in l99l;
- 
to remove obstacles to investment by
foreigners. Poland is finding it diflicult
to attract foreign investment. The self-
management structure of large firms
have considerably hindered negotia-
tions on privatisation and takeovers by
foreign investors. The 1989 legislation
on joint ventures was largely liberalised
in June l99l and the government is
relying on this measure to produce pos-
itive results in the near future.
63. However, the economic recession
worsened following the collapse of Eastern
European markets, while industrial restructuring
is only just taking off.
64. Thus, in 1991 industrial production fell
by l7Vo, the unemployment rate, which had been
590 in 1990, rose to I l0lo of the active population
and will rise still further when certain large state
firms close their doors for lack of orders and
financial resources.
65. ln April 1991, the IMF granted Poland a
loan of $2 500 million over a period of three
years to help its economic reforms. However,
the loan was suspended in September 1991
because the country was no longer able to fulfil
the conditions laid down (in particular, strict
control of government expenditure).
(v) Ronania
66. In October 1991, Romania in turn
embarked upon a process of economic reform in
spite of the government's narrow maryin for
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handling opposition disapproval of such mea-
sures and the fear of social movements following
the disorganisation of the economy. The eco-
nomic situation is serious since the independent
policy pursued by Ceausescu was detrimental to
domestic consumption and the development of
many sectors of the economy.
67. The private sector is emerging slowly:
50 000 licences of the 140 000 requested have
been granted since August 1991.
68. Reorientation of national production
towards the internal market and the abolition of
export credits led to a sharp fall in exports.
69. Under the caretaker government headed
by Mr. Theodor Stolojan, Romania has set up
muctr of the legal and institutional framework
necessary for privatisation and the establishing
of a market economy. Praise has come from the
IMF for sticking to tough budgetary parameters
and a new IMF interim lending agreement is in
the offing.
70. A particular blow of late has been the
rejection by the United States House of Repre-
sentatives of the bill, strorrgly supported by the
United States Government, to restore
Romania's " most favoured nation " trading
status. That Romania should be considered less
worthy than China, North Korea and Albania
seems somewhat strange. The 300 United States
observers present in Romania for the recent
elections were reasonably impressed, by all
accounts. Perhaps it is merely a case of having to
educate Congress in the realities of a changing
situation.
V, Security questions
71. Each country has its own views on its
security and on European security as a whole in
the light of the nature and extent of its internal
problems and its geopolitical situation.
(i) Bulg,aria
72. Bulgaria's geographical situation in the
centre of the Balkans gave it strategic impor-
tance in the Warsaw Pact and made it the Soviet
Union's preferred ally. Today, Bulgaria finds
itself without the protection of a sizeable ally in
the region just when it is having to face up to
two major problems in an unstable area.
Relations with Turkey
't3. Bulgaria is afraid of possible territorial
claims by Turkey and is worried about the large-
scale concentration of Turkish troops along its
frontiers. In spite of the end of the policy of
assimilation of the Turkish minority, it fears any
intervention by Turkey in respect of this
minority, which is l0 to 150/o of the population
of the country and has a far higher birth rate
than the national average.
The Macedonian question
74. This was revived by the break-up of Yugo-
slavia. A third of Macedonia was attributed to
Bulgaria in the 1878 Treaty of San Stefano.
75. On l5th January 1992, Bulgaria
recognised the independence of the Macedonian
Republic but not the existence of a separate
Matedonian nationality because it was afraid of
possible claims by Serbia. However, in Bulgaria
many groups are calling for union with the new
Macedonian Republic.
(ii) Czechoslovakia
76. Czechoslovakia's problem is a national
one. It is a federal state, established in 1918, fed-
erated in 1968 and composed of two nations:
Czech and Slovak.
77. The last months of 1991 were marked by
a revival of tension following Slovakia's will to
become independent or, failing this, political
and economiC autonomy. The whole question is
the possibility of democratic management (by
the Czech Republic) of the Slovak nationalist
claim.
78. It is important to point out that anxiety
about the internal difficulties of the former
Soviet Union and its subsequent dismantling
was an external factor of union and consensus
between the Czech and Slovak Republics. Now
the division into two countries seems inevi-
table.
(iii) Hungary
79. The problem of minorities is a special one
in Hungary. Since the end of the first world war,
a quarter of the Magyar population has been
living in one of the four countries which are
neighbours of Hungary. In a context of disinte-
graiion of federations and rising nationalism,
iuch a situation is obviously explosive.
The Hungarian minoritY in Ukraine
(200 000 persons)
80. The government is on friendly terms with
Ukraine which, in its declaration of sovereignty
in July 1990, recognised the rights of minorities
on iti territory. However, in July l99l the
Ukrainian Parliament adopted a declaration
guaranteeing all citizens equal political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights. Hungary fears
a possible revival of Ukrainian nationalism that
would limit the rights of the Magyar minority as
an anti-Magyar campaign has sprung up and
many Hungarian monuments have been dese-
crated.
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The Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia(about 450 000 persons)
81. The Hungarian Government is trying to
be firm in its attitude towards the question of
the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina. The
Yugoslav crisis has placed Hungary in a delicate
position. It is trying to remain on friendly terms
with Serbia (which is moreover trying to regain
control over Vojvodina) in order to avoid retali-
atory measures against the Hungarian minority
but without forgetting to remain on good terms
with the neighbouring breakaway republics.
However, the transformation of Yugoslavia into
a mini-federation comprising only Serbia and
Montenegro is encouraging the Magyars to want
to be attached to their mother country, which is
unacceptable in Belgrade.
The Hungarian minority in Romania(1 800 000 persons)
82. Hungary is trying to normalise its rela-
tions with Romania where, since the fall of the
Ceausescu rdgime, the ethnic problem has resur-
faced: this is now the most worrying situation
due to the large number of persons involved.
The Romanian Government is acutely con-
scious of the problem and is making every effort
to contain a relatively latent antagonism by
ensuring equal rights for all.
The Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia
(600 000 persons)
83. The situation of this minority, which is
concentrated along Slovakia's southern border,
has so far been acceptable. Its representation in
the institutions conforms to its numerical size
and its rights are respected. Moreover, the main
religion in Slovakia is the same as that of the
Magyars. However, the secession of the Slovak
Republic may call this into question.
84. The Hungarian Government is trying tofind solutions through diplomatic channels,
aware as it is of the negative effect that would be
produced by the outbreak of conflicts on the
process of integrating the country into western
economic and political organisations. This
policy is facilitated by the consensus that exists
on security matters.
(iv) Polaad
85. Poland is facing two major problems from
outside:
- the weight of uniJied Germany is raising
several questions: the future of Poland's
relations with a politically and econom-
ically stronger power with twice as
many inhabitants and a GNP six times
higher; the problem of the Oder-Neisse
line; the problem of German minorities
in Poland;
- 
the dispute with Lithuania: this follows
the Lithuanian Government's decision
in August l99l to abolish local govern-
ments. This is a typical case provokod
by diverging national interests and the
leaders' perceptions following the dis-
mantling of the Soviet Union.
86. Internally, mention should be made of the
specific characteristics of the Polish people:
- 
unity of the population (large majority
of Poles);
- 
religious unity (98% Catholic);
- 
historical unity (reference to the same
history as compared with Germany)
unlike most other countries of Central
and Eastern Europe.
(v) Romaait
87. Because of its geographical situation
between Yugoslavia and the CIS, Romania is
seeking economic and security guarantees.
However, there are deeprooted differences over
security matters and threat perception, be they
at home (policy towards minorities, who rep-
resent l59o of the population in Romania) m
abroad.
88. The problem of minorities is not solely
linked to the presence of some 1.8 million Hun
garian Romanians: in addition, the population
includes sizeable numbers of other ethnic origin:
German, Ukrainian, Serb, Croat, Russian, Turk
and Gypsy. Most minorities are represented in
Parliament and the Government has accepted
that all international human rights legislation
takes precedence over national legislation.
89. Attempts are now being made to conclude
a bilateral " treaty on a pattern of behaviour "
with Hungary to tackle the twin problems of
territorial claims and minority rights. With
Germany a bilateral commission on minorities
has been formed, chaired jointly by the State
Secretaries in the respective Ministries for
Foreign Affairs.
An example: Moldova
90. The treaty of friendship signed on 5th
April 1991 between the Romanian President
and his Soviet opposite number, guaranteeing
the inviolability of frontiers and territorial
integrity of the two states, was very badly
viewed by those in favour of the attachment of
Bessarabia (part of Soviet Moldova since the
end of the second world war) to Romania. They
saw this treaty as implicit legitimisation of the
annexation of Bessarabia and North Bukovina
by the former Soviet Union and the renunci-
ation of Romanian claims to those territories.
Although the topic of reunification with
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Moldova is not explicitly referred to in offrcial
statements, nationalist parties such as Vatra
Romaneasca (Romanian home) support reunifi-
cation with Moldova (where two-thirds of the
population is of Romanian origin), the recovery
of North Bukovina and South Bessarabia, now
Ukrainian. However, Moldova, which declared
its independence on 27th August 1991, does not
seem to want, in the short term at least, to be
restored legally to Romania. On 10th January
1991, the Moldovan President, Hircea Snegur,
confirmed his country's intention to set up a
12 0O0-strong army. National institutions are
being set up. Although the Moldovan Govern-
ment's perceptions of its relations with Romania
are based on the principle of " one nation, two
states " and draw a clear distinction between
cultural integration and political reunification,
some people in Romania are finding it increas-
ingly hard to endorse this point of view.
91. However, the greatest problem for
Moldova remains the Russian l4th Army which
is pnrving even more difficult to dislodge than
are the remnants of Soviet forces still in place in
the Baltic states.
YI. Foreign policy developments
92. Depending on the problems facing it and
its view of its own security, each country adopts
a specific foreign policy and takes appropriate
steps to implement it. Because of their geo-
strategic position, none ofthem can offer a guar-
antee of security without allies. This is why they
now want to establish lasting relationships,
strengthen co-operation with other European
countries and be integrated in western alliances.
Here, NATO is the only credible alternative as a
security guarantee since the CSCE lost credi-
bility because of its lack of action in the
Yugoslav crisis.
(i) Bulgaria
93. Since the fall of Todor Jivkov, Bulgaria
has turned to the western countries. In January
1991, it condemned the Soviet intervention
against the Baltic states.
94. It signed treaties of friendship and
co-operation with Germany on 9th October
l991,with Italy on 10th January 1992 andwith
France on lSth February 1992.
95. In the context of a more open policy, it
restored diplomatic relations with Israel that
had been broken off in 1967.
96. Bulgaria has also turned to the other
Balkan countries to discuss the possibility of
economic and defence co-operation.
97. On 7th October 199/,, it signed a treaty of
co-operation and friendship with Greece. Pres-
ident Jelev supports the idea of a multilateral
conference with Greece and Turkey dealing with
regional security problems.
98. The idea of a confederation between
Greece and Bulgaria was considered by Bul-
garian leaders to be a guarantee of peace in the
Balkans and is gaining gtround in Bulgaria,
which can but worry neighbouring states
(Turkey and former Yugoslavia).
(ii) Czechoslovakia
99. There are two stages in Czechoslovakia's
foreign policy. In 1990, it was essentially
European, advocating at one and the same time
the maintenance of regional alliances and inte-
gration in wider European structures. However,
the country's return to Europe was to be gradual
and in a changed European system, which would
be European in theory but western in practice.
Czechoslovakia was then endorsing the
Gorbachev policy.
100. In the second stage, as from 1991, it was
no longer seeking to set up new structures in
place of the old system but to bring already
existing structures nearer to co-ordination with
western countries.
101. ln January and February 1991, Czecho-
slovakia took part in the interallied coalition in
the Gulf war by sending a contingent to Saudi
Arabia.
102. In February 1991, Czechoslovakia
became a full member of the Council of Europe
and signed a trilateral agreement with Poland
and Hungary aimed at co-ordinating their posi-
tions in regard to European integration.
103. ln June 1991, it obtained the withdrawal
of Soviet troops and decided to recognise the
independence of the Baltic countries and
Ukraine.
104. ln December 1991, it signed an agreement
of association with the EEC.
105. Czechoslovakia wishes to move closer to
WEU and NATO. Here it has acted as a pioneer
by appointing to its Brussels Embassy a military
attach6 specially responsible for dealing with
relations between Czechoslovakia and NATO.
106. ln February 1992, a treaty of friendship,
co-operation and good neighbourliness was
signed with Germany, which has now become its
leading economic partner. It now remains to be
seen just what effect the splitting of the country
will have.
(iii) Hungary
107. Hungary's immediate aim is integration
in European structures.
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108. On 6th November 1990, it became a
member of the Council of Europe and, on 16th
December 1991, signed an agreement of associ-
ation with the EEC. It is also endeavouring to
conclude bilateral agreements with western
countries and with its immediate neighbours. [n
July 1991, it signed a bilateral open skies treaty
with Romania and, in April 1992, a treaty of
friendship and co-operation with Russia.
(iv) Poland
109. ln February 1991the Minister for Foreign
AIfairs, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, describing the
broad lines of foreign policy, reassessed the
threat and gave a new definition of security. He
said that, instead of Europe being divided into
specific or grey areas, security should be per-
ceived in a wider context and not only in mil-
itary terms or the defence of a country. Europe
as a whole should be considered as a uniform
security area.
Policy vis-d-vis other countries
I10. Poland has signed bilateral cooperation
treaties with France, the United Kingdom, Italy
and the United States and, in July 1991, acceded
to the Pentagonal, which became the Hexagonal,
then the Septagonal and is now known as the
Central European Initiative.
l1l. Its foreign policy is centred on
Germany.
ll2. On 14th November 1990, the treaty on its
frontiers (ratified on l2th January 1991) guar-
anteed Germany's recognition of the Oder-
Neisse line as the permanent frontier between
the two countries.
I13. On 17th June 1991, the treaty of
co-operation and good neighbourliness granted
rights to the German minority in Poland.
ll4. Together with its former partners, Poland
is trying to find new means of co-operation so as
to break out of its isolation in face of the CIS
and Germany.
I 15. Relations with the former Soviet Union
are more complex. In the diflicult negotiations
on the withdrawal of Soviet troops, in par-
ticular, an agreement was initialled in Moscow
on 26th October 1991: combat units were to
leave the country by l5th October 1992 and
logistic units by the end of 1993. In view of the
risk of worsening political instability in the CIS,
Poland is trying to develop its relations with the
various republics: it recognised the indepen-
dence of the Baltic states immediately. It also
gives priority to bilateral co-operation treaties.
116. In July 1991, a declaration of
co-operation with Latvia was signed, in Sep
tember 1991 a declaration of bilateral
co-operation with Belarus and in October 1991
a declaration of bilateral co-operation with
Russia.
Policy towards international organisations
ll7. ln May 1989, Poland was granted guest
status in the Council of Europe and became a
full member in November 1991.
ll8. ln June 1991, the Polish Government
approved the declaration by NATO members to
link the security of the Atlantic Alliance with
European security.
(v) Ronunia
I19. Long after 1989, Romania's foreign policy
remained without a clearly-defined framework
or precise course. In June 1990, taking
advantage of the international situation, it
managed to emerge from its diplomatic isolation(support for the coalition of western forces
during the Gulf crisis and United Nations
Security Council resolution adopted during the
Romanian presidency in August 1990).
120. Part of the problem since the beginning of
1990 has been to reconstitute the diplomatic
service, decimated by the vagaries of the pre-
vious r6gime, when even the mere ability to
understand a foreign language was often per-
ceived as contrary to the interests of the state.
l2l. On /sl February 1991, it was granted
observer status in the Council of Europe with
the support of France, Spain and Italy, which
have close historic and cultural links with
Romania. Increasing contacts with western
countries thus became a priority.
122. ln July 1991, a treaty of co-operation and
friendship was signed with Italy. ln November
1991, France invited it to the fourth summit
meeting of French-speaking countries. The
desire not to leave Romania on the sidelines has
also been marked by many agreements. On 22nd
October 1990, an agreement on economic and
trade co-operation was signed with the EEC. In
January 1991, the western countries decided to
extend the Phare programme (Poland-Hungary:
assistance to economic reconstruction) to
include Romania. ln September 1991, a treaty of
friendship and co-operation was signed with
Turkey and, in November 1991, a twenty-yearpact of friendship, co-operation and
good-neighbourliness with Greece (economic
co-operation agreements, Greek assistance in
the framework of the Phare programme).
123. Relations with Bulgaria are still tense
because of differences over the territories lost by
Romania in 1940 (Dobrudja) that are now part
of Bulgarian territory.
124. The greatest friction is with Hungary
because there are still differences over the
Magyar minority in Transylvania. Romania
l
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considers the Hungarian presence (consulate,
cultural and economic exchanges, etc.) to be a
threat since it weakens Romanian authority in
the region. The movement of Hungarian forces
from West to East following a reform of military
doctrine merely increased this mistrust.
125. The Yugoslav crisis is accentuating
Romania's feeling of insecurity. Fear of the
emergence of a stronger Serbia within a smaller
Yugoilav federation led the Romanian Gov-
ernrnent to support the continued existence of
Yugoslavia from the outset.
YII. Armed forca and defence
126. In a new regional context and in order to
guarantee adequate defence, lhe military sector
is being entirely overhauled, from military doc-
trine to defence forces. Several common factors
can be discerned in the various countries.
127. Economic constraints are leading to a
drastic reduction in budgets for defence and
armed forces and countries have to abide by the
principle of reasonable sufficiency in their
defence policies.
128. The stress is on all-round defence. Pri-
ority is therefore being given to defensive
wea,pons (mines and anti-tank and anti-aircraft
weapons).
L29. Implementation of a conflict prevention
policy, the redeployment of forces hitherto
hainiy facing westwards, the redistribution of
militarry regions and the development of a rapid
reaction and mobile capability are the conse-
quences of the absence of identifiable enemies
and the multiple facets of the threat.
130. Finally, all these countries are trying to
enhance the army's image. They want to
humanise the constraints of military service so
as to remobilise the people (and in particular
young recruits) round an anny that had too
often been compromised in the past.
(i) Bulgaria
l3l. The process of depolitisation and reform
of the army was more recent in Bulgaria than in
the other Central and Eastern European coun-
tries for several reasons: close dependence ofthe
arrny on the political authorities, more decisive
Soviet influence on military and security matters
than in other Warsaw Pact countries (Bulga-
ria having been considered as the former Soviet
Union's most loyal ally) and the fact that many
former officers trained in Moscow are still in the
army and are opposed to in-depth reforms.
132. The restructuring of the armed forces is
nevertheless under way:
- 
reorganisation of the army in smaller,
more mobile units (transformation of
divisions into brigades);
- 
there are no plans for reductions in
troop levels, these having fallen already
because young people are disinclined to
carry out military service;
- 
debate on professionalising the army'
(ii) Czechoslovahia
133. Reforms of defence PolicY and
modernisation of the armed forces were effected
in two stages.
134. Following the events of 1989, the first
stage in the slow restructuring of the army
started under the supervision of General Vacek,
a former communist who had become Minister
of Defence: depolitisation and end of party
control over the armed forces, abolition of mil-
itary training in schools and, above all,.publi-
catibn of the military budget in the mid-nineties
for the first time in forty years. The long-term
aim is to create a highlY mobile,
semi-professional territorial defence force.
135. With the appointment of Leon
Dobrovsky, a civilian, as Minister of Defence in
October i990, the second stage began. The
reform process continued in March 1991 with
the appointment of Karol Pezl (a former adviser
to the Ministry of Defence and a man of the
Prague spring) as army chief of staff. Eowever,
differenc-es appeared in the army. The free
legion, composed of young officers, wanted the
army to be completely purged, while kon
Dobiovsky favoured continuity and supported a
gradual transformation that would notjtopardise its operational capability.
136. Another problem was the proportion of
Slovaks in the army. They had a20o/o majority in
the regular army in 1960 and 34.70/o in 1991.
Risks of ethnic tension cannot be ruled out since
the majority of the population and part of the
politicil class does not want to retain a joint
army at federal level.
137. It should be noted that, as Czechoslovakia
has no access to the sea, it has no navy.
(iii) Hungary
138. Because of the low capability of its armed
forces (which were the Warsaw Pact's weak
link), the Hungarian leaders have opted for
minimum defence. This is all-round defence
that gives priority to extremely mobile troops
with -strengthened air defence and anti-tank
capabilities.
139. The President of the Republic is supreme
commander of the armed forces. In the past,
there was no national defence plan, orders ema-
nating direct from the Communist Party in
Budapest or Moscow.
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140. The Hungarian army was the only
Warsaw Pact army not to be organised in divi-
sions and regiments but in arrny corps and bri-
gades.
l4l. The great majority of military equipment
is obsolete. It would need to be completely
replaced and this cannot be done for budgetary
reasons. The weakest point is logistics. To
remedy this lack of means and the lack of incli-
nation for military service, the Hungarian Gov-
ernment is having to maintain conscription
at the same time as some degree of
professionalisation of the armed forces.
(it) Poland
142. Poland is one ofthe countries that do not
intend to have weapons of mass destruction.
143. The armed forces are entirely under the
control of the Polish authorities and they may
not be deployed outside the frontiers.
144. According to official statements, on 5th
May l99l there were 305 000 troops in the
Polish armed forces, 200 000 of which were con-
scripts. This figure should fall to a total of
230000 to 250000 by 1995.
145. Parallel with reductions in troop levels,
the length of military service is being cut and the
proportion of professionals, now 400/0, may rise
to 50 or 600/o by the year 2000.
146. Furthermore, territorial defence units
have been disbanded, while militias and frontier
guards have come under the authority of the
Ministry of the Interior.
147. The territory, now divided into three mil-
itary regions (Pomerania, Silesia and Warsaw),
will be reorganised in four regions (Pomerania,
Silesia, Mazury and Little Poland) to ensure a
better distribution of forces throughout the ter-
ritory.
148. Poland has the largest navy of any of the
former Warsaw Pact members.
(v) Romania
149. Romania's control over its defence sector
was one of the keystones of the Ceausescu gov-
ernment. Romanian defence strategy was mod-
elled on that of Yugoslavia, i.e. defence on every
horizon, based on the war of the whole people.
Today, Romania's defence policy is conditioned
by its leaders' fear of being isolated and differ-
ences of perception of external dangers.
150. Paradoxically, Romania was the last
country to call for the dissolution of the military
and political structures of the Warsaw Pact.
l5l. Romania's case is a striking example of
relations between the Communist Party and the
military and of the political r6le of the army. The
latter has moved from total sovietisation in the
fifties to restructuring by Ceausescu for internal
political purposes. This policy prevented any
emancipation of the military sector from the
political authorities. To a greater extent than in
the other Central and Eastern European coun-
tries, military policy had a political and social
control function (supponing the r6gime, control
and socialisation of young people).
152. All the more credit therefore to those in
power now, both in government and in the
armed forces, for the changes being made in the
relationship of the army to society. Such an evo-
lution takes time however and greatly depends
on the personal commitment of those involved.
Your Rapporteur has been much impressed by
first hand accounts of the changes which arb
obvious in for example the army's relationship
with the parliament: the realisation of the need
for lobbying and for an efficient public relations
organisation.
153. The recently-created National Defence
College, bringing the military together with
those from " civilian " ministries, the private
sector and the mass media, is a particular step to
be applauded.
154. A diminishing demography has meant that
there are now far fewer conscripts available for
the forces where some units are manned by only
some 300/o of their CFE-agreed strengths in
peacetime. Reductions and restructuring go some
way to alleviate the problem but, like Poland,
Romania is turning more and more to the idea of
giving comparatively short, but renewable, con-
tracts to try and attract volunteers.
155. At the other end of the military hierarchy
the current Minister of National Defence, Lt.
Gen. Niculae Spiroiu, is now discussing the pos-
sibility of his post being 'civilianised " in the
future: a move which would counter centuries of
tradition but which would be perceived as a very
strong pointer to greater accountability.
" Berlin revisitcdn
156. In the remarkable document on security
and defence in Central and Eastern Europe
which she produced at the request of the WEU
Institute for Security Studies as an introduction
to the Assembly's Spring 1992 Symposium in
Berlin * A new security order in Europe ",
Sophia Cl6ment summarised the defence iitu-
ation in the countries concerned as follows:
(i) Bulgada
157. In 1990, the National Assembly passed a
law on the depolitisation of the entire adminis-
tration. 9890 of civil servants agreed to cancel
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their party membership. The Central Political
Department of the Armed Forces, subordinate
to tlrc Central Committee of the BCP, had been
abolished a few months earlier. Many oflicers
retired (112, i.e. 8590 of the generals) in
December l99l and only nineteen new generals
and thirty-nine commanders were appointed.
Gencral Yordan Mustafchiev (Ludzhev's prede-
cessor) was appointed lnspector-in-Chief of the
Bulgarian Army (a post resembling that of
inspector-general and new in Bulgaria).
Seventy-six State Security generals retired in
July 1991.
158. The appointment of Dimitur Ludzhev as
Minister of Defence on 8th November l99l by
the government of the new Prime Minister,
Philippe Dimitrov, continues the depolitisation
process, as do the appointment of Christo
Danov, a civilian lawyer, as Minister of Home
Affairs in January 1991 and of General Luben
Petrov as Vice-Minister of Defence and chief of
defence staffin August 1991. Dimitur Ludzhev
was one of the three Vics'Prime Ministers in
Dimitur Popov's coalition government, which
had made him responsible for establishing the
new security policy in the National Security
Council. He is also close to President Jelev and
the only leading member of the CDF to have
experience in military matters since he is a lieu-
tenant in the reserve army and has a diploma
from the Pleven Military Academy, thus making
him more acceptable to the military. Although
depolitisation took some time - it was started
only in November l99l 
- 
it is nevertheless
decisive. The posts of advisers to the Minister of
Defence are held by civilians and the post of
Vic+Minister has been abolished. Many officers
have been retired.
Restructuring the military sector
159. The tenth point made by President Jelev
on l8th December 1991 referred more particu-
larly to the establishment of the military guar-
antoes necessary for the country's national
security. The army was to be reformed to make
it a modern, well-equipped army, highly profes-
sional, well-paid and capable on its own of
defe,nding the country's frontiers. The education
systcm was to be organised and Bulgarian
officers would be retrained in the military acad-
emics of NATO member countries. There would
be co-operation between the Bulgarian defence
industry and the military-industrial complex of
the western countries so as to bring Bulgarian
standards closer to those of NATO so that more
orders might be passed in Bulgaria.
160. Bulgaria would also like to restructure its
army, creating smaller and more mobile forces(transformation of divisions into brigades,
replacement of tank regiments by infantry units
reduced by 300/o and a 500/o reduction in exer-
cises).
16l. The Ministry of Defence is to be restruc-
tured to form several directorates (e.g. adminis-
tration, economics and political questions) and
two new departments to handle social questions
and ecology. Finally, two study groups, com-
prising both military and civilians, have been
instructed to define the various stages in the
development of the armed forces from 1994 to
2 000 (mobile brigades should replace traditional
structures and military headquarters should be
given increased powers at the expense of the
Ministry of Defence) but there are no plans to
reduce troop levels (now 100000 men) as these
have already fallen due to Bulgarian young peG'
ple's aversion to military service. These new con-
cepts will be the subject of a juridical text on
security, defence and the armed forces. The
army, air force, navy and frontier guards are at
present part of the Ministry of the Interior.
162. At his first press conference following his
appointment, the Minister of Defence, Dimitur
Ludzhev, announced that it was necessary to
develop a new security system with a profes-
sional army and loyal to the political authorities.
There was also a discussion about making the
Bulgarian army, 500/o of which consists of con-
scripts, a professional army. The amendment of
the military service law, adopted in August
1990, reduced the period of service from
twenty-four to eighteen months (Ludjev would
have preferred twelve months). Such measures
stem from young people's aversion to military
service. In an opinion poll conducted in autumn
1991, only 160/o of conscripts had a favourable
opinion of military service and 52o/o adopted a
negative view. Oflicers consider conscription
leads to a lack of professionalism and moti-
vation. Young oflicers in favour of the proposed
reforms are grouped in the Georges Rakovski
Bulgarian Legion, set up in 1991, which has a
real r6le in overseeing military headquarters as a
whole and senior oflicers and acts as a pressuregroup with the aim of returning to
pne-communist military tradition, which implies
close relations with the country's intelligentsia.
However, there is far from being a consensus.
The Legion is against all co-operation with
parties representing ethnic minorities such as
the Movement for Rights and Liberties or the
Movement for Unified Macedonia (Ilinden)
which is calling for recognition of a Macedonian
minority in Bulgaria that it considers to be a
danger to national security.
163. None of the military academies has been
closed. There are three high-level academies:
combined services, Georgui Sava in Sofia;army,
Vassil Levsky in Veliko Tarnovo; air force,
Georgui Benkovski in Dolna Metropolia; navy,
Nikola Vaptzarov in Varna.
164. Conversion is being carried out even in
the various associations connected with the
army. The Voenne Izdatelstvo publishing house
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has become a stock company and there now
remain only four of the seven press organs of the
army.
165. The Bulgarian Government is aware of
the difficulty of ensuring the country's defence
solely by military means. The desire to avoid
setting up antagonistic military alliances in the
Balkans means that diplomatic and political
efforts must be made through the development
of bilateral relations in both political and eco-
nomic areas, creating links between countries in
the region.
(ii) Czechoslovakia
The in-depth modernisation of the armedforces -
depolitisation and humanisation
L66. The first stage in the slow restructuring of
the Czechoslovak army started with the
appointment of General Vacek, a former com-
munist, as Minister of Defence just after the
events in 1989. In November 1989, General
Vacek replaced Milan Vaklavik, close to Mr.
Jakes's rdgime and a member of the Communist
Party. Miroslav Vacek had implemented a
number of reforms such as the depolitisation of
and the end of party control over the armed
forces, the abolition of military training in
schools and, above all, publication of the military
budget in mid-1990 for the first time in forty
years. In January 1990, the armed forces were
purged on the basis of their qualifications. 9 460
offrcers, i.e. l5Vo of the oflicer corps, had to leave
the army. A law passed by the Assembly on l4th
March 1990 reduced the length of military
service from twenty-four to eighteen months,
authorised religious freedom in the army and sus-
pended the right of the army to repress street
demonstrations. As in Poland, the right to consci-
entious objection was recognised both for
national servicemen and for professional soldiers.
This led to massive departures from the army.
Regarding long-term goals, a document has been
adopted entitled the development aims of the
Czechoslovak army up to the year 2000. It pro
vides for the creation of a highly mobile, semi-
professional territorial defence force, which
means reducing strengths by 40 000 to 60 000 by
1993 (bringing the number down to 400000
men), reducing military equipment (heavy
artillery, tanks, armoured troop carriers) by 40 to
600/o and reducing military service to twelve
months. Units stationed in Slovakia will rise
from l89o in 1990 to 380/o in 1993 and the
number of national servicemen will rise from
350/o in 1989 to almost 80Yo in 1993. Three new
regional commands will be created in Bohemia,
Moravia and Slovakia and a single command for
the air force and air defence.
167. The second stage of restructuring started
in October 1990 when the government gave in
to pressure from the newcomers in the political
and military establishment and appointed L.
Dobrovsky, a civilian, as Minister of Defence.
This process continued in March l99l with the
appointment of Karol Pezl, former adviser to
the Minister of Defence, to the post of army
chief of staff. The latter was one of the Prague
spring men who tried to reform communism
and then withdrew following the Soviet
invasion. In 1971, he was relieved, for political
reasons, of his duties in the military head-
quarters operational preparation section and
dismissed from the army. He is among the 6lite
today returning to the forefront of the political
stage in the framework of a wider movement
Obroda (renewal), which advocates a return to a
more human socialism, the motto of the Prague
spring. Since the velvet revolution, various ten-
dencies in the army have been calling for it to be
radically transformed. Differences remain on
this subject. The " free legion " of young oflicers,
would like the army to be completely purged,
with the resignation or retirement of all senior
oflicers. They challenge the reliability of m
army that is mainly composed of old soldiers
who have merely turned their coats inside out in
order to remain at their posts. kon Dobrovsky
for his part is counting on the continuity of the
army and supporting a gradual transformatior
that would not jeopardise its operational capa-
bility. The training period for reservists has been
reduced by four weeks and four out ofa total of
seven military academies have been closed for
lack of staff. The post of Inspector-General,
created in 1991, responsible for monitoring the
military budget and the armed forces' con-
formity with the constitution, is still vacant for
the time being.
168. The proportion of Slovaks in the regular
army has increased in recent years. It was 2OIo
in 1960, 28o/oin 1980 and 34.701o in 1991. Throe
of the four Deputy Defence Ministers, 320/o of
the generals and 450/o of the military district
commanders are Slovaks. This is an over-
representation insofar asjust over a third ofthe
population is Slovak. The possibility of ethnic
disputes increasing in the army cannot therefore
be ruled out, particularly as the majority of the
Slovak population and part of the Slovak
political class do not want a joint army to be
retained at federal level.
(iii) Hugary
169. The former Hungarian People's Army,
entirely integrated in the Warsaw Pact military
structure, subordinate to the Soviet Eastern
Forces Group and under strict Communist
Party control, was prepared for defence against
the West. It was to protect the western flank
during a Soviet offensive towards the Danube
valley and the Klagenfurt-Graz main road in
Austria to prevent a breakthrough by the
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German second corps facing West and assumed
to bc moving towards Budweis in order to carry
out a rear attack against the Eastern Forces
Group. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops
(the bilateral agreement on the total withdrawal
of such troops, numbering about 65 000, was
signcd on l0th March 1990 and implemented on
l9th June l99l), the bases and orientation of
Hungary's defence were changed. It is now
national. It rejects the image of the enemy and
aims to ward off any attack from all directions
(defence of all frontiers against a potential
aggressor). This is all-round defence, which
gives priority to highly mobile troops with
strengthened air defence anti-tank capabilities.
This will to ensure adequate defence stems from
the meagre capability of the Hungarian armed
forces, which were the weakest link in the
Warsaw Pact forces. The Hungarian leaders
havc to ensure credible defence, although
security lies first in political, economic and cul-
tural co-operation. This would explain the initial
reticence of the Hungarian Government about
the CFE agreements which fixed quotas that it
considered too restrictive, particularly for tanks,
and would have made the Hungarian army
wholly unable to ensure its own defence (what it
callcd circular defencelessness). In 1990,
Colonel Pick, an oflicer seconded to the Pres-
ident, said the CFE agreements had introduced
a collective security system ranging as far as the
Austro-Hungaian frontier but collective inse-
curity beyond it. It was for this reason, too, that,
after its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact mil-
itary organisation and the latter's disbandment,
Hungary continued to affirm that it was not in
its interest to reject all relations with the Soviet
Union or to exacerbate the latter's internal
problems and conflicts with its immediate
neighbours. Today, the CIS is evolving and any
change in the trend ofthis new defence concept
is so far out of the question. Thus, Hungary
intends to refuse to allow any belligerent country
to use its national territory and air space.
Modernisation and rationalisation
l7O. Renamed Magyar Honvedseg in May
1990, the Hungarian army is now a national
institution and no longer under communist
party control. It has 90 000 men in peacetime
and 350 000 in wartime, i.e. 300/o lower than in
1990. Most political oflicers have been with-
drawn. In December 1989, only 44 of the 87
serving generals kept their posts: 17 retired en
bloc or resigned when the first civilian Minister
of Defence, Lajos Fiir, was appointed in May
1990. The President of the Republic is now
supreme commander of the armed forces,
responsible for signing the national defence law
drawn up in the light of the new defence doc-
trine offrcially proclaimed in November 1991.
In the past, there had been no national defence
plan, orders emanating from communist party
headquarters in Budapest or Moscow. The Pres-
ident may also proclaim martial law and decide,
in place of parliament, on the use of the armed
forces. He appoints the army chief, his com-
mander, the frontier guard commander and, on
the recommendation of the government, gen-
erals, whom he also has the power to dismiss.
l7l. The aim is to keep armed forces with a
credible deterrent capability. Since its restruc-
turing in 1987, in agreement with Soviet
Marshal Ogarkov's strategic doctrine, the Hun-
garian anny was the only Warsaw Pact army not
to be organised in divisions and regiments but in
anny corps and brigades (twelve divisions trans-
formed into three corps, each being composed of
five brigades, and an independent artillery bat-
talion, the brigades themselves being subdivided
into battalions) with their headquarters in Tata,
Kaspovar and Cegl6d under the army high
command based in Sz6kesfehervar.
l'12. The period of military service was
reduced from eighteen to twelve months in
January l99l (parliamentary decision of 29th
October 1990) and the age limit for service
reduced from 55 to 50.
173. However, economic constraints and the
decision taken in 1989 to reduce the defence
budget by more than 350/o until l99l signifi-
cantly limit the possibilities of procuring
western equipment, although there is an
essential need to modernise military equipment
in every sector. Most military equipment is
fifteen to twenty years old and in some cases
- 
armoured vehicles and air forces - it is so
obsolete that it needs to be completely replaced.
The Hungarian air force, which had 160 fighter
aircraft and 95 helicopters, of which 30 attack
helicopters, in 1988, has been reduced. The
number of MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighter aircraft
fell from 1 13 in January 1989 to 70 in 1990 and
cannot, for the time being at least, be considered
to be a credible deterrent force until they are
fully modernised. The T-55 tanks will not be
replaced because of stringent budgetary restric-
tions, but they will be modernised. Logistics are
the Hungarian army's weak point. Only regular
forces have had adequate training so that the
army could not, unassisted, be self-sufficient in
the event of war. However, according to a study
published at the end of 1990, abandoning the
offensive military doctrine would involve large
reductions in 1991. If one bears in mind that the
defence budget in 1990 was about 40000
million florins, i.e. 3Vo of the national budget,
that it was reduced to I 000 million florins inl99l and that an adequate start to
modernisation would alone need some 70 000
million florins, new procurement seems
improbable, not to speak of an inflation rate of
about 30%, which would in reality mean a
reduction of about 26000 million florins. 910/o
of the 1990 military budget was already ear-
179
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marked for operational and current expenditure,
leaving only 90/o for development and pro'
curement (compared with 40q0 in the western
European democracies). To overcome this lack
ofresources and the significant decline ofregard
for military service, which is no longer con-
sidered to be an honour, the Hungarian Gov-
ernment is therefore obliged to retain con-
scription in the armed forces in parallel with
some degree of professionalism. Another
problem that should not be overlooked is the
need to take over the training of oflicers and the
rest of the army on new bases using national
methods. So far, the army and air force had been
trained'according to the Soviet military doc-
trine. Most officers were sent to Moscow for
more advanced training and had to be fluent in
Russian, the command language of the Warsaw
Pact forces.
(iv) Poland
The defence sector: an in-depth restructuring
l'14. Implementation of these decisions
requires deep-rooted changes in the exercise of
power (co-ordination of the various agencies
and bodies) and there have been many diverging
views regarding the extent and rate of the
reforms to be carried out.
175. There have been many changes in the
defence sector.
176. Control: the question discussed first was
which authority would be responsible for
co-ordinating security questions and replace the
country's Defence Committee, set up in the
sixties. President Walesa thought a National
Security Council should be set up, closely linked
with presidential services, to define government
policy in national security matters in the event
of external or internal danger and to define ways
and means of defending the country against any
threat: military, economic, ecological, etc. It
would be chaired by the President himself and
include the Prime Minister, the Ministers for
Foreign Affairs, the Interior, Defence, Finance
and Justice and the directors of the private
offices of the President and Prime Minister.
However, since it was set up in mid-February
1991, parliament has refused to give a ruling on
the presidential proposal, believing it was for the
government to develop new government bodies,
with the result that, for months, two bodies, one
new, the other supposed to be no longer in office
but effectively at work, have continued to share
Polish foreign policy.
177. The depolilisation of the military and the
demilitarisation of politics: the Ministry of
Defence is no longer an exclusively military
institution but is directed by a civilian with a
separation between the military branch and the
civil administration in order to avoid the Com-
munist Party having any control over the mil-
itary. The civil administration is responsible for
defrning and conducting defence policies,
co-ordinating them with the various govern-
mental agencies, ensuring contacts with foreigt
administrations and developing the armed
forces. The military branch, under a chief-of-
staff or a senior officer, is responsible for pre-
paring operations.
178. The Political Administration Department
has disappeared completely, as have many
departments of the Ministry of Defence and mil-
itary academies. In 1991, the powers of certain
branches of the military sector were reducod
considerably (internal defence forces have
become the military gendarmerie) or they were
purely and simply disbanded (frontier defence
troops have been replaced by frontier guards,
independent of the Ministry of Defence).
Finally, an amendment to the 1985 law onjudicial proceedings strengthens government
-control 
over the military hierarchy. The militaryjurisdiction used to consist of a special unit, offi-
cially subordinate to the Prosecutor-General but
in practice dependent on the military command.
It had a largely political rOle and its purpose was
to ensure party control in the army. The military
prosecutor is now responsible to the government
and appointed by the Prime Minister on the rec-
ommendation of the Prosecutor-General.
Changes in the structure and composition of the
armed forces
179. In accordance with the sufficiency prin-
ciple, Poland decided to phase out heavily-
equipped units, many air force units and logistic
support units, while retaining an anti-tank and
anti-aircraft capability. It therefore gave priority
to rapid reaction forces (airborne assault bri-
gades and combat and transport helicopter regi-
ments) and, above all, the air defence system.
The withdrawal of eighty MiG-2ls was partly
offset by the procurement of ten MiG-29s in
1990. The army will be composed of operational
forces (ten mechanised divisions) and regional
defence units equipped with light weapons. It is
expected that Polish troops, 50Vo ofwhom have
so far been in the West, 250/o in the centre and
25Vo in the east, will be redeployed towards the
east. Finally, the army is considering taking part
in operations outside its territory.
180. The perception of insecurity at its imme-
diate frontiers is leading to a search for guar-
antees both inside and outside the country.
Thus, the former Minister of Defence, General
Florian Siwicki, stated on television at the
beginning of 1990 that the restructuring of the
army is Poland's contribution to the estab-
lishment of an atmosphere of confidence in
Central Europe. The aim is to have a small but
more efficient defensive arny, which means that
the doctrine, equipment, command and troop
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deployment will be defensive and only part of
the armed forces will be able to conduct a tac-
tical counter-offensive. Hence the army is per-
ceived as a useful institution and it would
appear that most Polish leaders consider it
would be difficult to have a strong republic, con-
fident in its future, without it. However, the
need for change has been felt, the army having
compromised itself on many occasions (appli-
cation of martial law in December 1981,
invasion of Czechoslovakia in spring 1968,
repression of popular demomstrations, very hard
service conditions). Nor should one forget the
extent of the pacifist trend of the mid-eighties
when the army's r6le was not to guard Poland's
frontiers but to ensure the presence of Soviet
troops on Polish territory to act as political
police and protect the privileges of the political
powers. In these circumstances, opposition to
the army assumes another form and becomes
part of the struggle for independence.
181. A series of reforms was thus started in
order to rally the population and young recruits
round the army. First, the defence budget has
been progressively reduced since 1989. In 1990,
the breakdown of military expenditure by sector
was as follows: more than 550/o for personnel,
22Vo for scientific research and supplies, 15.50/o
for training and maintenance and only 7o/o for
investment. The defence budget for the first
quarter of 1992 amounts to $ 500 million, i.e.
5.9% of the total government budget and 23o/o
lower than that for the first quarter of 1991.
Only 4o/o of the defence budget is earmarked for
the procurement of weapons and equipment.
This made certain members of the parlia-
mentary Defence Committee refer to the need to
remove restrictions on weapons exports in order
to obtain additional funds.
(v) Romania
The armed forces: slow depolitisation
182. Romania offers a striking example of rela-
tions between the Communist Party and the mil-
itary and the political r6le of the army, which
moved from total sovietisation in the fifties to
restructuring for internal political purposes,
Ceausescu wishing to pursue a policy inde-
pendent of that of Moscow and, consequently, to
strengthen his personal authority and party
hegemony over the army. This policy prevented
any emancipation of the military sector as a
whole in relation to the political power. Military
policy often appealed to Romanian nationalism
and anti-Russian feelings in order to present the
anny as the defender ofnational sovereignty vis-
d-vis external enemies. More than in the other
Central and Eastern European countries, it had
a r6le of political and social control (support for
the r6gime, control and socialisation of young
people, mobilisation of civilian society). In the
early seventies, the entire military sector, split
up into many structures independent of each
other, was brought under higher military bodies
and the authority of Ceausescu, thus becoming
the true instrument of the party. Limited
resources and technology held up essential
modernisation.
183. According to the Romanian Minister of
Defence, the Romanian armed forces are not
prepared to avert an attack. The restructuring
policy is only just starting to be applied. The
number of troops has been reduced to 225 000
and the restructuring programme provides for
mobile, lightly-equipped forces, adequate air
defence and rapid intervention units.
Defence policy
184. Romania's control of its defence sector,
without taking into account its potential effec-
tiveness against the Soviet Union, was one of
the cornerstones of the Ceausescu Government.
The Romanian army's defence strategy followed
the Yugoslav model, i.e. all-round defence,
based on the war of all the people, implying a
strategy of mass mobilisation and the training of
a para-military unit for territorial defence
purposes, the Patriotic Guards, numbering
700 000.
185. Today, Romania's defence policy is
affected by its leaders'fear in view ofthe coun-
try's isolation and divisions relating to the per-
ception of external dangers. Paradoxically,
Romania was the last country to call for the dis-
bandment of the Warsaw Pact military and
political structures and only Eastern European
country to sign a bilateral treaty with the Soviet
Union 
- 
a gesture considered controversial both
outside and inside the country. For the Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Adrian Nastase, a separate
security system for the whole of Eastern Europe,
helping to ensure greater stability and
cooperation in the region, would have been to
the advantage of the western countries insofar as
NATO and WEU are not yet prepared to open
their doors to the Central and Eastern European
countries. The Romanian Government's wish to
integrate Romania in the new Europe is making
itself increasingly felt. The Secretary-General of
NATO, Manfred Wdrner, said on this subject
that Romania's status should be identical with
that of the newly-emerging democracies in
Central and Eastern Europe:
" We believe that [Romania] should
become a constructive partner, because it
has an important contribution to make to
the balance of security and co-operation
in the area."
186. On lst December 1991, the Romanian
Prime Minister, Mr. Stolozan, therefore
repeated Romania's wish to join NATO in order
to guarantee its security. He said Romania
l8l
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wished to join the alliance but that this did not
depend on it alone while, in the same talks, the
Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Adrian
Nastase, said his country wished to develop
closer relations with NATO, at the highest level
acceptable to NATO in its relations with Eastern
European states.
YIII. Defence industdes
187. Until 1989, the Central and Eastern
European countries were Soviet satellites at both
political and industrial level.
188. After the Soviet Union had, it is believed,
started to supply them with free military
equipment in the years following the second
world war, the establishment of the Warsaw
Pact meant the burden could be shared. Each
country was encouraged to set up a specialised
defence industry.
189. The need for each country to barter with
other Soviet bloc countries to obtain equipment
that it did not produce itself, the " big
brother's' private stamping-ground in
advanced technology and the obligation to
export free of charge to friendly countries pre-
vented any of the countries becoming militarily
self-sufficient.
190. Each of these countries must now try to
convert and diversify its defence industry. But
the future is a dark one since this industry,
accustomed to being privileged and to have no
competition, now has to be competitive on a
world market that is in regression and bow to
the rules of the market economy.
(i) Bulgarit
l9l. During the communist era, the defence
industry was considered an integral part of the
military sector. The disbandment of the Warsaw
Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union
plunged it into a serious crisis because of the loss
of traditional markets and the cancellation of
many orders from the Soviet Union, its main
customer, for spare parts or raw materials.
Between 20 000 and 30 000 workers, i.e. 250lo of
the work force, were out of work between 1989
and 1991.
192. The restructuring of this industry is being
carried out at several levels:
- 
externally: priority to the East; devel-
opment of friendly relations with the
military in the new states stemming
from the former Soviet Union;
- 
internally: reducing the dispropor-
tionate share of the military sector in
the economy.
193. Bulgaria has decreed restrictions on its
exports of arms to countries which practise ter-
rorism or have authoritarian r6gimes. However,
production costs are very low and for the time
being products are competitive on the world
market and, more particularly, on third world
markets.
(ii) Czecloslovakia
194. Arms production in Czechoslovakia is
based on a long tradition. It was the country the
least dependent on the Soviet Union for military
equipment. It produced 35Vo of its requirement$,
l59o coming from other members of the Warsaw
Pact and 500/o from the Soviet Union.
195. Since 1991, arrns exports have fallen
sharply because of the international situation
and because the political line of the new gov-
ernment, that claims to be non-violent, intends
to suspend all arms exports to conflict areas.
Furthermore, in 1988, the communist gov-
ernment had announced measures to reduce the
military potential and had adopted a resolution
giving priority to the development of civil
industry at the expense of military industry.
196. The problem is that 800/o of production
comes from the Slovak Republic (which might,
moreover, involve sharing problems in the event
of a Slovak army being formed) and that there
ate profound differences between the two
republics on the nature and rate of reforms. The
Slovak Republic is particularly affected since its
economy is largely dependent on the arrns
sector. The latter employs 80 000 persons and is
Slovakia's main source of revenue. In 1988,
Slovakia's arms production amounted to 19 300
million koruna, in 1990 9 000 million and in
l99l only 5 000 million. Thus, in spite of the
consensus between the two republics on the sus-
pension of exports to conflict areas, Slovakia
reserves the right, in the short term, to export
heavy weapons in order to ensure a progSessive
transition for its armaments industry.
(iii) Hmgary
197. Hungary has only a small arms pro-
duction capability. It has no aircraft industry,
apart from an air force maintenance estab-
lishment, and its few arms firms are in serious
financial difficulties. Its only trump card is that
it has managed to set up and maintain a world-
level research industry in certain electronics
sectors which should allow it to play a r6le in
developing a new air defence system, considered
to be of first priority.
198. It exports practically no weapons. Because
of the limited requirements of the country's
armed forces, the Hungarian Government is
quite aware that a national defence industry
would not be profrtable without a good expoft
market.
l
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(iv) Poland
199. The foundations of the Polish defence
industry date back to the first world war (fighter
aircraft, steelworks, electronics industry).
200. It has the following assets:
- 
a considerable production capacity that
has never been fully exploited. For
instance, each year the tank manufac-
turing industry can produce 350 tanks,
600 armoured vehicles and I 000
tracked vehicles;
- 
large research and development capa-
bilities that would be even larger if
Poland had the necessary resources (e.g.
the successful modifications to Soviet
models);
- 
alarge aircraft industry: thePZL (asso-
ciation of aeronautical and engine
industries) has a work force of about
90 000. It builds its own aircraft but
also takes part in co-operation and
co-production pr.ogrammes with foreign
aircraft industries in both East and
West (Antonov, Ilyuchin and Piper)
which have a future ahead.
Arms exports
201. Until 1989, 80 to 90% of arms exports
were destined for other Central European coun-
tries and the third world. Decisions on exports
are otill subject to strict state control. Exports to
conflict areas are banned.
202. Since 1990, Poland has been engaged in
bilateral negotiations with the United States and
numerous members of Cocom and has signed
bilateral agreements with France, Belgium and
the United Kingdom with the aim of being
removed from the list of countries proscribed by
Comm.
203, Poland is endeavouring to make its
national armaments industry more competitive
so as to enter new markets (Gulf Arab states,
Western Europe) and at the same time open up
new prospects for its defence industry.
(v) Romatia
204. In Romania, self-sufficiency was the rule
in the arms production sector so as to limit
imports from the West or the Soviet Union
which largely ceased supplying equipment and
spare parts as a reprisal for Romanian refusal to
take part in the 1968 repression of Czechoslo-
vakia.
205. In spite of the absence of a developed
arms industry, the Ceausescu r6gime worked to
produce guns, munitions, small fighter aircraft,
tanks (modified T-55s) and patrol craft. The cost
of this undertaking was high but it had some
successes such as helicopters produced under
French licence.
206. The range of equipment currently in pro-
duction has to be seen to be believed. Falling
export markets and shrinking national military
manpower implies that this level of production
will have to be drastically reduced in the imme-
diate future and the armaments industry restruc-
tured. Fortunately there is a keen awareness of
the problem and a strong resolve to find prag-
matic solutions, not least in increased interna-
tional co-operation.
IX. Conclusion
207. The foregoing chapters show that the
Central European states now face a limited
number of choices if they are effectively to
organise their individual and/or mutual security
and defence. The choices are:
(i) a network of bilateral and multi-
lateral agreements and co-operation
between themselves, to manage crises
and try to resolve conflicts before
they escalate. A beginning was madein the so-called Triangle summits
between Czechoslovakia, Hungary
and Poland held in Visegrad and
Kracow in 1991. In such a context
the idea of a * Central European
Union " has been advanced, although
seen by some as self-defeating in the
sense that, once established, there
would be little incentive to amal-
gamate such arrangements into, say,
NATO or WEU, and indeed oppo-
sition and eventual confrontation
might result in the longer term;
(iil membership and security co-
operation in regional arrangements
which straddle hitherto * east " and
" west " conceptions. Examples
include the * Pentagonale " proposals
by ltaly in 1989 and 1990, associ-
ating Austria, Italy, Hungary, Poland
and Yugoslavia (the former
Habsburg Empire). The addition of
Poland produced a 'Hexagonale "
and then, with Slovenia, a
* Septagonale ". The organisation
was renamed as the Central
European Initiative with the
inclusion of Croatia during other
CSCE meetings of March 1992. The
mandate now encompasses a broad
range of co-operative activities
among the members in the realms of
economics, environmental protection
and transport as well as culture.
183
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The European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (EBRD)
is to consider financing major invest-
ments (e.9. a Trieste-Budapest-Kiev
hiehway) on condition that demo-
cratic reform proceeds apace as well
as freedom for the press and the rec-
ognition of minority rights. This
would not be the first time that
financial pressure has become a
major component of enduring demo-
cratic reform and a measure of sta-
bility in the region.
The Nordic Council now includes
observers from the Baltic states and
is trying to agree arrangements for
co-operation in the Baltic Sea area.
Similar initiatives are progressing in
the Black Sea area also;
(iii) a general trend towards Central
European participation in the major
European institutions in order to
receive binding security guarantees if
necessary. Such moves include efforts
to gain full membership of the
European Community, NATO and
WEU.
A number of Central European gov-
ernments have already formally
announced a desire to become NATO
members; all are already very active
in both the NACC and the North
Atlantic Assembly. With the long-
overdue restructuring and re-
orientation of NATO and its devel-
oping relationship with the CSCE has
not the time now come to consider
seriously the idea of admitting at
least the Central European nations as
full members of NATO?
" Not without Russia " is the
probable response, for NATO has a
well-founded fear of not wanting to
offend Russia and thus agavate
inter-state tensions in Europe. None-
theless the idea should be examined
seriously, perhaps within the context
of the CSCE which obviously has an
umbrella r6le;
(iv) bilateral treaties with individual
states in Western Europe, especially
Germany, which provide for mutual
supervision of minority rights
according to a European norm and
for the settlement of any outstanding
claims from the past. A precedent for
this form of arrangement exists in the
1970 Paris Treaty between Austria
and Italy over the status and rights of
the German-speaking majority in the
Italian province of the Alto Adiger.
Other parallels are agreements also
between Poland and Germany, as
well as bilateral agreements between
Germany and Romania.
208. Quite rightly, most Central European
states try not to abandon any one of the above
options, preferring to explore all avenues in the
hope of a breakthrough.
209. As far as WEU is concerned, the arrange-
ments agreed with the Central European coun-
tries in Bonn on 19th June 1992 are supposed to
suffice for the moment. Such considerations do
not prevent individual initiative, however,
witness the following exchange in the French
National Assembly on l9th June 1992 (the same
day), when the Rapporteur for the Foreign
Affairs Committee, Mr. Etienne Pinte, made the
following point:
While Poland is turning firmly towards
the Europe of the Twelve, it is also tena
ciously seeking guarantees for its security.
Its history explains this insistence and it
should not be forgotten that it still viewsits Ereat neighbours as disturbing
shadows.
Poland therefore asked to join NATO. It
then held out a hand to Western European
Union. So far, it has found the great
western countries reticent.
Although I understand that it is impos-
sible, for the time being at least, for
Poland to be integrated in NATO, I do
not see why a place cannot be found for it
in Western European Union. I therefore
ask what France intends to do to associate
Poland with WEU?
Moreover, it would have been desirable
for our country to specify in the treaty we
are examining that it is prepared to help
to find a status for Poland in WEU. I
would remind you that the Secretary-
General of WEU said dialogue was no
longer enough and that WEU should be
prepared to further and examine the pos-
sibility and political expediency of special
links with the Central and Eastern
European countries. A status has been
found for associating Turkey and a for-
tiori one should be found for Poland!
I do not endorse your analysis ofthe pos-
sible reactions ofthird countries. I am in
fact convinced that we do not need to fear
the reactions of our allies when the
purpose is to guarantee the security of a
friendly country. To note that our
American allies would not view kindly a
I
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rapprochement between Poland and WEU
or military co-operation agreements
between France and Poland should not
frighten either France or the United States.
Such agreements exist officially with other
Central European countries: why should
there not be one with Poland? Fur-
thermore, did the United States not set up
NACC to be sure of controlling the
security of the Central European coun-
tries?... "
The Deputy Minister for European Affairs, Mr.
Georges Kiejman, gave the following reply:
" You referred to security problems. As
you know, Poland's security is dear to
France.
Today, I venture to say that security
problems are handled increasingly in mul-
iilateral forums rather than bilateral con-
ventions and we are endeavouring to
ensure that Poland maY take Part.
Poland is already associated with certain
regular consultations in the Europgan
seiurity area thanks to WEU and NACC.
Admitfedly Poland is not a member of
WEU and, in fact, we have not ProPosed
that it become a member. If it depended
on France's wish alone, it would of course
have to convince its Partners.
May I remind you that WEU is now des-
tined to implement the defence policy of
the European Economic Community? It
would therefore seem very inappropriate,just when we are, or I hoPe we are, Pre-
paring to ratify the treaty on European
Union, to bring into WEU a country
outside the European Economic Com-
munity before WEU can be sure of its
aims and its methods of operating at the
service of the EEC.
I sincerely think that this is neither the
time nor the place to discuss the exagge-
rated apprehension that I am aware the
United States may have about the r6le of
WEU. We have stated that WEU actionis complementary to that of NATO.
However, these considerations are rela-
tively remote from the specific question of
bilateral realtions between France and
Poland and it was therefore normal for
the matter not to have been raised in the
co-operation treaty.
In any event, believe, like us, that balance
and stability in Europe depend largely on
our ability to offer these countries clear
prospects of future integration in bodies
with a general vocation. "
zLO. It is worth noting that, as far as France is
concerned, the door is not firmly shut. The same
sentiment may be found in many of our member
nations individually.
2ll. Now through the consultation process in
the NACC and with the inauguration of discus-
sions between WEU members and the Eight of
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, it may
be hoped that the security and defence interests
of Uoth Western and Central Europe will
become mutually supportive. As we are all
members of both the CSCE and the NACC, a
measure of caucussing might be envisaged to
establish joint positions before crucial meetings
take place (as occasionally took place in Yienna
in th-e run-up to the signature of the CFE and
Open Skies treaties).
212. The particular realm where there would
be a definite advantage to specifically European
co-operation concerns the procurement of arma-
ments where all our nations now have a
vocation to co-operate. With moves to bring the
Independent European Programme Group and
the Eurogroup within the aegis of WEU to form
a European Armaments Agency, now is the time
to include the subject also in discussions with
the Central European nations.
213. Coupled with such considerations is the
need to d-evelop language training in Central
European countries, preferably by " training the^
trainirs ". In addition, exchanges at all levels of
military society are bound to have an effect on
traditidnal attitudes and help to break taboos
and traditional barriers.
214. In a forthcoming report of the Assembly,
* European security Reserve forces and
nationil service " (Rapporteur: Mr. De Decker),
the Rapporteur argues in favour of inaugurating
a European debate on conscription and the rOle
of " national service ". A majority of Central
European countries are also being forced to
decide on the pros and cons of conscription: we
should pool bur resources and discuss the
subject together in an attempt to rationalise the
arguments.
215. In short, there is no lack of matter for dis-
cussion under the rubric " Defence and
Security " whenever WEU and the Central Euro-
peans meet, whether in the Asse-mbly,-between
Ministers or under the aegis of the Institute.
However, in your Rapporteur's opinion' mere
discussion is not enough.
216. If any nation wishes to be taken seriously,
it must go-beyond the boundaries of words to
deeds an-d one of the most heartening aspects of
the recent behaviour of most Central European
states has been a readiness to assume responsi-
bility by contributing for coalition operations in
itr. b"ir in 1990/9f or for one or other of the
various current United Nations missions or, in
some cases, for both. Not least among the
advantages of such co-operation is the oppor-
tunity for international contact and the devel-
opm6nt of military competence to complement
co-operation in more political forums. The evo-
185
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lution of " defence forces " for a more humani-
tarian r6le will in turn have an effect at home,
not least on defence budgets.
217. In summary, the evolution of Central
European states in the realm of defence is little
different from that in Western Europe, in
strictly military terms. The difference lies in thepotential threat to stability in inherently
political and economic terms and especially
because of the * new nationalism " prevailing.
218. Your Rapporteur believes that WEU can
and should play a part in ensuring that the
Central European states progress together with
ourselves towards new alignments for European
defence and security which will be of mutual
advantage.
I
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(a) Bulgaria
GDP (1991).' 138.40 billion Leva($2S.tZ billion)
Defence budget (1992): 8.ll billion Leva($l.rt billion)
%o GDP for
defence (1991):
Poprulation:
Minlster of Dcfence:
Armtd forces:
Active:
Reserves:
Terms of service:
Equlpment:
Main battle tanks(MBr):
Arrnoured vehicles:
Artillery:
Surface craft:
Submarines:
Fighter aircraft:
Helicopters:
Miscellaneous aircraft:
Patticipation in
Unlted Nations forces:
Cambodia (UNTAC'?):
6.9Vo
9 098 000
Mr. Dimitar Ludjev
107 000
(conscripts: 70 000)
472 540
l8 months
2 100(t-34,T45,T-55,T-72\
(CFE ceiling: I 4'15)
2 053 (all categories)
(CFE ceiling: 2 000)
2 129 (all categories)
(CFE ceiling: I 750)
75
3
259
(CFE ceiling:235)
9l
t26
474
(b)
GDP (1991):
Defence budget (1992):
%o GDP for
delence (1991):
Pqulation:
l. Sources: Military
tions.
2. See Glossary.
Czuhoslavakia
952.24 billion Koruny
($98.02 billion)
26.90 billion Koruny
($2.+S billion)
2.9Vo
15 788 800
Balance 1992193, and other publica-
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Minister of Defence:
Armed forces:
Active:
Reserves:
Terms of service:
Eqdpment:
Main battle tanks(MBr):
Armoured vehicles:
Artillery:
Fighter aircraft:
Helicopters:
Miscellaneous aircraft:
Participation in
Ilnited Nations forces:
Angola (UNAVEM II 2):
Croatia
(UNPROFOR 2):
Korea (NNSC 2):
Mr. kon Dobrovsky
145 800
(conscripts: 75 000)
495 000
18 months
3 208(T-34, T-55, T-72)
(CFE ceiling: 1435)
4 286 (all categories)
(CFE ceiling: 2 050)
3414 (all categories)
(CFE ceiling: 1 150)
402
(CFE ceiling: 345)
186
160
l6 observers
20 observers
8 military policemen
I infantry battalion
staff
(c) Estonia
GDP (1991):
Defence budget (1992):
Population:
Minister of Defence:
Armed forces:
Active:
Terms of service:
16.75 billion Roubles
($9.85 billion)
135 million Roubles
1 583 00
Mr. Hain Rebas
2 000
15 months
(d) Hungary
GDP (1991): 2 880 billion Forint($53.90 billion)
Defence budgu (1992): 5!'60 !il!!gn Forint($1.16 billion)
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% GDP for
defence (1991):
Population:
Minister of Defence:
Armed forces:
Active:
Reserves:
Terms of service:
Equipment:
Main battle
tanks (MBT):
Armoured vehicles:
Artillery:
Danube Flotilla:
Fighter aircraft:
Helicopters:
Miscellaneous aircraft:
Participation in
United Nations forces:
Angola (UNAVEM II 2):
Iraq/ Kuwait(uNrKoM 2):
Middle East(UNTSO 2):
2.3o/o
l0 543 800
Mr. Lajos Fiir
80 800
(conscripts: 53 900)
192 000
l2 months
t 357(T-34, T-54, T-55,
T-72)
(CFE ceiling: 835)
I 809 (all categories)(CFE ceiling: I 700)
I 040 (all categories)(CFE ceiling: 810)
6
9l
122
46
15 observers
7 observers
2 observers
GDP (1991):
(e) Iatvia
22.31 billion Roubles($13.12 billion)
Defence budget (1992): 257.4 million Roubles
Population: 2 687 000
Minister of Defence: Mr. Talavs Jundzis
Armed forces:
Active: 2 550(conscripts: I 950)
Terms of service: 18 months
(l) Lithuania
GDP (1991): 32.81 billion Roubles($19.30 billion)
Defence budget (1992): I billion Roubles
Population: 3 723 000
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(g) Poland
GDP (1991).' I 391431.40 billion
Zlotys
($102.40 billion)
Defence budget (1992): 38 450 billion Zlotys
$z.qq bilion)
%i GDP for defence(1991):
Population:
Minister of Defence:
Armed forces:
Active:
Reserves:
Terms of service:
Equipment:
Main battle
tanks (MBT):
Armoured vehicles:
Artillery:
Surface craft:
Submarines:
Fighter aircraft:
Helicopters:
Miscellaneous aircraft:
Participation in
United Nations forces:
Cambodia (UNTAC 2):
Croatia(UNPROFOR 2):
Iraq/ Kuwait(uNrKoM 2):
Korea (NNSC,):
Lebanon (UNIFIL 2):
Syria (UNDOF 2):
Western Sahara
(MTNURSO 2):
(h) Ronunia
Minister of Defence:
Armed forces:
Active:
Reserves:
GDP (1991):
Defence budget (1992):
% GDP for
defence (1991):
Population:
Mr. Audrius Butkevicius
7 000
12 500 national guard
2.4o/o
38 207 000
Mr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz
296 s00(conscripts: 167 400)
435 200
18 months
2 850 (T-54t55, T-72)(CFE ceiling: I 730)
2253 (all categories)(CFE ceiling: 2 150)
2316 (all categories)(CFE ceiling: I 610)
62
3
481
188
il5
176 soldiers
I battalion(899 soldiers)
7 soldiers
staff
84 soldiers
159 logistics support
2 observers
2 100 billion Lei($37.10 billion)
173.70 billion Lei($0.90 billion)
3.to/o
22 749 000
I
i
I
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Minister of Defence:
Arned forces:
Active:
Reserves:
Terms of service:
Equipment:
Main battle
tants (MBT):
Lt. Gen.
Niculae Spiroiu
200 000
(conscripts: 126700)
593 000
l2 months
(army, air force)
l8 months (navy)
2 875
(T-34, T-55, T-72,
T-85, T-580)
(CFE ceiling: I 375)
Armoured vehicles:
Artillery:
Surface craft:
Submarines:
Fighter aircraft:
Helicopters:
Miscellaneous aircraft:
Participation in
United Nations forces:
Iraq/ Kuwait
(UNTKOM 2):
3206 (all categories)
(CFE ceiling: 2 100)
4 009 (all categories)
(CFE ceiling: 1475)
140
I
486
(CFE ceiling: 430)
220
(CFE ceiling: 120)
272
7 observers
Glossary
MINURSO United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
NNSC Neutral Nations' Supervisory Commission for Korea
UNAVEM II United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDOF United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIKOM United Nations Iraq/Kuwait Observer Mission
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
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Amendment I
30th November 1992
Defence: Cental Europe in evolution
AMENDMENT 1'
tablcd by Mn Hardy and othen
l. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:
* Ensure that both WEU member states and Central European states develop effective arrange
ments to prevent the export of military equipment to those countries and groups which puniue
policies of militant nationalism or of aggressive intention. "
Signed: Hardy, Johnston, Dunnachie, Marshall, Davis, Thompson, Litherland, Cunlffi, Hughes,
Godman
l. See loth sitting, lst December 1992 (amendment agreed to).
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WEU's oprutional organisation and the Yugoslav crisis
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf of tlu Defence Committee2
hy Mr. Marten, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnerr RrcoMtvtENonttot l
on WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis
Expr-eNntonv MruoneNpuu
submitted by Mr. Marten, Rapporteur
Introduction
WEU: the operational organisation
Operational developments
O WEU planning cell(ii) WEU satellite centre(iii) The European Corps
Recommendations and responses
(/ Recommendation 519 on the application of United Nations Reso-
lution 757(ii) Extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers on the sit-
uation in Yugoslavia (Helsinki, lOth July 1992)(iii) Fact-finding in the Adriatic area (24th-27th August 1992)(ii) 3rd September: urgent meeting of the Standing Committee
Conclusion
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
1. Adopted in committee by 14 votes to 0 with 6 abstentions.
2. Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); \rs. Bqgrveldlschlaman, Mr. de_ Puig_ (Altemate: Moya) (Yice-Ctriir.L"j; tri11,1 Attoncfe, Bassinet, Boideras, niito, Carigtia, Chevalier.(Alternate:,Sarens), Cox, De D.ecker,Dees, Durand,
F;rrrrd;;,' M;rquei, rrunirotti, Fioret, Fourr6, Hardy, lrrire1 JunE, Kelchterm4rs, Mrs. L9nt7-Qor7a1e.,- MM. van der Linden,
Moirtrn, ford Newatl (Alternat} Thompson\, MM. Pecchioli, Perinat 
.(Alernate:. Cttco), Reis l€ite (Alternate: Mrs. Aguiar),
Schcer,'Sinesio,Sir Ke'ith Speed,MM. Steiner,Yazqtez (Alternate: Bolinaga\,Zieret.
N.B. Tfte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Recommendation
on WEII's opemtional organisation and the Yugoslav crisis
The Assembly,
(i) 
. ryecgJltlle Recommendations 506, 512,519 and 525 which have all sought to prompt precise
action by WEU to help solve the crisis in the former Yugoslavia;
(iil 
- 
Fully endgrsing Unite_d N-ations Resolutions 713,757,770,771and 781 and the efforts being
made by Lord Owen and Mr. Vance to resolve the crisis;
(iii). Dismayed that s9 little apparent progress has been made in finding a political solution to the
crisis and that the suffering of the peoples concerned is likely to be intensifi6d still further with the
onset of winter;
(!tL 9rgrng the Council to multiply efforts within the United Nations, the CSCE, the EC and the newWEU Forum for Consultation with the Central European states, to seek greater co-operation at all
levels in a further attempt to convince the various belligerents to stop fig[ting;
(t Disappointed that the United Nations Security Council has not heeded WEU's call for rein-
forcement of the embargo on Serbia and Montenegro and that consequently the fighting is being pro
longed;
(yr) Congratulati{tg ttre Council for promptly following up a number of the Assembly's recommenda-
tions and applauding the Italian presidency for its pragmatic and positive initialives over WEU
co-ordination and liaison with the United Nations, CSCE and NATO;
(!ii) Pleased !h.at all WEU countries have offered to contribute either forces, logistic support or facil-ities, or a combination of such assets, but insisting on the need for an equitab'ie shariir! of costs;
(viii) Convinced that an air defence capability plus associated intelligence-gathering measures to helpprotect United Nations forces are essential;
(ixl Considering that similar WEU and NATO naval and maritime air assets might well be combined
to form composite forces to stress complementarity and in a demonstration of cosl-effectiveness rather
than duplication;
(x) Believing that when WEU forces are operating as such they should be readily identifiable,
RrcouurNos rHAT rnr CouNcll-
l. Intensify efforts within the United Nations, the CSCE, the EC and the new WEU Forum forConsultation to support Lord Owen and Mr. Vance's endeavours in Geneva and to sponsor a possible
fresh initiative to convince t-he.belligerents in all parts of the former Yugoslavia to itop fighting and
seek a political solution to their grievances;
2. 
. ^ 
Pregare a resolution to be tabled by WEU members of the United Nations Security Council to
reinforce the present embargo at least to-the level of that enforced against Iraq in lgg}tgi and in par-
ticular to take account o{ the problem of cargo in transit and also olthe complications of the Dan^ubeConvention and to publish evidence at an early stage of any significant breach of the embargo;
3 
. 
Fulfil its pledge for WEU member states to " offer expertise, technical assistance and equipment
to the governments of.Danube riparian states to prevent the use of the river Danube for the punjose of
circ 
'nqve-nting or breaking the sanctions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713
and 7 57 " and in particular respond to Romania's request for assistance;
4. Ensure that all WEU nations which have offered forces, logistic support or facilities are per-
mitted to.participale- i1r gp_elations, although lol necessarily ihoG organisid exclusirety unOer-tlredirect aegis of the United Nations. Both the CSCE and th6 EC, for dxample, require ionsioeraUii
support for observer missions;
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5. Prepare a special supplementary budget for 1992 to take account of operations concerning the
former Yugoslavia and also to enable the WEU planning cell to function correctly;
6. Make contingency arangements to provide an adequate air defence capability to help protect
United Nations forces engaged in the former Yugoslavia;
7. In conjunction with the NATO authorities, rationalise naval and maritime air operations in the
Adriatic area to form composite and cost-effective forces;
8. Design a symbol of specific European identity to represent WEU and urge member countries to
use it to distinguish their military forces 
- 
ships, aircraft, vehicles and personnel 
- 
taking part in WEU
operations. Personnel serving in the planning cell should be among the first recipients of such a badge.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Martea, Rqporlcur)
I. Introdaction
l. The aim of the present report is to
acquaint members of the Assembly with the
series of developments concerning both WEU's
operational organisation and the former Yugo-
slavia, and which have occurred since the last
plenary session in June. The report concentrates
particularly on recommendations for action, the
Council's replies and initiatives and parallel and
complementary actions in other bodies.
2. The period in question has been particu-
larly rich from every point of view, but particu-
larly where WEU and its operational rOle is con-
cerned. The following chapters mark the
principal milestones.
II. IAEU: the operational organisation
3. In Recommendation 518', the Assembly
adopted a series of recommendations designed
to give an impulse to the Council's deliberations
scheduled for the then imminent meeting at the
Petersberg near Bonn on l9th June 1992.
4. The Assembly was certainly not disap-
pointed in the Council's Petersberg Declaration
which took up the majority of the Assembly's
detailed recommendations and announced an
array of action for the immediate future:
" IL On strengthening WEU's operational
rble
l. In accordance with the decision con-
tained in the Declaration of the member
states of WEU at Maastricht on l0th
December l99l to develop WEU as the
defence component of the European
Union and as the means to strengthen the
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance,
WEU member states have been exam-
ining and defining appropriate missions,
structures and means covering, in par-
ticular, a WEU planning cell and military
units answerable to WEU, in order to
strengthen WEU's operational r6le.
2. WEU member states declare that they
are prepared to make available military
units from the whole spectrum of their
conventional armed forces for military
tasks conducted under the authority of
WEU.
3. Decisions to use military units
answerable to WEU will be taken by the
WEU Council in accordance with the pro-
visions of the United Nations Charter.
Participation in specific operations will
remain a sovereign decision of member
states in accordance with national consti-
tutions.
4. Apart from contributing to the
common defence in accordance with
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and
Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty
respectively, military units of WEU
member states, acting under the authority
of WEU, could be employed for:
- 
humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- 
peace-keeping tasks;
- 
tasks of combat forces in crisis man-
agement, including peace-making.
5. The planning and execution of these
tasks will be fully compatible with the mil-
itary dispositions necessary to ensure the
collective defence of all allies.
6. Military units will be drawn from the
forces of WEU member states, including
forces with NATO missions 
- 
in this case
after consultation with NATO 
- 
and will
be organised on a multinational and
multi-service basis.
7. All WEU member states will soon des-
ignate which of their military units and
headquarters they would be willing to
make available to WEU for its various
possible tasks. Where multinational for-
mations drawn from the forces of WEU
nations already exist or are planned, these
units could be made available for use
under the authority of WEU, with
agreement of all participating nations.
8. WEU member states intend to develop
and exercise the appropriate capabilities
to enable the deployment of WEU mil-
itary units by land, sea or air to accom-
plish these tasks.
9. A planning cell will be established on
lst October 1992, subject to practical con-
siderations, under the authority of the
Council. It will be located with the
Secretariat-General in a suitable buildingin Brussels. The Council has today
appointed Maj. Gen. Caltabiano (Italianl. WEU: the operational organisation, Document 1307,13th May 1992, Rapporteur: Sir Dudley Smith.
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Air Force) as its first Director. The
planning cell will be responsible for:
- 
preparing contingency plans for the
employment for forces under WEU aus-
plces; 
.
- 
preparing recommendations for the
necessary command, control and com-
munication arrangements, including
standing operating procedures for head-
quarters which might be selected;
- 
keeping an updated list of units and
combinations of units which might be
allocated to WEU for specific opera-
tions.
10. The Council of Ministers approved
the terms of reference for the planning
cell. "
5. The formal reply of the Council to Rec-
ommendation 518 was somewhat slower in
arriving (received by the Assembly on 16th
October) but, as well as reiterating the appro-
priate parts of the Petersberg Declaration, added
a number of extra details which demonstrate the
Council's readiness now to progress operational
matters in a particularly pragmatic and con-
structive manner. These extra details are high-
lighted in the following text of the Council's
reply to Recommendation 518:
" l. In accordance with the decision con-
tained in the declaration of the member
states of WEU at Maastricht on l0th
December l99l to develop WEU as the
defence component of the European
Union and as the means to strengthen the
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance,
WEU member states have been exam-
ining and defining appropriate missions,
structures and means covering, in par-
ticular, a WEU planning cell and military
units answerable to WEU, in order to
strengthen WEU's military r6le.
(a) At its meeting in Bonn on l9th June
1992, the WEU Council of Ministers
agreed that" a planning cell will be estab-
lished on lst October 1992, subject to
practical considerations, under the
authority of the Council. It will be located
with the Secretariat-General in a suitable
building in Brussels ". The Council of
Ministers also approved the terms of ref-
erence for the planning cell.
(0,/ Questions pertaining to closer military
co-operation comPlementary to the
alliance, in particular in the fields of
logistics, transport and training remain on
the agenda of the Council's Defence Rep-
resentatives Group. Whenever appro-
priate, information on the outcome of the
discussions on this issue and their fol-
low-up will be fed into the ongoing dia-
logue with the Assembly.
(c) On l9th June 1992, WEU ministers
agreed " that the chiefs of defence staff
should meet twice a year prior to the
regular Ministerial Councils and on an ad
hoc basis whenever necessary ". The
Council does not envisage, at present, the
creation of a WEU * Military Com-
mittee'. However, it should be recalled
that 
- 
according to paragraph 12 ofPart I
" on WEU and European security " of the
Petersberg Declaration - following the
transfer of the Council and Secretariat to
Brussels, national delegations could be
reinforced with 'military delegates " to
develop and provide advice for the
Council, to introduce the views of the
chiefs ofdefence staffto the planning cell
and to monitor the professional standards
of the planning cell's work. In the future,
an enhanced r6le of the WEU chiefs of
defence staff would be envisageable in
principle, in line with the organisation's
evolution.
(d) ln its reply to sub-paraepph (d) of
paragraph I of the recommendation, the
Council wishes to draw the Assembly's
attention to Part II, " on strengthening
WEU's operational r6le', of the
Petersberg Declaration. In this decla-
ration, WEU member states " declare that
they are prepared to make available mil-
itary units from the whole spectrum of
their conventional armed forces for mil-
itary tasks conducted under the authority
of WEU'. Decisions to use military units
answerable to WEU " will be taken by the
WEU Council in accordance with the pro
visions of the United Nations Charter.
Participation in.specific operations will
remain a sovereign decision of member
states in accordance with national consti-
tutions. " The declaration also specifies
that * military units will be drawn from
the forces of WEU member states,
including forces with NATO missions - in
this case after consultation with NATO -
and will be organised on a multinational
and multi-service basis ". Furthermore,
* all WEU member states will soon des-
ignate which of their military units and
headquarters they would be willing to
make available to WEU for its various
possible tasks. Where multinational for-
mations drawn from the forces of WEU
nations already exist or are planned, these
units could be made available for use
under the authority of WEU, with
agreement of all participating nations. "
WEU member states " intend to develop
and exercise the appropriate capabilities
to enable the deployment of WEU mil-
itary units by land, sea or air to accom-
plish these tasks. " The possibility of the
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creation of a European aeronaval force
with the capability for force projection is
currently under consideration by the
Council and its working groups, as are the
related technical questions. The Assembly
will be kept informed on the outcome of
these discussions and on any follow-ups in
due course.
2. Apart from contributing to the
common defence in accordance with
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and
Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty
respectively, Part II " on strengthening
WEU's operational r6le " of the
Petersberg Declaration identifies the fol-
lowing tasks for which military units of
WEU member states, acting under WEU's
authority, could be employed: humani-
tarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping
tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis
management, including peace-making.
The Petersberg Declaration specifies:
" The planning and execution of these
tasks will be fully compatible with the mil-
itary dispositions necessary to ensure the
collective defence of all allies. "
3. On l9th June 1992, WEU ministers
agreed that a number of points should be
made in extending the invitation to the
countries interested in becoming mem-
bers, observers or associate members. In
this context, the Council wishes to draw
the Assembly's attention to Part III * on
relations between WEU and the other
European member states of the European
Union or the Atlantic Alliance " which
specifies: * Other European member
states of the Atlantic Alliance which have
accepted the invitation to become asso-
ciate members of WEU, although not
being parties to the modified Brussels
Treaty, may participate fully in the
meetings of the WEU Council 
- 
without
prejudice to the provisions laid down in
Article VIII of the modified Brussels
Treaty 
- 
of its working groups and of the
subsidiary bodies ", subject 
- 
inter alia 
-
to the following provisions: (...) they will
be able to be associated to the planning
cell through a permanent liaison
arrangement; (...) they will take part on
the same basis as full members in WEU
military operations to which they commit
forces (...). "
For " practical reasons ", however, ' space
activities will be restricted to the present
members until the end of the experi-
mental phase of the satellite centre in
1995. During this phase the new members
and associate members will be kept
informed of WEU's space activities.
Appropriate arrangements will be made
for associate members to participate in
subsequent space activities at the samo
time as decisions are taken on the contin-
uation of such activities. "
The possibility of observers participating
in the WEU planning cell and in WEU's
space activities is not foreseen in the
Petersberg Declaration. While possible, in
principle, the inclusion " of other NATO
states or European Community associates
in WEU operations on an ad hoc basis "
would have to be addressed on a case-
by-case basis.
4. Possibilities for cooperation between
the experimental WEU satellite centre
and the planning cell as well as the desira-
bility and feasibility of ensuring * frrm
links " of the WEU satellite centre in
Torrej6n with non-WEU bodies will be
examined in due course, as the satellite
centre becomes more operational.
5. WEU's relations with the IEPG are
addressed in the Council's replies to Rec-
ommendations 517 and 523.
6. The declaration adopted in Bonn on
l9th June 1992 by the extraordinary
meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers
with states of Central Europe states that
'the enhancement of WEU's relations
with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and
Romania should reflect the specific rela-
tions which exist and are developing
between these countries and the European
Union and its member states. Other
appropriate forms of co-operation could
be set up in the light of the development
of these relations. " Ministers agreed to
strengthen existing relations between
WEU and these states by structuring the
dialogue, consultations and co-operation.
The declaration specifies that * the focus
of consultations will be the security archi-
tecture and stability in Europe, the future
development of the CSCE, arms control
and disarmament, in particular the imple-
mentation of the CFE and Open Skies
treaties, as well as the 1992 Vienna doc-
ument. Developments in Europe and
neighbouring regions will be of particular
interest to the participants. In this way,
WEU's Central European partners will be
able to acquaint themselves with the
future security and defence policy of the
European Union and find new opportun-
ities to co-operate with the defence com-
ponent of the union and with the
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance as
these develop. "
7. Questions pertaining to the '* mainte-
nance of an effective and credible
'I
!l
i,I
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minimum nuclear deterrent " and to the
desirability of instituting a WEU
* nuclear consultation group " are not at
present on the agenda ofthe Council and
its working $oups.
8. The contents of the Petersberg Decla-
ration as well as the declaration of the
extraordinary meeting of the WEU
Council of Ministers with states of
Central Europe, both adopted on l9th
June 1992, testify to the fact that WEU
member states are fully conscious of the
need to develop relations between NATO
and WEU on the basis of the dual purpose
of transparency and complementarity. "
6. Your Rapporteur would like to make a
point of drawing the extra information given to
the attention of members:
0 " The Council of Ministers also
approved the terms of reference for the
planning cell. "
The terms of reference adopted were
brmdly in line with the outline given in Sir
Dudley Smith's report which also mentioned
arrangements for appointing and paying the
staff. (See below for further details.)
(iil " ...national delegations could be rein-
forced with " military delegates " to
develop and provide advice for the
Council, to intoduce the views of the
Chiefs of Defence Staff to the
planning cell and to monitor the pro-
fessional standards of the planning
cell's work. In the future, an enhanced
rille of the WEU Chiefs of Defence
Staff would be envisageable in prin-
ciple, in line with the organisation's
evolution. "
At least one country has already ear-
marked an offrcer as a " military delegate " and
advisor to the Permanent Representative.
Others will follow in due course. It is important
that such posts are kept separate from those in
the planning cell in order to preserve the
integrity and * objectivity " of the latter.
The WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff are
already assuming an enhanced r6le (c.f. the last
mceting on l6th October 1992in Rome) and the
Assembly has not hesitated to make suggestions
regarding subjects for future discussion 2.
(iiil " The possibilily of the creation of a
European aeronaval force with the
capability for force proiection is cur-
rently under consideration bY the
Council and its Working GrouPs, as
are the related technical questions. "
The creation of a European aeronaval
force was first suggested in a 1988 report of the
Defence Committee entitled " Naval aviation " 3
and it is good to hear that the Council is now to
study and develop the idea. The Defence Com-
mittee intends to keep a watching brief on the
subject and will be reporting progress to the
Assembly.
(iv) 'While possible, in principle, the
inclusion " of other NATO states or
European Community associates in
WEU operations on an ad hoc basis "
would have to be addressed on a case-
by-case basis. "
Ad hoc co-operation in WEU operations
is already starting, although not yet with the
planning cell which will take time to establish.
In particular, 'bilateral " cooperative arrange-
ments with the United States and Canada, albeit
separately, are about to be developed.
(v) " Possibilities for cGoperation between
the experimental WEU satellite centre
and the planning cell as well as the
desirability and feasibility of ensuring
" firm linl<s " of the WEU satellite
centre in Torrejdn with non-WEU
bodies will be examined in due course,
as the satellite centre becomes more
operational. "
Your Rapporteur is pleased that the idea
of links with non-WEU bodies has not been
excluded definitively. The work of the satellite
centre in Torrej6n must be complementary to
that of other bodies working in the same
domain. As the satellite centre becomes opera-
tional it will have to rely on other agencies for
certain information and should obviously be in
a position to reciprocate.
I II. Operational develoPments
(i) WEU Planning cell
7. As forecast in the addendum to the report
on WEU: the operational organisation (Rappor-
teur: Sir Dudley Smith), Lieutenant-General
Marcello Caltabiano (Italian Air Force) was duly
appointed to head the WEU planning cell, sec-
onded by Brigadier-General Jean-Philippe Roux(French Army). The cell was established on
Thursday lst October 1992 in premises kindly-
made available by the Belgian Ministry of
Defence at Laeken in the suburbs of Brussels.
The cell will move into the same premises as the
Secretariat General at 4 rue de la R6gence when
that building is ready.
3. Document 1139,
Wilkinson.
2. European security - reserve forces and national service,
Document 1338, Rapporteur: Mr. De Decker.
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8. At the time of writing, the cell is staffed
by a single representative of each member
country. Others will soon join and there have
been many more volunteers than places for this
first operational facet of WEU's new r6le.
9. Apart from the problem of premises not
yet being ready, the most immediate require-
ment is to establish a budget for the planning
cell so that it may begin work in earnest. As col-
leagues will know from the Assembly's perennial
problems over its own budget, our governments
have been slow to commit the necessary funds to
Western European Union in spite of a particular
requirement now for WEU to play a more
central r6le.
10. Some of the former Warsaw Pact coun-
tries with which your Rapporteur has had
contact of late have pointed out a deflrnite lack
of effective democracy in the way in which the
Assembly has been continually hamstrung by
governments when it comes to adequate
finance.
11. It is obvious that a proper budget must be
provided for the planning cell and your
Rapporteur would therefore urge that a supple-
mentary budget for 1992 be agreed immediately
to allow the cell to function as soon as pos-
sible.
(ii) IYEU satellite centrc
12. The Technological and Aerospace Com-
mittee's report on European armaments
co-operation after Maastricht a makes reference
to the problems of equipping the satellite data
interpretation and training centre at Torrej6n
near Madrid. These problems which relate espe-
cially to the choice of computer software to be
used are in the process of being resolved and
your Rapporteur trusts that suitable solutions,
allowing for further developments of the centre
in the future, have prevailed. There has been a
consequent delay in inaugurating the centre.
(iii) The Earopeaa Corps
13. In an effort to ensure transparency with
NATO, France and Germany have decided to
bring their intentions on the Eurocorps officially
to the attention of the North Atlantic Council.
This is an excellent way to proceed and should
result in SACEUR being charged formally with
working out the modalities of cooperation with
all concerned.
14. Meanwhile, the corps headquarters is in
the process of being established in Strasbourg
where two Spanish army officers are now also
4. Document 1332, 23rd
Lopez Henares.
present as the precursor for likely Spanish par-
ticipation. Belgium should also declare its
intention to take part once the formal rela-
tionship with WEU and NATO is established.
15. France has given further details regarding
the formation of the Eurocorps:
* The decision to set up a European corps,
announced on 14th October l99l by Pres-
ident Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl,
then confirmed in La Rochelle with the
adoption of the report and time-table sub-
mitted by the defence ministers, is seen to
be the logical follow-up to this overallpolitical approach. It foreshadows
European integration in defence matters,
and, being multinational and having a
flexible organisation, it is adapted to the
new strategic context.
From the outset, France and Germany
opened the project to participation by any
other WEU member states so wishing.
Advance oflicers from countries that are
the most interested, e.g Belgium, Luxem-
bourg and Spain, are henceforth invited to
take part in the work of the corps head-
quarters in Strasbourg.
This corps, the joint instrument of the
governments of participating nations, is
under the command of a staff offrcer and
is to allow Europe to have its own military
capability. Its creation shows the will of
participating states, in the framework of a
European Union that will eventually
include a joint defence policy, to assume
their security and peacokeeping responsi-bilities jointly and by common
agreement.
Its missions are as follows:
- 
joint defence of the allies, in application
of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty,
or Article V of the Brussels Treaty;
- 
keeping and restoring peace;
- 
humanitarian action, particularly dis-
aster and famine relief, assistance to
refugees and evacuation operations in
cnsls areas.
The European Corps has a multinational
headquarters of mainly ground forces, but
with air and naval components, and a
number of national units (with the
exception, however, of the Franco.
German brigade) which are assigned to it
as a matter of priority. In aqy event, they
remain in a central chain of command.
The range of possibilities for the use of the
European Corps may allow it to be
deployed in very different frameworks,
either under the aegis of WEU or as a
special contribution to NATO. It may also
October 1992, Rapporteur: Mr.
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be the preferred structure for conducting a
peace-keeping action in the framework of
the United Nations, be it inside or outside
Europe.
Today, it is a Franco-German initiative
that is being worked out, but the phi-
losophy underlying this project
encourages the integration of components
from other countries, either within the
headquarters or as additional units. The
timelable for setting it up is as follows:
- 
July 1992 to June 1994: progressive
build-up of the bi- or multinational
headquarters, which will be fully opera-
tional in July 1994. The first general
commanding the European Corps will
take up his duties in October 1993;
- 
October 1993 to Seqtember 1995:
French and German units composing
the corps will be assigned progressively.
The following are already earmarked:
the Franco-German brigade, the first
armoured division stationed in
Germany and the equivalent of a
German division that still has to be
determined;
- 
lst October 1995: the European Corps,
or at least the French and German units
assigned to it, will be finally created
and available operationally.
As the first European multinational unit,
this corps will be able to give WEU the
military means it now lacks. It is the first
demonstration of a will for joint defence
alongside and not in opposition to NATO.
Further multinational (in particular naval
or air) units might be envisaged subse-
quentlY. "
16. It will be seen from the above remarks
thrt we are in a period of consolidation of the
operational arrangements for WEU in the
aftermath of the Maastricht and Petersberg Dec-
larations. The bulk of initiative has concerned
the crisis in former Yugmlavia and it is to con-
sideration of such practical aspects that your
Rapporteur wishes to devote part two of the
prEsent report.
IY. Recommendations and responses
(i) Reommendation 519 on the a0plication
of United Ndions Resolutioa 757
t7. The draft recommendations were proposed
by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on behalf of the Defence
Committees and adopted during the special
5. The application of United Nations Resolution 757,Doc-
ument 1319, 2nd June 1992, Rapporteur: Mr. De Hoop
Scheffer.
debate devoted to the Yugoslav crisis on Tuesday
2nd June 1992. The recommendation reads:
" The Assembly,
(/ Recalling Recommendations 506,
511 and 512 on the Yugoslav crisis;
(l/ Anxious that the peoples concerned
should no longer be exposed to the ter-
rible suffering which is currently pre-
vailing, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and in Croatia;
(iiil Wholeheartedly endorsing United
Nations Resolution 757 voted in the
Security Council on Saturday, 30th May
1992;
(iv) Determined to ensure that the trade
and oil embargo designed to bring Serbia
and Montenegro to realise the errors of
their actions should prove effective;
(v/ Strongly supporting the WEU Secre-
tary-General's appeal for European action
and calling for the application of Anicle
VIII of the modified Brussels TreatY,
Uncrx-rlv RECoMMENDS THAT rHr CouNctt-
Take immediate steps to invoke Article
VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and
prepare appropriate action by WEU states
io help apply United Nations Resolution
757. Further measures should be con-
sidered if Resolution 757 does not have
the desired effect;
Take immediate initiatives to ensure that
war criminals will be judged following the
guidelines of the proposal of the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe of May 1992."
18. The Council met on the Petersberg near
Bonn on 19th June, as already mentioned, and,
after underlining the extreme urgency of human-
itarian assistance, principally to the Bosnian
people, and the need to establish a security zone
encompassing Sarajevo and its surroundings,
particularly the airport so that it might be
ieopened, expressed its support for the active
participation of member states in this operation
in accbrdance with United Nations Security
Council Resolution 758. The ministers also
declared that WEU was prepared, within the
limit of its possibilities, to help ensure effective
implementation of Security Council resolutions
relating to the Yugoslav conflict. To this end,
the Ad Hoc Group of representatives of foreign
and defence ministries was instructed to study
specific aspects of the task. The Ad Hoc Group
met in Rome on 3rd July 1992 and the incoming
presidency of the WEU Council (Italy) acted
swiftly in deciding to call an extraordinary
meetihg on lOth July 1992 in the wings of the
Helsinki CSCE Summit.
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,ll,(ii) Extraordinary mcetiag of llEU
Council of Ministers on the situatioa ia Yugoslafia(Helsinki, 10th luly 1992)
L9. The following text was issued at the con-
clusion of the extraordinary meeting:
" The ministers of the WEU countries,
having taken note of the report of the ad
hoc Group on Yugoslavia, adopted the
following decisions:
l. Decision to implement the monitoring
at sea operations as proposed by the ad
hoc Group on Yugoslavia at its meeting of
3rd July in Rome. Surveillance of the
embargo set by United Nations Security
Council Resolutions 713 and 757 will
involve the participation of at least five to
six ships, four MPA, one support ship,
ground base helicopters. Such surveillance
will be carried out in international waters,in the Otranto Channel and on other
points off the Yugoslav coast, including
off the Montenegro coast, following con-
sultations with UNPRoFoR.
- 
The said naval operations will start at
the earliest moment under Italian
co-ordination. The participation of the
member states will be subject to the
provisions of their national constitu-
tions. These WEU operations will be
open to the participation of other allies
and co-ordinated in co-operation with
NATO. Rules of engagement and oper-
ational co-ordination will be estab-
lished by the competent naval author-
ities at the initiative of the Presidency.
- 
The ad hoc group will constantly up-
date options concerning naval embargo
enforcement for which a further United
Nations Security Council resolution
would be necessary.
2. Decision on WEU efforts in the field of
humanitarian aid on the basis of the rec-
ommendations of the ad hoc group.
- 
The presidency will present an in-
ventory of contributions by WEU part-
ners to the competent United Nations
authorities.
- 
The presidency is also requested to
promote a further rapid exploration by
the ad hoc group on the options of
ground transport through humanitarian
corridors.
- 
In this context the ad hoc group will
identify possible modalities and list
logistical and other means that partners
would be willing to make available. The
group will also consider, in consultation
with NATO, the need for contributions
by other allies.
- 
Any operation concerning the estab
lishment of humanitarian corridons
would have to be subject to further
decisions by the Security Council andbe co-ordinated with the United
Nations in particular for the aspects
concerning protection. Appropriate
contacts would be established in a
timely fashion.
- 
Co-ordination with United Nationg
UNCHR and EC Commission, through
the Presidency will also aim at identi-
fying additional needs of the popula-
tions and ways to meet them more
effectively.
3. Immediate information on our initia-
tives will be passed to the United Nations
Secretary-General and to the Chairman-
in-Oflice of the CSCE. "
20. Your Rapporteur would draw colleagues'
attention to one particular phrase which
acquires some significance below:
" The Ad Hoc Group will constantly
update options concerning naval embargo
enforcement for which a further United
Nations Security Council resolution would
be necessary. " (emphasis added).
21. On the same day, subsequent to the WEU
Council meeting, the North Atlantic Council, in
ministerial session also in Helsinki, took the fol-
lowing decisions:
" Ministers
- 
agreed on a NATO maritime operation,
drawing on Stanavformed and other
assets as appropriate, to monitor com-
pliance with United Nations Security
Council Resolutions 713 and 757 in
co-ordination and co-operation with
the operation decided by WEU. The
participation of the member states will
be subject to the provisions of their
national constitutions;
- 
agreed that practical details and modal-
ities to implement the decision by Min-
isters should be worked out by NATO
military authorities, in co-ordination
with those of WEU, for decision by the
appropriate fora.'
22. The result was that a series of operations
began in July in the Adriatic in an effort to
enforce the United Nations embargo, such as it
was. From l6th July, a WEU flotilla alternated
in the southern and centre part of the Adriatic
with ships of NATO's recently-formed Standing
Naval Force Mediterranean. American ships
from the 6th Fleet (under national command)
also sailed into the area to provide communica-
tions facilities and radar surveillance for the air-
craft taking part in humanitarian airlift into
Sarajevo.
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(iii) Foct-findiag in thc Adriatic area
(24th-27th lugrnt 1992)
23. Your Rapporteur accompanied the
Chairman of the Defence Committee to Italy on
24th August 1992. After briefings in the Min-
istry of Defence and at naval headquarters, the
delegation flew to Brindisi to embark succes-
sively in the Italian frigate Scirocco, in
command of the WEU flotilla, the German
frigate, Niedersachsen, which was part of the
Standing Naval Force Mediterranean with a
Turkish Commander, and thence to the
Amcrican aircraft carrier, USS Saratoga. We
also met the Commanders of the Spanish and
Portuguese ships taking part in the WEU force
and flew over the area in an Italian maritime
patrol Atlantic. After briefings in Cagliari, in
Sardinia, where we met the German maritime
patr.ol crews, the team returned to Rome for dis-
cussrons.
24. Main impressions gained from the visit
WEIE:
- 
Embargo at sea: exellent organisation
by the Italian Navy. Good co-operation
with NATO and United States national
authorities. Some duplication: e.g. no
real need for NATO Standing
Naval Force Atlantic to relieve
STANAVFORMED - WEU could have
helped.
- 
Command and control: good.
- 
Rules of engagement: clear and
simple.
- 
Need for:
(a) better cost-sharing arrangement;
(b) all WEU countries to participate in
one way or another.
25. Above all, however, it was obvious that
the embargo was certainly not being applied as it
had been during the Gulf crisis, which is where
the Council's opinion on the need for a further
United Nations Security Council resolution for
embargo enforcement becomes gerrnane.
26. As a result of the study visit, the
Chairman of the Defence Committee recom-
mended a strengthening of the embargo and its
rigorous application and this call was echoed by
th? WEU Council meeting at the end of the
Lsrdon Conference on Yugoslavia on Friday
28th August. The Council also considered the
options for action agreed by the Ad Hoc Group
which had met in Rome on 24th August.
27. The communiqu6s issued after the two
mcetings read as follows:
* Communiqu| issued after the meeting of
the \VEU ad hoc GrouP on Yugoslavia
(Rome, 24th August /,992)
The WEU ad hoc GrouP on Yugoslavia,
composed of senior oflicials of the Minis-
tries for Foreign Affairs and Defence, met
in Rome on 24th August to study the
report drawn up by the contingencY
planning group set up at the previous
meeting to prepare options for decisions
by the Council of Ministers. The latter is
to meet in London on 28th August next
and will be attended by Ministers for
Foreign Affairs and Defence. This will be
the first concrete action taken following
the conference on Yugoslavia.
The operational hypotheses worked out
and discussed in the ad hoc Group relate
to the problem of humanitarian convoys
in the context of Security Council Reso-
lution 770 and the question of monitoring
heavy weapons in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The speed and efliciency with which the
contingency planning group managed to
work out options considered appropriate
by all the partners reflect the solidarity in
WEU, the determination to take joint
action and the attention each one accords
to the need to facilitate the granting of
speedy assistance to the population of
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
One should view in the same spirit the
timeliness with which all partners indi-
cated that they were prepared to make
practical contributions.
At the meeting of the Ministerial Council,
it is planned to adopt final decisions on
the contributions of the various member
countries intended to facilitate the
achievement of the aims of the United
Nations and to instruct the Italian presi-
dency to present to the United Nations
Secretary-General the result of the
planning work accomplished and the
means made available by the member
countries in order to allow the implemen-
tation of the measures envisaged in
relation to the various problems.'
* Communiqu€ issued after the meeting of
the extraordinary Council of Ministers(London, 28th August 1992)
L The Foreign and Defence Ministers of
WEU member states met in London on
28th August 1992 following the con-
clusion of the london conference on
former Yugoslavia. They expressed their
firm conviction that the principles agreed
at that conference should provide the
foundations for progress towards a
peaceful and just resolution of the crisis in
lhe former Yugoslavia. In particular, they
reaflirmed the urgent necessity for the
parties involved to cease the fighting and
the use of force immediately and strictly
respect the agreed cease-fltres. They
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strongly urged all parties involved in the
conflict to adhere to the principles
through positive actions and to contribute
effectively to the implementation of spe-
cific decisions also adopted by the
London conference.
2. Ministers noted and endorsed the con-
tributions which WEU and its member
states were already making and were pre-
pared to make to bring peace to the
former Yugoslavia:
Delivery of humanitarian assistance
The delivery of humanitarian assistance
to the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina
constitutes one of the most immediate
requirements for establishing civilised
conditions promoting a political solution.
Ministers approved the planning carried
out by WEU experts covering the pro-
tection of humanitarian convoys by mil-
itary escorts. They welcomed the will-
ingness of the United Nations Secretary-
General to recommend to the Security
Council that UNPROFOR operations in
Bosnia-Herzegovina be enhanced to
provide such escorts, and expressed the
view that humanitarian operations and
associated protective support should be
organised by the United Nations. They
underlined the collective will of the
member states of WEU to contribute to
quch operations by military, logistic,
financial and other means and decided to
keep the United Nations informed from
today of the details of such contributions.
The Nine also decided to offer collectively
today through the presidency to the
United Nations the results of WEU's
planning. They asked the Ad Hoc Group
and Contingency Planning Group to elab-
orate rther the necessary planning.
Supervision of heavy weapons
Ministers underlined the importance of
the supervision of heavy weapons in
Bosnia-Herzegovina in the overall peace
process and for alleviating the suffering of
the population. The ministers welcomed
the conference's decision that all mortars
and heawy weapons in Bosnia-Herzegovina
wguld be subject to international super-
vision and, as a first step, notified to-the
United Nations within 96 hours, as a
prelude to their disengagement from the
conflict. WEU member states are willing
to contribute to carrying out supervision
operations under the overall responsi-bility of the United Nations anO in
co-ordination with the CSCE and other
organisations. Ministers took note of the
planning undertaken by WEU experts and
decided to make it available thrbugh the
Italian presidency to the United Nations
Secretary{eneral, the Chairman-in0flie
of the CSCE and the Secretary-General of
NATO.
Strengthening the embargo
Ministers noted the success of operation
sharp vigilance to monitor the embargo in
the Adriatic. They agreed that strengtl>
ening the effectiveness of the embargo
established by United Nations Security
Council Resolutions 713 and 757 would
be an important means of promoting a
political solution to the crisis in former
Yugoslavia. They welcomed the conclu-
sions of the London conference and
expressed the willingness of WEU
member states to contribute to any further
measures necessary to make the embargo
as effective as possible. Member states -of
WEU could, if requested, offer expertise,
technical assistance and equipment to the
governments of the Danube riparian
states to prevent the use of the river
Danube for the purpose of circumventing
or breaking the sanctions imposed by
United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tions 713 and 757. They also support the
call by the London conference to the
Security Council to consider further mea-
sures to ensure rigorous implementation
of sanctions in the Adriatic. They also
decided that the Ad Hoc Group should
continue its work in this flreld.
3. Ministers decided that the Italian pres-
idency would continue to ensure a full
exchange of information and the nec-
essary co-ordination with the other
organisations involved (United Nations,
EC, NATO and CSCE). "
(iv) ird Septemben urgent muting
of the Standing Commidee
28. The President of the Assembly called an
urgent meeting of the Standing Committee on3rd September to debate developments. As
Rapporteur for the Defence Committee, your
Rapporteur was asked to present a report on
WEU and the situation in former Yugoslavia
and also to formulate and present appiopriate
draft recommendations. Against the background
of the study visit to the Adriatic the foflowing
recommendations were adopted (comments in
brackets):
* The Assembly,
Q Acling through an urgent meeting of itsStanding Committee;
(First time ever the Standing Committee
had met: extraordinary procedure, underlining
the special urgency.)
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(ii) Recalling Recommendations 506, 511,
512 and 519 which have all sought to
prompt specrfic WEU action to help resolve
the Yugoslav crisis;
(As the Yugoslav crisis has unfolded the
Assernbly has suggested a series of actions to the
Council: some of these ideas have been
examined seriously, others ignored. The Council
should re-examine all the Assembly's ideas,
many of which are now even more appropriate
than when originally suggested.)
(iiil Fully endorsing Uniled Nations Reso-
lutions 713, 757, 770 and 771;
(713 and 757 are United Nations Resolu-
tions setting up the present embargo on Serbia
and Montenegro;770 authorises the use of force
to permit access by humanitarian convoys;7'll
institutes the notion of war crimes which will be
tried by a special court (c.f. Mr. Feldmann's
amendment to Assembly Recommendation 519
in June 1992.)
(iv) Welcoming the progress made as a
result of the London Conference but sad-
dened that in spite of many attempts, in
varying bodies, to Jind a political solution
to the crisis, the suffering of the peoples
concerned is intensifying to a devastating
degree, not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina
but also in Croatia where Dubrovnik is still
being shelled nightly;
(The London Conference was the last in a
series of attempts to find a political solution to
the crisis. In spite of all the words and pious
expressions of intent, real people are still dying
every day. The media is concentrating on Bosnia
(Sarajevo) but conflict is still intense around
Dubrovnik, Mosta... (WEU ships and aircraft
watch nightly bombardment of Dubrovnik -
powerless to intervene.).)
(v) Regretting that the United Nations
embargo on Serbia and Montenegro is not
being applied ffictively, except at sea;
(The only concerted action to apply the
United Nations embargo is at sea. The
WEU/NATO surveillance operation is effective
in that no merchant ship entering or leaving a
Montenegro port is unchallenged.
To date: c. I 700 challenges
c. 17 violations
c. 12 suspicious ships
Although the embargo is not yet a
blockade, the information gathered on embargo-
breaking is very important and would prove
invaluable in applying a Gulf-type operation.)
(vi) Congratulating the ltalian presidency
of WEU for its initiatives in convening an
extraordinary Council of Ministers meet-
ing in London on 28th August, as reqrcst-
ed on behalf of the Assembly by ils Pres-
ident, and approving the communiqui
issued which ffirs the United Nations
assistance in delivering humanitarian aid,
in the supervision of heavy weapons and in
strengthening the embargo;
(Congratulations to the President of the
Assembly for requesting an emergency meeting
of the Council of Ministers. Congratulations to
the ltalian presidency for responding. Approval
of the WEU ministerial communiqud which
offers assistance to the United Nations under
three headings:
1. Delivering humanitarian aid - the provision
of military escorts for humanitarian convoys.
WEU states would contribute " military,
logistic, financial and other means ". WEU'S
planning to be made available to the United
Nations (as after Metz planning meeting in
October l99l with regard to Croatia and Slo-
venia).
2. Supervision of heavy weapons WEU states
willing to help carry out supervision opera-
tions under the overall responsibility of the
United Nations and in co-ordination with the
CSCE and " other organisations ", WEU
planning to be made available to the United
Nations, CSCE and NATO.
(Note: 1 and 2 refer to operations where
WEU forces would be under direct United
Nations command.)
3. Strengthening the embargo. WEU willingness
to help strengthen the embargo, both at sea
and on land, especially offering expertise,
technical assistance and equipment to the
governments of the Danube riparian states.
WEU planning to continue in the Ad Hoc
Group.
(Note: WEU forces here are under WEU
opcon (operational control).)
(vii) Pleased that a majority of WEU
countries are contibuting forces for oper-
ation Sharp Vigilance and are prepared to
make forces available to support Uniled
Nations effurts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but
also hoping for a more equitable cost'
sharing agreement between member coun-
tries;
(Hitherto, WEU nations contributing
forces are:
- 
Italy, France, Spain, Portugal and the United
Kingdom 
- 
naval forces;
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- 
Italy, Germany, France and the Netherlands 
-
maritime air patrol;
- 
France and the United Kingdom 
- 
AWACS(national command).
(Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and
the United Kingdom also contributing to NATO
forces.)
At present there is no specific cost-sharing
agreement on a WEU basis: unfair for burden to
fall on only some countries who contribute
forces. Ideally costs should be shared on the
normal WEU basis.)
(viii) Welcoming the North Atlantic Coun-
cil's decision to make NATO's logistical
infrastructure available to cooperate in
WEU action in the framework of United
Nations Security Council directives and
also welcoming offers by the Uniled
States;
(The North Atlantic Council is reported
to have offered logistical support for operations
- 
important for WEU to use the organic link
with NATO in the modified Brussels Treaty.)
URcerqrly RECoMMENDS THAT rnr CouNcrr
1. Seek immediate United Nations apprG
val to impose a complete and total land,
air and sea blockade of Serbia and Monte-
negro, the cessation of all Jinancial, eco
nomic and other international assistance
and the exclusion of Serbia and Monte-
negro from all international organisations
until such time as they comply completely
with all United Nations resolutions and the
decisions of the London Conference;
(A blockade on Serbia and Montenegro is
necessary, both on land and at sea to support the
embargo. Strict parallel with the embargo versus
Iraq. Action in the United Nations needed now,
to convince Serbia that the London agreement
must be respected in order to avoid potential
isolation.)
2. Respond favourably to Romanian
requests for help in policing the border with
Serbia and help to establish similar
arrangements with other neighbouring
countries in the region;
(Romania has already made a ddmarche
with WEU, EC, etc., asking for help in policing
its border with Serbia. EC has responded pro-
posing a number of observers. Opportunity here
for WEU nations, which might not be willing to
send forces to Bosnia, to take part in enforcing
the embargo. Direct offers by WEU should also
be made to Bulgaria and Hungary.)
3. Insist that Greece give the necessary
assurances of total compliance with the
Uniled Nations embargo before continuing
the present negotiations for WEU mern-
bership;
(Greece appeared ambiguous on applying
the embargo:
- 
in spite of a Greek warship in th
Stanavformed and a Greek maritime patrol
aircraft searching for ships violating the
embargo it is known for certain that at least
one Greek merchant ship visited a Monte-
negrin port recently;
- 
trucks were reportedly plying across the Greek
border with very little control on cargo or
final destination.
Greece should be above suspicion as a
NATO member and applicant for WEU. The
Council should seek assurances before con-
tinuing the present membership negotiations.)
4. Offer to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations to keep WEU forces
available to the Uniled Nations under
European command and operational
control in order to maintain cohesion and
to carry out Resolution 770 ffictively, andin close coordination with the United
Nations;
(The Chairman-in-Offrce of the WEU
Council has announced that WEU forces for
Bosnia will be made available to the United
Nations and used as the United Nations sees fit.
WEU forces are likely to be dispersed piecemeal
therefore. Recent events have shown that some
United Nations commanders lack the expe-
rience necessary in such a situation... It would
surely be better to try and maintain European
cohesion and complementarity by operating our
forces as a whole, under WEU command, withthe United Nations as an umbrella
organisation.)
5. Ensure that the WEU military planning
cell is fully operational when established
on Ist October 1992 in order to play a spe-
ciJic rAle in the present uisis;
(The WEU military planning cell was to
be established from lst October. Eventually it
will be in the same building in Brussels as the
Secretary-General. It has a r6le to play now and
should be operational as soon as possible: maybe
in Rome, co-located with the WEU military
experts group?)
6. Institute a formal liaison mechanism
with NATO headquarters and appropriate
commands and also with the relevant
Uniled States authorities to help promote
fficient and cost-effictive co-operation
and to avoid duplication of effurt;
(The modified Brussels Treaty contains
an article, Article IV which provides for an
organic link with NATO. This link must be
I
I
204
t
DOCUMENT I337
invoked and a formal liaison established
between WEU and NATO - even to the extent
of forming joint planning groups. Liaison with
United Stat-es forces also should be formalised
and upgraded (e.g. United States offers to WEUin Acliiatic). Duplication of effort is not
common sense, is costly and does nothing for
the reputation of any organisation.)
7. Prepare, in coniunction with other
bodies, the future military requirements
which may become necessary should
Serbia not respect the London engage-
ments and, in particular, study the need to:
(The aim of this recommendation is to
ensure that WEU is ready to lend further
support to the United Nations, if necessary,
stroutd Serbia not respect the engagements made
at the London Conference.)
(a) develop the alternative options for
action considered on 28th August;
(Ministers were presented with a series of
options on 28th August. They chose the most
bisic and probably the least effective: 5 000
extra troops at the United Nations's disposal.
Option two would have involved l1 50G13 000
troops under WEU command to carry out spe-
cifiCtasks in support of United Nations humani-
tarian operations. Such an option would imply a
higher livel of equipment, air cover also and
probably greater efficiency and concentration of
effort by WEU forces as well as enhanced
morale.)
(b) plan appropriate anti-submarine and
mine-iinting operations in the
Adriatic;
(At present there is little threat of mining
or submarine operations from what is left of the
* Yugoslav' Navy, but they have a definite
capability and we should be prepared.)
(c) ensure air superiority in the area of
operations and if necessary an air
exclusion zone;
(d) take steps to ensure sufJicient air pro
tection lor WEU forces made available
to the Uniled Nations;
(Air cover and therefore air superiority
will be vital in support of land operations in
Bosnia: we should not tackle the task without air
cover (which could be easily provided in area
from lind or sea platforms). Maybe also an air
exclusion zone over Bosnian airspace would be
the best solution, as presently over Southern
Iraq.)
(e) confine all naval assets based in Kotor
and Bar;
(fhe easiest way to neutralise " Yugoslav "
naval assets is probably to confine them to port
- 
which should be possible with the very
minimum of allied naval co-operation.)
a develop electronic counter-measures(ECM) to best effect and, more specili-
cally, iam and neutralise military com'
muniiations as well as Jire control
systems;
(Not enough apparent consideration has
been given to electronic counter-measures which
could be used to jam military communications
and the fire control systems, for example, of
hostile missiles, artillery, etc.)
(g) provide military hospital facilities in
-' ine region for the treatment of the.
woundbd, both senice and civilian, and
organise facilities for refugees;
(There is a growing need for hospital facil-
ities in the former Yugoslavia. All our countries
could help with such a purely humanitarian task,
even if they cannot provide military forces, per
se. Mobile military hospitals could be estab-
lished in Bosnia, Croatia, even in neighbouring
countries. Some possess large hospital ships, or
ships which might be used temporarily to house
refugees many of whom, will need special help
before winter arrives.)
8. Invile non-member nations to co-
operate in furnishing military forces to
complement WEU assets;
(Some countries, Canada and Czechoslo-
vakia (in spite of problems at home) have
offered support to WEU in the past. Any such
offers should be encouraged to ensure a truly
multinational and international approach.
Those countries with aspirations to join WEU or
become associate members should be urged to
identify with and actively support WEU
action.)
9. Examine action to be takn, including
military action, not only to stop present
Jighting but also to prevent present con''fllcts -spreading to Kosovo, 
-Sandjak,-Vojvodina 
and Macedonia and, in con'juiction with the CSCE, consider the
timely deployment of protective forces.
(The greatest danger now is that present
conflicts may spread to other parts of the former
Yugoslavia. The CSCE has decided to send
long-term missions to Kosovo, Sandjak and
Vojvodina. WEU should monitor developments
and be ready, in conjunction with the CSCE, to
support the timely deployment of protective
forces.)
Reactions to Recommendation 525
29. The major reaction, to r@ommendation 3,
came initially from the Greek authorities in the
form ofletteis addressed to the President ofthe
Assembly, to the Chairman of the Defence Com-
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mittee and also to your Rapporteur. The letter
to the Chairman of the Defence Committee con-
tained a number of assurances of Greek com-
pliance with the embargo. It is not known
whether the Greek Government gave specific
assurances also to the WEU Council: enquiries
are continuing.
30. It would have been useful to discuss this
particular point with Greek parliamentarians
and your Rapporteur would urge that the subject
be raised during the next plenary session.
31. In the light of the Greek reaction your
Rapporteur put the following Written Question
to the Council on l4th September 1992:
* Written Question 304
With reference to the selective embargo
on Serbia and Montenegro decided in
United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tions 713 and 7 57 , to ask the Council:
(a) to list all those vessels challenged by
WEU and other forces in the Adriatic
and which are known to have called at
Montenegrin harbours, giving details
of their port of registry, provenance
and declared destination and, where
possible, also the cargo carried;
(b) to repofi what action has been taken
to alert the United Nations authorities
to any apparent breach of the embargo
at sea;
(c/ to inform the Assembly of approaches
made to WEU by Bulgaria, Greece,
Hungary and Romania concerning the
application of the embargo on the
various relevant land boundaries and
the response given. "
32. The Council's replies to Recommendation
519 and Recommendation 525 were sent to the
Assembly on l6th October 1992. They read as
follows:
" Reply of the Council to Recommendation
519
l. Meeting in Bonn on l9th June 1992,
the WEU Council of Ministers adopted a
declaration on the Yugoslav crisis in
which ministers expressed the determi-
nation of their states * to abide fully by
the provisions of the United Nations
Security Council Resolution 757 and to
implement comprehensively the sanctions
which it contains. In this connection, they
noted that the United Nations Security
Council has decided to consider immedi-
ately, whenever necessary, further steps to
achieve a peaceful solution in conformity
with relevant resolutions of the Security
Council, based inter alia on Part VII of
the United Nations Charter. "
Furthermore, " Ministers declared that
WEU is prepared, within the bounds of its
possibilities, to contribute towards
effective implementation of United
Nations Security Council resolutions in
connection with the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia. They charged an ad hoc
group composed of representatives from
foreign affairs and defence ministries to
examine WEU's possibilities to contribute
to the implementation of the relevant
United Nations Security Council resolu-
tions. "
In accordance with decisions taken at the
WEU Ministerial meeting in Bonn on
l9th June 1992, the ad hoc Group on the
former Yugoslavia met in London at the
WEU Secretariat-General on 26th June
1992 to examine ways of contributing to
the implementation of relevant United
Nations Security Council Resolutions and
further steps the Security Council might
take to achieve a peaceful solution. Subse-
quently, two groups of military experts
met in Rome to consider requirements for
possible naval measures in support of the
United Nations embargo and other sanc-
tions, as well as possible WEU contribu-
tions in support of United Nations
humanitarian efforts in Sarajevo. On 3rd
July 1992, both groups reported back to a
session of the ad hoc Group.
On lOth July 1992, in the margins of the
CSCE Helsinki summit, an extraordinary
meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers
was held on the situation in Yugoslavia.
WEU ministers, having taken note of the
report of the ad hoc Group on Yugoslavia,
decided to implement the operations of
monitoring at sea, as proposed by the ad
hoc Group on Yugoslavia at its Rome
meeting of 3rd July. Furthermore, min-
isters adopted a decision on WEU human-
itarian aid efforts on the basis ofthe rec-
ommendations of the ad hoc group.
The implementation of the operation of
monitoring at sea started immediately
after the extraordinary WEU Council of
Ministers in Helsinki. They are conductedin close co-ordination with NATO
forces.
The foreign and defence ministers of
WEU member states met in London on
28th August 1992 following the con-
clusion of the London conference on
former Yugoslavia. They expressed their
'firm conviction " that * the principles
agreed at that conference should provide
the foundations for progress towards a
peaceful and just resolution of the crisis in
the former Yugoslavia. In particular, they
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reaffirmed the urgent necessity for the
parties involved to cease the fighting and
the use of force immediately and strictly
respect the agreed cease-fires. They
strongly urged all parties involved in the
conflict to adhere to the principles
through positive actions and to contribute
effectively to the implementation of spe-
cific decisions also adopted by the
London conference ".
On 28th August 1992, ministers noted
and endorsed the contributions which
WEU and its member states were already
making and were prepared to make to the
United Nations efforts to bring peace to
the former Yugoslavia, in the following
fields: delivery of humanitarian assist-
ance, supervision of heavy weapons and
strenthening the embargo.
As regards the strengthening of the
embargo, ministers noted the success of
operation sharp vigilance to monitor the
embargo in the Adriatic. They agreed that
strengthening the effectiveness of the
embargo established by United Nations
Security Council Resolutions 7 13 and 7 57
would be " an important means of pro.
moting a political solution to the crisis in
former Yugoslavia " . They welcomed the
conclusions ofthe London conference and
expressed the willingness of WEU
member states " to contribute to any
further measures necessary to make the
embargo as effective as possible ". Mem-
ber states of WEU could, if requested,
offer expertise, technical assistance and
equipment to the governments of the
Danube riparian states to prevent the use
of the river Danube for the purpose of cir-
cumventing or breaking the sanctions
imposed by United Nations Security
Council Resolutions 713 and 757. Min-
isters also supported the call by the
London conference to the Security
Council to consider further measures to
ensure rigorous implementation of sanc-
tions in the Adriatic. Furthermore, min-
isters decided that the ad hoc group
should continue its work in this field.
The texts of the communiquds of the
extraordinary meetings of the WEU
Council of Ministers on the situation in
Yugoslavia were offtcially transmitted to
the Assembly. Whenever appropriate, the
Assembly will continue to be regularly
informed on the implementation of the
relevant ministerial decisions. Develop-
ments in the Yugoslav crisis will remain
on the agenda of the Council and its
working groups.
2. The Council takes due note of the
Assembly's request in the second para-
graph of the recommendation. It wishes to
draw the Assembly's attention to the fact
that 
- 
in their strong condemnation of the
unacceptable policies of ethnic cleansing
and forced expulsions in former Yugo-
slavia - senior members of governments
of individual WEU member states have
deemed it appropriate to speak in favour
of international sanctions for the perpe-
trators of war crimes in the context of the
conflict in former Yugoslavia. "
* Reply of the Council to Recommendation
525
l. Meeting in london on 28th August
1992 following the conclusion of the
London conference on former Yugoslavia,
the foreigrr and defence ministers of WEU
member states noted the success of oper-
ation sharp vigilance to monitor the
embargo in the Adriatic. They agreed that
strengthening the effectiveness of the
embargo established by United Nations
Security Council Resolutions 713 and757
would be * an important means of pro-
moting a political solution to the crisis in
former Yugoslavia ". They welcomed the
conclusions ofthe London conference and
expressed the willingness of WEU
member states * to contribute to any
further measures necessary to make the
embargo as effective as possible ". Min-
isters also supported the call by the
London conference to the Security
Council to consider further measures to
ensure rigorous implementation of sanc-
tions in the Adriatic. Furthermore, min-
isters decided that the ad hoc group
should continue its work in this field.
2. At that same meeting, ministers agreed
that member states of WEU could, if
requested, offer expertise, technical
assistance and equipment to the govern-
ments of the Danube riparian states to
prevent the use of the river Danube for
the purpose of circumventing or breaking
the sanctions imposed by United Nations
Security Council Resolutions 713 and
7 57.
As such requests would be of a civilian
nature, they would not, however, concern
WEU as such. They could be better
handled in other frameworks, such as the
EC or the CSCE.
3. The Council takes due note of the sug-
gestion made in paragraph 3 of Recom-
mendation 525.
4. The Council takes due note of the sug-
gestion made in paragraph 4 of Recom-
mendation 525. It recalls that on 28th
August 1992, WEU ministers approved
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the planning carried out by WEU experts
covering the protection of humanitarian
convoys by military escorts. They wel-
comed the willingness of the United
Nations Secretary-General to recommend
to the Security Council that UNpROFOR
operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina be
enhanced to provide such escorts, and
expressed the view that humanitarian
operations and associated protective
support should be organised by the
United Nations. They underlined the col-
lective will of the member states of WEU
to contribute to such operations by mil-
itary, logistic, financial and other means
and decided to keep the United Nations
informed from that day of the details of
such contributions. The Nine also decided
to offer collectively, through the presi-
dency, to the United Nations the results
of WEU's planning. They asked the ad
hoc Group and Contingency Planning
Group to elaborate further the necessary
planning.
5. At present, the Council does not
foresee a " specific r6le in the present
crisis " in the former Yugoslavia for the
WEU planning cell.
6. In its reply to the Assembly's sug-
gestion for instituting n a formal liaison
mechanism with NATO headquarters and
appropriate commands and also with the
relevant United States authorities to helppromote effecient and cost-effective
co-operation and to avoid duplication of
effort ", the Council wishes to draw the
Assembly's attention to paragmph 3 of the
communiqud of the WEU extraordinary
Council of Ministers of 28th August 1992.
Paragraph 3 reads: " Ministers decided
that the Italian presidency would continue
to ensure a full exchange of information
and the necessary co-ordination with the
other organisations involved (United
Nations, EC, NATO and CSCE). "
7. Measures and options such as those
listed in paragraph 7 of Recommendation
525, could be prepared by WEU and other
bodies, if and when deemed necessary.
8. In principle, invitations to
non-member states * to co-operate in fur-
nishing military forces to complement
WEU assets " can be extended by the
Council on a case-by-case basis.
9. The Council is fully aware of the risk of
the present conflict in the former Yugo-
slavia spreading to Kosovo, Sandjak,
Vojvodina and Macedonia. In the opinion
of the Council, any " examination of
action to be taken, including military
action ", as well as " the timely deployment
of protective forces " is best undertaken
in the larger framework of the United
Nations. "
Aid to Danube riparian states
33. In the Council's answers to both Recom-
mendations 519 and 525 it is stressed that
'fhey (Ministers) agreed that strengthening the
effectiveness of the embargo established by
United Nations Security Council Resolutions
713 and 757 would be 'an important means of
promoting a political solution to the crisis in
former Yugoslavia "'. But the Council included
a further comment in its reply to Recommen-
dation 525 * As such nequests would be of a
civilian nature, they would not, hogever,
concern WEU as such. They could be better
handled in other frameworks, such as the EC orthe CSCE ". Why should this be? The
Assembly's Standing Committee had urged the
Council to 'respond favourably to Romanian
requests for help in policing the border with
Serbia' (much of which is coincident with the
Danube) " and help to establish similar arrange
ments with other neighbouring countries in the
region ".
34. Was it this ddmarche by Romania which
had given the Council second thoughts? Stranger
still is the Council's reply to Written Questibn304 (communicated to the Assembly on l6th
October 1992):
" Reply of the Council to Written Question
304
l. The Council regrets that it cannot
comply with the request made in para-
graph (a) of Written Question 304, as the
relevant data is classified. However, the
Council would like to take the oppor-
tunity to inform the Assembly that, as of
l5th September 1992, WEU and NATO
forces in the Adriatic had challenged216l
vessels in implementation of United
Nations Security Council Resolutions 713
and 757. Of these, 32 were suspected of
violating the embargo.
2. The WEU presidency is keeping the
competent United Nations authorities
informed about the progxess of operation
sharp vigilance.
3. As of l5th September 1992, there had
been no oflicial approaches to the WEU
Council 'by Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary
and Romania concerning the application
of the embargo on the various land
boundaries'. "
15, To begin with, the Council says that theinformation on the ships suspected of breaking
the embargo in the Adriatic is classified. Surelyit is in the interests of all who wish to see thb
embargo properly applied that details of
probable violations are published? In addition,
your Rapporteur finds it somewhat strange that
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lists which were hitherto unclassified should
now prove so diffrcult to consult. Has the classi-
fication been applied by WEU or by NATO or
by the United Nations? And for what reason?
36. In addition, the Council goes on to say
that Romania had not made an offrcial approach
concerning the application of the embargo...
37. The next study visit by the Chairman of
the Defence Committee and your Rapporteur
was therefore to Romania (from llth to l5th
October 1992).
Romanian efforts to apply the embargo
38. The various Danube conventions dating
mainly from the 1920s established a certain
measure of freedom of navigation on the
Danube which has the status of an international
waterway. The situation regarding transit is
somewhat similar to that on the high seas and
the faithful reader will remember from what pre-
cedes that the WEU Council was of the opinion
that a further United Nations Security Council
resolution was necessary before the embargo
might be applied any more stringently in the
Adriatic.
39. Some of our member countries, however,
and others have told Romania and Bulgaria that
they should give United Nations Resolution 757
precedence over the Danube Convention: in
other words expecting the Romanians to enforce
the present embargo on the Danube to a greater
extent than we ourselves are prepared to do in
the Adriatic.
40. The Romanian Foreign Offrce has sought
clarification from the United Nations itself, but
at the time of writing no definite answer had
been received. Fortunately, the CSCE s Com-
mittee of Senior Officials has stepped into the
fray and meeting on l8th September had this to
announce:
" Sanctions monitoring
The Committee of Senior Oflicials notes
with satisfaction the steps taken by the
international community to implement
United Nations Security Council resolu-
tions. However, practical problems are
being encountered by the neighbouring
states in the enforcement of these sanc-
tions, particularly transit traffic. In order
to assist the neighbouring states in over-
coming these special problems, the CSO
urges all participating states to take nec-
essary measures to ensure strict com-
pliance with the sanctions in this
respect.
The CSO takes note of the decisions of the
London Conference on the former Yugo-
slavia concerning the implementation of
sanctions and endorses the establishment
of sanctions assistance missions in all
states neighbouring Serbia and Monte-
negro. The London Conference has
invited the EC and the CSCE to
co-ordinate these activities.
The Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary
and Romania have invited experts to
provide advice on ways of overcoming
difficulties in the application of the sanc-
tions. Officials from the EC presidency
and other CSCE states have participated
in preliminary fact-finding missions to
these countries. The CSO welcomes the
intention of participating states to
organise similar fact-finding missions to
the other neighbouring states.
The CSO decides to endorse the plan
drawn up by the United Kingdom/
European Community in close co-ordina-
tion with the United States of America
and other CSCE participating states. This
plan calls for the establishment initially in
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania as early
as possible of sanctions assistance mis-
sions to assist the governments of these
states in the implementation of sanctions.
The status of these missions will be
defined in Memoranda of Understanding
agreed with the host governments as soon
as possible. Similar sanctions assistance
missions will be established in countries
neighbouring Serbia and Montenegro that
may also be experiencing problems in
implementation of sanctions. "
CSCE sanctions monitoring
41. On the Danube, the Defence Committee
delegation discussed the embargo with the
United States customs oflicers who are already
co-operating with Romanian customs oflicials
under CSCE auspices.
42. Nevertheless, your Rapporteur feels that
the Romanians should have received a reply to
their ddmarche which was addressed to WEU in
preference to any other organisation (NATO,
NACC, etc.), especially in view of the Council's
apparent offer to Danube riparian states as well
as in the context of the newly-formed (l9th
June) Forum for Consultation with Central
European states.
43. This being said, the WEU Council has
boen instrumental in trying to ensure that a
number of the Assembly's recommendations are
implemented without delay. From Recommen-
dation 525 the Council has:
urged a stronger embargo (thus far
without success);
sought air cover for United Nations
operations likely to involve WEU
forces (United Nations Resolution 781
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goes some way to creating a " no fly
zone" but not as far as one would
wish). Direct contact is now in place
between WEU and the United States
authorities to explore other air defence
possibilities;
- 
sought to keep WEU forces under a
European Commander within the aegis
of the United Nations. General
Morillon (France) will now have
British, Canadian and Spanish forces
under his command as well as French
plus a number of units from Belgium,
the Netherlands and Portugal.
44. These forces arc being deployed to
Bosnia-Heruegovina for humanitarian reasons.
They are likely to be extremely vulnerable unless
their rules of engagement allow a strong
response to any aggression. Depending on the
way the situation evolves, the Council should be
ready to propose additional measures to the
United Nations if necessary.
Y. Conclusion
45. Given the continuing developments in the
Yugoslav crisis, the recommendations formu-
lated by your Rapporteur today may well be
overtaken by events tomorrow. Which is why
the present recommendations will probably
have to be updated before being debated in
plenary session in the first week of December.
46. Of course, we may hope for a break-
through in the talks which continue in Geneva
under the aegis of Lord Owen and Mr. Vance
but we have been disappointed so many times
now by the intransigence of one or other party
engaged in this war or by the lies told in order to
obtain yet more time to kill and maim.
47. It is obvious that WEU, like the United
Nations or NATO is only the sum of its parts 
-in other words, our governments will only
decide to participate in any given action on
largely national criteria, in spite of moves
towards a common European foreign and
security policy at Maastricht. None of our
organisations is supranational and all have
special viewpoints on what may or may not be
achieved.
48. The United Nations, in spite of a series of
appropriately partisan Security Council resolu-
tions, still seems to wish to remain " non-
aligned " in the present crisis and has demon-
strated the serious disadvantages of such an
attitude which has been bred through countless
blue beret peace-keeping operations. Such oper-
ations have tended, however, to include very
little military action per se, such as that experi-
enced by the Western European nations in
recent years.
49. NATO has been largely paralysed, partly
because of its changing but still embryonic
organisation for the post-cold war era, partly
because traditional attitudes (such as a tendenc,y
to over-react in numerical terms) have been slow
to change, but primarily because of a lack of spe-
cific leadership: the United States has been
largely 'otherwise engaged " throughout the
Yugoslav crisis. Will the situation change after
the United States presidential election?
50. In fact the operations being conducted in
former Yugoslavia are much less reminiscent of
the vast set battle long cherished by NATO and
Warsaw Pact planners than they are of, say,
Chad or Djibouti, where French forces have
become expert at trying to keep the various
warring factions apart. It is probably no coinci-
dence therefore that French forces make up the
largest contingent currently taking part in
United Nations operations.
51. In the present set of draft recommenda-
tions, the Rapporteur is seeking to develop those
which he formulated for the Standing Com-
mittee and which were adopted as Recommen-
dation 525.
(t) The set of recommendations recalled
are:
- 
506 (on Europe and the Yugoslav
crisis);
- 
512 (on operational arrangements fm
WEU 
- 
the Yugoslav crisis);
- 
519 (on the application of United
Nations Resolution 757);
- 
525 (on WEU and the situation in
former Yugoslavia).
All sought to prompt the WEU Council and
member countries to help solve the Yugoslav
crisis.(ii) All relevant United Nations Security
Council resolutions are endorsed:
- 
713 (Arms embargo, peacekeeping
force);
- 
757 (Application of the embargo);
- 
770 (Humanitarian relief in Bosnia-
Herzegovina);
- 
771(Detention camps in former Yugo
slavia);
- 
781 (Ban on military flights in Bosnia-
Herzegovina).
(iiil It appears that a political solution to the
crisis is as distant, if not even further away, than
previously. What is imminent is the onset of
winter 
- 
a thin layer of snow was already present
in parts of Romania just across the border from
Serbia when your Rapporteur visited the area in
mid-October. The implications are obvious.
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(iv) There has been a tendency to sit back of
late and think that the search for a solution in
the former Yugoslavia may be left to others.
Your Rapporteur believes that there is now
room for a specific initiative by WEU in
co-operation with the principal organisations,
but particularly in the Forum for Consultation
with the Central European states, some of which
as " neighbours ", are the most immediately
affated.(v) As a result of Recommendation 525, it
appeared that the WEU Council was adamant in
pushing for reinforcement of the present
embargo. Unfortunately the idea was not fol-
lowed through and as a result the flrghting con-
tinues unabated. It is now evident, for example,
that large amounts of fuel are reaching Serbia:
the price of a litre of petrol has reportedly
dropped from 3.50 DM to I DM over the past
two weeks. The embargo needs reinforcing, even
to the extent of preventing transit through
* third party" states or on the Danube.(vi) Through their actions thus far both the
Council and the Italian presidency of WEU have
maintained the initiative of action on the
European side and ensured an unprecedented
liairon with the United Nations, CSCE and
NATO. The implications for WEU are consid-
erable: the relationship established now will help
determine the r6le to be played in the future.
(vit) All WEU member states are contributing
in one way or another. Certain nations, such as
Italy, are bearing an unfair proportion of the
costs and therefore your Rapporteur suggests
that a supplementary budget be formulated to
take account ofpresent operations. In addition,
the Council must determine a budget to enable
the planning cell to function correctly.
(viii) Most military experts believe that an air
defence capability is essential to help protect
ground forces. The United Nations resolution
on a * no fly zone'(781) does not go far enough
to remove the threat of air action against troops
present for humanitarian purposes. With a series
of air bases across the Adriatic in Italy and even
considering recent proposals on aero-naval
co-operation WEU would be well-placed to
provide eflicient air cover. Even more effective
would be bilateral co-operation between WEU
and the United States in zone 
- 
if the necessary
political decisions were forthcoming.
(ix) Your Rapporteur saw for himself at the
end of August the excellent arrangements made
to co-ordinate naval and maritime air activities
in the Adriatic area. There is no escaping the
fact however that some duplication is taking
place. The ideal and most cost-effective solution
would be to pool resources in as many domains
as possible to form composite WEU/NATO
forces.
(x) Much has been made of current actions
" under the WEU flag ". What flag? The time
has come to identify WEU forces as such when
taking part in WEU operations. The Assembly
has been instrumental in choosing a logo for
itself which might well be adopted for use by the
different component parts of WEU 
- 
even to the
extent of putting a special emblem on all mil-
itary forces 
- 
ships, aircraft, vehicles and per-
sonnel. The staff of the planning cell should be
the first recipients of such a badge.
52. Your Rapporteur trusts that the indi-
vidual recommendations in the operative text,
given the background arguments advanced
above, are self-evident. We cannot stop trying to
help solve the Yugoslav crisis 
- 
our new opera-
tional organisation must be developed as a tool
to be used to that end as well as for more tradi-
tional r6les.
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Supplementary draft recommendation
oa WEU's operational orgaaisation and the Yugoslav cdsis
The Assembly,
(i) Welcoming United Nations Security Council Resolutions 786 (on an air exclusion zone) and787(reinforcing the present embargo to the level of a blockade) which respond directly to the Assembly's
recommendations;
(ii) Welcoming the United Nations Security Council's decision to set up a peace-keeping force for
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and wishing to see the initiative extended to Kosovo and
elsewhere;
(iii) Welcoming the WEU Council's prompt responses to the Assembly's Recommendation 525
adopted on 3rd September 1992 and also the Council's Declaration on former Yugoslavia issued on
2fth November 1992,
RrcouurNos rHAr rHr CouNcrr-
l. Urge all member nations to review and improve their participation in at least the humanitarian
aspects of operations concerning the Yugoslav crisis;
2. Actively promote the idea of establishing safe areas for refugees and displaced persons
throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia;
3. Transform the Ad Hoc Group into a standing advisory group to manage WEU's response to the
Yugoslav crisis for as long as the crisis lasts;
4. Publish the evidence of any known breach of sanctions and particularly of cases where arms or
other military equipment were exported to the Serbs and other warring factions in the former Yugo-
slavia.
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l. Since the adoption on Thursday 5th
November 1992 of the draft report on " WEIJ's
operational organisation and the Yugoslav
crisis ", progress has been made both in the
United Nations Security Council and in the
WEU Council. A number of the Assembly's rec-
ommendations have been implemented, espe-
cially relating to the reinforcement of the
embargo which is now to be enforced in a
similar way to that prevailing during the Gulf
crisis, i.e. instituting a blockade along the lines
suggested by many members of the Defence
Committee on 5th November (cf United
Nations Security Council Resolutions 786 (on
an air exclusion zone) and 787 (reinforcing the
present embargo to the level of a blockade)).
2. Your Rapporteur has therefore prepared a
number of documents (see contents list) and a
set of supplementary preliminary draft recom-
mendations so as to draw colleagues' attention
to the changing situation. The original draft
recommendations remain valid.
3. Among the documents which follow, your
Rapporteur would like to highlight the decla-
ration on former Yugoslavia issued by the Min-
isterial Council after its meeting in Rome on
20th November which reiterates the positive
approach to current problems evident since the
beginning of the Italian presidency of WEU.
Your Rapporteur was grateful for the oppor-
tunity to question and make recommendations
directly to Ministers prior to the meeting and
also benefited from an extremely constructive
exchange of views with the Chairman of the
Defence Committee from the Chamber of Dep-
uties, the Hon. Gastone Savio. In particular,
there was general agreement on the need to
publicise proven breaches of the embargo.
4. With regard to forces currently engaged in
the UNPROFOR I and 2 operations, your
Rapporteur is indebted to our British colleague,
Sir Russell Johnston, MP, for the specific ques-
tions he posed in the House of Commons on
27th October 1992. His questions and Ministers'
answers are included below.
5. After much urging the United Nations
now seems poised to engage in a measure of pre-
Explanatory Memoraadum
(submitted by Mr. Maae4 Rapporteu)
ventative peace-keeping by sending a mission to
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
- 
a
measure which should be applauded and
extended to other areas.
6. As far as WEU itself is concerned, your
Rapporteur believes that:
(i) there should be a positive response to
Romanian requests for help in
enforcing the embargo on the
Danube;
(ii) all member nations should review
and make qualitative improvements
to their. participation 
_in operations
concerning the former Yugoslavia. Ifit proves impossible, for national
motives, to participate in the poten-
tially more bellicose options, member
states might consider further em-
phasising the more humanitarian
aspects;
(iii) the idea of safe areas must be
developed and implemented without
delay;
(ivl while waiting for the WEU planning
cell to become fully operational the
Council should transform the Ad Hoc
Group into a standing advisory group
to manage WEU's response to the
Yugoslav crisis for as long as the crisis
lasts.
7. The Secretary-General's newsletter rea-
ched th-e-Asqembly as this document is going toprint (26th November). As well as inci-udinlg a
slrqmary of various operational developments
$fl_"g recent months it gives a chronology ofWEU's involvement in the Yugoslav crisis
which makes a useful complemenito the com-
prehensive chronology ofevents included in the
present supplement to Document 1337.
8. In organisational terms it is evident that
mu-ch is being achieved by WEU now compared
with only five years ago: we must ensure thit the
operational organisation is used by its members
to best effect 
- 
which depends ai ever on the
necessary political will.
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APPENDIX I
aniled Nations Securtty Council Resolution 786
(adopted on 10th Novcmber 1992)
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolution 781 (1992) of 9th October 1992,
Takingnoteof thereportof theSecretary-Generalof 5thNovember 1992(5124767 andAdq.l)
and his subsequent letter of 6th November 1992 (5124783\ submitted pursuant to resolution 781
(1992\,
Considering that the establishment of a ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and
Herzegovina constitutes an essential element for the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance
and a decisive step for the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Taking into account the need for a speedy deployment of monitors on the ground for obser-
vation and verification purposes,
Gravely concerned at the indication in the Secretary-General's letter of 6th November 1992 of
possible violitions of its resolution 781 (1992) and of the impossibility of corroborating_the infor-
mation on such violations by technical means presently available to the United Nations Protection
Force,
Determined to ensure the safety of humanitarian flights to Bosnia and Herzegovina,
l. Welcomes the current advance deployment of military observers of the United Nations Pro-
tection Force and the European Community Monitoring Mission at airfields in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);
2. Reaffrrms its ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which applies to
all flights, whether of fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft, subject to the exceptions contained in para-
gpph t of its resolution 781 (1992), and reiterates that all parties and others concerned must comply
with this ban;
3. Endorses the general concept of operations described in the Secretary-General's r.eport and calls
on all parties and others concerned, including all Governments operating aircraft in the area, to
co-operlte fully with the United Nations Protection Force in its implementation;
4. Calls upon all parties and others concerned henceforth to direct all requests for authorisations of
flights pursuant to paragraph 3 of its resolutiot TSl (1992) to the United Nations Protection Force,
wilth special provisibns -being made for flights of the United Nations Protection Force, and all other
flights in support of United Nations operations, including humanitarian assistance;
5. Approves the recommendation in paragraph l0 of the Secretary-General's rgpolt- that the
strength-of the United Nations Protection Force be incrcased, as proposed in paragraph 5 of the report,
in order to permit it to implement the concept of operations;
6. Reiterates its detennination to consider urgently, in the case of violations when further reported
to it in accordance with its resolution 781 (1992), the further measures necessary to enforce the ban on
military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
7. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 787
(adopted on 16th November 1992)
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25th September l99l and all subsequent relevant reso-
lutions,
Reaffirming its determination that the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina con-
stitutes a threat tb the peace, and reaffirming that the provision of humanitarian assistance in the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is an important element in the Security Council's effort to restore
peace and security in the region,
Deeply concerned at the threats to the territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which, as a state member of the United Nations, enjoys the rights provided for in the
Charter of the United Nations,
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- 
Reaffirming also its full support for the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia as
the framework within which an o-verall political settlement of the crisis in the former Yugoilavia may
be achieved, and for the work of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the Cbnference, -
Recalling the decision by the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to examine the
possibility of promoting safe areas for humanitarian purposes,
Recalling the commitments entered into by the parties and others concerned within the
framework of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia,
- 
Reiterating its call on all parties and others concerned to co-operate fully with the Co-Chairmen
of the Steering Committee,
- _ Notlngthe progress made so far within the framework of the International Conference, includingthe Joint Declaration signed at Geneva on 3fth September 1992 and 20th October 1992 by the Presi-
dents of the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); the
Joint Statement made at Geneva on 19th October 1992 by the Presidents of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); the Joint
Communiqud issued on lst November 1992 atZagteb by the Presidents of the RepubliCof Croatia and
the Bepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; the establishment of the Mixed Military Working Group in
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and the production of a draft outline constitution foithe
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
. 
Noting with grave concern the report of the Special Rapporteur appointed following a special
session of the Commission on Human Rights to investigate the human rights situation in the former
Yugoslavia, which makes clear that massive and systematic violations of human rights and grave viola-
tions of international humanitarian law continue in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Welcoming the deployment of additional elements of the United Nations Protection Force for
the protection of humanitarian activities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance
with its resolution 776 (1992) of l4th September 1992,
. _Dgeply 
-concerned about reports of continuing violations of the embargo imposed by its resolu-tions 713 (1991) and 724 (1991) of l5th December 1991,
- 
_ _ 
De-eplV concerned also about reports of violations of the measures imposed by its resolutionT5T(1992) of 30th May 1992,
l. Calls upon the parties in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to consider the draft outline
constitution as a basis for negotiating a political settlement of the bonflict in that country and to con-
tinue negotiations for constitutional arrangements on the basis of the draft outline, undei the auspices
of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee, these negotiations to be held in continuous and unin-
terrupted session;
2. Reaflirms that any taking of territory by force or any practice of " ethnic cleansing " is unlawful
and unacceptable, and will not bepermitted to affect the outcome of the negotiations onionstitutional
arrangements for 
.he Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and insists that all displaced persons be
enabled to return in peace to their former homes;
I .Strongly reaffrrms iqs_call on all parties and others concerned to respect strictly the territorialintegrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and aflirms that any entities unilaterally declared
or arrangements imposed in the contravention thereof will not be accepted;
4. Condemns the refusal of all parties in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular the
B.osnian Serb paramilitary forces, t^o comply with its plevious resolutions, and demands -that they and
all other concerned parties in the former Yugoslavia fulfil immediately their obligations under ihose
resolutions;
5. Demands that all forms of interference from outside the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,including-infiltration into the country of irregular units and personnel, cease immedi;6t;;;t- r;;i:firms its determination to take measuies against all parties and others concerned which iaif to fuifrf tfre
requirements of resolutrgn 752 (1992) and its other relevant resolutions, including ttrJ requiremini
that all forces, in particular elements of the Croatian lImy, be withdrawn, or be subjit to ttre autioriiyof the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Heri6govina, or be disbanOi<i or oisarmid; ----"
6. Calls,.upon all parties in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to fulfil their commitments toplt into effect an immediate cessation of hostilities and to negoiiate in the Mixed Milit".y w"iiiriiGrgup, continuously-and in unintemrpted session, to end the Elockades of Sarajevo and olher towni
and to demilitarise them, with heavy weapons under international supervisioni -
7 - Condemns all violations of international humanitarian law, including in particular the practice
of " ethnic cleansing " and the deliberate impeding of the delivery of food a-nd rieOical supplie-s io tfri
2t6
il
APPENDIX I DOCUMENT I337
civilian population of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and reaffirms that those that commit
or ordei the commission of such acts will be held individually responsible in respect of such acts;
8. Welcomes the establishment of the Commission of Experts provided for in paragraph 2 of its
resolution 780 (1992) of 6th October 1992, and requests the Commission to pursue actively its investi-
gations with regard to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, in particular the practice of
" ethnic cleansing ";
9. Decides, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in order to ensure that
commodities and products transshipped through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Mon-
tenegro) are not diverted in violation of resolution 757 (1992), to prohibit the transshipment of crude
oil, petroleum products, coal, energy-related equipment, iron, steel, other metals, chemicals, rubber,
tyrei, vehicles, aircraft and motors of all types unless such transshipment is specifically authorised on a
chsoby-case basis by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) under its no-objection pro-
cedure;
10. Further decides, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that aqy vessel
in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating fr_om the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall be considered, for the purpos.e of_imple-
mentation of ttre relevant resolutions of the Security Council, a vessel of the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (Serbia and Montenegro) regardless of the flag under which the vessel sails;
I l. Calls upon all states to take all necessary steps to ensure that none oftheir exports are diverted to
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in violation of resolution 757 (1992):
12. Acting under Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, calls upon states,
acting nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, to use such measures commensurate
with lhe specifii circumstances as may 6e necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt
all inward and outward maritime shifping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations
and to ensure strict implementation-of the provisions of resolutions 713 (1991) and'757 (1992);
13. Commends the efforts of those riparian States which are acting to ensure compliance with reso-
lutions 7 1 3 ( I 99 I ) and 7 57 (1992), incfuding such measures commensurate with the specific circum-
stances as miy be necessary to halt such shipping in order to inspect and velfy their cargoeq ryg qg{l-
nations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions of resolutions 7 1 3 ( 1 99 1) and 7 57 (1992);
14. Requests the states concerned, nationally or through regional agencies or a_Irangeme_nts, to
co-ordinaie with the Secretary-General inter alia on the submission of reports to the Security Council
regrrding actions taken in puisuance ofparagraphs l2 and 13 ofthe present resolution to facilitate the
monitoring of the implementation of the present resolution;
15. Requests all states to provide in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations such
assistance as may be require-d by those States acting nationally or through regional agencies and
arrangements in pursuance of paragraphs 12 and 13 of the present resolution;
16. Considers that, in order to facilitate the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolu-
tions, observers should be deployed on the borders of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
requests the Secretary-General to present to the Council as soon as possible his recommendations on
this matter;
17. Calls upon all international donors to contribute to the humanitarian relief efforts in the former
Yugoslavia, to support the United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Programme of Action and
Apfeal for the former Yugoslavia and to speed up the delivery of assistance under existing pledges;
18. Calls upon all parties and others concerned to co-operate fully with the humanitarian agencies
and with the United Nations Protection Force to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance to
thme in need of it, and reiterates its demand that all parties and others concerned take the necessary
measures to ensure the safety of United Nations and other personnel engaged in the delivery of human-
itarian assistance;
19. Invites the Secretary-General, in consultation with the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees and other relevant international humanitarian agencies, to study the possibility of and the
requirements for the promotion of safe areas for humanitarian purposes;
20. Expresses its appreciation for the report presented to the Council by the Co-Chairmen of the
Steering Committee o tre International Conference on the Former lugoslavia, and requests the Secre-
tary-GJneral to continue to keep the Council regularly informed of developments and of the work of
the Conference;
21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved.
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APPENDIX III
Questions posed by Sir Russell tohnston, MP, to Ministen
in the House of Commons, on 27th Oaober 1992
Bosnia
Sir Russell Johnston: To ask the Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
what information he has on the supply of arms
or direct military support to the Serbian, Croat
and Muslim forces in Bosnia in contravention of
the arms embargo; and if he will make a
statement.
Mn Douglas Hogg: There are a number of
unconfirmed reports of arms supplies to Bosnia.
An Iranian aircraft carrying anns was seized at
Zagreb airport recently. The Western European
UnionA.[orth Atlantic Treaty Organisation sur-
veillance operation in the Adriatic has reported
a number of ships suspected of violating the
United Nation's trade and arms embargoes. But
it is not clear whether these vessels are carrying
goods destined for Bosnia.
Sir Russell Johnston: To ask the Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
what information he has on whether the
Bosnian-Serbs are continuing to receive arms
and military supplies from the rump Yugoslavia;
and whether any form of monitoring is proposed
of the border between Serbia and the Serbian-
controlled area of Bosnia.
Mn Douglas Hogg: We have no firm evi-
dence of whether Serbia is continuing to supply
arrns to the Bosnian Serbs. The Yugoslav
authorities deny this. Moreover, the Bosnian
Serbs are already well-equipped; further supplies
from Serbia would be unlikely to have a signif-
icant effect on their military capability. The
monitoring of Serbia's and Montenegro's
borders with Bosnia-Herzegovina was agreed in
principle at the London conference. But these
borders run through moutainous terrain, and are
highly permeable. Effective monitoring would
absorb much personnel and equipment. The
United Nations is thus according higher priority
to using the resources available to ensure the
safe and rapid delivery of emergency relief sup-
plies to Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Sir Russell Johnston: To ask the Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
prior to the full deployment of British forces to
Bosnia-Herzegovina, what assessment he has
made of the number of foreign mercenaries
active in the field, their origin and the factions
they are fighting with; how confident he is that
British forces will be at no risk from attack by
mercenaries; and if he will make a statement.
Mr. Douglas Hogg: There have been
repeated reports of mercenaries fighting in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and some are clearly well-
founded. No reliable estimate of the numbers
involved has been made. Our assessment at
present is that mercenaries do not as such
increase the threat posed to British troops by the
various armed groups in Bosnia-Herezegovina.
Sir Russell Johnston: To ask the Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairsif he has now secured agreement from the
Bosnian-Muslim, Bosnian-Serb and Bosnian-
Croat communities to allow free passage for
British forces deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and to guarantee their safety from attack.
Mr. Douglas Hogg: Security Council reso.
lution 776 of l4th September reaffirms the
determination of the Council to ensure the pro-
tection and security of UNPROFOR and United
Nations personnel: there is no need to seek an
explicit resolution on these lines. Furthennorg
United Nations personnel deployed to Bosnia-
Herezgovina to facilitate and escort convoys of
humanitarian aid will proceed only on the basis
of negotiated safe passage.
Macedonia
Sir Russell Johnston: To ask the Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairiif he will list those countries which have given
diplomatic recognition to the independenie of
Macedonia.
M1. Douglas Hogg: Bulgaria, Croatia,
Lithuania, Philippines, Russia,- Slovenia and
Turkey have been notified to us as having
recognised the former Yugoslav republic of
Macedonia as an independent state.
Kosovo
Sir Russell Johnston: To ask the Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
whether the speech by Lord Owen representing
the presidency of the EC in the debate on the
former Yugoslavia in the plenary session of the
Council of Europe on 3rd October in which he
excluded any possibility of independence for
Kosovo represents government policy; and if he
will make a statement.
Mn Douglas Hogg: We share Lord Owen's
views. The Serbian authorities should grant the
Kosovars genuine autonomy with full human
rights, and the Kosovars should accept this. A
special group on Kosovo is working intensively
within the international conference.
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Overseas missions
Sir Russell Johnston: To ask the Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
whether the agreement within the Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe on lSth
September to send missions to Vojvodina,
Kosovo and Sanjak have been implemented;
how many persons are being deployed and from
which countries; and if he will make a
statement.
Mr. Douglas Hogg: CSCE long-term mis-
sions have been in place since the end of Sep-
tember in Kosovo, Vojvodina and Sanjak under
the leadership of Ambassador Bogh of Nonvay.
Apart from Ambassador Bogh, there are eight
mission participants involved from Norway,
United States, Austria, Canada, France, Sweden
and Switzerland.
We welcome the establishment of these
missions and the valuable r6le they can play on
behalf of the international community in moni-
toring developments and in helping to prevent
conflict in these troubled regions.
Yugoslavia
Sir Russell Johnston: To ask the Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
if he will publish a list showing those countries
which have contingents as part of the United
Nations protection forces - UNPROFOR - in
the territory of the former Yugoslavia, indi-
cating their numbers and function and where
they are based.
Mr. Douglas Hogg: The following coun-
tries have contributed contingents to
UNPROFOR. Numbers, function and location
where known are also indicated. The table is
divided into two parts to reflect countries'com-
mitments to UNPROFOR - first phase - and
those agreed for UNPROFOR - second phase.
UNPROFOR (lst Phase)
Nationalily Strength/Type Location
Argentina
Belgium
Canada
Czedrslovakia
Denmark
Eeypt
France
900/Infantry Battalion
620/lnfantry Battalion
9@/Infantry Battalion
350/Engineer Battdion
500/Infantry Battalion
90O/Infantry Battalion
400/Infantry Battalion
4l0/Infantry Battalion
143/HQ Company
66/Airport Company
600/Logistic Base
900/Infantry Battalion
300/Construction Battalion
900/Infantry Battalion
90O/Infantry Battalion
Sarajevo
Sarajevo
Sarajevo
Sarajevo
Zagreb
ZagrebFinland
Jordrn
Kenya
900/l ntantrv Battalron
360/Signals Battalion
900/Infantry Battalion
I00/Movement Control
UnitPoland 900/Infantry Battalion
RussianFed. 900/InfantryBattalionSweden 100 HQ CompanyUkaine 400/Infantry Battalion
United Kingdom 260 Medical BattalionVarious* 60 Military observers
40 Civilian Police/Monitors
100 Military Police
ComPany
Luxemboug/ CompositelnfantryBelgium Battalion
Ncpal
Netherlands
Nigeria
Norway
Nationality
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
France
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
United
Kingdom
Zageb
Zagreb
Zagreb
Sarajevo
Tagreb
Sarajevo
Sarajevo
Tagreb
(40 and 620 respectively)
In addition to the above, UNPROFOR (lst phase)
includes: 160 military observers from 29 countries;
650 civilian police monitors from 16 countries:
deployed evenly to various sectors within Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Rapporteur's note: * also includes personnel from
Bangladesh, Brazil, Ghana and Switzerland.
UNPROFOR (2nd Phase)
Strength/Type
100 Transport
16 HQ
2 Support Unit
800 Infantry
20 HQ
380 Support Unit
8HQ
143 Support Unit
I 382 Infantry
199 Engineer Unit
200 Helicopter Unit
33 HQ
388 Transport
99 Signals
32 HQ
8 Support Unit
50 Engineer Unit
2 Engineer Unit
33 HQ
20 Suryical Team
710 Infantry
16 HQ
25 Support Unit
883 Infantry
508 Engineer Unit
19 Support Element
42 HQ
I 206 Support Unit
Location
Yitez
Kiseljach
Yitez
Banja Luka-
Doboj
Kiseljach
Banja Luka-
Doboj
Kiseljach
Kiseljach
Bihac
Bihac
Bihac
Kiseljach
Vitez
Yitez
Kiseljach
Yitez
Yitez
Kiseljach
Mostar
Kiseljach
Mostar
Jajce-Vitez
Jajce-Vitez
Jajce-Vitez
Kiseljach
Jajce-Vitez
Kiseljach
United States 400 Mobile Army Surgical
Hospital
rs HQ
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Headquarters will be based in three areas but
with the main one in Kiseljach near Sarajevo.
The Defence Secretary, Mr. Rffind,
added: A main party of about I 800 personnel is
expected to be operational in Bosnia by mid-
November. In addition, 400 extra troops,
mainly Royal Engineers, will be involved in
order to assist in the initial stages of
deployment. This brings the total numbei to be
deployed initially to 2 400, including head-
quarters troops. We have also provided United
Nations observers, a field ambulance and an
RAF Hercules has been taking part in humani-
tarian airlift operations in Saiajevo.
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Steps taken by the Romanian Govemment to apply
the embargo against Serbia ond Montenegro I
ird lune 1992
The Romanian Government declares that
it intends to apply to the letter Security
Council Resolution 7 57 in spite of the
serious consequences this may have for
the country's economy. Romania reserves
the right to compensation under Article
50 of the United Nations Charter. Appro-
priate measures are taken immediately.
20th lune 1992
Romania sends a memorandum to the
Security Council on measures adopted in
application of Resolution 7 57 .
15th luly 1992
l. The Romanian Government sends an
addendum to its memorandum describing
action taken subsquently'
2. The Romanian Government declares
that it is prepared to receive forelCn
experts to co-operate with the Romanian
aulhorities in verifying that the sanctions
are respected.
3. Consultations are held in the
framework of NACC on setting up this
team.
29th tuly 1992
The Romanian Ambassador in Rome goes
to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to
stress that Romania is PrePared to
co-operate with WEU to enforce the
embargo against Serbia and Montenegro.
He aski that this proposal be submitted at
the meeting of the Ad Hoc GrouP to be
held in Rome on 30th JulY.
15th to 18th August 1992
An exploratory team sent by the United
Kingdom Chairmanship-in-Office of the
EEC visits Romania for talks with the
Romanian authorities on the problems
that have arisen, and in particular on
crossing points and Danube ports. The
team's report was favourable to
Romania.
18th August 1992
Romania sends a team to the Sanctions
Committee in New York. The committee
says the Danube r6gime is not affected by
sanctions.
1. lnformation received from the Romanian Embassy in
Paris.
APPENDIX IV
20th August 1992
The Romanian Government aPProves
detailed instructions for verifying respect
for sanctions on its territory.
28th August 1992
The Romanian team in New York asks for
details on transit traffic.
3rd and 4th September 1992
Legal experts from the German Ministry
foi Foreign Affairs go to Romania for
consultatibns with experts from the Min-
istry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry for
Communications and Transport and the
Customs Directorate-General. They ex-
press a favourable oPinion on Ro-
mania's action.
9th September 1992
The Romanian Government adoPts a
decision concerning concrete measures to
monitor international navigation on the
Danube.
10th September 1992
Answering the Romanian Government's
question, the Sanctions Committee says
there is an obligation for states along the
Danube also to apPly the embargo to
foreign ships on inland waterways within
their authority.
14th September 1992
The Ministry for Communications and
Transport issues Order 134192 on mea-
sures io strengthen the application of Res-
olution 757. This decision is circulated as
an official Security Council document on
8th October (Document S 24 613).
18th September 1992
A committee of senior officials from
countries along the Danube meets in
Prague. It decides to call a meeting of the
liaison group on international relief mis-
sions to apply sanctions against Yugo-
slavia.
28th September 1992
Two teams are sent to Romania, one com-
posed of two American experts and the
other of three experts including an Italian
customs expert. They are now working in
Tournu Severin for inland waterway
matters and Timisoara for road traffic.
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I
,l
,i
23rd November
27th November
28th November
29th November
lst December
2nd December
4th December
6th December
10th December
l4th December
27th December
28th December
2nd January
3rd January
6th January
7th January
8th January
9th January
APPENDIX V
Chronologt
1991
Geneva: signature of the twelfth cease-fire (CFl2).
United Nations Security Council Resolution 721 gives full backing to peace-
keeping force, provided cease-fire holds; continued shelling of Osijek.
Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom announce readiness to recognise
Slovenia and Croatia.
Croatian forces lift blockade of Marshal Tito barracks in Zagreb; beginning of
Yugoslavian withdrawal from Zagreb; cease-fire appears to be holding; the
Committee of Senior Oflicials (CSO) meets in Prague and confirms earlier
CSCE positions, Yugoslavia does not attend.
Some violations; cease-fire generally holding.
EC restores trade benefits, financial co-operation and PHARE to Slovenia,
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, back-dated to l5th November.
Mr. Cyrus Vance and Mr. Kadijevic hold talks in attempt to make cease-fire
hold; fighting at Osijek continues.
The WEU Assembly adopts Recommendations 5l I and 512 calling for the par-
ticipation of all member states in humanitarian operations, thus setting an
example of solidarity; it also calls for these operations to be co-ordinated.
Co-ordination is to be increased with a view to participating in a peace-keeping
force 
- 
still under the aegis of the United Nations 
- 
as soon as the conditions
making this legitimate have been met. These recommendations also advocate
taking without delay the necessary military and naval measures to enforce the
embargo decided by the Twelve on 8th November, grounding all military air-
craft in Yugoslav air space, using electronic counter measures to best effect and
imposing effective arms and oil embargos on all Yugoslav belligerents.
Yugoslavian assault on Dubrovnik; United States imposes sanctions on all
republics; general increase in fighting in all areas.
Zagreb: local cease-fire as troops withdraw and prisoners exchanged.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 724 agrees to send advance team
of observers, probably 12 civilian, 6 military.
United Nations observers arrive; fighting continues.
Mr. Cyrus Vance arrives for fifth visit (to 4th January) ;confirms that no peace-
keeping force will go to " Yugoslavia " until cease-fire observed.
1992
Croatia and Serbia agree to United Nations force deployment, which hinges on
stable cease-fire; new cease-fire, negotiated by Mr. Cyrus Vance, agreed, to
come into effect on 3rd January.
CFl3 comes into effect.
United Nations prepares to send 50 military observers to " Yugoslavia "; some
violations but cease-fire generally holding.
Yugoslavian air force shoots down EC helicopter; five OM members killed.
United Nations Resolution 727, adopts plan to send 50 military
observers; Mr. Kadijevic resigns, replaced temporarily by Generai
Adzic, Yugoslavian Chief of Staff.
EC peace conference reconvenes in Brussels.
liaison
Blagoje
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l|th January
15th lanuary
20th January
2Lst lanuary
23rd January
3Lst January
3rd February
4th February
6th February
7th February
1lth February
16th February
18th February
19th February
2Lst February
24th February
26th February
27th February
lst March
Mr. Milan Babic (Serbian leader of the self-proclaimed " Krajina Republic ")
opposes United Nations plan on basis that it provides insufficient guarantees
for minority Serbs in Croatia.
EC members recognise independence of Slovenia and Croatia, witholds recog--
nition of Macedon-ia and Boinia-Herzegovina; United Nations advance team of
45 arrives as cease-flrre holds generally.
Mr. Milan Babic again rules out deployment of United Nations observers in
Krajina region.
Both sides accuse each other of violations; Serbian draft law to allow " nations
wishing to remain in common State " to form new parliament and other institu-
tions.
" Helsinki Watch " reports that Serbian irregular forces are responsible for exe-
cutions of up to 200 civilians.
Serbian regular and irregular force leaders meet to " discuss " deployment of
United Nations peace-keeping forces.
Mr. Milan Babic claims his agreement with other Serbian leaders for United
Nations deployment extracted by * police methods and torture ".
First inter-ethnic clashes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the Mostar region.
Lord Carrington arrives in Yugoslavia to " knock heads togethet irnZagteb and
Belgrade "; advance United Nations force to be increased to 75 as cease-fire
holds.
Mr. Franjo Tudjman drops objections to United Nations force; Mr. Milan
Babic now only remaining opposition to United Nations plans; some Security
Council members argue for partial deployment; Mr. Cyrus Vance disagrees.
United Nations Resolution 740 calls for hold-out leaders to accept United
Nations plans for deployment and increased observers from 50 to 75; Mr. Milan
Babic announces plan for referendum on question of deployment.
Croatia renews opposition to United Nations plan after the new United Nations
Secretary-General, Mr. Butros Ghali, announces that Serb areas within Croatia
will remain outside Croatian control under United Nations peace-keeping plan;
Mr. Franjo Tudjman claims this is not what was agteed.
The Twelve discuss the merits of recognising Macedonia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Mr. Milan Babic postpones referendum on United Nations plan.
United Nations announces that political settlement of Yugoslavia to be left in
hands of Lord Carrington; Mr. Butros Ghali recommends immediate dispatch
of peace-keeping forces (to be known as UNPROFOR: United Nations Pro-
tection Force).
United Nations Resolution 743 establishes UNPROFOR for 12 months; Mr.
Milan Babic agrees to peace plan and disarming of militia, explaining that basic
objections had been satisfied (including explicit United Nations acknowl-
edgement that Croatian authority would not apply in Serb enclaves); Yugoslavia
to withdraw from areas occupied by United Nations; Croatia announces Cro-
atian law will apply in all areas; Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher states that, since
his visit, Mr. Franjo Tudjman has no more objections; ethnic leaders in Bosnia-
Herzegovina agree that republic's borders should remain unchanged.
The United States, the United Kingdom and France argue that the
UNPROFOR budget is too high and needs to be reduced by half before
approval.
Serbian sources report Mr. Milan Babic ousted, replaced by Mr. Goran Hadzic,
Prime Minister of the (self-proclaimed) Serbian Autonomous Region of Sla-
vonia, Baranja and Western Srem'; the latter supports United Nations plan;
Serbia offers new commitment to EC peace conference.
Artillery attacks in Croatia; first major violation of 3rd January cease-fire.
Bmnia-Herzegovina independence referendum; 630/o (990/o of those who vote,
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2nd March
3rd March
6th March
10th March
l2th March
16th March
ITth March
lSth March
23rd March
26th March
27th March
30th March
3lst March
lst April
3rd April
5th April
6th April
7th April
27th April
22nd May
mostly Muslims and Croats) vote " yes "; sporadic violence in republic in wake
of vote; Montenegrin referendum vote in favour of continued union with
Serbia.
Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina raise barricades around Sarajevo.
Agreement reached to dismantle barricades; Mr. Cyrus Vance visits Belgrade to
discuss UNPROFOR deployment.
Mr. Cyrus Vance visits Bosnia-Herzegovina; claims agreement between ethnic
communities reached, promises to seek peaceful settlement; announcement that
UNPROFOR to be fully deployed by l5th April 
- 
headquarters to be in
Sarajevo; the President of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic,
announces he will seek negotiations to allow Yugoslavian withdrawal from
Bosnia-Herzegovina if republic is recognised.
The Commander of UNPROFOR, Indian General Satish Nambiar, arrives in
Zagreb; fighting continues in East and South Croatia; UNPROFOR to be
deployed in Serb-controlled regions of Eastern and Western Slavonia, and in
Krajina.
European Parliament calls for EC recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
United Nations troops begin full deployment; 350 advance troops head for war
zones.
United Nations advance troops now in forward positions.
Agreement between ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina signed; basic
agreement to divide republic into ethnic * cantons ".
Fighting in Herzegovina between Yugoslavian and Croatian forces.
Slovenia urges CSCE to recognise Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia; fighting
continues in Bosnia-Herzegovina at Bosanski Brod and Derventa; Western dip
lomats warning that slow pace of United Nations deployment is allowing mili-
tants on all sides to prepare for spring campaign.
More violence in Bosanski Brod; leader of Serbian 'assembly " in Bosnia-
Herzegovina announces creation of ' Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina'
which would join Yugoslavia.
Brussels: meeting of leaders of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
I 300 French United Nations troops leave France.
Brussels: 4-point agxeement between presidents of all republics, undertaking to
dismantle trade restrictions, restore transport and communication links, wbrk
to restore power and flow of oil.
Bosnia-Herzegovina asks United Nations for military help to end fighting,
which has now spread across northern Bosnia-Herzegovina(local ethnic mititias
attempt to gain territory before recognition and division).
Severe escalation of fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina; casualties now in the hun-
dreds (massacres of Muslims by Serbs reported at Kpres and Bijeljina);leaders
agtree to new political talks and all call for cease-fire.
Serbian forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina fight for control of Sarajevo; large demon-
strations for peace there; United Nations headquarters attacked.
EC recognises Bosnia-Herzegovina; recognition of Macedonia withheld because
of continuing Greek objections, despite Macedonia's meeting of conditions for
recognition; fighting continues; US recognises Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina; Security Council authorises earliest possible full deployment of
peace-keeping troops; Mr. Butros Ghali announces that violationi of January
cease-fire now total 100-200 per day; 800 French United Nations troops in
Krajina region.
QqrQil and Montenegro form the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The
EEC insists on federal troops being withdrawn from Bosnia before it recognises
the FRY.
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia join the United Nations.
224
APPENDIX V DOCUMENT 1337
30th May
4th June
19th June
26th June
29th June
2nd July
jrd July
10th July
14th July
lTth July
23rd July
29th July
30th July
2nd August
l3th August
l4th August
24th August
24th-27th August
26th-28th August
26th August
The United Nations decrees a total embargo against Serbia and Montenegro
while the first bombs fall on Sarajevo.
Meeting of the WEU Permanent Council to discuss former Yugoslavia.
The WEU Council of Ministers, after underlining the extreme urgency of
humanitarian assistance, principally to the Bosnian people, and the need to
establish a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its surroundings, particu-
larly the airport so that it might be reopened, expresses its support for the active
participation of member states in this operation in accordance with United
Nations Security Council Resolution 758. The ministers also declare that WEU
is prepared, within the limit of its possibilities, to help ensure effective imple-
mentation of Security Council resolutions relating to the Yugoslav conflict. To
this end, an ad hoc group of representatives of foreign and defence ministries is
instructed to study specific aspects of this task.
Meeting of the Ad Hoc Sub-group on Yugoslavia (AHGY).
The blockade of Sarajevo is ended with the opening of an air lift and the United
Nations Security Council authorises the deployment of a thousand blue berets
at Sarajevo airport.
Rome: meeting of naval experts.
Rome: meeting of the AHGY.
WEU decides to start naval monitoring of the Adriatic to enforce the United
Nations embargo.
Mr. Milan Panic, an American businessman of Serb origin, is appointed Prime
Minister of the FRY.
Rome: meeting of the naval points of contact, mainly devoted to WEU/NATO
co-ordination of naval operations of surveillance.
Rome: meeting of the AHGY.
Rome: meeting of naval experts on embargo and humanitarian assistance.
Geneva conference on Yugoslav refugees. The war in Yugoslavia has already
displaced 2.2 million persons and caused more than 12 000 victims.
Rome: meeting of the AHGY.
An American daily newspaper reveals the existence of Serb internment camps
and atrocities. The United Nations Security Council was to confirm this and ask
all belligerents to allow international agencies access to these camps.
The Security Council adopts two resolutions, one authorising recourse to mil-
itary force to convey humanitarian aid to Bosnia, including the camps, and the
other condemning the principle of ethnic cleansing practised by certain bellig-
erents.
Rome: meeting of the AHGY and humanitarian group.
France announces that it is prepared to send I 100 men to Yugoslavia in the
framework of United Nations resolutions. The United Kingdom then
announces that it will send I 800 men and Italy I 500.
Rome: meeting of the Ad Hoc Group to consider the report drawn up by the
contingency planning group and the various options to be submitted to the
WEU Council following the United Nations Security Council Resolution 770
relating to the protection of humanitarian convoys and the monitoring of heavy
weapons in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Fact-finding mission by the Chairman of the WEU Assembly's Defence Com-
mittee, Sir Dudley Smith, MP, and Rapporteur, Mr. Gtinter Marten, MdB, to
observe WEU operations in the Adriatic area (and to visit NATO-US ships).
Recommendations formulated for WEU extraordinary Council meeting (see
28th August) and Assembly's Standing Committee (see 3rd September).
London: international peace conference.
Lord Carrington, Chairman of the conference since its creation by the Twelve,
resigns and is replaced by Lord Owen.
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6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
I l.
12.
13.
All delegations (including the Serbs) adopt the following four texts:
1. Declarution of 13 principles to be reqrccted by all partics
Obligation to cease fighting and respect the cease-fire.
No advantage gained by force will be recognised.
All parties will take part in negotiations with a view to resolving the political problems and
difficulties.
Full respect of human rights.
Implementation of guarantees in favour of the fundamental rights and freedoms of those
belonging to ethnic or national minorities.
An end to " ethnic cleansing " and detention camps.
Personal responsibility of those who have violated the Geneva Convention on war crimes.
Respect ofborders and ofindependence, sovereignty and territorial integrity ofall states in
the region.
The succession of the former State of Yugoslavia will be defined by consensus or by arbi-
tration in mutual respect of the different states.
Respect of United Nations resolutions by all states and all factions.
Humanitarian aid must be brought to the most in need, notably children.
All parties must co-operate fully in international peace-keeping efforts and armament
control operations.
International guarantees for the establishment of agreements reached at the London Con-
ference and at further work by the permanent structure to be set up in Geneva.
2. Resolution on Bosnia-Herzegovina
It calls on the fighting parties to cease " completely and immediately " hostilities and all kinds of
violence and to resume " immediately and without conditions " negotiations in seven sectors
and " establish an international peace-keeping force, under the auspices of the United Nations,
to enforce the cease-fire, monitor military movements and adopt other measures destined to
restore confidence ".
3. Action programme
It foresees that the negotiations begun in Brussels under the European Presidency and then
carried on at the London Conference continue in Geneva and that six working grcups be created
for this purpose, with responsibility for:
- 
Bosnia-Herzegovina;
- 
humanitarian problems;
- 
minorities;
- 
the succession of the Yugoslav State;
- 
economic recovery;
- 
measures of confidence.
4. Declaration on Serbia
In this document, the Serbs and Montenegrins commit themselves:
- 
to put an end to any intervention across their borders in Bosnia and Croatia;
- to do whatever is in their power to prevent the Bosnian Serbs from taking territories and
expulsing minorities;
- 
to restore the rights of the national and ethnic communities and minorities;
- 
to use their influenoe among the Bosnian Serbs to obtain the closing down of detention camps
and to allow the return of refugees to their homes;
- 
to declare that they abide by the integrity of present borders.
It was also agreed that the parties involved in the conflict would notify the United Nations
within the next 4 days of their mortar shells and heavy weapons, something considered a
" prelude " to military disengagement.
226
,l
I
i
rl
:
il
rl
I
APPENDIX V DOCUMENT 1337
27th August
28th August
30th August
3|st August
lst September
2nd September
3rd September
Fighting continues throughout the day in Sarajevo.
Resumption of Serb artillery fire in Dubrovnik.
Brussels: the NATO Defence Planning Committee agrees to STA-
NAVFORLANT taking over from STANAVFORMED from 9th to 26th Sep
tember.
Belgrade: the Deputy Minister of the Interior of the ' Yugoslav " Federal Gov-
ernment is dismissed, accused of not having supported the government's anti-
ethnic cleansing programme.
The French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Roland Dumas, repeats France's
proposal for an air exclusion zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina to protect civilians
against Serb bombing.
Extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council.
London: the WEU ministers for foreign affairs and defence meet in connection
with the London Conference. They express their firm conviction that the prin-
ciples adopted at the conference should lay the foundations for progress towards
a fair political solution to the crisis in former Yugoslavia.
They also decide to make immediately available to the United Nations almost
5 000 men and various means of transport and logistic equipment.
Violent fighting continues on the main fronts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A shell
kills eight people and wounds scores in a Sarajevo suburb.
Poland's former Prime Minister, Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, instructed by the
United Nations to inquire into violations of human rights in former Yugoslavia,
denounces, in his report, the everyday practice of ethnic cleansing and advo-
cates the extension of the UNPROFOR.
Belgrade: socialists and extreme nationalists table a motion of censure of Mr.
Milan Panic, accusing him of not defending Serb interests at the London Con-
ference.
Lord Owen starts a tour of European capitals.
Sarajevo: violent exchanges of artillery between Serbs and Muslims.
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council: NATO decides to support action taken
under the responsibility of the United Nations to protect the transport of
humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina by road and rail.
Brussels: the Twelve agree to strengthen the trade embargo against Serbia and
Montenegro.
An Italian relief aircraft is shot down by a missile near Sarajevo in an area
under Croatian control. Sarajevo airport is closed and humanitarian relief
flights suspended.
Geneva: opening of the standing conference on former Yugoslavia under thejoint chairmanship of Lord Owen (for the EC) and Mr. Cyrus Vance (for the
United Nations).
Paris: extraordinary meeting of the Standing Committee of the WEU Assembly,
which recommends a complete blockade of Serbia and Montenegro and their
exclusion from all international organisations until such time as they respect all
United Nations resolutions and the decisions of the London Conference. In
Recommendation 525, the Assembly recommends that the Council * seek
immediate United Nations approval to impose a complete and total land, air
and sea blockade of Serbia and Montenegro, insist that Greece give the nec-
essary assurances of total compliance with the United Nations embargo before
continuing the present negotiations for WEU membership, offer to the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations to keep WEU forces available to the United
Nations under Europan command and operational control and institute a
formal liaison mechanism with NATO headquarters " .
The Assembly also recommends that, if Serbia does not respect the London
commitments, an air exclusion zone be created.It recommends that countries that are not members of the organisation be
invited " to co-operate in furnishing military forces to complement WEU
assets " and, finally, that the Council * examine action to be taken, including
military action,... to prevent present conflicts spreading to Kosovo, Sandjak,
Vojvodina and Macedonia ".
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4th September
5th September
7th September
8th September
9th September
lOth September
I lth September
l2th September
12th-13th September
14th September
1sth September
Zageb: the Croatian authorities seize a cargo of arms on board an Iranian air-
craft intended for the Muslims.
The federal parliament of the new * Yugoslavia " rejects the motion of censure
of the Yugoslav Prime Minister tabled on 3lst August.
Sarajevo: resumption of artillery firing after a few days' calm.
GenLva: the emergency meeting on distributing humanitarian aid is unable to
reach a decision on resuming the Sarajevo air lift.
Two French blue berets are killed in an ambush of a humanitarian convoy.
Mr. Mesic is elected President of the Croatian Parliament.
The co-Chairmen of the international conference, Mr. Cyrus Vance and Lord
Owen, start a five-day tour of former Yugoslavia.
Paris: the French Miirister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Roland Dumas, has talks
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Butros-Ghali, on the
need for rapid implementation of Resolution 770 providing for humanitarian
convoys to have a military escort.
Mr. Butros-Ghali says he agrees with the principle of air protection for con-
veying humanitarian aid to Bosnia provided the Security Council gives a spe-
cific mandate.
The United Nations Security Council meets to examine further steps to be taken
to ensure the safety of blue berets.
The Serb leader in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Rodovan Y:atadzic, says the Serbs
in Bosnia will place their heavy weapons under United Nations control before
the deadline (noon on 12th September) set by Lord Owen and Mr. Cyrus Vance.
The Greek Prime Minister, Mr. Constantin Mitsotakis, denies that Greece has
infringed the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro and confirms that his
country does not intend to support a military intervention in former Yugo-
slavia.
The Yugoslav Prime Minister, Mr. Milan Panic, replaces the entire Yugoslav
Delegatibn to the Geneva Conference, affrrming that the permanent-negotiating
team that took part in the London Conference and was composed of supporters
of President Milosevic was not equal to its task. The Liberal Minister without
Portfolio, Mr. Ljubisa Rakic, leads the new team.
Belgrade: resignation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the new Yugoslavia,
Mr. Madislaw Jovanovic, who disagrees with Mr. Panic's policy that he con-
siders contrary to the interests of Serbia and the Serb people.
Mr. Butros-Ghali recommends to the Security Council a four- or five-fold
increase in United Nations troops to ensure an increase in deliveries of humani-
tarian aid.
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopts a declaration on
the conflict in former Yugoslavia.
Sarajevo: Iord Owen and Mr. Cyrus Vance announce that high-level discus-
sioni on the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina are to start in Geneva on l Sth Sep-
tember.
Istanbul: the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopts a declaration
condemning the policy of ethnic cleansing.
Serb and Bosnia militias start to regroup their heavy weapons to place them
under the control of the UNPROFOR blue berets. However, several local camps
refuse to hand in their 32 mm mortars.
Meeting of ministers for foreign affairs of the European Community. They
support the idea of an air exclusion zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina and call on the
United Nations to exclude the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from all United
Nations bodies.
The fresh outbreak of fighting in Sarajevo jeopardises the Geneva talks.
The United Nations Security Council authorises the deployment of several
thousand additional blue berets in Bosnia-Herzegovina to protect humanitarian
relief convoys.
Resolution 776, adopted by 12 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions, approves the most
recent report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, authorises the
extension of the UNPROFOR mandate and the number of troops in Bosnia-
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Herzegovina recommended by the Secretary-General to carry out the missions
referred to in the report, including the protection of convoys of released pris-
oners if the International Committee of the Red Cross so requests. About 6 000
European soldiers are thus to join the I 500 UNPROFOR troops.
The Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OtC) calls for the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia to be excluded from all United Nations bodies.
Precarious calm in Sarajevo.
16th September Prague: the CSCE Committee of Senior Officials publishes a report on the situ-
ation in the detention camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina which is damning for the
three communities in Bosnia.
Lord Owen and Mr. Cyrus Vance welcome the positive attitude of the gov-
ernment in Belgrade, which has accepted the presence of observers in Serbian
and Montenegrin airports.
17th September Prague: at a meeting of the CSCE, the Vatican proposes an eight-point plan for
ending the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The plan provides inter alia for a
true naval blockade completed, if necessary, by the closing of the air space of
Bosnia-Herzegovina to all flights except for those of the United Nations and a
strengthened, verified land and waterway embargo and recourse to all means
available to the international community in the absence of good will by the
parties to the conflict.
Violent fighting breaks out again in Sarajevo, particularly in the Ilidza sector,
held by the Serbs, where Muslim forces have attempted a breakthrough.
Belgrade: the Prime Minister, Mr. Milan Panic, is the target for further attacks
after he declares that the new Yugoslavia cannot expect to take over purely and
simply from the former federation and should apply for admission to the
United Nations.
18th-2Lst September Resumption of the Geneva negotiations on the constitutional future of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Differences jeopardise the alliance between the Croats and the
Bosnian Muslims. The views of the Croat and Serb leaders that there should be
a three-state confederation are @ntrary to those of the Muslims, who advocate a
unified Bosnia.
I9th September New York: The United Nations Security Council adopts Resolution 777 laying
down inter alia that the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Monte-
negro) cannot automatically replace the former Socialist Federation of Yugo-
slavia in the United Nations.
21st September New York: the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Mr. Milan Panic, meets the diplo-
matic leaders of the permanent members of the Security Council at the United
Nations. Inconclusive end to the Geneva Conference. The Bosnians table a pro-
posal for an internationally-recognised sovereign republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, which would be a decentralised state ensuring equal rights for
Croats, Muslims, Serbs and all other citizens and guaranteeing political plur-
alism, all religious and national rights and the rights of minorities.
Athens: meeting between the ceChairmen of the international conference, Lord
Owen and Mr. Cyrus Vance, and the Greek Prime Minister, Mr. Mitsotakis, on
the Yugoslav crisis as a whole and, more particularly, recognition of the
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. At the same time, Greece recommences
exports of oil to Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia that it
intemrpted following affirmations that it was violating the oil embargo against
Serbia and Montenegro.
The Bosnian President, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, appeals to the United Nations to
compel Serbia to respect its undertakings and asks for the creation of an interna-
tional tribunal to try war crimes committed during the conflict.
22nd September Air raids continue in Bosnia.
New York the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is officially excluded from the
United Nations General Assembly.
Athens: Mr. Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen ask the Greek Government to
influence Serbia in order to reach a fair and peaceful settlement, in particular of
the Kosovo problem.
23rd September Belgrade: the Serb leader, Mr. Rodovan Karadzic, threatens the West that a true
religious war will break out that will lead to an international conflict if the par-
tition of Bosnia is not accepted.
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24th September
27th September
28th September
29th September
30th September
lst October
2nd October
3rd October
6th October
7th October
9th October
10th October
l Ith October
New York: Mr. Franjo Tudjman and his Bosnian opposite number, Mr. Alija
Izetbegovic, announce that the two republics have concluded an agreement
setting up a commission to co-ordinate their defence efforts against Serb regular
and irregular forces.
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council.
The United Nations strengthens its arrangements to protect blue berets.
Convoys are escorted by armoured vehicles.
Fighting continues in Sarajevo.
Visit by Lord Owen and Mr. Cyrus Vance, to Belgrade.
The President of new Yugoslavia, Mr. Dobrica Cosic, agrees to meet his Cro-
atian opposite number, Mr. Franjo Tudjman, in Geneva on 3fth September.
The American press reveals that 3 000 Bosnian Muslim prisoners were mas-
sacred near Brcko by Serb militias in May and June 1992.
The French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Roland Dumas, asks the United
Nations and the European Community to hold an inquiry into the massacre.
The High Commissioner for Refugees says 400 000 people may die of cold and
hunger in Bosnia-Herzegovina this winter if a large-scale effort is not made
immediately by the international community.
The Yugoslav Prime Minister, Mr. Milan Panic, obtains Washington's support
for a partial lifting of the oil embargo to allow " Yugoslavs - to be heated this
winter.
Resumption of the Geneva Conference with the two co-Chairmen, Lord Owen
and Mr. Cyrus Vance, and, on the one hand, the Croatian President, Mr. Franjo
Tudjman, and his Yugoslav opposite number, Mr. Dobrico Cosic, and, on the
other, the Bosnian Serb leader, Mr. Rodovan Karadzic.
Mr. Tudjman and Mr. Cosic undertake to try to find a fair and peaceful solution
to the Bosnian conflict. In a joint declaration, they condemn ethnic cleansing,
undertake to speed up the normalisation process between their two countries,
facilitate the return home of displaced persons and accept the demilitarisation
of the Prevlaka peninsula in Croatia. The Yugoslav federal army will leave the
peninsula on 2fth September, the day the two Presidents are to meet Lord
Owen and Mr. Cyrus Vance again in Geneva.
According to Lord Owen, the parties to the Yugoslav conflict have accepted the
principle of discussions on the demilitarisation of Sarajevo.
French General Philippe Morillon is officially appointed head of the
strengthened UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Serbs, Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina agree to negotiate at military
level, in the presence of the head of UNPROFOR, their progressive withdrawal
from Sarajevo.I 560 prisoners are released from the Serb-controlled Trnopolje camp.
The President of the United States, Mr. George Bush, announces that he is pre-
pared to send forces to take part in establishing an air exclusion zone over
Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to prevent the Serbs from bombing Muslims.
The Sarajevo air lift is resumed.
The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 780
setting up a commission of inquiry into war crimes.
serb forces take the town of Boganski-Brod, the last stronghold of the croats
and Muslims in northern Bosnia.
Opening of negotiations on the demilitarisation of Sarajevo.
The United Nations Security Council adopts Resolution 781 imposing an air
exclusion zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Serb air force continues to overfly Bosnian territory.
Belgrade: the referendum organised in Serbia does not produce a large enough
majority to allow legislative and presidential elections to be held befoie the due
date.
Serbia boycotts the consultations between Croatia and new Yugoslavia that are
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12th October
l3th October
14th October
15th October
l6th October
18th October
19th October
20th October
2lst October
23rd October
26th October
27th October
starting in the framework of the agreements on normalising relations between
the two countries.
In Kosovo, a province in the south of Serbia that lost its autonomy in 1990,
ethnic Albanians who have unilaterally proclaimed a Republic of Kosovo and
broken off the dialogue with the Serbs, call for teaching of the Albanian lan-
guage to be resumed.
Geneva: at a meeting with the co-Chairmen of the international conference,
Lord Owen and Mr. Cyrus Vance, the leader of the Serbs in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Mr. Rodovan Karudzic, offers to withdraw all his aircraft from
Bosnia-Herzegovina and group them in the airports of the Yugoslav Federation
under the control of United Nations observers.
Mr. Cyrus Vance urges the Security Council to be most vigilant in face of pos-
sible repercussions in Kosovo and Macedonia.
Paris: the Montenegrin Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Miodrag Lekic, asks
Mr. Roland Dumas to ensure the presence of international observers for the leg-
islative elections to be be held in Montenegro in December.
Mr. Milan Panic goes to Pristina (Kosovo) to establish a dialogue between Serbs
and ethnic Albanians.
The chief of the Serb air force, General Zimovir Ninkovic, opposes the
agreement on the withdrawal of his forces from Bosnia.
The Chairman of the WEU Assembly Defence Committee, Sir Dudley Smith,
MP, accompanied by Mr. Giinter Marten, MdB, visits Romania and notes that
the country is respecting the embargo against Yugoslavia.
The President of Yugoslavia, Mr. Dobrica Cosic, calls for the resignation of Mr.
Slobodan Milosevic and says there is a risk of civil war in Serbia.
The United Nations discovers the location of the Vukovar slaughter. Mr.
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, asked by the United Nations to inquire into the human
rights situation, denounces serious violations of such rights in Kosovo that may
lead to further violence.
After ten days of relative calm, Sarajevo is again heavily bombed.
Belgrade: the Serb police loyal to President Milosevic take control of the Federal
Ministry of the Interior to oppose the policy of compromise advocated by the
Yugoslav Prime Minister, Mr. Panic.
Geneva: at their first meeting since the beginning of the crisis in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the Bosnian President, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, and his Y_-ugoslav
opposite number, Mr. Dobrica Cosic, agree to intensify their efforts to
normatise relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the basis of mutual recognition.
Geneva: the Croat and Yugoslav Presidents, Mr. Franjo Tudjman and Mr.
Dobrica Cosic, undertake to normalise their relations by setting up liaison
offrces in Zagreb and Belgrade.
Because of the worsening situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the HRC has to
suspend its humanitarian relief convoys. The Bosnian President, Mr. Alija
Izeibegovic, agrees 
- 
after refusing for a long time - to an army gfficel loyal to
him playing a direct part in the technical discussions on the demilitarisation of
Sarajevo held under the aegis of the United Nations.
Vienna: the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Mr. Milan Panic, meets the Austrian
Minister for Foieign Affairs, Mr. Alos Mock. He asks for tangible Western aid
in order to succeed in Yugoslavia.
For the first time since the beginning of hostilities, military leaders from the
three warring communities (Serbs, Croats and Muslims) meet in Sarajevo under
the aegis of ihe United Nations. They discuss technical conditions for q hypo-
thetical cease-fire and means of helping the arrival of international aid.
Bosnia's Serb pilots refuse to move their aircraft to aerodromes in new Yugo-
slhvia.
The French battalion, outside United Nations command, arrives in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
Presentation to the steering committee of the Geneva Conference of a plan for a
231
DOCUMENT I337 APPENDIX V
t,
,i1
,tl
li
very decentralised constitution for Bosnia-Herzegovina, providing for a central
authority and several multi-ethnic regions. The plan aims to make a political
solution possible in Bosnia-Herzegovina when fighting stops. According to the
spokesman of the co-Chairmen, Mr. Fred Eckhard, it also aims to safeguard the
sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a nation (as the Muslims want) while
guaranteeing wide autonomy for the provincial governments (to satisfy the
Serbs and Croats).
Belgrade: Mr. Rodovan Karadzic rejects this plan from outside.
The deputy leader of the Serb Delegation to the Geneva Conference, Mr. Nikola
Koljevic, finds the proposed constitution for Bosnia-Herzegovina unaccep-
table.
At the close of a second mission, the United Nations Rapporteur, Mr. Tadeusz
Mazowiecki, produces a very somber review of several months of war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and considers that ethnic cleansing has already largely attained its
arms.
The strategic town of Jajce, a Muslim stronghold, falls into the hands of the Serb
forces, leading to the exodus of thousands of refugees towards central
Bosnia.
Lord Owen and Mr. Cyrus Vance arrive in Kosovo to meet local Serb and
Albanian leaders.
Belgrade: in the Chamber of Deputies, the nationalists and Serb radicals vote a
motion of censure of the Prime Minister, Mr. Milan Panic.
Geneva: the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
Mr. Cornelio Sommaruga, calls for the creation of protected areas to receive as
top priority civilians interned in camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Thousands of refugees from Jajce are blocked at Croatia's southern frontiers.
The Chamber of Deputies rejects the motion of censure of the Yugoslav Prime
Minister, Mr. Milan Panic.
After their success in central Bosnia, Serb forces increase their pressure on
northern Bosnia. Bosnian radio reports violent fighting in Olovo, Kledanj and
Tuzlo.
At a meeting with the President of the European Commission, Mr. Jacques
Delors, the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Mr. Milan Panic, pleads for sanctions on
new Yugoslavia to be lifted.
The Serb leader in Bosnia, Mr. Rodovan Karadzic, announces a peace plan
aimed at confirming his gains on the ground. He advocates the creation of a
Bosnian confederation comprising three nation states.
The three parties to the conflict sign another cease-fire but flrghting continues in
southern Bosnia.
Start of the eighteenth cease-fire.
Opening in the United Nations Security Council of the first public debate on the
fate of the Muslim population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serb army breaks the
eighteenth cease-fire.
Mr. Roland Dumas launches the idea of a meeting of the London Conference on
former Yugoslavia devoted entirely to Bosnia. The meeting would be held at
ministerial level.
The United Nations Security Council adopts Resolution 787 strengthening eco-
nomic sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro. The Islamic proposal to lift the
embargo on weapons for Bosnia-Herzegovina is rejected.
Rome: meeting of the WEU ministers for foreign affairs and defence. Decla-
ration on former Yugoslavia.
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28th October
29th October
2nd November
3rd November
4th November
5th November
8th November
I0th November
12th November
13th November
I4th November
16th November
20th November
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Amerdment I
lst December 1992
WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis
SUPPLEMENTARY DRAFT RECOMMENDATION
tabhd by Mr. ,, ,#:::";;'o1B^,hi, and others
l. After paragraph 4 of the supplementary draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as
follows:
" Study plans for a European_ mili-tary operation to relieve th_e region of Sarajevo, liberate the
prison camps and put an end to the policy of occupation and ethnic cleansing pursued by the
Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. "
Signed: De Decker, Mackie of Benshie, Caro, Finsberg, Hardy
l. See llth sitting, 2nd December 1992 (amendment agreed to).
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Amendment 2
lst December 1992
WEU's operutional organisation and the Yugoslav crisis
SUPPLEMENTARY DRAFT RECOMMENDATION
tabted by Mr. ,, ,#:::";;'o1B" hi, and otkers
?.-- After paragraph 4 of the supplementary draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph asfollows:
* Take measures for and announce sanctions to be taken by member states against shipping corn-
panies and airlines guilty of violating the embargo decreed by the United Nations;;
Signed: De Decker, Mackie of Benshie, Andreotti, Caro, Finsberg, Hardy, P1criaux
1. See llth sitting,2nd December 1992 (amendment amended and agreed to).
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htropean security - ruserve forces and national semice
REPORT I
submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee2
by Mn De Declrer, Ropporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DRAFr Rr,couurNontlol,t
on European security - reserve forces and national service
ExpLnNnronv Msl"toRAxoutvl
submitted by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. National service in France, Belgium and the Netherlands
(i) France
(iil Belgium
(iii) The Netherlands
III. NATO's new force structures and the reserves
IV. Current reforms(/ Belgium
(ii) Canada
(iii) France
(ivl Germany
(v) The Netherlands
(vi) Porutgal
(vlfl SPain
(viii) Turkey
(rxl United Kingdom
(x/ United States
Y. The Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (the CIOR)
f, NATO relationshiP(iil Activities
(iiil Organisation
(ivl Commissions
(v/ National Reserve Forces Committee
(vi) The CIOMR
YI. Conclusions
APPENDICES
I.
II.
The CIOR's country-by-country survey of reserve forces
National service in'countries of wEU and the North Atlantic Alliance
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Sit Dudley Smith (Chairman); Mrs. Baaneld-Schlaman, Ml de_ Puig (Al_ternate:_Moya) (Yice-
Chairmen); MM. Alloncle, Bassinet, Boideras, Brito, Cai$ia, Chevalier. (Alternate: Sarens), C9x, De Decker, Dees, Durand,
Fernsndei'Marqtes,Fiandro3ti, Fioret, Fourr6, Hardy,bmer, Jung, Kelchtermans,Yrl Lentz-C_ornene,.MM. van der Linden,
Marpn, forO Newilt (Alternafe: Thompson), MM. Pecchioli, Perinat (Alternate: Cuco), Reis Leite (Alternate: Mrs. Aguiar),
Schetr,'Sinesio, Sir Keith Speed, MM. Steiner, Vasquez (Alternate: Bolinaga), Zierer.
N.B, Tfte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Recommendation
on EuruTnan security 
- 
reseme lotus aad natioaal senice
The Assembly,
Q . Recognising- that adequate ltanding_forces must still be maintained to preserve the requirementfor defence incumbent in Article S of ttrJWashington Treaty and Article V o?tne more Uin<iinimd-ified Brussels Treaty;(i.i) Conscious that.with- the ending of East-West conflict in Europe there is a reduced need for
sizeable-standing and largely conscripiarmies and that instead, smalle{ ne*iUti, mobi6;a;;;;;;:fessional forces are required;
Qiil Beqrlng in. mind, however, the imperative of maintaining a capability for home defence inEurope which might be increasingly entrusted to reserve forces;(rl Recognising the devotion to duty of the Atlantic Alliance's reserve forces and mindful of the sac-
rifices made by those who serve in the reserves;
(y) 
. 
Underlining the important liaison r6le played by reserve forces in linking the armed forces withthe civilian PQPulation, wh.ich strengthens piUtit spiritedness anO promoili-5.it"r unO"ista"Orrrg i;our nations of defence problems;
(vi). 
.Considering the current debate in 
_many member countries on the relative advantages of con-scription vis-d-vis all-volunteer and professional forces, although at"are tlii tfr"-futt;i;";;r6;;-tionally more costly;
(vii) Witnessingthe. general reductions in the..length of national service in the majority of member
countries, or its abolition, and wishing to hiehlight the obvious effect on 169 ura-ifu6ifiii 
"f 
p-rj*fi:
trained reservists;
(viii) Determined to promote full and frank debate in WEU on the subject of national service and
reserve forces in member countries;(ix) Convinced that more coherent arrangements for assuring a cost-effective European security
sy.!le.m l4gylo be-possible, grven gr- eater co-operation and consuitation betwCn mlmuei it"tii, u"ii,within WEU and to.gether with the other nitions of the Atlantii etti"nii -"no lr,. North atunticCo-operation Council;
(x) 
. 
Knowing that the Central European states would welcome the opportunity to discuss matters
such as national service and reserve fbrces;
gr) Supporting. the efforts of the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (CIOR) to stimulateinformed discussion among-its members on a wide uarieti 
"ilrtfi;";Ji6-irg inut tt. CIoR willsoon include all Atlantic Alliance nations, at least as observers, and iiais. *ifi1ftifirii4E ."pii,
nations which are full members of the North Atlantic co-opCration Co"riit ----(xii) Recalling Recommendation 469 adopted by the Assembly on 6th June l9g9;(xiii) Believing- that multinational units such as the Franco-German Brigade serve as a channel for the
enthusiasm of those who wish t-o place their national service in a nurope;;;;i;*i anO ttraittre idfi;fattributing reserve forces for the- European Corps provides a furtn#oppo.fi;ilil"i ilGgr;ii,rr; --
(xiv/..Considering the.increasingly strong calls by the-armed forces for modern, varied technologies
enabling them to nroyidq furthertraining, particuiarly for the voffiieil;h;il'riq"i."o iJ;;;?;;
a long enough period, which will be useful for theiisubsequent employmeniai cii1i"*; - --- - --'(rr'/ 
. 
Assertlng.that the-arrangements for organising and-mobilisin_g reserve forces in Austria, Finland,Sweden and Switzerland may ierve as a futuie modil forUottr ihe Westirn ili;p;;-arO 
"#.ijiv lln.iCentral European states,
RrcouurNps rHAT rsr CouNcrr_
l. 
. 
Take every- opportu^nity to ensure that the debate on reserve forces and national service in anymember country benefits from a common tqnd of experience and requiri-i"ir u"O include discussionon the subject on the agenda of the next WEU Chiefs of DeienCJ=Siaff 
-iiiir-C; 
^
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2. Stimulate informed debate in member countries on revised rOles for reserve forces as well as on
reductions in and possible restructuring of national service;
3. Provide a forum for discussion of such matters ilmong member states and also with Austria,
Finland, Sweden and Switzerland and interested Central European states;
4. Strongly encourage WEU countries without volunteer reserve forces to consider the example of
those which- already possess such an asset which is indispensable for countries abolishing national
service and to provide proper equipment and training for the reserves;
5. Explore the idea of creating a European " national guard " for territorial defence, using the
reserye forces of WEU member states;
6. Reconsider the Assembly's previous recommendation to " take specific action to allow at an
individual level the exchange of mittary personnel between countries to enhance their awareness of
European co-operation, give them great-ei opportunity for travel and a more interestin_g work envi-
ronment, and sirve as a useful recruiting incentive at a time when the demographic levels are making
recruiting most diflicult' (Recommendation 469);
7. Give priority to training volunteers who would be asked to form reserve forces w-hose training
would be continued for long enough after their return to civilian life for them to be, if necessary, a
useful complement to regular military personnel;
8. Decide to give a symbol of European identity to all forces - ships, aircraft, vehicles and regular
and reserve personnel - taking part in WEU operations;g. Establish and develop a liaison with the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (CIOR);
lO. Ask the WEU Institute for Security Studies to make a thorough examination of national service
and the structure of reserve forces in member states and of the possibilities for co-operation;
I l. Invite WEU parliamentarians to participate in discussions on these topics.
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Explanatory Memorandam
(submitted by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur)
I. Infioduction
l. The Defence Committee has long been
interested in the rOle of the reserve forc06and
has included regular reference to such forces in
its reports. However, the last report dedicated
entirely to the subject was reserve forces(Rapporteur: Mr. Delorme) adopted by the
Assembly in June 1976t.
2. The recommendation makes very inter-
esting reading:
'The Assembly,
(/ Considering that improved organisa-
tion, recruitment and training of reserve
forces would allow:
(a) a considerable strengthening of the
deterrent potential of the field forces
of the European armies;
(b) European defence to be based to a
substantial extent on recourse to the
widest possible mobilisation of the
people's energies in the event of attack;
(i/ Considering that the defence of
Europe must not be based solely on nuclear
deterrence and a modern and effective
field force but must also be ensured by a
people's deterrent, expressing the will of
the peoples of Europe to remain respon-
sible for their own destinies;
(iii) Aware of the importance of the r6le
which reserves can play in strengthening
the links between the European peoples
and their armies, particularly in keeping
public opinion better informed about the
importance of defence problems;
(iv/ Underlining the flrnancial advantages
of forming large-scale reserves, as oppostd
to an equivalent active force, when the
proportion of national budgets devoted to
defence tends to remain constant or even
diminish and when personnel costs linked
with the maintenance of active forces are
continuously increasing to the point of
sometimes jeopardising the implemen-
tation of certain equipment programmes;
(u/ Considering it necessary to harmonise
the concepts which govern the organisation
of reserves in Europe, in the framework of
a common strategy for all the Western
European states,
RrcoulrlrNos THAT rnr couNcrr-
l. (a) Together with the member states of
the Atlantic Alliance which are not
members of WEU, specify the type of
tasks entrusted to the various components
of the European defence system: nuclear
forces, combat forces, internal defence
forces;
(D/ Consequently define requirements in
respect of internal defence forces and
combat forces with a view to harmonising
the concepts of European states in this
field;
2. To this end, set up a group of experts
consisting of senior defence oflicials to
study measures likely to develop the con-
tribution by reserves to the internal
defence of European territory and inter
alia consider the possibility of:
(a) increasing the number of reservists
who could be called up for internal
defence, particularly where there is no
system of conscription;
(D/ producing special equipment for
reserves for internal defence forces, com-
bining power, simplicity and robustness,
and ensuring that it is made available
immediately in the event of mobilisation;
(c/ improving training of reserve officers
responsible for commanding the units
forming internal defence forces, such
training to include on the one hand
periods of training in active units and on
the other hand periods of training
together with reservists in the ranks;
(d) adapting compulsory military service,
where this exists, to the requirements ofinternal defence and consequently
provide for a short but intensive period of
active service followed by a number of
training periods at regular intervals;
(e/ organising internal defence forces on a
territorial basis by assigning the necessary
number of national servicemen and the
essential reservists, according to their
place of residence;
(fl payinereservists undergoing periods of
training at an appropriate rate;
3. (a/ Study measures likely to increase
the availability and effectiveness of
reserves for combat forces and inter alial. Document 707.
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seek means of improving the training of
such reserves and the speed and efficiency
of their mobilisation;
(b) Pay particular attention to
question of the time required for
mobilisation and immediate use
reserve units in the field forces;
4. Consider setting up a EuroPean
defence college where those responsible
for Europe's defence and reserve officers
would discuss their experiences and
endeavour to define joint principles which
might govern the use of reserves in
Europe. "
and much of the detail is extraordinarily
gennane even today.
3. An appendix gave details of the balance of
forces between the Warsaw Pact and the
Atlantic Alliance and defined the characteristics
of land forces in peacetime and their possible
strengthening in wartime and the study also gave
a forecast of the future shape of war - " attack
with or without warning, lightning or long-
drawn-out, conventional or nuclear ".
4. The situation has of course changed dra-
matically from that of 16 yeani ago and the
absence of a clear military threat against western
interests in Europe has largely undermined the
original requirement for considerable numbers
of trained reserves. Even the mobilisation of
some 230 000 United States reservists for the
Gulf conflict in 1990/91 (only a comparatively
small percentage left United States soil and the
majority filled billets at home vacated by active
personnel) is not considered a sufficient reason
for retaining the same sizeable reserves for the
future.
5. In the United States, as in the United
Kingdom and in Canada, the regular forces are
all-volunteer and in general do not produce a
great deal of manpower for the reserves in prac-
iical terms 
- 
the bulk of the reserves are them-
selves voluntary also.
6. Virtually all other members of the
Atlantic Alliance, barring Iceland and Luxem-
bourg, rely on forming their trained reserves by
giving their conscripts a reserve commitment at
the end of national service. What happens
therefore if that period of national service is
reduced to the point where no effective training
is possible or indeed the national service is abol-
ished?
7. The aim ofthe present report is therefore
twofold: to give an account of the present
reserve forces maintained by WEU countries
and also to examine the effect on the reserves of
reducing or abolishing national service.
8. If at the same time our nations may be
incited to debate the matter and even take com-
plementary decisions on future force structures
instead of acting always unilaterally then the
Assembly's efforts will not have been in vain.
II. Natiorwl semice in France,
Belgium and the Netherlands
9. Of course national service in most of our
countries has fulfilled a number of political and
social purposes as well as providing the cheapest
way of maintaining large numbers to reinforce
the regular army. To examine a number of cases:
(i) Frana
10. France's commitment to maintaining
national service for the future, although at a
comparatively reduced level, has been restated
on a number of occasions, with the last formal
restatement of principle occurring in the Prime
Minister's speech to the colloquy on the new
strategic debate on lst October. Mr. Bdrdgovoy-
was adamant that conscription formed part of
the natural structure of national life and was
unlikely to be abolished in the immediate
future.
11. The length of national service in France
has been reduced, however, from 12 to 10
months and no national servicemen were
allowed to serve as such in either the Gulf con-
flict or nowadays in the former Yugoslavia: all
must sign on for a three-year contract of " long
service' if they wish to volunteer for active
duty.
12. Another particular complication of
national service in France is that nearly one in
four of the eligible male population escapes his
obligation for one reason or another. On the
othei hand, it is also possible to do one's
national service working for a different ministry
than the Defence Ministry: perhaps on a
co-operative venture overseas or in a prefecture
or even with the fire brigade (the " sapeurs
pompiers "). The latest idea is to spend time
hetping the socially deprived - an experience
which could be of mutual benefit to all con-
cerned.
13. Although the French Government has a
particular attachment to the maintenance of
conscription, it is in the process of not only
modifying the length of national service (now l0
months instead of l2), but also adapting to new
conditions:
" Conscription is at the heart of our
defence options. Our attachment to it is
not rooted only in the two century old link
- 
and quite different from the mere
financing of the armed forces through tax-
ation 
- 
that the nation has managed to
maintain with its army thanks to military
the
the
of
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service. Objective considerations still mil-
itate in favour of retaining a large place
for conscription in the organisation of our
armed forces.
The usefulness of military service has been
proved
This is testified by the participation of
national servicemen in several external
operations, in particular in Yugoslavia
and Cambodia. France's ability to deploy
a significant part of its units outside its
territory and the development of peace-
keeping operations and humanitarian
actions are thus based on an essential con-
tribution by conscripts, particularly
branches such as emergency medical
treatment, logistics, interpretation, etc.
Conscription accounts for about 50Vo of
troop levels
The foreseeable trend of troop levels in
the years ahead should not modify this
proportion. Dropping conscription and
building up an entirely professional army
could only be at the cost of reducing the
size of forces. This would no longer allow
them to carry out the tasks that our
country wishes to assign to them and
would reduce the relative weight of our
defence system in Europe.
Cowcription ensures the diversity and
standard of the human resources of our
armed forces
If we deprive ourselves of this contri-
bution, there would be serious difficulties
in recruitment which, in the lower ranks,
might draw only those without a place in
the economic system.
The budgetary aspect can clearly not be
concealed
The maintenanoe of an army of conscripts
is the only way compatible with the effort
to stabilise financial resources earmarked
for defence purposes. Apart from the doc-
trinal considerations underlying our
choice, the anny has a deep-rooted,
lasting need for conscripts, otherwise it
will have to pay a very high price for
many essential executive and support
tasks, and recruit, at market rates, all the
specialists it vitdly needs in very many
sectors, ranging from unusual languages
through medicine to electronics.
Furthermore, while military service
remains overwhelmingly the main form of
national service since it accounts for 95Vo
of those called up, the essential r6le
played by the various civil forms in oper-
ating public services should not be for-
gotten: service in the police force,
co-operation service, technical assistance
in overseas departments and territories
and the new civil security service created
by the law of 4th January 1992.
However, perpetuating conscription in
our defence system means two conditions
have to be met 
- 
equality and universality
- 
as the basis of its acceptance by public
opinion. From this point of view, the
demographic trend and the adaptation of
medical selection standards have allowed
the rate of exemption to be reduced to a
historically low level of about l8%. This
tendency should be extended by a steady
effort to terminate inequality between
certain forms of national service.
Obviously, conscription cannot remain
outside the far-reaching changes affecting
all the components of our defence. It must
also be adapted to become fully integratodin the new organisation that the gov-
ernment is planning. By reducing the
period of military service to ten months,
the law of 4th January 1992 makes this
adaptation and extends it through m
ambitious renovation of conditions for
carrying out military service, particularly
in the army.
Thus, the reform of the system of training(abolition of the period of classes, direct
incorporation in working units) and
adoption of the new concept of dffiren-
tiated operational availability (a system
whereby units immediately available
coexist with deferred availability units
thanks to the possibility of calling up
some national servicemen two month
after their demobilisation) guarantee a
new place and r6le for conscription in the
country's defence policy. "
14. This does not mean that the debate on a
professional army is non-existent, quite the con-
trary in fact, and it wil probably not be very
long before the debate is out in the open again.
15. There is a definite effect on the reserve
forces as a result of the shortening of national
service: the reserves are given l/6 less training
than previously and this is bound to have a con-
sequence particularly for 'high+ech' posts
The cost of training is rising as equipment is
subjected to a greater turn-around in use. Some
consultation has taken place with the United
Kingdom on the formation of voluntary rEserves.
16. The French Ministry of Defence has
recently announced sweeping changes in the
anangements for constituting reserve forces.
Many of these ideas coincide with your Rap
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porteur's own suggestions and merit further
study within WEU and NATO:
" Current developments that have led us
to carry out major reforms in the armed
forces will inevitably have repercussions
on our reserve forces. It was therefore
essential to draw up a plan to modernise
and make reserve forces coherent with the
options agreed for active personnel.
This plan, the broad lines of which were
presented recently by the Secretary of
State, is to replace the present system,
based on mass recruitment, by a strict
organisation corresponding to the opera-
tional requirements of the armed forces
and of the gendarmerie and adapted to
both crisis and war situations.
Guidelines
Four main guidelines will be followed in
implementing this plan, known as
'R6serves 2000':
- 
constructing a general framework
within which each service can set up
and run its own reserve system adapted
to its operational needs, no longer just
for wartime but also 
- 
and this is a fun-
damental innovation 
- 
for times of
crisis.
Thus, voluntary reservists might be
called up in time of crisis in the light of
the needs of the armed forces;
- 
concentrating the efforts of the armed
forces and gendarmerie on the 500 000
reservists they effectively need and no
longer on the 4 000 000 reservists
forming the present mobilisation
potential;
- 
ensuring careful administration of these
reservists, calling up and training vol-
untary reserve officers on a more
regular basis and guaranteeing them
assignments that correspond to their
know-how;
- 
making volunteers 'loyal' by giving
them a contractual framework to ensure
a better follow-up of their training and
career in the reserve.
The Rdserves 2000 plan will be based on
three categories of reservists:
- 
those immediately available who might
be called up for a period of two to three
years after the end of their military
service and who will thus already have
received instruction and training;
- 
volunteers who would have to provide
the major part of reserve offtcers and
non-commissioned officers. As the
central element of this reform, volun-
teers would be given contracts enabling
their training and careers to be followed
up on a personalised basis;
- 
specialists, i.e. personnel exercising pro-
fessions in civilian life that are directly
transferrable to the armed forces (inter-
preters, doctors, etc.). They might be
recalled when needed in the event of
crisis or war.
This plan is thus aimed at promoting the
notion of voluntary service and concen-
trating the resources of our armed forces
on forming, managing and training
reservists according to their needs in time
of crisis or war and to those needs only.
The R6serves 2000 plan, which will
require legislative changes and new regu-
lations, will be implemented progressively
through shrewder staff management and
an increased effort by the armed forces in
favour of their reserves. "
17. Your Rapporteur believes that a fine line
remains between the lengh of training received
by the average national serviceman and the
same man's performance then as a reservist.
lE. With the general shortening of lengths of
national service in the majority of our countries
(see table at Appendix II) sometimes for par-
ticular political or economic ends rather than
out of concern for efficiency, it is more and
more difficult to understand why certain nations
do not abolish conscription altogether rather
than reduce ad absurdem.
19. That being said, your Rapporteur cannot
agree that a decision to abolish conscription
with a consequent effect not only on the size of a
country's forces but also on the size of its
reserves should be taken either lightly or unilat-
erally.
(ii) Belsiun
20. The Belgian Defence Minister's recent
decision to end conscription by 1994 fore-
shadows a dramatic reduction in the size of the
country's armed forces overall and means that
most equipment programmes will have to be
re-evaluated. This decision makes Belgium the
first country in continental Europe to abandon
conscription (although probably not the last).
21. An end to conscription will involve
demobilising more than 30 000 billets for con-
scripts. National service is presently scheduled
to end after 1993. Conscripts called up that year
will serve for eight months in Belgium or only
six months in Germany.
22. Attempts have been made in parliament
to set up a special commission to examine the
implications inherent in the decision but so far
have not met with any success.
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(iii) The Netherlands
23. In the Netherlands, however, a special
consultative commission (the * Dienstplicht "
Commission) has been hard at work, weighing
up the pros and cons ofthe professional versus a
conscript army. For the present the commission
has concluded that national service in the Neth-
erlands should not be abolished but be
shortened and made more agreeable.
24. Abolishing military service purely and
simply would have the effect of vastly reducing
the Dutch army's operational ability, especially
ofits land forces, as well as its eventual recourse
to mobilisable reserves. The commission also
pointed out that 
- 
independently of problems at
constitutional level 
- 
passing to a career army
entailed gxeat cost.
25. The commission considered that a
* radical reform " of military service was
needed. It especially pleaded in favour of a
flexible length of service, of nine, 12 or 15
months, depending on the function (conscripts
within this last category could, for example, be
posted to humanitarian missions or " peace-
keeping "). The report also comes down in
favour of an improvement in the material condi-
tions granted to conscripts (compensation, help
in finding work, university enrolment, etc.).
III. NATO's new force structures
and the reserves
26. Given the alterations in NATO phi-
losophy with the end of the cold war, one might
be forgiven for wondering just what reserve
forces would be required for within the NATO
atea.
27. Fortunately, your Rapporteur has had the
benefit of expert advice. Writing in the
Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers'
newsletter, Colonel L6on Stenuit of NATO's
International Military Staffhas this to say about
NATO's new force structures and the reserves:
" The new NATO force structure calls for
three categories of forces, namely Main
Defence Forces, Reaction Forces and
Augmentation Forces. Main Defence
Forces (MDF) will form the major portion
of the force structure and will generally be
maintained at lower readiness. However,
some MDFs will be kept at high readiness
for early defensive operations in a crisis.
Reaction Forces (RF) must be capable,
versatile, highly mobile and will be main-
tained at high degrees of readiness with
employment options covering all regions
of the alliance. They will be divided into
Immediate Reaction Forces (IRF) and
Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF). They need
air, land and maritime components. Aug;
mentation Forces (AF) will provide
appropriate strategic and operational
reserves not necessarily tied to specific
regions. They will be maintained al
varying degrees of readiness and will be
used where appropriate to reinforce thc
RFs and the local MDFs.
The structure of these forces must be
flexible enough to be adapted to the size
of the crisis and other factors such as
geography and climate. Thus, it may be
said that the NATO authorities will have
the opportunity to select units from a
large menu, depending on the circum-
stances.
This new NATO force structure clearly
calls for a greater reliance on force build-
up capabilities through reinforcement,
reserve mobilisation and reconstitution.
The obvious increased importance of
reservists will confront all alliance nations
with the challenge to develop or improve
their reserve organisation. The options
chosen will most probably vary from one
nation to another, however the common
objective must be effectiveness.
As the bulk of the forces will rely on
reservists, reserve oflicers will now need
to be educated and regularly trained and
updated in order to be capable of
assuming a larger spectrum of responsibil-
ities. Even high technology equipment
and weapon systems will be operated or
used by reservists. One can envisage that
fighter squadrons could be augmented by
reserve pilots, or even as we see already
now in the United States, that reserve
squadrons could be activated. The same is
also valid for ground and naval units
equipped with modern and sophisticated
equipment. Of course, there is a limit. For
example, the time is over when you could
simply store or even mothball modern air-
craft, and reserve fighter pilots need to fly
almost as much as regular pilots.
The key issue for the organisation of the
forces will be to identify which functions
need to be maintained in peacetime in
order to allow not only for a timely
build-up but also for a continuity training
programme that includes the training of
reservists and the * maintenance " of
equipment (in the broad sense).
The question to define if a unit needs to
be on * active' or * reserve " status in
peacetime is not necessarily dependent
upon the timing in which it needs to be
ready. Some nations have already
developed structures and training pro-
grammes that allow for units primarily
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manned by reservists to be maintained at
high readiness. Other nations are in the
process of developing similar systems.
The percentage of active personnel
required will essentially depend upon the
type of weapon system and mission. It can
be expected that some units will be exclu-
sively manned by reservists, whilst others
will only rely on reservists to reach full
combat strength or even have no
reservists at all.
It is well understood that technology and
training are essential but not the only
matters for consideration during this
period of fundamental change in the force
structure. Over the years of peace that are
hopefully in front of us, the forces will
need to maintain their motivation and the
required level of expertise in order to be
capable when required to assume their
tasks. The necessary recall of reservists
from civilian life for regular training exer-
cises will be very challenging not only for
employers and economic activities in
general but also for the armed forces, the
reservists and in particular for the reserve
officers. The following are a few topics
that will need consideration in most
NATO countries:
- 
practical arrangements between the
ministries of defence and the civilian
employers in order to avoid reservists
and their employers being profes-
sionally and financially penalised;
- 
selective recall of personnel in crisis,
which avoid disturbing unnecessarily
economic activities;
- 
motivation of reservists through val-
uable training opportunities;
- 
public support through well-adapted
information programmes.
These are only a few ideas but it is
essential that this fundamental transfor-
mation of NATO's force structure be suc-
cessful. Besides the budgetary benefits
that may be expected by governments, the
opportunity should not be missed to
establish efficient and practical plans to
allow capable reserve units to support
NATO's strategy. "
28. Of course the restructuring of NATO is
not yet fully complete and is bound to have a
further effect on the eventual shape of the
reserves in years to come.
IY. Currcat reforms
29. For the present, almost every country of
the Atlantic Alliance is in the process of modi-
fying the structure of its forces, to a greater or a
lesser degree. Current reforms which affect both
national service and the reserves are based on
the following " snapshot ":
(i) Belgium
30. In relation to its size Belgium has tradi-
tionally had one of the highest ratios of reserve
forces of any country of the alliance. The
Belgian army can count on 192 000 reservists
who can be mobilised.
31. There were traditional tasks to be accom-
plished:
- 
to complement active units and bring
them to full defence strength;
- 
to form two reserve brigades one of
which is assigned to the lst Belgian
Corps;
- 
to form the regiments for home defence
and also to form a number of
specialised units, notably engineering
and logistical units.
32. The air force, with a peacetime strength of
17 300, could be augmented with 40 500
reservists if necessary upon mobilisation. The
reservists would be required to bring the active
air force to full combat strength and have a par-
ticular r6le for airfield defence.
33. For the tavy, 12 400 reservists would be
available to join a peacetime strength of 4 400.
Some billets exist at sea but the majority of
reservists would be used for port defence or to
take part in the naval control of shipping
organisation.
34. Traditionally, a system of conscription
provided the opportunity to train a large
number of reservists. In common with most
countries of the alliance, national service in
Belgium was being restructured and it had been
planned to reduce from 10 months in Germany
and 12 months in Belgium to eight months in
Germany and l0 months in Belgium with effect
from this year, and to eight months everywhere
from the beginning of 1993.
35. International developments and the threat
following the upheavals in Central and Eastern
Europe, the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact,
the reunification of Germany and the prospect
of the withdrawal of troops of the former Soviet
Union from Central Europe led the Belgian
Government to decide, in July 1992, on a com-
plete restructuring of its armed forces.
36. The future structure takes account of the
following principles:
- 
maintenance of three forces (army, air
force and navy);
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- 
reorganisation of armed forces round a
smaller number of units with high tech-
nology equipment and capable of
deployment at short notice and in
various contexts;
- 
reduction in the number of regular serv-
icemen from 48 000 to 40 000;
- 
accentuating the inter-force and inter-
army aspects of future operations in the
organisation and working of head-
quarters and lines of command;
- 
retaining only a small reserve;
- 
abolishing military service as from
1994.
37. At the present stage in current studies, the
new structures of the regular army have not been
defined well enough to be able to express an
opinion on the future shape of the reserve. With
the termination of national service, it is obvious
that the reserve concept will have to be com-
pletely revised.
(ii) Canado
38. Canada is one of the four NATO nations
with voluntary military service and no con-
scription. The armed forces perform tasks in
Canada and Europe, as well as in several placesin the world in the context of the United
Nations (nearly 3 500 Canadians are presently
serving in various United Nations operations).
39. The armed forces total 84 000 active
forces, 27 500 primary reserves and about the
same number of supplementary reserves. These
two categories of reserves, the primary and the
supplementary, provide the bulk of Canada's
citzen-soldiers. The latter category, the supple-
mentary reserve, is a pool of trained personnel
who are available in the event of an emer-
gency.
40. The primary reserve consists of volun-
teers, officers and non-commissioned members
who have agreed to perform duties for the mil-
itary service of their choice. This choice can be
the militia, which is the traditional name for the
anny reserve, the naval reserve, the air reserve
or the communication reserve. The members of
these four elements generally train one or two
nights a week, one or two weekends a month and
often participate in summer training which lasts
on average two weeks.
41. The militia is the largest element of the
primary reserve. It has approximately 20 000
personnel, spread over the vast country in more
than 100 cities and towns. The total number of
units is l3l of which 99 are combat arms units(infantry, artillery or armour) and 32 are
support units (e.g. medical, engineers, military
police). Traditionally the militia had its driil-
halls in the town centres and the military
activity was part of the community's daily life.
Since the second world war, this tradition has
faded away and the militia has often moved to
barracks out of town.
42. The move has not been without conse-
quence for civil-military relations and attempts
have now to be made to interest the public at
large both in their armed forces in general and
the reserves in particular.
43. The Canadian Government's ambition is
to increase the reserve forces to some 35 000, a
major part of which will wear the militia's
uniform. The planned increase implies that a
major recruiting campaign over an extended
period will be necessary while at the same time
special attention should be given to bringing the
forces closer to the people.
44. The naval reserve's r6le is to enhance the
war capability of maritime command (the navy)
and to complement the navy in ongoing
peacetime tasks and activities. The missions of
the naval reserve include maritime coastal
defence, mine counter-measures, naval control
of merchant shipping and the provision of per-
sonnel to integrate into regular force ships and
shore-based units. The naval reserve is com-
posed of 23 divisions or units across the
country, comprising about 4 200 personnel.
45. A modernisation programme for the naval
reserve has started. Twelve maritime coastal
defence vessels for the naval reserve have been
ordered and will come into service during the
1990s. These vessels will be used for training of
the naval reserve in coastal, inshore and harbour
surveillance as well as in mine counter-
measures. Modernising the equipment for
diving teams of naval reserves is another
example.
46. The smallest element in the reserves
system is the air reserve. The air force, which in
Canada is called air command, controls the air
reserve. It comprises I 450 personnel in two
wings, three squadrons and augrnentation flights
at each airbase across the country. Its wartime
missions include augmentation of the regular
force and providing a manpower base for
mobilisation. In peacetime, the air reserve is
tasked with United Nations peace-keeping mis-
sions, search and rescue, light transport and
maritime surveillance.
47. Another small element is the communi-
cation reserve, comprising some I 700
specialised personnel, organised in six regiments,
12 squadrons and three troops, all located across
Canada. The communication reserves augment
regular force units ifrequired, they participate in
peace-keeping missions, support civil emergency
authorities with their special equipment and par-
ticipate in military exercises where their par-
ticular expertise can be used.
244
DOCUMENT 1338
48. Following the September 1991 defence
policy announcement, Canada's reserves are to
increase by approximately 25Vo while the regular
forces will see their numbers decrease by some
9%.
49. Consistent with the September 1991
decision, economies will be affected in several
areas:
- 
reduction of the regular force from
84 000 to 76 000;
- 
civilian staff reductions from 33 000 to
32 000;
- closure of the two Canadian forces
bases in Germany by 1995;
- 
cancellation of commitment to main-
tain a I 000-man task force in Europe.
50. Some savings are expected to be achieved
by slowing the rate of grourth in the reserves in
the near term. However, the targets for the
ultimate size and compooition of the reserves
have not changed. The Department of Defence
remains committed to the implementation of
the total force concept. The integration of the
regrrlars and reserves into a total force remains
one of the fundamentals of the new Canadian
defence policy.
51. The reserve component of the Canadian
forces is being required to play a more sub-
stantive r6le within the total force in the defence
and security of the nation. The process has
evolved over the past few years when significant
efforts were devoted to making the total force a
reality. Positive accomplishments were achieved
on a variety of key issues impacting not only on
the general effectiveness ofthe reserves but also
on the perception of their value to the overall
defence commitments.
52. A strategic plan for the reserves has been
formulated. The plan reafftrms the aim of the
reserves " to have an effective reserve com-
ponent, within a viable total force, which
enables the Canadian forces to carry out its
asrigned defence and security responsibilities in
peacetime and emergencies or in war'. The plan
thcn defines the reservist as a citizen who trains
on a part-time basis, or occasionally full-time,
pmsessing strengths and limitations that are dif-
ferent from those of his or her regular force
counterpart.
53. An analysis made of the characteristics
required by the reserve component in order to
be effective within the total force concluded that
the reserve component must be the following:
- 
a reflection of and have the support of
the Canadian society at large;
- 
highly motivated and have competent
leadership;
- 
individually and collectively trained to
standards required to be operationally
ready;
- 
structured to facilitate command,
control, administration, and training in
peacetime and possessing the capacity
for expansion and sustainment when
deployed in emergencies and war;
- 
supported by full-time personnel
assisting with administration, training
and operational requirements;
- 
funded to recruit, train, and retrain suf-
ficient personnel to support its required
r6le with the total force;
- 
properly equipped to meet training and
operational requirements;
- 
protected through voluntary or legis-
lated employers' support in civilian
jobs 
. 
while absent for training, emer-
gencles, or war;
- 
given mutual respect, confidence, and
support among all members of the total
force from both regular and reserve
components.
54. Canada is therefore well advanced in for-
mulating structures for a changed security and
defence scenario. This determination to tackle a
series of very difficult decisions was stressed by
the Canadian Associate Minister of National
Defence, The Honourable Mary Collins, MP,
both when the Defence Committee visited
Canada in July 1990 and again when the
Chairman of the committee, Sir Dudley Smith,
MP, met her during the NAA session held in
Banff, Alberta, in May this year.
(iii) Fmnce
55. In total almost 680 000 people are
involved in the " military ' side of defence. Just
over 300 000 are professional military, just
under 250 000 are conscripts and about 130 000
are civilians. Although 680 000 is no small force,
it would not be enough in time of real crisis. In
that case, half a million reservists would be
needed to bring the peacetime armed forces to
wartime strength. At present, over 500 000
reservists are involved and they would man 5201o
of the army, 27o/o of the navy, 42Vo of the air
force, 5990 of the gendarmerie and 650/o of the
armed forces medical service.
56. These figures are a convincing indicator
that the effective performance of the armed
forces depends to a high degree on reservists.
Hence it is obvious that the active duty time of
the conscripts - recently decreased from 12 to
l0 months 
- 
must be fully devoted to preparing
the citizen-soldiers for their reservist missions.
(See also Chapter II (r,))
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(b) Germaay
57. The Bundeswehr is a conscript army, i.e.
approximately 5090 of its personnel are ser-
vicemen required to complete 12 months of
service at present or 15 months or even l8
months at an earlier stage under the Compulsory
Military Service Act. As a consequence of com-
pulsory military service, about six million
reservists have undergone military training since
the build-up of the Bundeswehr. Thus, the
Bundeswehr at any given time has more
reservists available than are actually required
for growth to full wartime strength of more than
1.3 million men.
58. For peacetime purposes, the Compulsory
Military Service Act provides that servicemen
having completed their basic miltiary service
can be earmarked for mobilisation as reservists
until the age of 32 (enlisted men), the age of 45
(NCOs) or 60 (offrcers). With these parameters,
the armed forces do not face any diffrculties in
maintaining a mobilisable reserve of 900 000
men. The reservists available beyond that
potential are generally also subject to control
under the Military Service Act and can be called
up as reserves until the age of 60 in times of war.
59. The new reservist concept will have to
establish its priorities:
(/ introduction of a volunteer reserve
component similar to the reserves of
the United States armed forces or the
United Kingdom Territorial A*y;
(ii) short reserve duty exercise terms offive days maximum, with the
weekends being avoided as far as pos-
sible;
(iii) individual determination of reserve
duty exercise terms instead of exer-
cises at company or battalion level
that are common practice, in par-
ticular in the army;
(iv) recall units based in the regional
vicinity, which has become more dif-
ficult due to the reduction of the
armed forces in an expanded German
territory since unification;
(v) attractive social benefits in order to
improve the acceptance of service in
the reserve.
60. Because only a minor proportion of the
six million reservists trained in the Bundeswehr
so far could be earmarked for assignment in the
reserve corps of the armed forces and that active
duty slots are available only to a limited extent,
the possibility of voluntary activity beyond the
scope described so far, has been created for
reservists.
61. The Federation of Reservists
Bundeswehr was assigned the mission
the
par-
liament and the Ministry of Defence to promote
reservists in their military development on a
voluntary basis, to keep them informed about
security policy as regards the armed forces, and
to provide support and assistance to them.
Moreover, the Federation, in co-operation with
its dedicated reservists, pursues public relations
activities in the interest of the armed forces. The
Federation has more than 100000 members 
-
including former reservists 
- 
indicating that the
reservists of the Bundeswehr are a social group
acting as an intermediary between the armed
forces and the civilian population.
(v) The NaLcrlatds
62. In time of peace about 0.8090 of the total
Dutch population participates in the prepa-
ration of the national and inter-allied defence.
The armed forces total 100 000 military women
and men in time of peace, of which 45 000
(male) are conscripts. The navy's total is 16 450
men and women of which I 500 are conscripts;
the army has 63 000 men under arms, of which
40000 are conscripts; and the air force total is
16 000 of which 3 400 are conscripts. the Royal
Military Constabulary totals some 3 500 of
which l0Vo are conscripts. The number of
women in the Dutch armed forces is still rela-
tively small: 3 500 volunteer women serve the
colours. In addition, a total of 23 000 civilians
are involved in the activities of the defence min-
istry and the armed forces.
63. In time of crisis not less than 175000
reservists are available to bring the armed forces
to full defence strength. At complete mobilisa-
tion, 20/o of the Dutch population would be
involved in active defence.
(fi) Portryal
64. The Portuguese armed forces number
approximately 70 000 men. In round figures the
army totals about 42000 of which 35 000 are
conscripts; the navy has 15 000 men, including
2 800 marines and some 5 000 conscripts and
the air force totals 13 000 of which 5 000 are
conscripts.
65. The pool of conscripts is large in Portugal.
Although annual intakes between 40000 and
50 000 were normal for many years, such high
numbers could be reduced in the future.
Whereas in other European countries, Germany
for example, the force structure shrinks as a con-
sequence of the demographic reality 
- 
the
reduction of available young manpower 
- the
reason for the Portuguese decision is political
and related to the reorganisation of the armed
forces. Portugal has enough manpower in its
conscript potential and a demographic decline
affecting military requirements will not start
before 1999.
of
by
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66. The regulars in the total armed forces
number 23 500 although, to complete the
financial picture of the regulars, some I I 500
men should be added. The first group is on
active duty, the second has left active military
life and is kept in reserve. This category of
" regular-reserve " receives full pay during their
reserve period. The system obliges officers to
leave the active service at a relatively young age:
lieutenant colonels and below at 56 and colonels
at 57. The real retirement age for oflicers is 65
and this implies that they remain on the paylist
- 
with full pay 
- 
until that age. The same applies
to NCOs, although sergeants for example remain
on active duty until the age of 57 and the
sergeant-major category until 60. Their reserve
period is therefore somewhat shorter.
67. The regular res€rves are only a small
group in the total of Portuguese reservists. The
majority come from the many thousands of con-
scripts who have served in the Portuguese
forces. They are soldiers, sergeants and lieu-
tenants with a lower age limit of 22 years. Hence
Portuguese reservists vary between the ages of
22 and 65.
68. The conscripts receive a basic training of
six weeks. The subsequent training of NCOs
lasts another week and for young reserve oflicers
seven weeks. In broad terms, the army musters
some I 000 junior officers and 2 000 con-
scripted non-commissioned officers. The navy
and air force each have approximately 200 con-
scripted junior officers. The imminent reduction
of national service to four months implies con-
siderable reorganisation for the reserves.
(vii) Sptin
69. At the end of March 1992, the Prime Min-
ister issued a new national defence directive
listing the far-reaching changes on the interna-
tional stage in recent years and laying the foun-
dations for Spain's defence policy for the years
to come and, in this context, those of military
policy proper. The new directive, which is the
culminating point of a course started more than
ten years ago, terminates an era during which
defence questions were considered mainly from
an isolationist, autonomist point of view and
replaces it with other guidelines according to
which, without losing sight of necessities
stemming from the exercise of national sover-
eignty, the requirements of interdependence
with surrounding nations are assumed in full,
particular attention being paid to European
security and defence dimensions and the
Atlantic Alliance.
70. In accordance with the new directive, mil-
itary defence will be ensured, on the one hand,
by permanent forces set up in peacetime and, on
the other, by reserve forces that can be called up.
The former will have to handle crises, armed
conflicts of limited intensify and the first stages
of large-scale conflicts. Reserve forces for their
part will have to be organised and equipped in
peacetime to allow the permanent force to be
increased progressively up to the strengths that
might be necessary in the event of greater hostil-
ities. This is a fundamental change in the
structure of the Spanish arrny, which has
hitherto been based on the existence of per-
manent forces. The increased importance now
attached to reserve forces, together with changes
in the international situation, allow the number
of troops to be reduced significantly. They will
be reduced from an end of the 1980s total of
280000 men to some 180000 by about 1997,
i.e. a one-third reduction.
71. The present structure of the armed forces
and that laid down in the directive are both
based on compulsory military service which, in
Spain, dates back to 1649. Nevertheless, there is
some pressure on conscription since, in view of
the improvement in the international situation,
many people believe it is preferable to have
wholly professional armed forces formed
entirely of volunteers. However, both the gov-
ernment and parliament consider the mainte-
nance of an army that is close to the population
thanks to compulsory military service to be
important enough for it not to be abandoned.
Moreover, it would seem difficult, for demo-
graphic and economic reasons, to obtain enough
correctly paid volunteers. These various factors
have led to the maintenance of compulsory mil-
itary service, the length of which has been
reduced from twelve to nine months.
72. Two main features of the future structure
of the Spanish forces will be the modernisation of
military service and a higher rate of profession-
alism. The first will be put into practice thanks to
the improvement made to many aspects of mil-
itary living conditions and training and a more
selective use of troops so that they are increas-
ingly assigned solely to posts and tasks with a
direct relationship with the country's defence; the
remaining posts will be increasingly attributed to
civilian personnel. Furthermore, and without
prejudice to the maintenance of military service,
the armed forces will in future be composed of a
larger number of professionals: in 1997, the latter
should represent 5090 ofregular forces compared
with 330/o at present. Of the 90 000 men now
planned, 50 000 will be oflicers and
non-commissioned officers and the others will be
professional soldiers occupying posts requiring
the highest qualifications, plus a nucleus of highly
combat-ready units that will allow the gov-
ernment to react in the early stages of a crisis.
(viii) Tu*ey
73. The armed forces are an integral part of
the Turkish population. The size of the Turkish
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forces is second to none in Europe. Within
NATO only the United States has larger forces.
The peacetime strength of the Turkish armed
forces (1991 figures) is over 620 000, to which in
time of crisis almost 900 000 well-trained
mobilisable reserves can be added, bringing the
full authorised strength for wartime to just over
1.5 million. However, in time of need several
more million men could be added to this total;
men who are still within the legal age-limits of
military service and have received military
training in the past.
74. In the event of mobilisation the Turkish
army can rely on two categories of reservists:
former regular personnel and former conscripts.
In the first category are oflicers and non-
commissioned oflicers who have left the service
at an early age and who are still eligible for
reserve duty. Some I 800 officers and 7 700
NCOs form this group. Of the conscript cat-
egory, almost 30 000 reserve third lieutenants
belong to the mobilisable army and almost
645 000 soldiers and sergeants. The mobilisable
reserves are meant primarily to bring units
which are under strength in time of peace to full
time strength and additionally to generate
mobilisable units.
75. All personnel and material preparations
for this generation process are made on a
regional scale. Spread over the country are 20
recruiting oflices which are regional centres for a
dense network of registration offices. Each com-
munity has such an office and each reservist is
obliged by law to keep his local office up-to-date
until his final discharge. The Turkish General
Staff provides the guidelines by which the
regional recruitment centres and the military
regional establishments can co-ordinate their
preparations.
76. In principle a Turkish reservist has a mil-
itary obligation of 20 years, from his 20th until
his 41st year. However, in practice the state does
not require the whole period. The full
mobilisation strengfih of some 1.5 million men,
which for obvious reasons of efficiency will be
composed of those with the most recent training,
requires only the actual availability of the most
recent six-year groups.
(ir) Uaited Kingdom
77. In time of war or crisis, the Territorial
Army (TA) would provide significant manpower
to support the regular army. At present it con-
tributes over half of the infantry, logistic and
medical support of the front line army, and
undertakes important home defence tasks. The
Royal Naval Reserve provides additional
trained manpower for mine counter-measures,
naval control of shipping and medical support;
the Royal Naval Auxiliary Service provides
many of the personnel essential for the defence
of ports and anchorages in time of tension or
war. Finally, the Royal Marines and the Royatr
Air Force also rely upon their reserves as an
integral part of their overall operational capa-
bility. Even so, the differences between the
regular and reserve forces have to be acknow-
ledged. The latter do not substitute for the
former, but rather complement them.
78. The key r6le and crucial value of the
reserves was graphically demonstrated and
re-emphasised during the Gulf conflict; a total ofI 774 reservists, consisting of both individual
and volunteer reserves, served in support ofthe
war in the Gulf. Of the 8E7 volunteer reservists,
19 were from the Royal Naval Reserve, 552
from the Territorial Army, 252 from the Royal
Auxiliary Air Force and 34 from the Royal Air
Force Volunteer Reserve. In addition, some 100
Royal Marine Reserves served in Turkey and
Northern Iraq in support of the United
Nations.
79. The way forward for United Kingdom
reserve forces is summarised in the 1992
Statement on the Defence Estimates:
" Reserves in the 1990s
l. The tradition of civil commitment to
national defence in times of emergency
has deep historical roots in the British
Isles, from Anglo-Saxon and Celtic times
to the more recent Militia, Yeomanry and
Volunteers. This tradition is upheld by
members of the present reserve forces,
both volunteer reservists and ex-regulars.
Today, reservists operate alongside their
regular service colleagues as an integral
part of the armed forces, whether as
members of formed volunteer reserve
units or as individuals applying their mil-
itary skills and experience within the
regular forces in times of tension and war.
2. The volunteer reserves have been a
central component of our armed forces
since the early years of this century and
undertook a major r6le in both world
wars. In recent decades they have made a
substantial contribution to our defence:
Royal Marines Reserve (RMR) and Terri-
torial Army infantry and support forces
for the defence of the United Kingdom
and the European mainland; the Royal
Naval Rescue (RNR) and the Royal Naval
Auxiliary Service (RNXS) in areas such as
mine countermeasures and the control of
shipping; and the Royal Air Force Vol-
unteer Reserve (RAFVR) and the Royal
Auxiliary Air Force (R Aux AF) in fields
such as intelligence, ground defence, air
movement, aeromedical evacuation, public
relations and maritime headquarters
support. over the years the reserves have
successfully adapted to new commitments
and patterns of warfare and the need to
become expert in a wide range of skills
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and specialisms. Members of the reserve
forces, most finding time for the reserves
while doing full-time jobs, have met the
challenge of an ever-increasing require-
ment for professionalism and dedication.
Those qualities were clearly in evidence
during Operation Granby, when some
2 000 ex-regular and volunteer reservists
were called out or undertook short-term
regular engagements in the Gulf and else-
where. This included TA soldiers serving
with " teeth' arms and others providing
support elsewhere.
3. The reserves will continue to play an
important rOle. With reduced readiness
requirements and increased warning
times, a study has been made of the
balance between regular and reserve
forces, with the aim of providing for a
more efficient and cost-effective use of
reserves in the mid-1990s and beyond.
Detailed consideration is being given to
the study's wide-ranging recommenda-
tions, which include new liabilities for
reserve service and changes to reserve
forces legislation. A Defence Open Gov-
ernment Document (OGD), " The future
of Britain's reserve forces ", was pub-
lished in March and has invited responses
to key elements of the study's recommen-
dations. Meanwhile, initial work on the
restructuring of the volunteer reserves has
proceeded. On 10th December 1991 the
ihen Secretary of State announced firm
plans for the TA, including a forecast
ieduction in strength from 74 000 to
63 500 in the longer term. Some 20 000
volunteers join - and a similar number
leave 
- 
each year and, as far as possible,
the reductions will be made through
natural wastage: no active volunteer who
remains suitably qualified for TA service
will be forced to leave. TA units will
undertake important r6les in the ACE
Rapid Reaction Corps, most notably in
the combat support areas, and in the
defence of the United Kingdom, including
r6les previously undertaken by the regular
aflny- A key feature of the new
organisation will be flexibility, with units
not committed to the ARRC having more
of a general reserve r6le.
4. TA units will continue to be dis-
tributed widely across the United
Kingdom, taking account of the need for
strong links with local communities to
sustain public understanding and support.
The advice and assistance of the 14 Terri-
torial Auxiliary and Volunteer Reserve
Associations (TAYRAs) in preparing
future force structures in the regions and
maintaining these links will continue to be
important to the government. The exis-
tence of the reserve forces depends not
only on the dedication of the reservists
themselves but also on the support of fam-
ilies and employers, the latter represented
through the work of the National
Employers Liaison Committee.
5. The TA will also benefit from equip-
ment enhancements for its new rOle. These
will include the Scimitar family of tracked
combat reconnaissance vehicles for the
medium reconnaissance regiment assigned
to the ARRC; l55mm FH70 howitzers
and the Starstreak Air Defence Missile for
the Royal Artillery; the Ptarmigan_com-
municaiion system for some Royal Signal
units; the Gazelle helicoPter
for Army Air Corps Squadrons and
DROPS for transport units.
6. For the smaller RNR and RNXS,
reorganisation has already begun, with a
reduition in the former from about 5 900
to 4700, and in the latter from 2 850 to
2700 by April.
7. The planned changes for the RAI'VR
and the R Aux AF are comParativelY
small. A review of units is likely to
confirm their existence, though in some
cases a change of r6le will be necessary.
We are investigating the feasibility of
employing auiiliairies in mission
planning for the Nimrod MPA. We intend
[o retain the six R Aux AF field squadrons
for the area defence of airfields and are
aiming to increase the number of R Aux
AF defence flights for the perimeter
defence of other vital installations.
8. These changes, and in particular those
for the TA and the RNR, have involved
some difficult decisions on the future of
units which have served the United
Kingdom with distinction. The gov:
ernment sought the views of all interested
parties, befoie proceeding with plans for
ieorganisation. Consideration is Qgllg
given to retaining old regimental affilia-
lions or unit identities where that would
be of benefit to the units concerned.
9. In order to sustain the enthusiasm and
dedication of reservists in the face of
change it has been essential to remove
uncertainties by consulting, and by
drawing up and implementing our plans
as quickly as possible. We will continue
ovei a longer period to make improve-
ments in thE structure and organisation of
the reserves, particularly in the light of
changed readiness requirements, and
extended warning times. Work on
improvements to the Drocedure for
selective call-out of reservists is already
well advanced, and we are addressing the
scope for greater flexibility in the call-out
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of reservists within the manpower
structure for 1995 and beyond. In sum,
the government remains committed to
capable and effective reserve forces, ready
to take their place alongside their regular
colleagues as an effective fighting
force. "
6) aniud Stor,cs
80. The United States has had by far the
largest number of fully-trained reservists of any
major power. With some 560 000 in the
National Guard, 1222 600 in the anny, nayy,
marines and air force reserves, 28 7@ in the
standby reserve and 178 700 on the retired
reserve, the United States must hold the record
for the best-trained and best-equipped reserve
force to complement its all-professional army,
navy, marines and air force.
81. The Defence Committee was privileged to
visit a number of units in various parts of the
United States in the second half of July 1990
and was gireatly impressed by the enthusiasm
and prowess of those we met, many of whom
were to be called up for active duty only a
month later.
82. ln 1973, a fundamental change in the
American military personnel policy took place.
In that year conscription was abandoned. The
system which had provided the armed forces
throughout the second world war and the years
since with hundreds of thousands of young men
had come to an end as a result of the Vietnam
war. The United States now relies entirely upon
volunteers for both regular service and reserve
duty.
83. In order to make the most effective use of
available resources, the Department of Defence
developed the " total force policy', whose
objective is " a balanced mix of active and
reserve forces that fully utilises all available
assets,. while ensuring that maximum military
capability is achieved at the minimum realistic
cost ".
84. The total force policy has now been in
existence for almost 20 years and has been a
major success. Active forces and reserve units
have participated together, complementing each
other, in exercises and in live actions. A signif-
icant equipment modernisation programme for
the reserve forces has been in existence since
1980, making reserve units compatible with the
active units. This has been a tremendous boost
for the readiness and morale of national guard
and reserve personnel. The total force policy andits implementation made it possible foi the
United States Government to place gxeater
dependence on the reserve forces.
85. The United States with a population of
over 250 million has about two million regular
forces and just over 1.6 million active reserve
forces for its many security tasks, both in the
United States and abroad. Regulars and
reservists perform these tasks together as
members of the total force. In fact, in the past
decade the number of active force missions to be
carried out by guard or reserve units has
increased. The extensive and expensirae
equipment modernisation programme for the
reserve forces, which was carried out in the
1980s, provided them with the essential tools for
these missions. At the basis of this programme
were policy decisions aimed at stopping the
competition for badly-needed modern equip
ment between regular and reserve forces. The
general goal was 'to equip all active, guard and
reserve units to full wartime requirements...
Units, that fight first shall be equipped first,
regardless of component. ".
86. Five of the seven reserve components
have only federal missions. The other two, the
army national guard and the air national guarq
also have a responsibility towards the state to
which it belongs. The special position of the
guard stems from the militia clause of the consti-
tution. Based on this clause the different states
are responsible for the appointment of officers
and the training of the militia. The army and air
national guard units therefore carry the name of
their state, such as Texas Arrry National Guard
or California Air National Guard. The federal
Congress, however, has the power to provide for
organising, arming and disciplining the guard.
87. In peacetime, the national guard of each
state is responsible to the State Governor but
can be called up for federal duty in case of
national emergency. Through the NationalGuard Bureau in the federal Defence
Department 
- 
the Pentagon 
- 
the services
provide guidance in matters of administration,
organisation and operational readiness. This
channel also makes possible the implementation
of federal control on the level of exercises and
training ofthe national guard as guard units are
required to meet the same standards as their
active duty counterparts.
88. The heart of the national guard and
reserve components are the Selected Reserve
Units.
89. The largest reduction in the United States
military force structure since the second world
war will be carried out between 1992 and 1997.
How and where the cuts will be made has still to
be decided but the overall goal is a 25Vo
reduction in five years time.
90. The diminution of forces includes a
massive reduction of the United States forces in
Europe. Another area of change will concernforces for deployment. In the 1980s, some
40 000 reservists were deployed annually from
the United States for exercises in Europe. In
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geneml, deployments will decrease and the
importance of computer exercises will increase
in tlre future.
91. The mix between active and reserve forces
will certainly change, due to the changing
requirements. The Reserve Officers Association
(ROA) of the United States is concerned about
the future as it sees * unwarranted negative
signals regarding the prospects for the guard and
reserye " and * proposals to reduce the reserve
forces that are budget rather than strategy or
cost+ffectiveness driven...that are simply fair-
sharc across-the-board reductions'.
92. ROA points to the fact that'the ability to
attain high levels of readiness in the reserve
components is not only theoretically possible
but is now a proven fact". A major ROA study
aimed at influencing policy decision-makers was
issued in August 1991, taking into account the
experience of the Gulf war. In summary it states:
- 
The total force policy provides a cost-
effective, combat capable force that
makes the best use of resources in the
face of severe budget constraints.
- 
The total force policy has been success-
fully tested in both minor and major
contingencies throughout the past
decade.
- 
Well-trained and well+quipped reservists
have demonstrated that theY can
perform as professionals equal in skill
and dedication to their active duty
counterparts.
- 
The use of reserve components of the
total force in contingency operations
brings a vital citizen involvement and
consensus to these conflicts.
- 
Therefore, the total force policy should
be reaffrrmed and suflicient resources
should be allocated to increase the pro-
portion of the nation's military capa-
bility in the reserve components and to
ensure their effectiveness.
93. It remains to be seen whether or not bud-
getary considerations will prevent the imple-
mentation of the total force policy. When your
Rapporteur met the Assistant Secretary for
Rererve Alfairs from the Pentagon, Mr. Stephen
Duncan, in Breda in August the mood could
pertaps be qualified as " cautious optimism
tempered with a fair dose of realism ".
Y. The Interallied Confederation
of Reseme Olficen (the CIOR)
94. In the preparation of the present report,
your Rapporteur has been fortunate to receive a
$at deal of information courtesy of the
Interallied Confederation of Reserve Offrcers
and was a guest at their 1992 Summer Congress
held in Breda in the Netherlands.
95. Breda provided a particular opportunity
to discuss the evolution of European security
and the CIOR deserves every congratulation for
its efforts to inform its members of the latest
developments.
96. Just what is the CIOR apart from being an
organisation which pre-dates NATO?
97. CIOR, the abbreviated title of the
organisation, is derived from the full name in
French, ' Conf6ddration Interalli6e des Officiers
de R6serve ". CIOR is a non-political, non-
governmental, non-profit organisation dedicated
io co-operation between the national reserve
officers associations of NATO countries and to
strenghening the basic solidarity within the
Atlantic Alliance.
98. CIOR's principal objectives are:
- 
to contribute to the strengthening ofthe
deterrent and defence capabilities of
NATO and its signatory countries;
- 
to support the policies of NATO and to
assist in the achievement of its objec-
tives;
- 
to maintain close contact with all
NATO military authorities and com-
mands;
- 
to establish and develop international
contacts between reserve officers in
order to improve mutual knowledge
and understanding;
- 
to maintain, through the individual
country associations, close liaison with
appropriate national defence organi-
sations;
- 
to develop uniformity in the duties,
rights, training and mobilisation of
reierve oflicers within NATO while
respecting national differences and tra-
ditions.
(i) NATO rclationshiP
99. The relationship between CIOR and
NATO, which through the years has been
intensive, was formalised in 1976. NATO's
highest military authority, the Military Com-
mittee (MC) then approved document MC 248
which regulates the co.operation on military
matters between NATO and CIOR. A per-
manent representative of CIOR to the Military
Committee was then established in the Interna-
tional Military Staff (IMS). At the political level,
the Defence Information Liaison Offrcer in the
NATO Information Directorate has, on behalf
of the Secretary-General, responsibility for
formal contact between NATO and CIOR and
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for providing political advice. In accordance
with an MC 248 recommendation, a Reserve
Affairs Adviser was appointed at Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).
His principal duties include liaison with CIOR
for Allied Command Europe.
100. NATO and SHAPE support educational
and information activities for reserve officers.
All 20 courses at the NATO School at Oberam-
mergau are open to reserve oflicers. Every two
years a one week NATO reserve officers course
is given at the NATO Defence College in Rome.
Annually, one information seminar is held for
young reserve oflicers at NATO and SHAPE.
Additionally, a young reserve oflicers' workshop
is held in conjunction with the CIOR summer
congress. Once every two years NATO and
SHAPE host a seminar for experienced reserve
officers, and, in alternating years, one for editors
of reserve oflicer magazines.
(ii) Aabities
101. In order to accomplish its objectives,
CIOR meets on an annual basis alternating the
location among member countries.
lO2. These congresses, lasting five days, are
held in July or August. Here current issues
affecting NATO and its reserve forces are dis-
cussed. Additionally there is communication
and interaction between reserve officers of the
alliance. During the time of the congress, a mil-itary competition consisting of military
orienteering, marksmanship (rifle, pistol and
sub-machine gun), obstacle course, utility
swimming and first aid is conducted. As men-
tioned already, also a workshop for young
reserve officers is held during the summer con-
gress. The host country association is entirely
responsible for planning and administering all
the details of the congress.
103. The mid-winter conference for the Exec-
utive Committee and Commissions is held at
NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium,
usually during the first week of February to
discuss issues further, interact with NATO
Headquarters and finalise summer congress
activities.
(iii) Oryaintion
104. The national reserve oflicers associations
form the heart of CIOR, but remain completely
independent in national operations. They eleit
from their members delegates to CIOR ahd the
head of each delegation is a Vice-President of
CIOR. The CIOR International President and
Secretary-General serve for two years and are
members of the same national association.
105. The Executive Committee, the highest
authority in the confederation, is composed of
the President, Secretary4eneral, VicePresi-
dents and up to four other delegates from each
national association. ViePresidents cast a singfe
vote for their entire delegation. The Executive
Committee is CIOR's policy body and decides
which country will assume the presidency, where
cong€sses will be held, what projects will be
assumed by the various commissions and the final
actions to be taken on these projects.
106. The financial status of CIOR is maintainodby assessments of annual dues from its
component national associations based on the
membership of each assmiation and on subsidies,
gifts and legacies.
(n) hnbsbrs
107. Six permanent commisions work on behalf
of the Executive Committee (EC). Guidance is pro
vided directly from the President. The EC also can
appoint special commissions for ad hoc tasls. Each
national delegation is required to appoint at least
one member to each commission. All commissions
have a Chairman, a Vic+Chairman and a Sec-
retary. These offroes are held for a period of trvo
years with a possible re+lection for two more yearc
- 
Commission l: Status of the reserve
officer, mobilisation, education, training
and exchanges.
Studies and suggests ways NATO
defence can be improved through the
use of member reserve forces.
- 
Commission 2: Defence issues and atti-
tudes.
Exchanges information about member
nations' attitudes, events and trends
affecting NATO. Studies disinforma-tion related to NATO and its
reserves.
- Commission 3: Public relations and
information.
Exchanges information on public
awareness of NATO, its defence and its
reserves. Recommends press and infor-
mation policy and helps to promote
NATO in member nations. Supports
the EC in general policy and planning
areas.
- 
Commission 4: Legal affairs.
Studies legal matters affecting NATO,
its defence, and its reserves. Assists the
EC in maintaining and changing the
CIOR byJaws as desired.
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- 
Commission 5: Civil defence and emer-
gency planning.
Exchange of information on disaster
preparation and emergency procedures
in member nations. Includes command
and control, preparation, planning and
training.
- 
Commission 6: Military competitions.
Directs and monitors the conduct of the
CIOR military competitions.
(v) National Resenc Frces Committee
108. A sound and effective relationship
between national reserve oflicers associations
and the national authorities responsible for
matters concerning reserve forces in general and
resetrve officers in particular, is an obvious asset
for both parties.
109. Internationally such a relationship exists
between CIOR and the National Reserve Forces
Committee (NRFC), which is composed of the
Chiefs of Reserves of the NATO nations.
I10. Although fully independent, the two
orgrnisations have established 1 9ys-tem for close
coloperation and exchange of information. It
has its $eatest visibility during the two annual
CIOR events - the summer congress and the
midwinter meeting - as the NRFC holds its
mectings also twice a year and in conjunction
with those of CIOR.
l1l. The chairmanship of NRFC rotates once
ev€ry two years. Here too the NRFC has opted
for -synchionisation with CIOR, as it has
decid;d that the Chairman of NRFC will be of
the same nationality as CIOR's President.
ll2. The NRFC studies and discusses reserve
forces issues of mutual concern and through its
Chairman exchanges results and views with
CIOR's Executive Committee.
(vi) Tlte CIOMR
ll3. CIOMR, the "Confdddration Interalli6e
de; Officiers M6dicaux de R6serve " , was estab-
lished in Brussels in 1947 as the oflicial
organisation of medical officers in the reserve
foices. Originally founded by Belgium, France
and the Netherlands, the * Conf6d6ration " now
includes all CIOR mgmber countries. Its objec-
tives are to:
- 
establish close professional relations
with the medical doctors and services
of the reserve forces within the
alliance;
- 
study and discuss issues of importance
to the medical reserve officer to include
medico-military training;
- 
promote an effective collaboration with
the medical services of the active
forces;
- 
generate maximum support in the study
of medical problems affecting the
morale of the troops.
Ll4. CIOR and CIOMR are associated
organisations. CIOMR holds its sessions at the
same time and place as the CIOR summer con-
gress and mid-winter conference but prepares a
ieparate agenda for the discussion of medical
matters.
I 15. The main drawback to the activities of the
CIOR and CIOMR over the years has been that
not all member countries of NATO have taken
part. Now, however, after intensive lobbying,
Spain has been invited to join the confederation
and your Rapporteur hopes that a way will soon
be fbund foi ttre remaining countries of the
alliance to be at least observers.
116. The above remark explains why some
detail is missing from the country-by-country
survey which follows at Appendix ! qn_d which
was kindly made available by the CIOR.
ll7. Colleagues who seek further information
on the reserv-es are advised to consult * NATO's
reserve forces " by Colonel Sjouke De Jong, pub-
lished by Brassey's as No. 6 in the Atlantic Com-
mentaries in 1992.
YI. Conclasioa
118. tn formulating the draft recommendation
on European security - reserve forces and
national iervice, your Rapporteur has been very
conscious that the report is being presented at a
critical but propitious time. " Critical " because
what is being decided now by our nations will
affect the shape of Europe's ability to defend
itself and its interests for the foreseeable future;
" propitious' because much of the debate on
reserve forces and on national service is now
current in our countries or is about to begin. It is
therefore to be hoped that the WEU Council will
respond positiveli to a very constructive set of
recommendations.
119. Finally, your Rapporteur wishes to give a
few words oi amplification for each preliminary
draft recommendation in turn:
* l. Take every opportunity to ensure that
the debate on reserve forces and national
service in any member country benefits
from a common fund of experience and
requirements and include discussion on
the subject on the agenda of the next
WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff meeting; "
The impression of the moment, rightly or
wrongly, is that much of the debate I alv of our
countlils is being conducted in isolation from
the debate in neighbouring countries. Of course'
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particular circumstances apply to individual
countries, but surely the priority must be to
examine the requirement for the various forces
on a collective basis before moving to purely
national considerations. Likewise the fund of
experience of some nations who have already
had to cope with diflicult decisions should be
pooled for the benefit of all. One of the best
places to begin is by putting the subject on the
agenda of the next meeting of the WEU Chiefs
of Defence Staff Committee.
n 2. Stimulate informed debate in
member countries on revised rOles for
reserve forces as well as on reductions in
and possible restructuring of national
service; "
A logical progression from recommen-
dation l.
" 3. Provide a forum for discussion of such
matters among member states and also with
Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland and
interested Central European states; "
Ideally your Rapporteur would like to see
a WEU initiative, preferably sponsored by the
presidency, to create such a forum for discussion
perhaps beginning with a colloquy to sound out
interested parties.
The Defence Committee's pioneering
study visits to Austria, Finland, Sweden and
Switzerland, as well as prompting the current
specific interest of all those countries in WEU,
reminded us of the relevance for territorial
defence of the arrangements for organising and
mobilising reserve forces practised by the
hitherto " neutral " countries. These examples
are now also being studied by many of the
Central European states with whom the Defence
Committee has also had contact.
" 4. Strongly encourage WEU countries
without volunteer reserve forces to con-
sider the example of those which already
possess such an asset which is indispen-
sable for countries abolishing national
service and to provide proper equipment
and training for the reserves; "
The recommendation is of course refer-
ring to the United Kingdom primarily (within
WEU) because of Britain's experience over some
30 years in recruiting and utilising a large vol-
unteer reserve force. France is already con-
ducting a study but the example, both of the
United Kingdom but also of Canada and the
United States, is very relevant for others of our
member nations. Part of the success of the
reserve programme is attributed to the modern
weaponswith which units are equipped. Qualitytraining is also essential.
* 5. Explore the idea of creating a
European * national guard " for territorial
defence, using the reserve forces of WEU
member states;'
The comparison here is particularly with
arrangements for territorial defence in the
United States where the national guard plays a
major rOle. This idea is linked with the premise
that " smaller, flexible, mobile and more profes-
sional forces " are increasingly required for pos-
sible operations outside traditional areas, but
that 'home defence " in Europe should not be
neglected (coupled with the need to preserve the
requirement for defence incumbent in Article 5
of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the
modified Brussels Treaty with its more binding
commitments.
Therefore your Rapporteur submits the
idea that a " European national guard " com-
posed mainly of reservists could be part of the
solution for the future.
* 6. Reconsider the Assembly's previous
recommendation to take specific action to
allow at an individual level the exchange
of military personnel between countries io
enhance their awareness of European
co-operation, give them greater oppor-
tunity for travel and a more interesting
work environment, and serve as a useful
recruiting incentive at a time when the
demographic levels are making recruiting
most difficult (Recommendation 469\; "
This recommendation was originally for-
mulated in May 1989 by Sir Keith Speed in a
report for the Defence Committee entitled
'State of European security 
- 
intervention
forces and reinforcement for the centre and the
north " . As with so many of the Assembly's rec-
ommendations, the idea was ahead of its time,but one particular development since then
serves to prove its worth.
Visiting the Franco-German Brigade at
Bdblingen the Defence Committee was much
impressed by the obvious enthusiasm of both
French and German national servicemen, given
the opportunity to serve in a multinational and
especially European context. The principle will
apply also as the Eurocorps is expanded with
other WEU countries participating. As well as
allowing national servicemen to put their
European idealism into practice your
Rapporteur believes that the idea should be
extended to reserve forces where the Eurocorps
and similar multinational developments provide
further opportunity for integration.
" 7. Give priority to training volunteers
who would be asked to form reserve
forces whose training would be continuedfor long enough after their return to
i
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civilian life for them to be, if necessary, a
useful complement to regular military per-
sonnel;'
The idea of giving priority to training vol-
unte€rs and continuing that training after reset-
tlement in civilian life might prove useful in
establishing the necessary bridge between the
two.
" 8. Decide to give a symbol of European
identity to all forces - ships, aircraft,
vehicles and regular and reserve personnel
- 
taking part in WEU operations; "
The idea behind this recommendation is
devebped in a report for the Defence Com-
mittee on WEU's operational organisation and
the Yugoslav crisis (Document 1337, Rap-
portzur: Mr. Marten). It is reiterated here main-
ly because of the " reserve' dimension but also
because your Rapporteur believes the Council
should be made aware of the deeply-held
political conviction that the European identity
has 'to be seen to be believed ".
" 9. Establish and develop a liaison wit
the Interallied Confederation of Reserve
Officers (CIOR);'
Through your Rapporteur, the WEU
Assembly has already established a link with the
Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers
(CIOR) and the wealth of detail contained in the
present report bears witness to that link. The Sec-
retary-General has also addressed the CIOR
which, with its vast international membership,
has a potential for reflection and influence in the
twin domains of security and defence going far
beyond the immediate domain of reserve forces.
Our countries are represented on the National
Reserve Forces Committee which has a regular
working relationship with the CIOR and where
the Council might consider some gentle WEU
* caucussing'...
* 10. Ask the WEU Institute for Security
Studies to make a thorough examination of
national service and the structure of
reserve forces in member states and of the
possibilities for co-operation; "
Through its growing network of interna-
tional contacts, both offrcial and unoffrcial, the
Institute is well-placed to conduct such an exami-
nation, the results of which would form a very
useful basis for discussion, for instance at the col-
loquy proposed as part of recommendation
3 above.
* 11. Invite WEU parliamentarians to par-
ticipate in discussions on these topics. "
This final recommendation is included as a
reminder to the Council that the parliaments of
WEU member countries include a wealth of
knowledge and experience appropriate to the dis-
cussion of the subject in hand. Indeed a number of
parliamentarians, like your Rapporteur, and par-
liamentary oflicials are themselves reservists and
are therefore particularly competent to express a
purely objective viewpoint.
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APPENDIX I
The CIOR's coantry-by-coantry sunq of reseme forca
A. WEU COUNTRIES
I. Belgium
I. Reserve structure
A. General organisation
(i) The r6le of the armed forces is to take
part in joint NATO defence and in carrying out
national tasks. The latter, carried out on behalf
of both NATO and the nation, are assigned to
interior forces under national command.
(ii) 90% of the combat troops of the
interior forces are reservists. For the military
defence of the territory, in wartime the com-
mander of the interior forces has available two
light regiments, four security battalions and nine
provincial regiments.
Depending on the structure of the
province, the provincial regiments are a paru-
chute commando company and a varying
number of tactical battalion headquarters, light
infantry companies, companies of guards and
light reconnaissance squadrons.
The r6le of these forces is:
(a) ground defence on national territory,
including a ground, air and NBC intel-
ligence and warning system,
(b) protecting Belgian and allied lines of
communication in Belgium.
B. Military service(i) General
As from the age of 18, under the law on
the militia all male Belgians declared fit have to
accomplish compulsory military service.
Once released from regular service,
recruits are given a mobilisation assignment.
Some are assigned as a complement to
active units and others to reserve forces, combat
units or support units.
(ii) Reserve fficers
The number of places open to candidate
reserve officers is fixed by the Minister of
Defence in the light of the needs of each force.
II. Personnel policies
A. Reuuitment
To become a reserve officer, the candidate
has to meet the following criteria:
(a) to have expressed the wish to be a
reserve officer;
(b) to have agreed to effect the required
active service (at present eleven
months or fifteen for parachute com-
mandos);
(c) to have obtained at least a secondary
school-leaving diploma;
(d) to be able to produce a certilicate of
good conduct as a civilian;
(e) not to have been found guilty of any
act considered by public opinion to be
dishonourable for an oflicer;
U) to have passed various psychological
and medical tests;
G) to carry out a probationary counie as
secondJieutenant or the equivalent;
(h) to be between l9 and 35 years ofage.
B. Assignment
Assignments are made by each force's
mobilisation body.
C. Training and promotion
Although the programme is reviewed in the light
of the period of military service, the followirry
course is followed:
(a) basic military training: about three
months after which the cadet becomes
a candidate reserve oflicer with the
rank of sergeant;
(D/ specialised training lasting about six
months in the force and unit to which
he is assigned; after this training, the
candidate reserve oflicer is giving the
rank of warrant officer;
(c) after carrying out the duties actually
incumbent upon him within the
framework of the unit to which he is
assigned, the candidate reserve officeris given the rank of second lieu-
tenant.
As well as the badge corresponding to
their rank, candidate reserve oflicers wear a red
flash as soon as they take up their duties and
until they become oflicers.
D. Rank
Reserve oflicers have their own status but
rank and seniority entitle them to exactly the
same rights as regular army oflicers when they
are recalled.
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E. Recall and voluntary service
(t) Reserve officers may be recalled as
follows: They are subject to ordinary recalls of
not more than thirty days a year. In peacetime,
they may be recalled in the cases of emergency
provided for under Belgian legislation; in
wartime, they are subject to mobilisation
recalls.
(iil With the consent of the Ministry of
Defence, reserve officers may also effect vol-
untary refresher and training periods, i.e. on the
occasion of exercises organised by URNOR or
regular units.
Not more than thirty days a year may be
spent on such activities and reserve offrcers take
part in them voluntarily.
They take place:
(a/ within units:
- 
at the request of the commander
of the unit, according to require-
ments and usually during exercise
periods;
- 
on the proposal of the reserve
officer himself in the light of the
programmes proposed by each force
or unit.
In the navy, there is a training programme
for anti-mine warfare flotillas drawn up in
co-operation with associations of reserve
oflicers. Most of these activities are
carried out during the week-end.
(b) At URNOR or in its clubs:
URNOR (Association Royale Nationale
des Officiers de R6serve) organises, with
the support of the armed forces, week-end
activities comprising small-scale exercises
involving tactical light infantry and guer-
rilla procedures.'
(iiil Remarks:
(a) During periods of compulsory recall,
work contracts are considered to be sus-
pended and the employer may then decide
not to pay reservists, but he may not
oppose compulsory recalls and does not
have the right to cancel the work con-
tract.
The national association is trying to con-
vince employers that experience acquired
in many areas by reserve officers largely
makes up for the disadvantage of their
short absences due to recall.
(b) lt is interesting to note that refresher
courses are not necessarily all remune-
rated.
III. Mobilisation
Mobilisation of reserve forces(i) When leaving active service, each
member of the armed forces receives a doc-
ument showing his mobilisation assignment.
(iil Since individual personal situations
may change, reservists may, in certain condi-
tions, obtain a suspension of their recall.
(iii) ln the framework of military defence
of the territory, the policy of the armed forces is
to assign reservists, as far as possible, to units
near their homes so as to reduce the real period
of mobilisation.
(iv) The government is very flexible in
recalling reservists. Depending on circum-
stances, they may be recalled in varying
numbers on an individual basis or as entire
units.
(v) Recalls may be made through
national and regional broadcasts on Belgian
radio and television (RTBF/BRTN).
2. France
L Reserve structure
A. General organisation
In wartime, the reserves would account
for 24% of the navy strength, 420/o of the air
force,470lo of the arrny, and l0% of the nuclear
forces.
Even the active army divisions (now 13)
and the new " Force d'Assistance Rapide " need
reservists to bring them to full war strength.
Their proportions are 240/o for organic army
corps units, 72o/o in service units (in particular
the medical service), 620/o for the equipment
support units. Finally, the reserves represent
8070 of the reserve divisions and about I 00 terri-
torial regiments.
il. Personnel policies
A. Appointment of reserve fficers
Accession and schooling of reserve
officers: in France, physically and mentally apt
reserve officer candidates get an initial cur-
riculum and training in normal units and at
specialised schools of the different services.
Admission at an " Ecole des Ofliciers de
reserve " (EOR) is quite selective. Young men
with a high level of education, or/and having
passed successfully final examinations at pre-
military training centres and a security desk may
be admitted directly in training or schools.
Access to the rank and status of reserve
officer is possible for reserve cadets under 35
and reserve non-commissioned officers with
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good training marks aged from 30 to 44 years.
Reserve officer training starts normally in
standing units and continues in specialised
application schools for selected candidates. In
some cases (especially air force and navy) candi-
dates may be accepted directly in the schools.
Pre-military training with good results gives the
best selection chances in all cases.
Trainees for the navy are selected * onfile' among the graduates of universities,
engineer schools, the Merchant Marine School,
and pre-military preparation graduates. The
reserve oflicers school of the navy teaches all
needed specialities at schools at major navy
bases.
At the air force 'EOR " at Evreux air
force base, one-third ofthe voluntary candidates
will be accepted for the four cycles in a year.
These young men had first been incorporated in
air base units where they had an initial training.
Those scoring at least a 12120 mark, must
succeed in a number of tests before admission.
400 more cadets come from military prepa-
ration and a few dozen more from high level
schools (engineering, magistrature, adminis-
tration).
After l0 more training weeks at
specialised schools or units, they are promoted
* aspirant de rdserve " and * sous-lieutenant'
when they return home.
B. Reserve/regular fficer policies
The normal reserve oflicer policies exist
within the services so the most qualified per-
sonnel are retained in the reserve structure to
maintain a strong armed force.
C. Assignments
Assignments are made for all reserve
officers so they are used as best qualified within
their service. Reassignments are carried out so
the reserve officers obtain experience in dif-
ferent units and levels of command and
support.
D. Legal position of reserve fficers
French residents, if fit, are reservists until
the age of 35. Officers and non-commissioned
officers can be maintained 'dans les cadres "
beyond that age limit if they prove a minimum
activity in exercises and reunions (as distinct
from purely associative activities which are by
no means compulsory nor are they taken into
account as such).
The law determines the age limits,
according to rank. This age is the age limit of the
same rank in the regular forces augmented by
five years. Officers are then discharged from
military obligations, and if their service records
are good, can be awarded by the Ministry of
Defence the status of ' honorariat " (retired
officer).
A reserve oflicer over 35 years old having
no activities, is automatically dismissed after a
few years. It must be emphasised that the staffs
issue mobilisation assignments up to a
* maximum employment age' (Age Limite
d'Emploi or ALE).
Honorary (retired) officers are 'accep
ted' at some military exercises, but must be
insured at their expense against accidents, and
can get only a * congress ticket " (2006 reduction
on railways). All reserve officers have access to
garrison officers messes, for a yearly contri-
bution.
ru. Training
No details available.
IV. Mobilisation
A. Mobilisation of reserves
Reserve oflicers cannot be considered sep
arately in the total reserve. The employment of
all reservists is governed by the 'plan de
mobilisation " of all the arms: anny, air force,
navy, gendarmerie and services.
The plan foresees 545 000 men, 281 000
being reservists. Those numbers do not include
personnel who have not received mandatory
instruction and those stationed overseas.
The mobilised force of the anny com-
prises 26 000 reserve offrcers and 52 500 non-
commissioned oflicers (against respectively
60000 and 245000 existing ones). The
mobilised army accounts for (situation 1983):
- 
I army with its organic elements;
- 
3 army corps with organic elements;
- 
15 active divisions (8 armour, 7 infantry);
- 
14 mobilised divisions, of which l0 are
' deviated " from active divisions and 4
from the schools.
The " armde de I'air's " (air force) mobili-
sation plan is very decentralised down to its 40
metropolitan bases and stations. In 1981, there
were 16 223 ai force reserve oflicers (of whom
3 259 had a mobilisation assignment) and
35 500 non-commissioned officers. The needs
are as follows: support, training, supervision:
2890; fusiliers commandos of the air force: 28%;
operations: l9Vo; instruction: l5Vo; infra-
structure: 60/o; computers, organisation: 2%;
mechanics, communications: 2%. The French
territory is divided into four 'r6gions
a6riennes " totalling five mobilisation centres.
The " am6e de mer' or * marine
nationale' (navy) still sometimes affectionately
called *La Royale", has 160000 reservists of
whom 14 000 are navy oflicers, 40 000 NCOs.
The mobilisation plan of the navy is adaptable
to the degree of international tension. Criteria
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for reserve officers for obtaining a mobilisation
assignment are basic qualification (including
operational and technical skills, age) voluntary
service, and proximity home-base.
The navy uses a system of selective
recalls, which imposes a very strict discipline on
the reservists concerned. The military adminis-
tration of the French coasts (roughly 3 000 km)
depcnds on three maritime districts called
'prEfectures maritimes " (PREMAR): Cher-
bourg (Channel coast), Brest (Atlantic coast),
and Toulon (Mediterranean) and their subdivi-
sions COMAR (" commandant de la marine').
They also have civilian responsibilities.
These structures are responsible for navy
mobilisation through their CMM (" centres
mobilisateurs marines').
The " gendarmerie nationale " is a service
depending on the Ministry of Defence. Its
normal function is a police function (agents of
the public force).
Administratively, France is divided
into * d€panements ", " arrondissements " and
" cantons ". Each " canton' has a " brigade of
gendarmerian, d few men commanded by a
lower non-commissioned officer rank. Their
main asset is their transmissions, so the entire
territory is covered by a gendarmerie-own trans-
mission which cannot be struck by strike or
other disorders. This is an important asset in a
time of crisis.
This so-called * gendarmerie d6parte-
mentale' is territorial, whereas another force,
the " gendarmerie mobile' is equipped with
specialised vehicles and transmissions. They
also have light weapons and live in barracks.
Thir mission is to oppose disorders of all kinds
and help in case of catastrophe. In wartime, they
become combat units.
There are also other specialised units,like
' gendarmerie maritime, fluviale " (river police),
* de I'air " (security of air bases). In case of
mobilisation, the gendarmerie recall their own
retervists, as well as reservists of the anny,
including I 100 reserve officers (300/o of their
reserve oflicers).
3. Gernany
L Reserve structure
A. General organisation
The Bundeswehr manpower planning
concept for the 1990s delimits the operational
minimum peacetime strength to 456 000 active
setrvicemen, 24 000 reservists from the standby
readiness component, and up to 15 000 reserve
duty training spaces from 1995 onwards,
together with the projected manpower reserve of
350 000 men, earmarked for security and
improving manpower sustainability. This indi-
cates that only a quarter of the projected war
authorised strength will be made up of active
servicemen and three-quarters will be reservists
designated for wartime assignment. This leads
to the following total:
Wartime strengh I 609 000 Approx. 350 000 reservists
designated for assignments
as part of the manpower rcrierve
I 340000
Approx.73%
884 000 reservists daigrated for
assignmenh as part of the war
authorised strength
Augmentation
Peacetime $rengh 495 000
15000 reserve
duty training spaces 8%
24000 sandby readiness
reservists
456 000 active service men92010 456000 active servicemen 2796
B. Reseme structure and administration
In the Federal Republic of Germany there
exists no exclusive reserve component. Due to
the planned restructuring of the army and the
pending implementation of the reservist concept,
discussion of this subject will have to be post-
poned until final decisions have been reached.
C. Reserve categories
The foltowing differing reserve categories
exist:
(/ standy reserve;
(ir/ reservists desiglrated for assignment
as part of the war authorised strength(alert reserve);
(iii) rcservists designated for assignment
as part of the manpower reserve;
(iv) remaining manpower reserve.
D. Command structure/statw of reserve forces
Reservists are fully integrated into the
armed forces command structure. A separate
reserve structure does not exist.
E. Limitations on number of reserve fficers
Limitations on the number of reserve
officers only depend on the armed forces
requirements and on the reserve officer candi-
dates' successful completion of their obligatory
training courses.
F. Full-timepersonnelassignment/support
A number of active servicemen are
assigned to mobilisation bases for the mainte-
nance of arms and equipment of reserve units.
Reservists receive additional support
from oflicers and non-commissioned officers at
the military district, military region, and mil-
itary subregion command levels.
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IL Personnel policy
A. Appointment as reserye fficer
The criteria for appointment as reserve
officer candidate are:
(i) place of residence in the Federal
Republic of Germany;
(ii) German nationality;
(iii) age limits;
(iv) educational or vocational qualifica-
tions;
(v/ minimum medical and physical
fitness requirements.
B. Reseme/regular fficers policy
The reservist concept, prepared by the
armed forces staff in the Federal Ministry of
Defence, outlines the qualitative and quanti-
tative manpower requirements in terms of
reserve and regular officers. The concept specifi-
cally deals with issues ranging from reserve
resources, satisfaction of personnel require-
ments, and reserve manpower management, to
the training, extension training and follow-on
training of reservists.
C. Assignments
In keeping with the Bundeswehr war
authorised strength, reserve oflicers can be
assigned at the various levels of command.
D. Legal status of reserve fficers
Reserve offrcers are subject to the same
disciplinary regulations as regular oflicers.
A separate code of military justice specifi-
cally applying to reservists does not exist.
E. Civilian employer support of reservists
A specific system, comparable with the
American system, does not exist. However,
during reserve training periods, legal protection
from loss of job is provided to reservists in
accordance with the provisions of the Federal
Job Reservation Act.
III. Training
A. Officer initial/basic taining
The training of reserve oflicer candidates
is conducted in several stages:
Basic training (three months). Promotionto reserve officer candidate (Fahnenjunker)(OR-5) may follow after successful completion
of the non-commissioned officer training quali-
fying him as squad leader and 12 monthsof mil-
itary service.
Promotion to Fiihnrich (OR-6) mayfollow upon successful completion of the
platoon leader course and2l months of military
service.
Promotion to Oberfiihnrich (OR-8) may
follow after 30 months of military service, and
the promotion to second lieutenant, after com-
pleting 36 months of military service.
B. Advanced fficer selection and training
Training and selection of future resen'e
oflicers takes place during reserve duty training
periods. Qualifications are based and depend on
the individual oflicer's willingness, his ability,
his mental capabilities and physical fitness.
C. Active duty training of reserve fficers
A number of courses can be completed by
reserve oflicers during reserve duty training
periods. This applies to the levels of platoon
leader, company commander, and field gradc
officers.
D. Inactive duty training of reserve fficers
Not applicable.
E. Extended active duty
Limited to a maximum of 12 years, if the
reserve oflicer has the necessary qualifications
and if he is needed in the armed forces.
F. Training during recall
The purpose of reserve duty training of
reserve officers is to provide training and
extension training.
G. Training exercises
Individual reserve oflicers may be called
up for participation.
H. Exchange training
In accordance with the existing bilateral
agreements between the Federal Republic and
the United States, the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands, participation in exchange training
programmes is possible. Efforts are under way to
arrange additional agreements on exchange pro-
grammes with other nations.
IV. Mobilisation
A. Mobilisation of reserves
Every mobilisation-assigned reservist
receives a draft notice specifying his assigned
unit in case of mobilisation.
B. Liabilily to perform seryice in peacetime/
war
The National Military Service Act pro
vides that call-up for military service may be
made in peacetime, in a crisis or in wartime.
C. Exemption from recall
Certain gxoups or individuals may be
exempted from recall on medical or vocational
grounds.
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D. Other mobilisation aspects
In case of mobilisation, reservists can be
recalled by publications in newspapers, radio
and television announcements, by telegram or
by specific calling-up orders.
4. Italy
I. Reserve structure
A. General organisation
The reserve forces are formed in a small
share by oflicers and non-commissioned oflicers
retired from active service and for the most partby personnel (officers, non-commissioned
officers, and enlisted men) who fulfil their
required military service.
The earmarking of conscripts who leave
the armed forces occurs by different procedures
for the anny, navy and air force_according to the
manpower requirements of each service.
B. Reserve structure and administration
(t) Army.
Each unit designates, for the purpose of
mobilisation, the oflicers, non-commissioned
oflicers and enlisted men belonging to the con-
tingents discharged last. On their discharge,
these personnel are " hooked " in the necessary
arnount for filling the unit.
In case of recall, these men must return to
their unit where they had previously served. On
the northeastern border ofltaly (along the river
Tagliamento), as regards the creation of the first
and second defence line, cadre units personnel
come from the same region, in analogy to
'Alpini " and " Lagunari " designated to defend
mountains and lagoons near Venice.
(ii) Navy.
Personnel appointed for the completion
of crews of naval squadron are directly recalled
by their respective naval headquarters. The
remainder are earmar*ed by maritime depart-
ments.
(iii) Air force.
The Air Regional Command recalls: pilot
offtcers and non-commissioned oflicers, oflicers
and non-commissioned officers of the adminis-
trative rOles, and enlisted men of the vigi-
lance.
C. Limitation on number of reserve ofricers
Recall for training purposes is set forth by
a speciflrc decree of the Ministry of Defence in
the context of training requirements and of
financial possibilities without any particular
procedure.
il. Personnel policies
No details available.
III. Training
A. Ofricer initial/basic training
The training of reservists depends upon
the requirements of filling existing units, of
establishing new units, and upon the mobili-
sation systems used in the three services:
(i) Army.
The system of "hooking" assures reser-
vists who are still young and who have been dis-
charged for over two or three years. Training
problems pertain to the need for refreshing
training and for the amalgam among the men.
Training recalls are made each year for
reserve oflicers and non-commissioned officers
in order to update their preparation on new
tactics and weapons.
(ii) Navy.
The high level of operational readiness of
naval forces creates limited training problems
and to the amalgam of personnel designated for
oompletion of crews.
Particular care is given to the training of
personnel belonging to the command branch
who are periodically recalled for 40 days of
oourses. Furthermore, on the occasion of the
biggest NATO exercise, a number of reserve
officers are recalled for a maximum of 30 days.
(iii) Air fore.
The same considerations pertain to the air
force, which annually recalls a limited number
of reserve officers.
B. Inactive duty training for reseme fficers
A substantial percentage of reserve
officers operate every day with units of regular
armed forces for the normal training and
updating exercises.
They are motivated by the conviction that
they loyally contribute to the defence of free
institutions and the strengthening of the state's
natural alliances.
ru. Mobilisation
A. Mobilisation of reserves
The general principles regarding mobi-
lisation of reserve forces are fixed by law.
Recall for mobilisation is a political
decision and, according to the Italian Consti-
tution, ascends to the chief of the state, to the
parliament, and to the government.
The compulsory recruitment of enlisted
men: after the compulsory drafting period
enlisted men are discharged. However, they nor-
mally remain 
- 
for a period of 12 months 
-
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* committed " to augment the same unit in
which they had served, in order to bring these
units to combat strength in time of emergency.
The remaining personnel (specialists) are
committed for 24 months to augnent units to be
mobilised in time of emergency.
Within operational units, " committed'
personnel are replaced each year by personnel
who have been discharged no more than two
years before.
B. Liability to recall in peace/war
The recalling of reservists can be carried
out:
- 
in case of general mobilisation, through
the use of wall posters and mass media;
or
- 
in case of gradual mobilisation, through
the dispatching of recall papers.
C. Exceptions for recall
The recall by the system of the ' hook " is
on a national basis: units displaced in the
Northeast of Italy can also receive reservists
from Sicily or Sardinia.
This means arrival is delayed because of
distances. But such a disadvantage is counter-
balanced by the fact that the men fill units where
they have previously served. In this way, opera-
tional readiness is acquired in a short time.
5. Netherlands
I. Reserve structure
A. General organisation
While the number of reservists who have
a mobilisation post in the navy and in the air
force is comparatively small, about 700/o of the
wartime posts in the army are filled with
reservists.
Thus, in general, there are a number of
individual selected mobilisation posts in the
navy and air force such as traffrc controller,
medical offrcer, etc., which are filled by
reservists.
Except for some guard companies in the
air force and a number of companies of marines
in the marine corps, there are no complete units
that have been identified and are called up in
wartime which are comprised mainly of
reservists.
In addition to the call-up of individuals
for functions in standing units, complete units
comprised of reservists would be called up to
support army operations.
A total of 175 000 men belonging to 900
company-sized units and about 400 replacement
detachments are mobilised. Approximately
107 000 reservists (soldiers, non-commissioned
officers, and officers) will be called up.
Although the reserve units are composed
primarily of reservists, key personnel will be
regular active duty personnel. For example, a
battalion of the standing army could lose its staff
officer personnel and intelligence oflicer (Sl and
52) to become an operations offtcer (S3) and
logistics officer (Sa) in a reserve unit of the same
kind. Reservists would fill the vacant Sl and 52
functions in the battalion of the standing army.
Regular oflicers not serving in units of the
standing anny, but employed at training schools,
in staff duties, or at the Ministry of Defence
will become commanding officers or will be
employed in other functions of the reserve units
in wartime.
Regular active duty non-commissioned
offrcers will be distributed throughout the
reserve units to ensure adequate and upto-date
expertise and knowledge is available in key func-
tions.
B. Reserve structure and administration
Overall responsibility for the arrny reserve
components is vested in the Oflice of Mobi-
lisation Preparation that is directly responsible
to the National Territorial Commander.
The head of this oflice is also Special
Advisor for Mobilisation Alfairs to the Com-
mander in Chief Iandforces (BLS). In addition,
the Deputy Commander l-andforces is Inspector
of Army Reserve Personnel (oflicers and non-
commissioned officers). The above-mentioned
oflice is responsible for training and assignment
to units of all army reserve personnel.
C. Command subordination/relationships of
reseme forces
The Office of Mobilisation Preparation is
responsible for training and assignment to units
of all army reserve personnel.
In time of mobilisation, this offrce
remains responsible for reserve units and per-
sonnel during call-up and unit formation, upon
completion of which the fully-manned and
equipped reserve units are turned over to and
then come under the responsibility of Com-
mander First Army Corps (field army) or the
National Territorial Commander (territorial
army).
D. Limitation on number of reserve fficers(t) Army.
The number of reserve officers that are
appointed yearly is dependent upon the require-
ments of the standing forces. Once commis-
sioned, promotion to first lieutenant follows
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thrce years after the final appointment as second
lieutenant.
Promotion to captain (and major)
requires a special course, completed success-
fully, a number of days active service in
mobilisation post capacity as a first lieutenant(as a captain) and the availability of a
mobilisation post vacancy for captain (for
major) besides having held the rank of first lieu-
tenant (captain) for five years.
(iil Navy.
The Ministry of Defence (navy) deter-
mines annually the number of reserve officers
required in accordance with peacetime duty and
mobilisation plan requirements.
(iii) At force.
The number of reserve oflicers on active
duty depends on the number of vacancies in the
peacetime establishment. After having com-
pleted their general conscription or contract,
only a small number of reserve officers are
assigned to frll vacancies in the wartime estab-
lishment.
Those not assigned to fill these vacancies
are kept in a wartime reserve or are put at the
disposal of the Secretary of State for Home
Alfairs to fill leading jobs in the Civil Defence
(as civilians).
E. Full-time personnel assignment/support
The only regular personnel assigned full
time to a reserve unit are the personnel tasked
with the maintenance of the reserve unit's
wartime equipment. There is one staff member
of a reserve division with some regular per-
sonnel to execute wartime preparations.
When the reserve unit is called up for
exercises or in a real emergency, the regular
active duty personnel with wartime assignments
wonld be made available for the duration of any
exercises.
il. Personnel policies
A. Appointment of reserve fficers
Reserve offrcers are derived from:
(i) Reserve oflicer candidates who have
successfully completed their training at one of
the reserve officers' schools.
(it) Former regular army officers. By law,
all former regular oflicers are appointed reserve
offrcers when under the age of 45. On request,
all discharged oflicers over the age of 45 are
appointed as reserve oflicers until the age of 55.
(iii) The same applies for former regular
navy and marine corps oflicers. If needed in
their special jobs, some naval reserve oflicers are
employed on a voluntary basis until the age of 50.
B. Reserve categories according to semice
duties in peacetime
(i) Army.
(a) Active dfiy.
(1) General conscription of l6
months.
(2) Reserve offrcers with a con-
tract of six years maximum.
(b) lnactive duty (expiring at the age
of 45 or 55 years)
(l) After having completed
general conscription.
(2) After termination of contract.
(c/ Reserve offrcers in categories(bXl) and (b)(2) can be:
(l) Reserve oflicers with mobi-
lisation post (in a unit of indi-
vidual assignment) or tempo-
rarily without a mobi-
lisation post awaiting a new
assignment.
(2) Reserve officers assigned to
the replacement pool.(3) Reserve officers with no
assignment at all.
(d/ Reserve officers in category (c)(l)
above can be called up from time
to time for refresher courses, exer-
cises, etc.
(i/ Navy/marine corps.
(a) Active duty.
(l) General conscription of l8-21
months.
(2) Reserve officers with a con-
tract of six years maximum.
(b) Inactive duty (expiring at the age
of 45 or 50 years).
(l) After having completed
general conscription.(2) After termination of contract.
(c) Categoies (b)(l) and (bX2) above
are called up periodically for exer-
cises and refresher courses.
(iii) Air force.
(a) Active dfiy.
(l) General conscription.(2) Contract: limited (two-six
years) or unlimited (expiring
category).
(b) lnactive duty (expiring at 40 or 45
years of age).
(l) After completion of national
service.
(2) After termination of contract.
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C. Appointment (nomination) of resente oficers
(i) General conditions including civil
education.
(a) Army. All candidates for reserve
officer must:
(l) Be Dutch citizens.
(2) Have at least passed senior
high school final examinations
successfully.(3) Have been selected by a
selection centre of the armed
forces after tests during pre-
service observation sessions.
(4) Successfully complete the
training, to include passing a
final examination, at a reserve
officers training school.
(5) Be recommended by their
commanding offtcer duringtheir service period as
ensign.
(D/ Navy/marine corps. All reserve
officer candidates must:
(1) Be Dutch citizens.
(2) Have passed senior high
school final examinations suc-
cessfully or a combination of
high school and technical or
nautical college.(3) Have been selected by an
armed forces selection centre
after various tests.(4) Have been selected by a naval
reserve officers selection
board after various psycho-
logical and medical tests.
(5) Pass a final examination suc-
cessfully in a reserve officers
training school.
(b) Air force. All reserve officer can-
didates must:
(l) Be Dutch citizens.(2) Have passed at least the final
high school examination suc-
cessfully.(3) Prior to enlistment, pass a
Ministry of Defence selection
board for general officer
selection, and an air force
selection board for a specific-
to-job selection.(4) Have successfully completed a
military job-training.
(5) Pass successfully a final exam-
ination at the air force reserve
officer training school.(6) Be recommended by their
commanding officer duringtheir service period as
ensign.
(i/ Number of months (effective service)
from call-up to appointment as a
reserve officer.
(a) kmy.
The first training for the reserve
oflicer will follow this scheme:
After approximately two months -
corporal.
After approximately four months(total) 
- 
sergeant.
After approximately six months(total) 
- 
vaandrig (ensign).
The * vaandrig' or * kornet " will
then be assigned to an operational
unit and will be commissioned to
second lieutenant l0 months later in
the week before he is demobilised if
his fitness report by his commanding
oflicer is satisfactory.
(b/ Navy.
Depending on educational back-
ground and service branch, reserve
oflicers receive their commission
nine weeks to one year after call-up.
(c) Air force.
After two months 
- 
corporal.
After approximately four and a half
months 
- 
sergeant.
After ll months 
- 
vaandrig (ensign).
Total general conscription L7
months.
Definite appointment to second lieu-
tenant takes place directly after
regular oflicers who have started their
training at the same time, are com-
missioned. As a matter of fact,
recently very few candidates are
accepted for reserve offrcer training,
unless they are willing to sign up for a
couple of years beyond national
servlce.
Age conditions(i) Army: minimum l8 years old
(ii) Navy: minimum 19 years old
(iii) Ait force: minimum 18 years old
Exemption from the normal conditions for
persons with a specialised civil education
that is useful for the armed forces(i) Army.
This applies to draftees who have qual-
ified as doctors, dentists, or chemists; after eight
weeks training with satisfactory results, they
may be appointed first lieutenant.
E.
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Draftees, with a technical or economical
scientific education may, after a reduced mil-
itary training, be appointed " vaandrig." and
acc6rdingly be assigned a post where their civil
education may be utilised. Appointment to
second lieutenant will take place in the same
way as for other " vaandrigs'.
(ir) Navy.
University graduates with an appropriate
degtree, e.g. naval architects and marine engi-
ne€trs, mechanical and electrical engineers, econ-
omists, lawyers, social scientists, and psycholo-
gists are commissioned as ensign after nine
weeks of reserve offtcers training.
This is done provided that they will have
a non-combatant position as a reserve officer;
university graduates qualified as medical doctor,
dentist, pharmacist or clerical offrcer are com-
missioned as lieutenant junior grade after nine
weeks of reserve officer training.
(iii) Air force:
Those who have completed a specific civil
education such as engineers, lawyers, and econo-
mists, are granted the acting rank of second lieu-
tenant afier nine weeks of reserve oflicer
training. Medical doctors are put at the disposal
of the Royal Air Force by the army in the rank
of flieht lieutenant.
F. Reserve/regular offtcer policies
When on active duty a reserve officer is
treated in exactly the same manner as other
active regular officers.
G. Assignments
Reservists are assigned to units or to indi-
vidual positions as described above.
H- Legal position of reserve fficers (vis-d-vis
their civilian employer)
There are no legal statutory provisions
governing the position of the reserve officer in
civilian life.
There are a number of emPloYers who
appreciate the reserve offrcers' service, and do
nbt count any recall periods as holidays, paying
them normal salaries less officer's pay.
Others will try not to engage reserve
officers, or inform them that any liability they
have orundertake as to recall periods, etc., is on
their own time, i.e. in lieu of holidays, and at
their own expense. The latter seems to be prev-
alent, due to the surplus number of reserve
offrcers and the fact that no-one not wishing to
do so, needs to continue reserve service after
attaining the rank of first lieutenant. The fore-
going applies in peacetime.
In time of war or in an emergency, it is
stipulated by a special law that the reserve
officer, when returning to civilian life has to be
given again his former function in enterprise.
Practice has shown, however, that in
reality the employers - with some good excep-
tions of course - do not adhere to same, which
means the reserve offtcer in question has to
restart his career.
As to the legal position of the reserve
oflicer in the employment of government,
province, or municipality (i.e. the civil servant
officer), generally speaking, there is no discrimi-
nation as compared to his colleagues and, when
fulfilling his duties as a reserve officer, he is
legally protected.
L Policies on uniforms
Rules for wearing uniform when not on active
duty
Reserve officers of the army and air force
are allowed to wear uniform when not on active
duty whenever they wish.
A reserve officer of the navy or marine
corps, however, is not allowed to wear uniform
when and where he likes when not on active
duty, but needs special permission from the
Ministry of Defence to wear uniform.
No permission is needed to wear uniform
when attending activities of one of the (reserve)
oflicers associations, when attending special
occasions such as weddings and funerals, and
when the reserve oflicer has a position in one of
the national (reserve) officers associations.
All Dutch reserve offtcers must apply for
special permission when they want to wear their
uniform abroad.
III. Training
A. Oflicer initial/basic training
(t) Army.
Each officer candidate is given his initial
training at the training school of the branch or
arm he is posted to. Training schedules differ
from branch to branch.
(ii) Navy.
All reserve offrcer candidates are trained
at the naval academy at Den Helder where the
regulars are also trained.
(iii) Air Force.
All reserve offtcer candidates receive their
initial training at the Gilze-Rijen Air Base.
Afterwards they receive specialised training at
the different air force schools at different air
bases (i.e. electronics at Deelen, mechanical
transport at Soesterberg, etc).
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(ivl Marines.
All reserve officer candidates are trained
together with their regular comrades at the
marine dep6t at Rotterdam.
B. Advanced fficer selection and training
Selection for and advanced training is
dependent on the oflicer's fitness repbrts
received during the first period of service and
during recalls. Those performing the best will be
selected for further training and promotion.
An important consideration is the amount
of time the officer is willing to voluntarily spend
on recalls.
C. Active duty taining for reseme fficers
This training can consist of the fol-
lowing:
(i) Training for three weeks with the
reserve unit (all tactical units
qualify).
(i/ Regular call-up for a few days staffor
field training for key personnel of all
arrny reserve units.
(iii) On-the-job training with a standing
unit if they have no mobilisation posi
with a similar unit.
(iv,) Individual call-up for specialised
training (in specialised subjects as
well as courses for advancement in
rdnk).
D. Inactive duty training for reserve fficers
No inactive duty training is available for
reserve offrcers.
E. Extended active duty
A reserve oflicer can usually (depending
on favourable fitness reports) extbnd the first
period of 
-active duty by a number of years (com-monly referred to as a KW volunt6er).
F. Training during recall
Apart from courses, some reserve officers
are called up for three weeks with their reserve
unit to do practical training. This applies to all
tactical units.
Reserve officers of the navy are called up
for training periods of a maximurir of two weeki
and reserve offrcers of the marine corps are
called up for periods of five weeks every three
years.
Key personnel of all army reserve units
are. called up regularly for a few days staff
training. All army reserve oflicers have the
opportunity to do on-the-job training with a
standing unit if they have a mobilisaiion post
with a similar unit.
G. Training exercises
No details available.
H. Exchange training
Much exchange training has taken place
in previous years. However, ai the presentiime
the Ministry of Defence now wishes to confine
future exchange training to NATO partners with
whom close co-operation in wartime would exist(i.e. Federal Republic of Germany).
IV. Mobilisation
A. Mobilisation of reserves
As already mentioned a total of 197 000
personnel will be mobilised in time of war. As
175 000 of these personnel belong to the army, it
is obvious that the major mobilisation probl6ms
are those of the Royal Netherlands Army. The
mobilisation system depends on the following:
(i) The system of army structure with a
mobilisable component with Short-
leave, RIM, and other mobilisable
units.
(a/ Shortleave is the four to six
month period in which the con-
scripts are on leave after com-
pletion of their active duty, but
they still belong to an active
unit.
(D/ RIM units (RIM means Direct
Intake unitwise from active unitsinto mobilisable units). Thus
every RIM unit has a parent unit
of the same size in the standing
army. It has 
-exactly the sameequipment as the parent unit and
conscripts are assigned to theRIM unit for a period of 16
months after leaving the parent
unit in the standing army. After
l6 months personnel are assigned
to a secondJine mobilisable unit
and distributed over different
units.
(ii) The way equipment, ammunition
and supplies are stored to support the
above-mentioned units is by using
mobilisation storage sites which are
ready for quick delivery and imme-
diate use.
(iii) The use of typical Dutch conditions
such as short travel distances, well
developed public transport, and ahigh audience density on the
nationally-controlled broadcasting
system will ensure maximum
response to any call to mobilise.
A full army mobilisation will be accom-
plished in three successive stages. Each ofthese
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stages corresponds roughly to the State of Mil-
itary Vigilance and the first two stages of the
formal NATO Alert System " simple " and
" reinforcement alert ".
Any mobilisation can be preceded by
measures to improve operational readiness
(which would most likely include the call-up of
conscripts on short leave).
B. Liability to recall in peace/war
A statutory law governing reserve officer
status empowers the Minister of Defence to
recall into active service all or any reserve
officers he considers required by existing condi-
tions for an indefinite period.
The Ministry of Defence can also recall,
in the interests of the service, any reserve officer
for periodic training ofup to 60 days every three
years, divided over a maximum of six periods.
C. Exception for recall
There are certain exceptions to the above,
mainly if the reserve oflicer is employed in a
civilian occupation that contributes to the
plaaned war effort.
6. United Kingdom
I. Reserve structure
A. General organisation
The Territorial Army (TA) was formed in
1908 from existing militia, yeomanry and other
volunteer units. From then until 1967, it con-
sisted mainly of TA divisions and brigades who
did some annual training but were not com-
mitted to battle until they had completed several
months of intensive training after mobilisation.
That was how they were used in both world
wars.
During the. period 1967-1969, the Terri-
torial Army was reorganised into its present
form in which it is integrated into the Regular
Army Order of Battle immediately on
mobilisation, thus making its peacetime
standard of training of far greater importance
than hitherto.
As a result of the 1981 Defence Review,
the Territorial Army is being expanded to reach
a strength of 86 000 by 1990. With the reduction
in sizebf the regular army, the expansion of the
Territorial Army places even greater emphasis
on its importance.
The r6le of the TA is to provide units and
individuals available both for employment on
specific tasks at home and overseas and to meet
the unexpected when required, and in par-
ticular:
(i) To complete the ArmY ORBAT
(order of battle) of NATO-committed
forces and to provide certain units
for the support of NATO Head-
quarters.
(ii) To assist in maintaining a secure
United Kingdom base in suPPort of
forces deployed in EuroPe.
(iiil Since the reorganisation in early
1969, the Territorial ArmY has con-
sisted of two elements: Group A and
Group B. Group A is distinguished
from Group B by the higher call-out
liability. Of the current TA in the
main TA establishment, over 9Woarc
in Group A.
The newly-formed Home Service Force
(HSF) forms Group C of the TA. Although an
integral part of the TA, the HSF is not at present
included in the main TA establishment.
B. Reserve structure and administration
Units of TA Group A are organised as
follows:
l. Independent units. These comprise the
largest part of the TA and consist of both major
and minor units which are recruited locally.
They have their own permanent staff and
preririses (TA centres) and keep most of their
equipment with them.
On mobilisation, they collect the balance
of their equipment and supplies from ordnance
dep6ts in the United Kingdom and those with
overseas r6le move to Germany and else-
where.
2. Sponsored units. Sponsored units are
filled by volunteers recruited countrywide. This
is partly because many such units are small tech-
nical specialist units (e.g. blood supply units,
petroleum laboratories, specialist teams, Royql
Engineers) whose specialist manpower is
unlikely to be available in sufficient numbers in
any one area.
Many of these specialist units are not nor-
mally required in the regular army's peacetime
ORBAT. Sponsored units are administered and
trained by a central volunteer headquarters(CYHQ). CVHQs are regular army establish-
ments in their particular arm or service who are
also responsible for the embodiment of their
own sponsored units on mobilisation.
Virtually all TA teach arm units are inde-
pendent. Of the logistic services, approximately
Lalf are independent and the remainder is spon-
sored.
TA Group B consists of the following:
l. University Officers Training Corps
(University OTC). The University OTC consists
of 19 independent units which cover not only
universities but also polytechnics and colleges.
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The military training in the University OTCs
aims to:
(a) foster knowledge and under-
standing of the army and its r6le;
(b) develop leadership qualities;
(c) prepare officer cadets for commis-
sioned service in the regular army
and the TA.
2. Bands. There are 22 TA Bands.
3. Minor miscellaneous units.
TA Group C comprises the Home Service
Force (HSF) composed of trained officers and
soldiers from all three services, including the
Territorial Army. Recruits are required to have
had military experience. The HSF companies
are hosted by an independent TA unit which
provides some training and administrative
assistance. The r6le of the HSF is to guard key
points thus releasing regular and TA home
defence units for mobile r6les elsewhere.
Individual reservists. There are several
categories of individual reservists available to
provide individual reinforcements to bring units
up to full-time strength and to provide battle
casualty replacements (BCRs).
l. Regular Army Reserve of Officers(RARO). RARO consists of both compulsory
and volunteer members including retired regular
and short service officers and oflicers with pre-
vious service in the Army Emergency Reserve,
the TA and TAVR. Members of the RARO have
no peacetime training liability and volunteers
are needed for all activities.
All regular oflicers who join the army
have a RARO liability, and six-year annual
training commitment upon leaving. Members of
RARO receive no emoluments unless they vol-
unteer for annual reporting, when they receive
an annual grant, and when they take part in
exercises they receive TA rates of pay.
2. The regular reserve comprises:
(a/ Section A. Former regular soldiers
fulfilling their compulsory period
of service with a regular reserve for
a period generally up to six years
dependent on their length of
regular service.
(6/ Section D. Those who have com-pleted their regular engagement
and regular reserve liability in
Section A may volunteer to enlist
or re-engage in Section D.
- 
3. Long Term Reserve (LTR). By virtue
of the reserve Forces Act 1980, all individuals
who joined the regular arrny on or after 28th
Fgbquary 1964, serve in the LTR up to the age of
45, following completion of their regular army
and regular reserve service. They are not liable
for training, but can be called out in a national
emergency.
4. Army Pensioners. These are indi-
viduals who have completed 22 years of regular
service and draw a pension. They have no
training liability and their recall liability is
similar to the LTR.
C. Command subordination/relationships of
reserye forces
The Director General Territorid Army
and Organisation (two star) is the adviser on TA
policy within the Ministry of Defence to the
Army Board and other army department direc-
torates with the Director Army Reserves (one
star) as his chief-of-staff dealing with aU matters
directly concerned with the TA reserve and
cadets.
A small number of TA formation head-
quarters exist specifically to command special-
to-arm units grouped under them (e.g. an
engineer or signals brigade headquarters). The
remaining TA units and independent sub-units
are commanded directly or through a brigade by
the district headquarters in whose area they are
located.
The commanders of TA formations are
regular offrcers whose staffs consist of regulars
and volunteers, and include volunteer deputy
commanders (colonel).
The Commander, United Kingdom Field
Army (three star) was appointed Inspector
General TA in 1983 and, as such, is responsible
for monitoring standards of operational effi-
ciency and training in all TA units.
D. Limitation on number of reseme fficers
The number of reserve officers is limited
only by the establishment vacancies for reserve
officers in the regular and reserve units, ships
and formations. There is also a requirement to
pass promotion qualification examinations.
E. Full-timepersonnelassignment/support
Some regular anny staff (normally the
commanding officer, quartermaster and regi-
mental sergeant major) are integral to the indt-
pendent units with which they are serving, and
remain with it on mobilisation. Others incfuding
the Training Major, Permanent StaffInstructors(PSIs) and Permanent Staff Administrative
Oflicers (PSAOs) are supernumerary and may
be posted once mobilisation is complete.
II. Personnel policies
A. Appointment of reserve fficers
The conditions for appointment to a reserve
commission in the Territorial Army include:
1. domicile in the United Kingdom;
2. citizen of the United Kingdom;
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3. age limitations;
4. educational requirements;
5. medical requirements;
6. special approval for those occupying
certain government appointments in
their civilian jobs.
Candidates who have no previous service
will normally carry out basic training before
appcaring beiore a Selection Board, after which
they must attend a lLday TA Commissioning
Course at the Royal Military Academy, Sand-
hurst. They will then be appointed to a com-
mission as-a second lieutenant on the basis of a
probationary period, normally of one year.
Direct appointment as officers in the Ter-
ritdal Army may be granted to those who have
previously:
1. served satisfactorily as officers in the
regular forces, or in the reserve or aux-
iliary forces (including the UDR and
Commonwealth Forces);
2. obtained qualifications for service as
chaplains, doctors, dentists or nurses;
3. served satisfactorily as warrant oflicers
in the regular arrny of the TA or UDR;
4. become eligible for direct appointment
as quartermasters by virtue of previous
service as warrant officers of the
regular army or the TA.
B- Reserve/regular fficer policies
Commander United Kingdom Field
Army (three star), the Inspector-General Terri-
torial Army, is responsible for monitoring stan-
dards of operational effrciency and training in
all TA units.
After considerable discussion with many
interested parties, the Inspector General issued a
new directive in February 1985 on the
recruitment, selection, assessment and training
of potential Territorial Army officers.
The arrangements outlined in this
directive represent a significant step forward in
improving the quantity, calibre and training of
potential Territorial Army officers.
C. Assignments
Volunteers for independent units join a
local unit and generally follow the British regi-
mental systern of recruiting by geographic
location. Volunteers who join sponsored units,
may join a local unit if they live in either
Iondon or in other major urban areas where
srrch a unit is located. Volunteers who live else-
where in the country iue sponsored through
Central Volunteer Headquarters (CYHQ).
There are no pre-designated regular army
pcrsonnel who would be assigned to TA units in
the event of mobilisation.
D. Legal position of reserve fficers
Reserve offtcers are subject to military
discipline at all times, whereas other ranks are
subject to military discipline only on training.
Reslrve officers are subject to the same disci-
plinary measures as their regular colleagues.
Civilian courts deal with offences against
civilian law, and military courts deal with
offenses against military law.
E. Civilian employer suqqort
A civilian employer is under no legal obli-
gation within the United Kingdom to release his
employees for training within the reserves
forces. In practice, employers vary widely in
their support of the reserve forces.
An employer may:
l. insist that all training must be carried
out within holiday periods;
2. allow one week's additional paid leave;
3. allow two week's additional unpaid
leave;
4. allow two week's additional unpaid
leave and then make up an individual
forces rate of pay to his normal civilian
rate.
Some employers make it practically
impossible for a member of the reserve forces to
mmplete his minimum commitment, and they-
have no obligation to do so. A programme of
employer support similar to the ones in Canada
is being started.
lil. Training
A. OfJicer initial/basic training
Since September 1985, new training-
arrangements have applied to the training--of
poteniial officers in the Territorial Army. The
new scheme is designed to be flexible enough to-
allow for the variation in military knowledge of
individual potential oflicers and the differing
time they have available to train. A potential
officer mby take between nine months and three
years to complete the cycle. Training is divided
into four phases:
Phase I 
- 
basic training based on the
Common Military SYllabus
Territorial ArmY (CMS(rA)).
Phase 2 - district-sponsored weekend
training.
Phase 3 - nine-day tactics and lead-
ership course.
Phase 4 - l4-day TA Commissioning
Course at the RoYal Military
AcademY, Sandhurst.
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Phase I and 3 training is conducted at
infantry dep6ts.
District Assessment Boards (DAB) are
mandatory for all candidates prior to their com-
mencement of offrcer cadet training (towards
the end of Phase I training).
District-sponsored week-end training
within Phase 2 is supplemented where possible
with unit training.
Entry standards have been laid down for
courses at Phase 3 and 4 level. The Territorial
Army Commissioning Course at the Royal Mil-
itary Academy, Sandhurst, is mandatory. Oflicer
cadet status is given automatically to all candi-
dates who pass the District Assessment Board.
B. Advanced fficer selection and training
Units are responsible for the training of
their own offrcers within the framework estab-
lished by the brigade commander. Brigade head-
quarters provide training activities for officers
within the brigade which include study periods,
tactical teach-ins, as well as specialist individual
training.
Courses normally of 15 days duration are
provided at the regular army training establish-
ments for special-to-arm training. Attendance
on these courses is often a mandatory
requirement for promotion. There are pro-
motion examinations from lieutenant to captain
and captain to major. Courses in staff duties are
now provided both at Grade 3 and Grade 2
level.
The Territorial Army Command and Staff
Course at the Army Staff College, Camberley,
provides training for TA staff officers and TA
officers about to command their units. The rec-
ommendations by commanding officers and
brigade commanders are critical in the selection
process for this course.
C. Active duty training for reserve fficers
All members of the Territorial Army have
an annual training obligation. Oflicers in inde-
pendent units spend 15 days at in-camp
training, up to 12 days in out-of-camp training
and 15 days voluntary training.
However, it is quite likely that many
oflicers will do considerable am6unts of vol-
!-{rtary training in excess of the 15 days spec-ified. The major limiting factor is how much
time a volunteer oflicer is prepared or able to
give to his TA.
Officers in sponsored units spend 15 days
at in-camp training and four days in out-
of-camp training. Officers in the Parachute Reg-
iment and Special Air Service (SAS) territoriil
units have additional out-of-camp requirements
for training.
Territorial Army units may attend annual
camp at any time during the year, but the main
period is from March to October. The annual
in-camp training is based on a cycle during
which those units with an overseas r6le in
BAOR are able to train in Germany, normally
every other year.
D. Extended active duty
In practical terms it is extremely diflicuh
for TA oflicers either as individual reserves or
within a TA unit to be accepted for extended
active duty.
E. Training exercises
Reserve officers may be selected to partic-
ipate in training exercises.
F. Exchange training
Substantial opportunities exist for ex-
change training with other NATO forces,
although the exchange programme with
Germany is by far the largest.
IV. Mobilisation
A. Mobilisation of the reserves
Before 1967 when the Territorial Army
was reorganised, the concept of mobilisation
was to provide reserve forces organised in divi-
sions and brigades to reinforce the regular army
worldwide and to defend the home base. This
concept has now changed and the Territorial
Army has the major r6le of providing units
available for employment on specific tasks both
at home and overseas.
In particular, the Territorial Army will:
1. complete the Army ORBAT of our
NATO-committed and home defence
forces and provide certain units with
support;
2. assist in maintaining a secure United
Kingdom base;
3. act as a basis for future expansion.
The arms, and in particular, logistic units
needed to complete an increased and balanced
ORBAT for general war, must be found from the
reserves. These consist ofthe individual reserves
which provide individual reinforcements, and
the Territorial Army which, in general, provides
reinforcing formed units.
The rdle of individual reinforcements, the
great majority of whom are reservists, is to
supply War Establishment Reinforcements(WER) to bring units, both regular and TA up to
War Establishment (WE) and to provide Battle
Casualty Replacements (BCRs).
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Mobilisation is the act of preparing for
war or other emergencies through assembling
and organising national resources, and the
pro@ss by which the armed forces or part of
them are brought to a state of readiness for war
or other national emergency. This includes
assembling and organising personnel, supplies
and materials for active military service.
All mobilisation plans are prepared and,
where possile, practiced in peacetime. These
plans enable all TA units and individuals to be
equipped and moved to their war locations as
quickly as possible during the transition to war
period. Call out is by one of a combination of
the following methods:
L Public broadcast on television, radio,
and in the press. This is always fol-
lowed by a postal notice.
2. Postal notice only when a Public
announcement is not considered
suitable or desirable. Notices are dis-
patched under special arrangements
with the Post Office.
Independent units mobilise at their own
TA centres and move as formed bodies to their
war locations. Sponsored units mobilise at nom-
inatcd regular units in the United Kingdom.
Individuals earmarked for posting overseas
report to Reinforcement Drafting Units
(RDUs).
B. Liability to recall in peace/war
Different categories of the reserves may
be mobilised in accordance with the Reserve
Force Act of 1980, which outlines the following
full call-out liabilities:
l. To be called out by order of Her
Majesty for service in any part of the
world when war-like operations are in
preparational progress.
No member of the Territorial ArmY
may be called out under this liability
until full use has been made of Section
A of the Regular Reserves. TA Group
B may not be called up under this lia-
bility which sometimes is referred to as
* higher liability " or Queen's Order I(Qor).
2. To be called out by order of Her
Majesty for service in any part of the
woild when national danger is
imminent or a great emergency has
arisen. This is sometimes referred to as
the * lower liability " or Queen's Order
rr (QoII).
3. To be called out by the Secretary of
State for Defence for home service in
defence of the United Kingdom against
actual or prosPective attack.
B. OTHER NATO COUNTRIES
I.
A.
1. Canada
Reserve structure
General organisation
The National Defence Act (NDA) states
that the Canadian forces (CF) are one service
composed of the following components: the
regular force; the reserve force; and the special
foice. The reserve force is that component of the
Canadian forces consisting of members who are
not on full-time active duty. It is, in turn, com-
posed of the following sub-components: the
Primary Reserve; the Supplementary List; the
Cadet Instructors List; and the Canadian
Rangers. The Primary Reserve includes the
Miliiia (the ground component) and the Com-
munications Reserve, in addition to the Naval
Reserve and the Air Reserve. Members of the
Primary Reserve are normally located in units
or in headquarters, but there is also a Primary
Reserve Liit of personnel who are not in
organised units.
O Llnits (Land Forces Reserve)
The Canadian annual defence review,
Defence 83, notes that there are ll7 major and
14 minor units in 112 locations across the
country. Of these units, 99 are combat arms
units and the others are administrative units.
Most of these units are assigned to the mobile
command; and none is larger than a battalion in
size. The non-combat units provide for trans-
portation, medical and other logistical support.
The units vary in size, especially at the battalion
level. Battalions may have different numbers of
companies, and most units are generally under
strength. It is important to note that signal
support is provided by the Communications
Reserve rather than by the Militia and must be
considered as part ofground support. There are2l units (6 regiments, 12 squadrons and 3
troops) located in major Canadian cities
throughout the country.
(iil Individuals (reservists)
There are two major sources of individual
reservists 
- 
the Primary Reserve Lists and the
Supplementary List - and one minor source -
the Cadet Instructors List.
The Primary Reserve Lists are carried by
each of the reserve establishments, so there is a
list for both the Militia and the Communica-
tions Reserves. There is, in addition, a non-
service list which is commanded and controlled
by National Defence Headquarters (ND$Q).
These lists are composed of members of the
Primary Reserve who cannot be convenieltly
carried on unit or headquarters rosters. These
members may be specialist oflicers for whom
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there are no established positions in the Militia
units or headquarters, members who for prac-
tical reasons have been exempted from weekly
training sessions by their commanders, or
members held for special types of employment.
The Supplementary List consists of
members of the reserve force who are not
required to perform duty or training except
when on active service. It consists of ex-regular
ollicers and other ranls, ex-Primary Reservists,
and former Cadet Instructors who have volun-
teered to return to service in an emergency.
Members of the Supplementary List are obliged
to serve only when placed on active service by
the Governor in Council or when called out on
an emergency. The list is administered by the
National Defence Headquarters, and it serves as
a record of former members of the Canadian
forces and of civilians who have special qualifi-
cations that are useful to the Canadian forces.
The only obligation of these personnel is to
notify the Director, Personnel Information
Systems at NDHQ/DPIS, of any change of
address or other circumstances which might
affect his status and to verify the information on
the Annual Reporting Card sent by NPHQ/-
DPIS. Many of these members would probably
volunteer in the event of mobilisation.
Finally, the Cadet Instructors List is a
very minor source of individual reservists. It
consists of oflicers of the reserve force whose
primary duty is the supervision, administration
and training of cadets. Much of this service is
voluntary without pay. These officers are
obliged to serve only when placed on active
service by the Governor in Council or when
called out on an emergency. They may be
required to undergo annual training but gen-
erally do not.
Special note should be made of the
Canadian Rangers. These are unit members of
the reserve force who are resident in the sparsely
settled, northern, coastal, and isolated areas of
Canada, who volunteer to hold themselves in
readiness for service but who are not required to
undergo annual training. They provide a mil-
itary presence in those areas which cannot con-
veniently or economically be covered by other
elements of the reserve force. These native men
of the land possess special knowledge of their
areas and perform such tasks as reporting suspi-
cious or unusual activities, participating in exer-
cises or operations, providing detailed infor-
mation concerning their local areas, and
assisting in immediate local defence by con-
taining and observing small enemy detachments
pending the arrival of other forces. There are
650 rangers organised into 12- to 50-man
patrols in 34 different locations in the northern
areas. They normally operate as individuals and
perform their tasks without pay in conjunction
with their civilian occupations.
B. Reserve structure and administration
Information included in section A.
C. Command subordination/relationships of
reserve forces
l. Naval reserve units are under thp
direct command of the Naval Reserve Head-
quarters in Quebec city - a branch of Head-quarters Maritime Command Halifax, Nova
Scotia.
2. Land forces reserve units of the
combat arms, logistics and medical support(Militia) are under command of Headquarters
Mobile Command. They are allocated to area
and district headquarters as follows:
- 
Militia Area Pacific, Vancouver, British
Columbia (19 units)
- 
Militia Area Prairie, Winnipeg, Man
itoba (37 units)
- 
Militia Area Central, Toronto, Ontario(60 units)
- 
Secteur de I'Est, Montreal, Quebec (36
units)
- 
Militia Area Atlantic, Halifax, Nova
Scotia (31 units)
Militia Units
- 
Artillery l8Armour l8Infantry 52
Field Engineer I I
Service Battalions 20
Medical Companies 12Bands 57
3. Communications units are under
command of Headquarters Communications
Command, Ottawa, Ontario.
4. Air reserve units are under command
of Headquarters Air Command, Winnipeg,
Manitoba.
D. Limitation on number
The overall total of officers and men is
authorised by the govemment. Detailed controlis exercised through reserve unit establish-
ments.
E. Full-time personnel assignment/support
Mobile command provides a regular
support staff to Militia units for the purpose of
aiding in administration and training support
matters. A regular force captain is usually
assigned to battalion headquarters to act as
adjudant and training officer for the companies
of the battalion. In addition, a non-
commissioned officer is assigned to act as chief
instructor and another non-commissioned
officer to handle supply matters. Finally, there is
a non-commissioned officer at company level to
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assist with training and other matters. There are
no civilian employees who work with Militia
units.
A similar system of regular force support
is in place at naval, communications and air
reserve units.
II. Personnel policies
A. Appointment of reseme fficers
Officer selection and training
Selection of Militia officers is the same as
for regular force oflicers. A person who is medi-
cally fit, and who is a university graduate, may
be interviewed by a personnel selection officer
and then by a board ofreview. A favorable rec-
ommendation by the board is necessary for a
commission. A programme also exists which
allows selected enlisted reservists to secure a
Militia commission. Area and/or district head-
quarters may provide the training courses for
those newly commissioned.
Similar systems of selection exist for
naval, communications and air reserve.
Olfrcer categories according to basic training
l. * Born " resenr'e oflicers (direct entry
officers);
2. former regular force oflicers;
3. commissioned from the ranks; and
4. Canadian service colleges.
Categories according to service duties
in peacetime
l. Primary Reserve: members perform
duties and training required of them;
2. Supplementary Reserve: perform no
duties or training unless they volunteer or are
placed on active service;
3. Cadet Instructor List: Administer and
train cadets; and
4. Canadian Rangers: voluntary duties in
the north.
Conditions of appointment
l. Citizenship. Must be a Canadian
citizen, except that a citizen of another country
with landed immigrant status who can meet the
professional qualifications may be considered
for enrolment.
2. Character. Must have a record of good
conduct and be recommended by commanding
offrcer of the unit.
3. Age.
(a) Except as provided in subpara-
graphs (b), (c) and (d), an applicant
must have reached his 17th, but
not 35th, birthday on the date of
enrolment.
(b) An applicant applying for enrol-
ment and training in maritime
surface and sub-surface, aircrew,
artillery or infantry must have
reached his l7th, but not 24th,
birthday on the date of
enrolment.
(c) A former officer of the Canadian
forces may be enrolled in the
Primary Reserve provided he has
at least one year to serve before
reaching compulsory release age.
(d/ Maximum age limits may be
exceeded on authority of the com-
mander when it is clearly in the
interests of the Canadian forces.
4. Academic/professional.
(a) At applicant who is not a former
oflicer of the Canadian forces and
whose officer classification does
not require special academic quali-
fications should have a complete
credit for a high school programme
leading to university entrance, at a
level or grade that is four years
short of a basic baccalaureat degree
and that includes:
- 
English or French;
- 
scrence;
- 
mathematics; and
- 
at least one of history, social
studies, geography or eco-
nomics.
(b) A former oflicer of the Canadian
forces who is otherwise qualified
for enrolment may be considered
regardless of educational qualifi ca-
tions.
(c) For certain specialist classifica-
tions, an applicant must possess
academic or professional or other
specialist standards.
5. Medical. Shall meet the standards
prescribed for the classification for which
enrolment is being considered.
6. Selection tests. Pass selection-pre-
prescribed tests.
7. Pre-enrolment screening. Be capable of
being security-cleared to the level specified for
the applicable oflicer classification.
B. Reserve/regular fficer policies
No difference in status.
C. Assignments
Reservists: members of the reserves vol-
unteer for units located in their home areas. Per-
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sonnel are recruited mainly from regimental and
high school cadet corps, from student militia
courses, from the regular forces, and from other
volunteers of the general public. Non-unit
members of the Primary Reserve are carried on
the Primary Reserve List and have no assign-
ments.
Pre-designated active personnel: if the
reserves are mobilised to serve as a training base
for total mobilisation, there are predesignated
active service personnel who would fill key
billets in the units. These personnel would be
company-grade officers and key non-commis-
sioned offrcers.
D. Legal position of the reserve fficer vis-
a-vis his civilian employer
There are presently no laws governing this
aspect.
E. Civilian employer support of reservists
There is no law requiring civilian
employers to support the reserve forces of
Canada by granting * special military leave'etc.
A group of prominent businessmen has
been organised to provide " ad hoc " support
and community involvement with the
reserves.
III. Training
A. Officer initial training
There are several methods whereby a vol-
unteer can qualify to become a reserve oflicer:
(/ Navy.
(a/ Reserve Entry Scheme Oflicers(RESO). Applicants under this
plan are enrolled as officer cadets
while attending university or
college and receiving training at
the division during the winter
and receiving training at regular
force schools during the summer.
Commissioned in rank of sub-
lieutenant on completion of clas-
sification training.
(b) Direct Entry Officer (DEO). Must
be university-trained or have
merchant marine certificate.
(c/ Commissioning from the ranks(CFR). Serving lrembers may be
commissioned from the ranks
providing they are recommended
by the commanding offrcer and
have a minimum rank of petty
officer second class and a
minimum of eight years service.
(d) Ex-regalar force. Ex-members of
the regular force may-be e$olled
in naval reserve in their former
classification provided they were
released honorably and have not
reached the Compulsory Release
Age.
(ii) Army and communications.
(a) Enrolled as oflicer cadet. Trained
under various officer production
programmes by phases including
RESO (s* (a) above). Commis
sioned as second lieutenant after
completion of basic oflicer qua-
lification training phases or
blocks.
(6/ Commissioned from the ranks
as second lieutenant (private/
corporal), lieutenant, (master
corporaUsergeant), captain (master
or chief warrant oflicer). Further
promotion requires qualifying
courses which are the same for all
oflicers.
(iii) Ah fore;e.
In addition to the plans in the navy
section above, the air reserve sends pilots
through the Regular Oflicer Pilot Training Plan(ROPTP). It also has a Reserve Officer Flying
Assessment (ROFA) programme under which
pilot candidates may attend an air force school
for assessment as to suitability. Upon successful
assessment of the ROFA, these pilots receive
fixed wing or rotary wing training after which
they are awarded the Canadian armed forces
pilot badge and are commissioned.
B. Advanced fficer selection and training
In the militia, qualification for promotion
is achieved by progressing through a series of 14
blocks of training. This is called the Militia Indi-
vidual Training Career Profile (MITCP).
Some of these blocts are home-study ses-
sions while others are formal courses. For pro-
motion from the rank of captain through to
lieutenant-colonel, there is also a minimum time
in rank requirement. It is possible for an officer
who takes qualifying courses each year to
progress through the 14 blocks in 12 years.
C. Active duty training for reserve fficers
Qualified reservists are encouraged to vol-
unteer for class C service with regular force units
in Canada and Germany. This duty is usually
less than a year in duration. Personnel are used
to bring units up to strength for major exercises
and other purposes. In addition, when Canada
contributes units to United Nations peace-
keeping operations, reservists are encouraged to
volunteer for class C service for a six-month
period (the normal period of deployment). The
numer of personnel on extended active duty
depends on service needs and money
available.
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D. Extended active duty
Reserve officers may apply to fill regular
force vacancies on a need to basis. Contracts are
for an indefinite period of service and are
reviewed and renewed on an annual basis.
E. Training exercises
Collective training (in the army) is con-
ducted:
(/ District level 
- 
annually;
(ii) Area (brigade level) 
- annually;(iil Divisional level 
- 
bi-annually as part
of the regular force formation
training in the Rendez-Vous series;
(iv) Corpslarmy level 
- 
as part of fly-over
training on NATO Fallex.
F. Exchange training
Very little is done in this respect. On
occasion a Canadian reservist could take
advantage of training outside the country, i.e.
participation with allied unit in an exercise(United Kingdom) or attendance at USMC
C-ommand and Staff Course (Quantico) or other
such exchange opportunities.
IV. Mobilisation
A. Mobilisation of the reserves
Mobilisation of the reserve forces would
be accomplished by the Governor in Council,
when acting in pursuance of the powers vested
in him by Section 3l of the National Defence
Act. He has the power to place the reserve force,
any unit or element thereof, or any officer or
man thereof, on active service. In an emergency,
the Minister of National Defence may call up to
perform any military duty other than training
srch offrcers and other personnel, and such
units, as he considers necessary. Wartime
mobilisation would be a political act requiring
parliamentary approval before the minister
could countersign the governor's declaration.
At the present time, detailed plans for
mobilisation of the reserve force are still being
developed. Currently, units and individuals,
upon notice, would report to their armories or to
a central location for those on the Primary
Reserve Lists. Members of the Supplementary
List would be invited to volunteer their services,
and it is expected that many would do so.
There have been no actual mobilisation
exercises conducted specifically to determine
how mobilisation would operate in practice.
Units do practice alerts, but this is part of their
normal field exercises, and no surprise alerts
have been held.
The Primary Reserve of the Canadian
forces would be used to augment the regular
force by providing units up to company level
which would be assigned to regular force bat-
talions in Canada or in Germany. Individuals
from other units, from the Primary Reserve
Lists, and volunteers from the Supplementary
List would be used as individual fillers to bring
regular force units up to full strength or to
provide specialists in technical areas.
B. Liability to recall in peace or wartime
(i) The Primary Reserve. This 'active "
portion of the reserve force may be:
(a) ordered to take 60 days unit
training and 15 days collective
training each year;
(b) called out on full-time service by
the minister in the event of an
emergency;
(c) called out on full-time service by
the government in the event of a
disaster;
(d) called out on full-time service by
the chiefofdefence stafffor aid of
the civil llower.
(ii) The reserve force.
(a) Nl or any part of the reserve force
may be placed on active service by
the government because of an
emergency in the defence of
Canada and in support of NATO,
the United Nations, or other mea-
sures of collective defence.
(b) Any member may be employed
full-time on a voluntary basis.
(c) There is no periodic recall.
C. Other mobilisation aspects
A comprehensive reorganisation of units,
training missions, locations, equipment hol-
dings, etc., is underway as a result of a recom-
mendation to the Department of National
Defence that a National Mobilisation Plan
should be developed and implemented. Accord-
ingly units would train to a specific r6le and at
mobilisation would be able to perform their
assigned task in a new formation.
2. Denmark
L Reseme structure
A. General organisation
All Danish reservists (including reserve
oflicers, sergeants and corporals) are members
of the Augmentation Force or the Mobilisation
Force; and therefore, Denmark does not have
any reserve units. Some individual reserve
oflicers are assigned to international military
staffs in the NATO structure (army, navy and
air force).
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B. Reserve stntcture and administration
All assigned reserve officers are managed
from their " home " - regiments, which are
responsible for education, training, exercises,
call-up, etc. Reserve officers have to be trained
in several jobs such as platoon leader, company
second-in-command, company commander and
sometimes in staff jobs and/or similar jobs in
the navy and air force.
C. Limitation on number of reserve fficers
Reserve officers' appointments are gen-
erally not limited except for lieutenant colonels,
who are only appointed according to vacancies
in mobilisation jobs.
il. Personnel policies
A. Appointment of reserve fficerc
A candidate for reserve officer must:
l. Be a Danish citizen.
2. Have completed at least nine years
civilian school duty.
3. Have completed his national service
commitment in the regular forces. At
present, that amounts to six to 12
months of service.
4. Have completed the six-month course
at the non-commissioned officer
school, and have been selected by the
commander of the school as fit for
reserve offrcers school.
5. Pass successfully the final examination
of the reserve officers school after a
period of four and a half months.
6. A candidate can be nominated as a
reserve oflicerbetween l8 and 32 years
of age.
Doctors, dentists and veterinary surgeons
receive reduced military training during the
university summer holidays, ending with
appointment to lieutenant (medical or veter-
inary corps.). A Priest (lutheran) can, at once, be
appointed as * Chaplain of the Reserve' but
will be outside the normal ranks system; he is
neither private nor oflicer.
B. Reseme/regular policies
All " born' reserve officers (officers of
the reserve) receive the same basic training. At
the end of their regular service, former regular
oflicers can accept an assignment to a mobil-
isation post, thus becoming reserve officer.
There are two main categories of reserve
oflicer:
l. Volunteer reserve officers with common
standby contract. These oflicers under-
take a four-year engagement rating
three week's service per year.
2. Volunteer reserve officers with limited
standby contract and without contract.
It is possible for most of these officers
to get a contract with limited standby.
These oflicers undertake engagement
according to the armed forces' demand
and their own possibilities.
There is no difference of status compared
to regular officers, except that any regular officer
always outranks a reserve oflicer ofequal rank,
regardless of seniority involved. Uniforms,
insignia, etc., are identical.
C. Assignments
The reserve offrcer must be qualified to
carry out, in wartime, the following duties con-
nected with the rank in question (e.g. in the
army).
l. Lieutenant: platoon leader in a
company-size unit.
2. First lieutenant: second-in-command
in a company-size unit.
3. Captain: commander or second-in-
command of a company-size unit.
Operations officer or equivalent in the
battalion staff.
4. Major: commander of a company-size
unit. Operations officer or equivalent
in the battalion or brigade staff.
5. Lieutenant-colonel of the reserve: bat-
talion commander or wartime garrison
commander.
In the navy and the air force, the duties
are generally more specialised than mentioned
above. So far, no captains (navy) have been pro-
moted, and the number of commanders is rather
limited.
D. Legal position of reserve oJJicers
When not called up for service, a reserve
officer has to pay for all his articles of clothing.
A certain percentage of the price paid for the
uniform is refunded.
E. Civilian employer support of reservists
Since August 1989 a programme with the
participation of the Ministry of Defence, the
Danish Employers Association and National
Board of Communities promotes understanding
and support from the civil employers.
III. Training
A. Officer initial/basic training
The basic training of a reserve oflicer lasts
18-21 months, during which he obtains the rank
of lieutenant.
B. Advanced fficer selection and training
The programme for advanced training of
officers requires that a reserve offrcer, in order
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to be promoted to captain, must complete a cor-
respondence course lasting l2 months, including
an exam for which he is called on duty.
C. Training during recall
If at all possible, reserve officers, during
recall periods, will be trained in their own
appointments, principally in recalled units.
D. Training exercises
In the arrny, during exercises, some
regular officers may act as umpires, while
reserve officers take their command. Normal
appointments in these cases are: lieutenants 
-
platoon commanders; Iirst lieutenants - com-
paoy second-in-command; majors - company
commanders; captains may act as company
second-in-command or as company com-
manders. Outside of recalls and maneuvres,
there are possibilities of taking over from regular
officers during the latter's leave or other
absence.
U. Mobilisation
A. Mobilisation of reserves
All reserve officers are liable to be
mobilised on an individual basis or as part of a
general mobilisation.
B. Liability to recall in peace/war
Reserve officers with a common standby
contract can be recalled in wartime or in periods
of international tension, substituting or supple-
menting a mobilisation of key personnel, units
or general mobilisation. Recall in peacetime can
take place as described above.
C. Exception for recall
On general or partial mobilisation, all
rreserve officers below retirement age are liable
to be called up with the units to which they are
assigned.
D. Other mobilisation aspects
Danish defence relies mainly on
mobilisable forces, of which the reserve oflicer is
an important part. 800/o of the full-strength
wartime force is mobilisable, and since 1988,
also non-commissioned officers and privates
have had the possibility of signing contracts with
the armed forces, in order to improve training
and readiness of the total mobilisable force.
i. Gruece
I. Reserve structure
A. General organisation
In Greece there are no reserve or terri-
torial military services or units separate from
the regular national armed forces. These have
the exclusive and sole responsibility for the
recruitment, organisation, and training of all
military personnel and for the defence of the
country. The national armed forces consist of
conscripts (called up annually for their national
military service) and of the permanent (profes-
sional) oflicers and other ranks who constitute
their framework. There are no permanent or
professional private soldiers, though there are
volunteers for fixed-time service periods
(periods of service).
Military service is compulsory for all male
Greeks, with some exceptions (monks, priests, dis
abled, heads of family, criminals, etc.). AIso,
people who have served in the armed forces of any
allied country are exempted from the obligation to
serve in the Greek forces. Women are not nor-
mally recruited, though they are accepted in the
armed forces as volunteers (officers and non-
commissioned officers). Positions for non+ombat
military services are often proclaimed for them,
for fixedtime periods (three to five years), in all
arms (army, navy, air force), but in non+ombat
anns, especially for auxiliary services (medical,
communications, office worlg etc.).
Conscripts for the armed forces are nor-
mally called up at various times of the year,
depending on the service (army, navy, air force),
regiment, and specialisation, etc., at the age of
21, though they may be called up earlier if
needed. They may volunteer for their national
service earlier than 21, even from the age of 16.
The number of volunteers to be accepted is fixed
each year. In case of general mobilisation or war,
as well as under special circumstances, the
normal age for recruitment can be postponed up
to the age of 26 or even 29 in the case of stu-
dents who are in the middle of their successful
studies for higher or highest education, or if they
have a brother serving in the armed forces at the
same time.
The length of service varies for each * arm "
and specialisation. The normal time is 2l months
for the army,23 months for the air force, and 25
months for the navy. For reserve officers and for
specialised categories of conscripts, this time gets
longer, but they are paid as professionals. On the
other hand, the length of service may be reduced
to half the normal time or even less, under certain
circumstances, e.g. if the conscript is a father of
many children, if he is the only or the oldest son of
a father incapable for worlg etc. In these cases, he
is allowed to only serve the time required for com-
pletion of his military training and for restricted
practice. Reduced-time service is not applicable to
officers.
After completion of their compulsory mil-
itary service, reserve officers may re+nlist, if they
wish, for definite time periods (six months to
three years). However, they can never become
regular soldiers unless they pass through a profes-
sional military school. There may be exceptions
for wartime periods. Besides the regular and the
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reserve soldiers, there are some * in-between " cat-
egories of well-paid military penonnel who fill
specialised positions proclaimed by the Ministry
of Defence; they are volunteers for medium terms(five years) which can be renewed.
Recruitment of all conscripts and reservists
is carried out by the recruitment service of the
army. Its headquarters is in Athens, and it has
branch oflices throughsul the country; one in each
of all 54 civil administrative regions (prefectures).
All Greek male citizens are registered in these
offrces at birth. Besides the main anny
recruitment servi@, there are two central
recruitment oflicers for the other " ams ", one for
the navy and one for the air force, but they have
no regional branch oflices in the prefectures.
Recruitment services are also established in all
military units, large and small, for the reception,
registration, movement, etc., of the recruits, and
for handling demobilisation matters. After com-
pletion of their compulsory national service, men
are registered in the catalogues of reservists. It is
noted that retired regular oflicers are not con-
sidered reservists and they are registered in sep
arate lists of the Ministry of Defence as * ex-
regular offrcers in retirement ".
B. Reserve structure and administration
There are two categories ofreservists; cat-
egory A which includes those who are under 40
years old and category B extending up to the age
of 50 or 55 though this age limit may be further
extended under special circumstances. For
officers the age limit is 60. Reservists can be
called up again for training in new weapons and
techniques as well as for military exercises, or
for any other reason considered necessary by the
Ministry of Defence. The call may be general or
partial, by area, category or ann, regiment,
specialisation, rank or even personal. In the case
of general mobilisation or war, the post for each
recruit is pre-designated in accordance with the
existing plan of mobilisation. The same plan
provides for the formation of the required addi-
tional large and small units; their commanders
and basic cadres (offrcers, other ranks) consist of
regular stafl designated for the purpose
beforehand.
IL Personnel policies
A. Appointment of reserve fficers
Reserve oflicers and non-commissioned
oflicers are selected from amongst the conscripts
after basic training which lasts about two
months. The criteria for the selection of reserve
offrcers are based on the education of the con-
script, his civilian occupation, his native area,
and other more specific qualifications, not
excluding his character, enthusiasm and psycho-
logical or conscientious factors. Some of the cri-
teria also influence decisions concerning the
" arm " or the regiment in which they are to be
posted or even the special unit for which a can-
didate is most suited.
B. Reserve/regular fficer policies
Reserve oflicers in active service receive
the same pay and normal allowances, and they
enjoy the same privileges (travel, medical, etc.)
as regular officers. They are treated the same as
their professional colleagues of the same rank.
When out of military service, they receive no
remuneration of any kind, unless they became
invalids while in active service. Invalid oflicers
are pensioned with full pay and allowances as
their professional counterparts and get regular
promotions. However, all reserve oflicers may
make use of the facilities of military clubs and
shops set up for professional officers and can
participate in various events and activities (mil-
itary, national, social) of the regular soldiers.
C. Assigaments
All reserve oflicers are registered in
special catalogues showing the units to which
they are to report ifcalled up again. These cata-
logues change with time as new offrcers come in
and the old ones grow older. Any officer con-
demned by courts (civil or military) for serious
crimes is crossed out from the catalogues.
D. Legal position of reserve fficers
The time spent in the forces by all
reservists (including private soldiers) is added to
the time of their civilian employment for
pension purposes and early retirement. During
the period of military service, reservists are
granted leave of absence from their civilian
employment, with full pay. However, if they are
public servants or employed in government
enterprises, they can only get one of the two sal-
aries (military or civilian); they have to make a
choice.
III. Training
A. Officer initial/basic training
Initial training is done when conscripts
are first called up for their national service, nor-
mally at 21, though they may be called earlier
according to the actual needs of the armed
forces.
Training for oflicers is carried out in the
reserve officers schools, established in various
parts of the mainland and on some islands.
Selection is effected after basic training of the
conscripts, according to the needs of the armed
forces each year.
There are nine reserve offrcers schools
proper, of which five are for the land forces, i.e.
infantry, artillery, tanks, engineers, and signals,
one is for the main auxiliary services, i.e.
transport, war materials, and medical. Training
time in these schools is normally four to six
months. After completion of training, the stu-
dents are designated * cadets " and are posted in
their regiments and units. Their commissioning
to the rank of second lieutenant is effected one
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month before completion of their national
service and demobilisation.
B. Active duty training for reserve fficers
From time to time reserve officers, espe-
cially younger officers, are called up for training
purposes in order to become acquainted with
new weapons and equipment or to participate in
advanced educational seminars in military tech-
niques, new methods of command, and new
systcms.
U. Mobilisation
A. Mobilisation of reserves
Reserve officers have to be in readiness
for mobilisation up to a certain age (depending
on the rank, specialisation, and the area of their
residency), which may vary from 35 to 50 or
even older in special cases.
Mobilisation is declared by special decree
of the Ministry of Defence, through personal
written orders and/or public announcements in
the press and the mass media. These orders or
announcements also indicate the place where
evqryone is to report.
For the period of military service,
reservists are granted leaves of absence by their
civilian employers with full salary. If they are
public servants, they must choose which of the
two salaries (military or civilian) they prefer.
After his demobilisation from national
service, military service records for each reserve
officer are transferred to the military
recruitment office in the area of his birth
place.
B. Liability to recall in peace/war
Reserve oflicers are mobilised either for
training and educational purposes, special
assignments, emergency cases or national
defence.
4. Norway
I. Reserve structure
A. General organisation
Conscription system
In principle, the armed forces have always
been based on conscription with some sort of
militia or mobilisation system. The traditions in
this field can be traced as far back as the year of
950. One of the ancient Kings, Hakon the Good,
then established the flrrst organised military
system.
The history of kings tells the following
about King Hakon's law:
'King Hakon made a law, that all
inhabited land along the sea-coast, as
far back from it as the salmon swims up
the rivers, should be divided into ship
sites according to the districts, and the law
stated how many ships there should be,
when the whole people were called out on
service, whenever a foreign army came to
the country.
The law also included the order that
beacons then should be erected upon the
hills, so that every man could see from
one to the other, and it is told that a war-
signal could be given in seven days, from
the most southern point of Nonvay and
all the way up to North Cape. "
In 1682, the army was restructured and
given a permanent organisation. According to
the system of that time, a stipulated farm, or a
number of farms, were jointly responsible for
providing and maintaining one soldier. These
soldiers were formed into companies/regiments
on a regional basis.
This arrangement remained in force up to
1799, when conscription was introduced as a
form of national service and later included in
the Constitution of 1814.
Norwegian law requires today every Nor-
wegian male citizen, physically and mentally fit
to be subject to military conscription from the
age of 20 to 44. Actual enrolment takes place at
19 for the approximately 30 000 in an annual
contingent.
The initial service is 12 months in the
army plus refresher training periods, totalling l5
months. In the navy and air force, the initial
service is usually 15 months.
B. Reserve structure and administration
Norway does not actually have a reserve
forces system in the true sense of the word.
There are only a few regular or standing forces
in peacetime, and Norway is thus wholly and
fully dependent on rapid mobilisation forces.
Many defence problems are due to the
size and location of the population. This means
that the reserve or mobilisation forces are not
always activated near their area of operations.
Norway has to make plans for rapid
mobilisation and transfer. The principle of local
recruitment is maintained in order to achieve
rapid activation.
The population dispersion also creates
transport requirements. At first the soldiers shall
gather from their dispersed living places to their
unit depdt. Thereafter, the units must move to
different deployment areas.
A rapid mobilisation also depends on a
flexible call-up system based on a War Service
Card issued each year to all conscripts and
regular personnel.
This card contains information on
assignment, unit, and reporting place. All per-
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sonnel assignments are reviewed once a year,
and kept up-to-date at all times. The
mobilisation plans are adjusted the same way. It
is a basic principle that all personnel are
assigned according to their specialties - both
military and civilian 
- 
and kept in the same post
as long as possible.
The administrative (dep6t) units are
responsible for this posting. This comprehensive
operation now is simplified by use of data pro-
cessing for all the mobilisation forces. The
administrative (dep6t) units are also responsible
for storing and maintenance of weapons, ammu-
nition and all other equipment according to
approved tables of organisation and equipment.
Oflicers and non-commissioned officers
assigned to these administrative (depOt) units in
peace are earmarked to fill key positions within
the units to be mobilised.
The Home Guard
The Home Guard is a force of some
90 000 men organised in small units of squad,
platoon, and company size. The men keep their
personal weapons and equipment at home, and
unit weapons are stored centrally in each local
community.
This enables the Home Guard, in the
event ofa conflict, to be on their defence objec-
tives and other tasks in a very short time.
Recruitment for the Home Guard is partly
through a volunteer system, partly by transfer of
surplus personnel from the mobilisation lists of
the services upon completion of three months
basic training.
The training of Home Guard personnel
takes place on a local basis at training centres in
the various districts. The annual training period
is, at present, 50 hours or six consecutive days.
The mission of the Home Guard is to defend
key points within their area, post guards on vital
objectives, take part in traffrc control and,
during the first hectic period of a crisis or con-
flict, to assist in and protect the process of
mobilisation. While the majority of the Home
Guard units are from the army, some are also
found in the other services. The navy Home
Guard man some 350 guard cutters in a variety
of r6les.
In the air force, some anti-aircraft artillery
units are organised and manned by the Home
Guard.
All Home Guard personnel have com-
pleted a period of initial service within one of
the three services and the average age is about
33-34 years.
C. Command subordination/relationships of
reserve forces
Since the Norwegian conscription and
mobilisation system is basic throughout the
forces, the standing forces and the reserve forces
are integrated.
D. Limitation on number of reserve olficers
The number of reserve officers in the
mobilised forces is suffrcient for filling all
needed positions with reserves. However, since
many key positions demand highly+rained
offrcers, these oflicers are found in the standing
forces. There are too few fullytrained reserve
officers to fill these positions to make true
reserve positions.
E. Full-time personnel assignment/support
In the anny, 10% of officers are regular
oflicers. The ratio is higher in the navy and the
air force due to the fact that most units are also
active in peacetime.
il. Personnel policies
A. Appointment of reserve fficers
Initially all oflicers, regulars and reserves,
start with the same basic training for the normal
conscript period. The regulars continue
extended training while the reserves are assigned
to the mobilisation units.
B. Reseme/regular fficer policies
When they are on duty, there are no dif-
ferences in policy except for the salary and
welfare benefit arrangements.
C. Assignments
Reservists are assigned to units or to indi-
vidual positions. The reserve oflicers are
mobilised at the same dep6t unit for their entire
career but they are rotated in different positions
as they take training courses and on the job
training.
There are also pre-designated active duty
personnel assigned to reserve units. Norwegian
law gives officers who have done duty longer
than the basic conscription training period
another 10 years of service with the mobilisation
force, i.e. up to 55 years of age. They may even
stay longer on a voluntary basis up to receiving a
pension for their age. They enter their
mobilisation positions according to their rank
and competence.
D. Legal position of reserve fficers
When on duty, the reserve offrcer has the
same obligations and security as the regular
officer.
Off duty, there are no special legal situa-
tions in peacetime.
If war breaks out, there is a royal decree
which gives the reserve oflicer authority to act in
certain situations without formal orders on his
way to his mobilisation unit and when com-
manding his unit a higher level command is
established.
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E. Civilian employer support of reservists
The legal requirements of the Nonvegian
conscription iystem mean that no reservist is in
dangerbf losing his job while performing oblig-
atory military service.
There are several agreements between
employers and employee organisations, where
policy-has been agreed upon to provide full pay
or partial pay when reservists are performing
refresher training.
Since conscription is fundamental in the
Norwegian society and national culture, most
employers support the system.
However, the reserve officer often
occupies key positions in civilian life and, as
such, refreshment training is a burden for the
employers.
(il. Training
A. Officer initial/basic training
Initial military service for the average
army soldier starts with three months of recruit
trairiing. This basic training is carried out at
special training centres located in southern
Norway.
After finishing their basic training, most
of the conscripts are transferred to units - com-
panies and baitalions - which in reality perform
iwo formal functions: continue the training, and
produce units for the mobilisation forces.
These units are, during this * unit training
period ", M-day forces (standing units). Those
ioldiers who are picked out for specialist
training will go to a technical training centre for
approximately another three months and thenjoin the standing units.
Officer candidate school
Each branch of the army has an officer
candidate school. Applicants to these schools
must have a high standard of civilian education(high school) -and are selected after going
through speciflrc and rather comprehensive entry
tests.lhe school lasts 12 months and implies a
further 12 months compulsory service, as a ser-
geant, normally with a standing unit.
Upon completion of the " compulsory
service year", these non-commissioned officers
are their promoted to second lieutenant and
flaced " in the reserve " with their mobilisationirnit. ltrey will thereafter be called uP f9I
refresher tiaining with their unit normally for 30
days every third year.
Most of the reserve officers and non-
oommissioned officers have the background and
service obligation in peacetime just addressed.
In this connection, it should be mentioned that
to become a regular oflicer, the grade I officers
must go through the military academy (three
years) and the grade II offtcers the advanced
bfficer school (one year) in addition to schooling
and training already mentioned.
B. Advanced fficer selection and training
This may be done on a voluntary basis by
participating together with the regulars.
C. Active duty training for reserve fficers
The reserve officer may sign a three-year
contract to serve 45 days during the period. This
may be done together with active units. Some
reserve oflicers, mostly students, do voluntary
duty during their summer holidays'
Refresher training
After completion of the initial service, the
soldier returns to his home. He is then trans-
ferred to a mobilisation unit, where an adminis-
trative unit (depOt unit) will keep him on record
as long as he is liable to serve as soldier in the
event bf war - uP to the age of 44.
Until he is 34 years old, he will normally
be assigned to a mobile field unit - or first-
priority unit (brigade, group, or comlal team).
From 35 to 44, he will join local defence or
supply units.
After the age of 45, the individual has no
obligations as far as compulsory military service
is cdncerned, but may volunteer to serve in the
Home Guard or the civil defence.
Present regulations permit the following
amount of refresher training to be carried out;
however, manpower and economy may be lim-
iting factors:
Maximum five refresher training periods
each not exceeding 2l days for the individual as
long as he stays wittr a first-priority. army unit.
Total length of refresher training periods should,
however,-not exceed 84 days for the individual
during his time in a first-priority unit.
First-priority field forces (combat bri-
gades) will be exercised every third-y-ear, other
iegional units will be trained every fifth year or
so.
Personnel doing initial l5 months' service
(approximately 20o/o of an annual contingert)
ivill normally not be called up for refresher
training, except for those transferred to Home
Guard and special categories in the navy.
In total, the army calls up for refresher
training some 20 000 men per year for periods
ftom 12-21 days, whereas the coastal artillery
and the air force call up some 3 000 each.
During the refresher training periods,
every man serves in his mobilisation assign-
meni. Training is progtressive and realistic, nor-
mallv leadine up-to-a final field exercise in
which the unit piactices its full operational r6le
(wartime task).
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D. Inactive duty training for reserve fficers
Norway tries to stimulate voluntary
service by various means, special refresher
courses and correspondence courses combined
with a practical training period, which can be
taken during periods when it is suitable for the
individual.
E. Extended active duty
_ 
Normally, no opportunity except as part
of UN peace-keeping force.
F. Training exercises
Reserve oflicers can be selected to partic-
ipate in exercises.
G. Exchange training
Norway participates in exchange training
with other nations.
IV. Mobilisation
A. Mobilisation of resemes
All personnel in mobilisation units are
given notice each year by special cards, some of
which are marked with colour codes.
When activation is required, these cards
may be referred to when orders are announced
by broadcasting and television. If time permits,
activation by mail or telegram is used.
Full mobilisation will be announced by
use of all means possible, sirens, church bells,
radio, television, etc. Telephone, police channels
and messengers will be used when applicable.
Reservists will immediately report to their
mobilisation dep6ts as detailed in the orders
received in advance.
B. Exceptions for recall
Reserve oflicers in key positions in the
wartime civil establishment may be excepted for
recall.
5. United States
L Reserve structure
A. General organisation
Overall responsibility at the Department
of Defence (DOD) for the reserve compbnents is
vested in the Oflice of the Assistant Secretary of
Defence for Reserve Affairs.
An important component of DOD is the
Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB), first
created by the Secretary of Defence in 1949 and
made a statutory body by the Congress in 1952.
The board is composed of 2l members,
including a civilian chairman, the Assistant Sec-
retary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force, one regular oflicer
from each of the three military departments, two
reserve officers from each of the six Department
of Defence reserve components, a coast guard
oflicer, and a reserve general or flag offrcer, who
serves without vote as military advisor to the
chairman and as executive offrcer to the
board.
The board is the only formal means by
which the Secretary of Defence consults with
high-ranking non-active duty reservists. The
individual services also have policy boards
which meet and help develop policy and
guidance for each service.
B. Reserve structure and administration
Within the service, each service Secretary
has an Assistant Secretary for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs and a Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary for Reserve Affairs.
The Chiel Army Reserve, and the Chie[
Air Force Reserve, are reserve major generals on
full-time active duty and who advise their
respective chief-of-staff on reserve matters.
The Director of Naval Reserve is a naval
reserve rear admiral who also serves as Chief,
Naval Reserve, and has two naval reserve rear
admirals on his staff. One acts as the Deputy
Chief, Naval Reserve, at USNR Headquarteis in
New Orleans, and one as his Deputy Director on
the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations in
Washington DC.
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Marine
Corps Reserve Alfairs is an active duty major
general. Similarly, the Chief, Coast Guard
Reserve, is an active duty rear admiral. Overall
responsibility for the coast guard reserve lies
with the commandant of the coast guard, subject
to regulations prescribed by the Secretary of
transportation and agreed to by the Secretaiy of
the Navy.
The National Guard Bureau (NGB) isjoint agency of the Department of the Army and
the Department of the Air Force and is respon-
sible for national guard matters. NGB is ledby a
national guard lieutenant general serving on
active duty and is assisted by an admiral
national guard major general and an air national
guard major general who also serve on active
duty at NGB.
The United States has seven reserve com-
ponents:
Army Navy
Army National Guard Navy Reserve
Army Reserve Marine Corps Reserve
Air force Coast guard
Air National Guard Coast Guard Reserve
Air Force Reserve
and two other components where operational
control is transferred to the Navy in wartime:
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Public Health Service;
National Oceanogaphic and Aeronautical
Administration.
C. Command subordination/relationships of
reserve forces
Although the Total Force Policy was first
announced as such by the Secretary of Defence
in 1969, the United States has relied extensively
on the national guard and reserves throughout
its history.
The United States has never maintained,
in peacetime, sufficient regular military forces to
meet the demands of war. The current Total
Force Policy places increased reliance on the
national guard and reserve components to meet
national defence requirements. This policy has
gone far to integrate the active, national guard
and reserve organisations into a single military
force.
The Department of Defence is providing
increased support to the national guard and
reserve forces in terms of funding, equipment
and training assistance.
D. Limitation on number of reserve fficers
Budgetary constraints, as applicable to
each service, provide limitations on the
numbers of reserve officers who can be on active
duty, in troop units, and assigned to some
mobilisation positions.
E. Full-timepersonnelassignment/support
A critical element in improving the read-
iness of the army reserve is the number of per-
sonnel available to provide full-time support for
its soldiers and units. Four categories of per-
sonnel form the arrny reserve's full-time support
team: Active Component soldiers, active guard/
reserve (AGR) soldiers, Army Reserve civilian
technicians, and Department of the Army
civilians. Each of these groups provides its par-
ticular strengths to the Army Reserve's
Full-Time Support Programme. Active army
soldiers provide current experience with Active
Component equipment, operational doctrine,
and training techniques; AGR soldiers provide
Reserve Component expertise and training and
assignment flexibility; civilian technicians
provide continuity, institutional memory, and
iies with the local civilian community; and
Department of the Army civilians provide the
clerical skills that support all levels of army
reserve administrative operations. Together,
thcse team players enable drilling reservists to
concentrate their limited training time on pre-
paring for their mobilisation missions.
The army reserve is working hard to
further refine its full-time support programme to
make it more eflicient and cost-effective. It is
the effectiveness of this programme that has
allowed the army's leadership to confidently
assign an unprecedented proportion ofthe total
army mission to the reserve components. With
active army and strength capped at about
780 000 the total army must look to its reserve
components to provide the flexibility that allows
it to absorb new missions within its constrained
resources. The perceptible improvements in
army reserve mobilisation readiness attributable
to increasing levels of full-time support have
been a major factor in the army leadership's
growing conviction that the reserve components
are, more than ever, equal to the job they have
before them.
The total army's increased reliance upon
its reserve components evidenced by their
expanding and evolving missions, is a prime
measure of the difference that full+ime support
can and does make. The cost of a full-time
reserve soldier is the same as that of a full-time
active component soldier; however, the reserve
expertise and professional experience the
full-time reservist brings to his support mission,
make the difference that enables a reserve unit
to accomplish an active component mission at a
fraction of the active component cost.
il. Personnel policies
A. Appointment of reserve fficers
Officer accessions in the reserves occur
through a variety of programmes summarised as
follows:
Officers who left active duty and joined a
Reserve Component. These officers, 
.in most
cases, were commissioned through service acad-
emies, Reserve Oflicers Training Corps(ROTC), or Offrcer Candidate Schools (OCS)
conducted by a service.
Direct appointment of enlisted members
or civilians with college degree/professional
degrees in special skills (e.g. medical officers and
nurses).
. 
Flight training programmes for each
servrce.
Deserving Airmen Commissioning Pro-
gramme.
B. Reserve/regular fficer policies
There are numerous policies that cover
the regular and reserve officer. When reserve
officers are on active duty, most of the normal
active duty policies and regulations cover their
actions. The reservist on active duty for short
training periods is generally covered under
reserve policies.
When reservists are not serving on active
duty, there are limitations on their actions, and-
their legal status and compensation, in case of
accideni or injury, is quite complicated.
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C. Assignments
As with the active service, the officer who
has the most exposure and varied background
has the best opportunity for success. There are
several policies that ensure reservists move from
a troop programme unit to a mobilisation post
orto other assignments. The main objective is to
gain experience and not become stagnated in
one duty assignment.
Periodic rotational assignments of officers
is designed and scheduled for oflicers to ensure
the oflicer skills are sharpened and upto-date,
and they are ready for active service.
D. Legal position of reserve fficers
The legal position of reserve officers
varies with the type of orders they serve under
and primarily whether they are on active or
inactive duty. The uniform code of militaryjustice is the governing document for most legal
action. A recent 1987 ruling clarifies the legal
status of reservists.
E. Civilian employer support of reservists
In June 1972, the President established a
National Committee for Employer Support of
the Guard and Reserve. The committee was
mandated to seek employer understanding and
appreciation of the guard and reserve. It reaf-
firms and implements personnel policies which
would assure individuals the freedom to partic-
ipate in guard and reserve training without job
impediment or loss of earned vacations.
By December 1987, employers employing
over 6lYo of the nation's workforce had signed
the Committee's Statement of Support for the
Guard and Reserve, in which employers pledge
that:
l. Employees' job and career opportun-
ities will not be limited or reduced
because of guard and reserve service.
2. Employees will be granted unpaid
leaves of absence for guard or reserve
training without having to sacrifice
vacation time.
3. The Statement of Support and result-
ant company policies will be made
known throughout the organisation.
The committee in its regular pursuit of
employer support for the guard and reserve, now
has succeeded in securing pledged support from
almost 300 000 employers, covering in excess of
60 million employees.
Members of the reserves are granted pro-
tection against discrimination in retention in
employment and loss of any benefit of
employment as a result of their reserve status.
In October 1986, United States public law
also barred employer discrimination against
guard/reserve personnel in the hiring process. It
is now unlawful for an employer not to hire an
othenrise-qualified job applicant because of the
person's guard/reserve affrliation.
ill. Training
A. OlJicer initial/basic training
Each reserve oflicer must attend initial
and/or basic oflicer training so they can receive
training in a skill and qualification within the
oflicer ranks. They also receive training within
their service according to policies that apply to
oflicer personnel. Some services such the army
reserve and army national guard require the
officer basic course to be taken in residence at
an active army school.
B. Advanced olficer selection and training
The oflicers who perform the best through
required evaluations are selected for higherJevel
schooling and training. In all cases of pro
motion, some higher level of schooling is
required so if one is to advance, they must pass
this training.
Because of time and resource constraints,
other advanced training may not be readily
available. Therefore, competition is keen and
there are selection procedures to ensure the most
qualified receive the schooling and valuable
training.
C. Active duty training for reserve fficers
United States reserve forces are divided
into three categories: ready reserve, standby
reserve, and retired reserve.
Ready reserve
The ready reserve is the principal source
of trained units and individuals available for call
to active duty in time of war or national emer-
gency. Members of the ready reserve are those
personnel who join ready reserve units without
prior active duty service and military personnel
released from active duty to the ready reserve to
fulfil their military obligation (six or eight years
total).
In general, unit members perform 48
drills annually of four hours each and 12-17
days of active duty for training annually. In
addition to the many units and individual
mobilisation augmentees in the ready reserve
structure (selected reserve), there are individuals
who do not belong to units and do not attend
regularly-scheduled drills. This group of service
members is called the Individual Ready Reserve(IRR). The IRR individuals are a pool of trained
reservists for use as fillers and replacements
upon mobilisation.
Individual mobilisation augmentee programme
The Individual Mobilisation Augmentee(IMA) programme is designed to provide
trained individuals to complement active com-
lt
l
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ponent organisations, the Selective Service
Systom, and the Federal Emergency Man-
alement Agency upon mobilisation. An IMA is
a member of the selected reserve and, therefore,
is available for mobilisation under the Presi-
dent's call-up authority.
The IMA performs two weeks of annual
training in a pre-assigned billet and may or may
not (depending on the service policy and payl
training category) attend inactive duty for
training drills. There atre " drilling " IMAs who
may perform up to 48 drills per year in some
components.
Standby reserves
The standby reserve is composed of
reservists who have completed their reserve
obligation by performing a tour of active duty or
service in the ready reserve. Standby reserves
are not required to attend drills or receive
further training nor are they parts of units. They
are a pool of training individuals who could be
mobilised if necessary.
Retired reserves
The retired reserve is composed of
reservists who have completed the requirements
for retired pay and those who are on the retired
list snd are receiving retired pay.
D. Inactive duty training for reserve fficers
As already mentioned, there are several
possibilities for inactive duty training for
ieserve officers. There are many units with
which officers can train on a voluntary basis (no
pay) and they can also take military education
courses.
Highly-motivated, aggressive reserve
oflicers can obtain inactive duty training
through various sources, and of course for each
day they perform this training, they collect a
reserve * point " which counts towards
retirement (up to 60 points per year).
E. Extended active duty
Some reserve oflicers are serving on
extended active duty. Reserve officers on
extended active duty are given the same pro-
tection on disability, retirement, medical and
dental care, survivor benefits, and non-disability
retirement, as are regular officers.
Any reserve commissioned officer who
accumulates 20 years of federal active duty, 10
of which are as a commissioned officer, may
request retirement. The current regulations
require reserve oflicers to retire upon com-
pletion of 20 yean extended active duty.
Waivers may be granted on a case-by-case
basis by each service.
Most enlisted naval reservists on active
duty (other than active duty for training) are
members of naval reserve's 3x6 programme
which requires three years of active duty service
followed by three years in the selected reserve of
the naval reserve. Other categories of enlisted
reservists of all services on active duty include
those who voluntarily requested tours of
extended active duty.
F. Training exercises
Each reservist and most units are required
to participate in some type of training exercise on
a recurring basis. Units must function well as a
unit and the best way to do this is to train in an
exercise. Individuals train with a unit or on a
special assignment to best use their qualifica-
tions.
G. Exchange training
Exchange training is accomplished
between services for reserve and active members.
There are written agreements with many allied
countries for exchange training during exercises
and at resident schools of instruction. Exchange
training offers true interoperability for contin-
gencies, should they occur.
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* CurrenUprojected.
l. End ofconscription by 1994 announced.
2. Decisions awaited.
APPENDIX II
National seryice in countries of WEa
and the North Atlantic Alliance
Lrngth of service (months) *
Country Army Navy Air force
w
E
U
Belsium 10
8r
t2
8t
t2
8r
France l0 l0
l0
l0
l0
l0
Germanv t2
t2
t2
t2
t2
t2
Italv t2 l0
t2
l0
t2
l0
Netherlands t4
t2
t4
t2
t4
t2
Portueal 8
4
t2
4
t2
4
Soain t2
9
t2
9
t2
9
Other
NATO
Denmark ll ll 9 9 9 9
Greece t7
t2 (2)' 2t t2 (?)2 l9 t2 (?),
Norwav t2
t2
l5
t2
L2
t2
Turkev l8
t2 (?),
t8
t2 (2\' l8 t2 (?)2
(Canada, Luxembourg, United Kingdom and United States have all-professional forces.)
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Suplementary Draft Recommendation
lst December 1992
European security - neserve forces and national senice
SUPPLEMENTARY DRAFT RECOMMENDATION'
submitted on beha( of the Defence Committeez
by Mr. De Declcer, Rapporteur
Supplementary draft recommendation
on European secuity 
- 
reseme forces and national semice
The Assembly,
Further developing the theme of " European security - reserve forces and national service ",
Rrcouurxos rHAT rgp CouNctt
l. Encourage member states to consult with a view to:
(a) safegmrding the status of national servicemen or reservists from both the public and the
' ' priv-ate sect-ors to allow them " leave of absence' to serve in the forces;
(b/ introducing liscal advantages for firms which employ reserve servicemen;
(c/ proposing European norms for equipment, service structures and command organisation;
2. Consider forthwith the idea of establishing a " European guard' composed of reserve forces
which would be used to help defend the common European territory of all member states;
3. Propose that member states which shorten the length of, or abolish, conscription should make
ih" t".-s^of voluntary military service more attractive eipecially with regard to pay and_allowances
unl uf* gire those leaving th6 forces priority treatment for employment within the public sector;
4. Urge member states abandoning the practice of conscription to 
.suspend legislation relating to
national-iervice rattreiitran revoking it-entirely, thus leaving current legislation on the statute books in
case of future requirements;
5. Ask the Ministries of Defence of member states to organise the dissemination of appropriate
irfo.-uiion iegarding military matters to all parliamentarians and especially those who have no
service background.
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mt. de luiS^ (Vice-Chairmen); \AM.
effJniri-te,ltii"atir-iioiOiil, Bassinet, Eorderai, Brito, Chevalier (Alternate: Lavgrge), Cox, De C-arolis, De Decker, Dees,
Oiiind, iernandes Marques, Fbrrarini, Fourr6, Hardy,hmer (Alternate: Feldmann), Jung (Alternate:.M-asseret), Kelchtermans,
Liciisi iettern ate: Caccial, itks. Lentz-Cornetie, Mli. van der Linden, Mannino Marten, Lord Newall, MM. Pecchioli , Perinat,
niii L.itJ tAtti-ate' y16. kuAi, Scheer, Sir Keith Speed, MM. Steiner, Yazquez (Alternate: Bolinaga), Zierer.
N.B. Tfte names of those taking part in the vote arc printed in italics.
287
DOCUMEI.TT I338
Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Ml De Deckcr, Rapponeur)
I. Introduction
l. Meeting on Thursday 5th November 1992
in Paris at the seat of the Assembly, the Defence
Committee unanimously adopted the set of rec-
ommendations on " Europan security 
- 
reserve
forces and national service' and the associated
draft report I. The number of members present
bore witness to the interest of the subject.
2. Subsequently, the committee held a joint
meeting with its " sister committee ": the
Security and Defence Committee of the North
Atlantic Assembly and members of the two com-
mittees also visited the Headquarters of the
French rapid action force (FAR) in Maisons-
Laffitte.
3. As a result of continuing discussion,
therefore, your Rapporteur has decided to
propose that colleagues adopt a further series of
recommendations relating to reserve forces and
national service.
4. The attached recommendations are self-
explanatory for the most part. The following
notes are therefore designed merely to highlight
or emphasise certain aspects:
l. Employer support is perhaps the most
critical area when it comes to
attracting volunteer reservists. Without
such support very few individuals have
the courage to go against the obvious
source of their livelihood. Your
Rapporteur here proposes both the
stick (l(a/) and the carrot (l(b)).
In addition, common structures, etc.,
within the armed forces of our nations
would have an effect far greater than
mere standardisation (l(c)).
2. Reflecting the debate in committee and
subsequently, your Rapporteur feels
that the idea of a European " national
guard " suggested in recommendation
5 of the original report should be
developed and investigated without
delay and as part of the current
reorganisation of forces in the majority
of member states (2).
3. This recommendation is in line with
some of the first findings of the Dutch
' Dienstplicht " Commission's interim
report mentioned in paragraphs 23 to
25 of Document 1338.
1. Document 1338,
Decker.
4. Your Rapporteur would submit this
recommendation as being crucial in
any nation's determination to * expect
the unexpected ". Once legislation on
national service has been revoked it is
almost impossible, politically, for any
government to reverse the decision. As
well as having to remain insured
against future risks and crises, a nation
might also decide that " national
service " should take perhaps a dif-
ferent form. France for example is now
experimenting with the idea of a na-
tional service taking care ofthe handi-
capped.
5. The United Kingdom's experience of
phasing out conscription in the early
1960s, as well as leading to better con-
ditions of service for its all-volunteer
forces (hence the greater costs
emphasised in the original report) had
another definite effect. Without
national service and with a much
reduced force overall fewer and fewer
people in any position of influence(industry, public sector, education,
media, etc., etc.) have experience of
military matters. The same premise
applies to all our national parliaments.
Some countries are perhaps better than
others in this respect and those of us
who have been members of national
defence committees (or indeed of the
WEU Assembly's Defence Committee)
are probably better informed than
some.
In the United Kingdom a specific pro-
gramme is organised by the Ministry of
Defence to conduct specialist arrny,
navy or air force orientation for
Members of Parliament. In addition
the services maintain special 'presen-
tation teams " which are continually
updating specialist audiences on the
latest developments in the military
domain. A very good example for the
rest of our nations.
5. Finally, on a note of actuality to com-
plement the report being presented to the
Assembly on WEU's operational organisation
and the Yugoslav crisis 2 your Rapporteur would
like to draw colleagues' attention to the r6le of
reserves now in the Yugoslav crisis. On 5th
2. Document 1337,
Marten.
5th November, Rapporteur: Mr. De
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November 1992 in the House of Commons in
London, Mr. Brazier, MP, asked the Secretary of
State for Defence " what plans he has to use
members of the reserve forces in support of
current operations ".
6. The Minister of State for the Armed
Forces, Mr. Archie Hamilton, MP, gave the fol-
lowing reply:
" My right honourable and learned friend
the Secretary of State for Defence
reported to the House by notice last
month the call-out of a small number of
willing offrcers of the Royal Air Force
Volunteer Reserve to support current
operations.
A further need for specialist support
available only from the reserve forces has
now become apparent, and a number of
individuals from the Territorial Army's
intelligence and security group (volun-
teers) have offered to serve on duties in
the United Kingdom. My right hon-
ourable and learned friend the Secretary
of State has made the Queen's order
required by section l2(l) of the Reserve
Forces Act, 1980, and has formally called
them out under section I 1(l) of the Act.
A number of offrcers of the Royal Naval
Reserve have also volunteered to serve,
and they are being called up under the
provisions of an Order in Council made
in May 1982."
7. At Maisons-Laffitte on 6th November in
answer to a question by your Rapporteur,
General Roquejeoffre stressed the need for
certain specialisations in the forces, who were
available only from the annual intake of
national servicemen or within the corps of
reservists.
8. These two further examples fully illustrate
the necessity for our governments to pay par-
ticular attention to reserve forces and to make
pnoper provision for their activation when nec-
essary.
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Anti-ballistic missile defence
REPORT I
submitted on behalf of the Technolagicol and Aerospace Committee2
by Mn ltnzpr, Rapponeur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnerr RrcorarasNonrol.r
on anti-ballistic missile defence
Dnerr OnonR
on anti-ballistic missile defence
Expr-eNetonY MEMoRANDUM
submitted by Mr. l-enzer, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. The ballistic missile threat to Europe
III. Current defence measures against the ballistic threat
IY. The European attitude
V. Questions for debate
VI. Conclusions
APPENDIcES
I. Treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems signed by
President Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev, Moscow, 26th May 1972
II. Number of missiles existing within different third world countries
III. Operational ballistic missiles planned or being developed in third world
countries
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: l0lt. Lopez Henares (Chairman); Mr. Lenzer, N... (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Atkinson, Biefnot(Alternate: Kempinaire),IVlrs. Blunck, MM. Bdhm, Caccia, Colombo, Curto, Davis, Dimmer, Mrs. Francese, MM. Lagorce, Lr
Grand, Gonzalez-l-axe, Litherland, Menzel, Palacios, Pogas Santos, Sarens, Savio, Sir Donald Thompson, MM. Tummers,
Valleix, Verbeek, Worms.
N.B. Tfte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
290
DOCUMENT 1339
Draft Recommcndation
oa anrt-Mfistic misile defcrce
The Assembly,
(i) Gratified that Europe is no longer threatened by a ballistic missile attack from the territory of
the former Soviet Union;(ir) Recalling nevertheless that the danger of proliferation of ballistic technology and nuclear, bio-
logical and chemical warheads stockpiled on the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States
has not yet been averted;
(iit) Noting that several third world countries, particularly in the Mediterranean and the Near and
tr4iddte East, are making considerable efforts to procure ballistic systems capable of reaching European
countries;(iv) Noting further that a number of countries that have not joined the missile technology control
rdgime (MTCR) are endeavouring to develop ballistic technology and to export it to third world coun-
tries;
(v) Disturbed at the growing number of countries endeavouring to develop nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons;(vil Recalling the uncertainty that still remains about the completion of the United States pre
grimme for esfabfishing a system of global protection against limited strikes (GPALS) and its conse-
quences for Europe;
(vii) Considering that such a system of protection will mean renegotiating the anti-ballistic missile
treaty of 26th May 1972;
(viii) Stressing the importance of the evolution of Russian-American co-operation in this matter in the
irarirework of which the possible creation of an early warning centre to avert the risks of ballistic
attacks is being studied;
(ix) Recalling that the technical diffrculties encountered during the Gulf war in intercepting with
Pa-triot systemi Iraqi missiles launched against Tel Aviv and Riyadh showed that protection against
this new type of threat was still far from perfect;(x) Convinced, therefore, that it is high time for the Western European countries to adopt a joint
position, on the one hand on the assessment of the possible risks for Europe of the development of bal-
listic technology throughout the world and, on the other, on the corresponding response;
(xr) Also convinced of the need to ensure that efforts to afford protection against ballistic missiles do
nd lead to an arms race in space,
RrcouueNos rHAT tsr CouNclI-
1. Assess without delay the risks to Europe stemming from:
(a) the development of strategic and theatre ballistic capability and nuclear capability in several
countries of the world;
(b) the proliferation of ballistic technology in countries close to Europe's southern and south-
eastern flanks;
2. Identify without delay Europe's needs and the means available to it to counter the ballistic
missile threat;
3. Adopt without delay a joint European position towards the American programme for global pro-
tection against limited strikes (GPALS) ;
4. Submit its conclusions to the Assembly.
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Draft Order
oa anti-Mlistic missila dafeace
The Assembly,(i) Considering that the rapid development of advanced ballistic missile technology and its prolife-
ration in the third world represents new challenges to Europe and to the whole world whose conse-
quences have not yet been fully defined;(it) Convinced of the need to hold a public debate on the repercussions of these challenges and on
the appropriate response,
INsr-nusrs its Technological and Aerospace Committee to pursue its work on anti-ballistic
missile defence problems and to organise a symposium in 1993 on this subject, to be attended by tech-
nical, industrial and legal experts as well as parliamentarians and representatives of governments and
the public.
292
DOCUMENT 1339
Expbnatory Memorandum
(submined by Mr. I*aze4 Ropporteur)
I. Infioduction
1. In the past twenty years, the scale of the
problem of protection against ballistic mjssiles
has changed several times, for very different
reasons.
2. During the long period of East-West con-
frontation, the concept of nuclear deterrence
seomed to afford the best protection against all
kinds of attacks, including those by ballistic mis-
siles.
3. However, this concept, based on a
crcdible response capability, has always been
threatened by changes in the very nature ofthe
r$ponse or by efforts by the two opposing alti-
anCes to acquire means of defence against mis-
sihs. This merely speeded up and strengthened
the offensive strategic weapons race in which the
two superpowers were involved.
4. Hence the idea of halting the race for
offensive arms by limiting means of defence
against them, the principle underlying the treaty
on limiting anti-ballistic missile systems con-
cluded between the United States and the
former Soviet Union on 26th May 1972, which
is still in force r, was of a novel not to say revolu-
tionary nature.
5. In this treaty, each party undertook not to
bring into service defence systems against bal-
[stiC missiles except within specific areas round
the two countries' capitals and limited areas sur-
rounding ICBM (intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles) silos.
6. By launching its strategic defence initi-
ative (SDI) on 23rd March 1983, the President
of the United States ran counter to the spirit of
the ABM Treaty since the SDI programme was
intended to protect United States territory by a
complex system of anti-missile missiles designed
to ward offa massive attack by the Soviet Union
comprising several thousand nuclear warheads,
although at the time the President gave an
arsurance that this was merely a research pro-
gramme in conformity with the ABM Treaty.
7. It was in an international environment
that had undergone radical transformations but
in which the Soviet Union still existed that Pres-
ident Bush announced, on 29th January 1991,
that the SDI programme was to change course,
emphasis henceforth being shifted to defence by
theatre missiles. This was christened GPALS
(etobal protection against limited strikes).
E. According to the Director of the Strategic
Defence Initiative Organisation (SDIO), Henry
F. Cooper, " under the new GPALS programme,
the objective is to protect the United States, our
forces-overseas, as well as our allies and friends,
by destroying the warheads of limited ballistic
niissile strikes (up to 200 warheads) launched
from anywhere on earth " 2.
9. Although the GPALS programme was
launched a long time before the first inter-
ception of an Iraqi Scud by a Patriot anti-missile
missile during the Gulf war, the consequences of
the proliferation of ballistic missiles in the third
world and increased efforts by several devel-
oping countries to develop such systems were
certalnly a major factor in this reorientation of
the SDI programme.
10. In this connection, it is striking to note
that the United States is still the only country
carrying out concrete research and-development
for an anti-ballistic missile defence system
when, for geographical reasons, it is less
threatened by such systems than Europe (and
the territory of Russia). Europeans must
therefore take certain decisions. First, they must
examine whether there is a need to recognise the
existence of a new type of threat since several
third world countries in the Mediterranean,
Near East and Middle East are able to procure
ballistic missiles that can reach European coun-
tries. Second, ifthey aflirm the existence ofsuch
a threat, they must give their views on the
ensuing conclusions and consequences, particu-
larly ai the United States has proposed- that its
GPALS programme be developed mainly in the
framewoik of NnfO and that it is already in
resular contact with Russia with a view to nego-
tiiting the conditions and methods for Russian
participation in the programme.
II. The ballistic missile threat to Europe
11. With the coming into force of the INF
Treaty and the signing of the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START) and subsequent to
the West's new ielations with Russia, the prin-
cipal successor of the former Soviet Union, the
thleat of a missile attack from the East is no
l. See Appendix I.
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Ilonger a matter of concern for the alliance, in
spite of uncertainty about the r6le that Russia
will eventually play following the transitional
period which all countries of the Common-
wealth of Independent States are now trav-
ersmg.
12. Conversely, paragraph 14 the com-
muniqu6 issued by the NATO Defence Planning
Committee and Nuclear Planning Group notes
that:
" In lipht of 
- 
t-he risks 
-posed Py ttreincreasing proliferation of ballistic mis-
siles, we discussed ballistic missile
defences against this potential threat. We
agreed to intensify alliance consultation in
this area. "
13. In this context, it should not be forgotten
that there are still many intercontinental bal-
listic missiles (ICBMs) held by countries on the
territory of the former Soviet Union where the
political situation is still unsettled. A prolife-
ration of such systems might therefore be a
danger for Europe, particularly as it is techni-
cally possible to modify the range of interconti-
nental missiles and use them as shorter-range
missiles.
14. However, it was the Gulf war and the
Iraqi Scud missiles fired at Tel Aviv and Riyadh
whose destructive effects, even with conven-
tional warheads, everyone could see on tele-
vision that first opened the eyes of Europeans
and made them realise the risks they themselves
might be running if the proliferation of ballistic
missiles in third world countries were to con-
tinue or if the number of countries developing
their own systems were to continue to increase
along Europe's southern flank.
15. This is why the Assembly, on the basis of
a first assessment of the threat from ballistic
missiles after the Gulf war 3, had already asked
the Council, in Recommendation 501 adopted
on 5th June 1991, to instruct the committee of
chiefs of defence staffof WEU to study inter alia
" the ballistic missile threat on Europe's
southern flank and a possible subsequent
common European requirement for an anti-
ballistic missile capability ". However, in its
reply to this recommendation the Council
throws no light on its thinking on this matter.
16. Estimates relating to countries possessing
ballistic missiles vary in respect of short- and
medium-range systems, but, according to infor-
mation in the SIPRI Yearbook for 1992, no
third world country yet has operational inter-
continental systems (ICBMs). China's position
towards proliferation is particularly important
since it has developed its own intercontinental
system and also has the CSS-2 missile with a
range of 2 700 km and the M-9 with a range of
600 km. Although China has said it intends to
respect the MTCR (Missile Technology Control
R6gime) 4, to which it has not acceded, it
remains an unknown factor where the export of
space technology is concerned, particularly as it
is developing a CSSX-5 system (with a one-ton
payload and a range of 2 000 km) and the M-I1
system (with a 500 kg payload and a range of
300 km).
17. Brazil, which has not acceded to the
MTCR either but has said it intends to do so, is
in the process of developing a VLS launcher
with a range of about l0 000 km and is consid-
ering developing an ICBM with a range of 3 000
km. In the arsenal of missiles in the 150 to I 200
km range, Brazil is in the process ofdeveloping
at least seven different systems, including the
SS-1000 (range I 200 km).
18. India, which to date has no intention of
acceding to the MTCR, is oonsidering devel-
oping a launcher with a range of 14 000 km and
is already testing two other systems, one (PSLV)
with a range of 8 000 km and the other (ASLV)
with a range of 4 000 km, the latter with the
assistance of the French and German industries,
moreover.
19. India's efforts to develop the Agni missile
with a range of 2 500 km should also be recalled.
The United States reacted strongly to the most
recent test of this system at the end of May
1992.
20. According to recent reports, South Korea
is considering developing a launcher with a
range of 4 000 km.
21. Where short- and medium-range systems
are concerned, the SIPRI Yearbook for 1992
estimates that twenty-six countries now have
ballistic missiles or will have them by 2000.
22. Among the nearest countries on Europe's
southern and southrastern flanks that are not
associated with the MTCR, Algeria has opera-
tional Soviet Frog-7 ballistic missiles with a
range of 65 km.
23. Where Libya is concerned, it has still not
been forgotten that it tried unsuccessfully to
launch missiles against the lt'alian island of
Lampedusa in response to the American air raid
on Tripoli. In addition to Frog-7s, the country
now has Scud-B missiles with a range of about
300 km and, according to unconfirmed sources,
SS-2ls with a range of 120 km. Some sources say
3. See Document 1272 
- report submitted by Sir Dudley
Smith on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Com-
mittee.
4. The participants in this unoflicial agreement banning the
export of conventional missiles and ballistic nuclear-capable
missiles and limiting exports of associated technology are:
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg" the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, the United
Kingdom, the United States and the European Com-
munity.
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with a question mark - that Libya may have
abotrt twenty Chinese M-9 missiles with arange
of 500 km 5 and others refer to work by the
German firm OTRAG which, after helping
Libya in the seventies and eighties to develop a
system with a range of 480 km, had to leave the
country under pressure from the German Gov-
ernment.
24. Rumour has it that German engineers are
still in Libya to develop a missile (Ittisalt) with a
range of 700 km and it is also said that a system(Al Fatah) is also being developed with a rangg
of 500 km 6 according to some sources and 950
km according to others.
25. Egypt has Frog-7 missiles and Scud-B
systems and, with the assistance of North Korea,
ii in the process of developing Scud-I00s with a
range of 600 km. According to sources that
cannot be verified 7, it is also believed to have a
few Condor IIs with a range of 9@ to 1 000 km.
This system was designed in Argentina but
development has since been discontinued.
According to information from the French eco'
nomic interest group CoSyDe, Egypt is also
developing a ballistic system known as
BADR/2000 Vector (range I 200 km).
26. Syria has Frog-7 (range 65 km), SS-21
Scarab (range 120 km) and Scud-B (range 280 to
300 km) systems. It should be added that there
ate a number of derivatives of the Scud-B
system with payloads varying from 300 to I 000
kg and ranges of between 300 and 900 km. In
1991, it also received about twenty Scud-C mis-
silcs (range 600 km) from North Korea,
developed by the latter country and China, but
it is not sure whether this system is operational
yet. There are also nrmours that Syria tried to
procure Chinese M-9 missiles with a range of
600 km, but there is no confirmation that China
in fact delivered them.
27. Saudi Arabia has the Chinese CSS-2
missile with a range of 2 000 km (2 700 km
according to certain sources), but there is also
talk of a DF-3 system with a range of 2 200 km.
28. It is difficult to assess lraq's current capa-
bility as it was obliged by United Nations
Saurity Council Resolution 687 to destroy all
its systems with a range of more than 150 km.
This applies in particular to the Al Hussein
missile, the Iraqi version of the Scud used in the
Gulf war. However, Iraq had also developed a
Temuz-l and Al Abeb system with a range of
2 000 km.
29. Iran obtained a large short-range missile
capability by developing its own systems, partly
with the assistance of China and North Korea. It
also has North Korean Scud-Cs with a range of
600 km.
30. With the assistance of China, France and
the United States, Pakistan, which has so far
hesitated to accede to the MTCR, has developed
a series of short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles which are now operational, such as
Haft-I (range 80 km), M-l I (range 290 km),
Shahpar (range 120 km) and Suparco (range 280
km). With Chinese assistance, Pakistan is cur-
rently developing Haft-II (range 300 km) and-
HaftJII (range 600 km). It is also thinking of
developing a space launch vehicle with a range
of 1200 km.
31. Taiwan, which has not acceded to the
MTCR, is believed to have cancelled devel-
opment of the Tien Ma missile that would have
had a range of 950 km.
32. Among countries not having acceded to
the MTCR that are trying to develop their own
ballistic missile capability and which intend to
export them, North Korea plays an important
rOie. Inter alia, it has developed a North Korean
version of Scud-B, with an extended range of
340 km and a version of Scud-C with a range of
600 km (sold to Syria and Iran) and is now, with
Chinese assistance, developing the No Dong I
system with a range of 1 000 km.
33. Israel and South Africa co-operate in bal-
listic missile technology. However, Israel has
announced that it would respect the principles
of the MTCR and South Africa has said it
intends to accede to it. With the assistance of
France, Israel has developed Jericho I (range
650 km) and Jericho II (range I 500 km) mis-
siles. Components for the latter have been
delivered to South Africa. Israel has also
developed a Jericho II-B with a range of I 300
km and - with French assistance - the Shavit
system with a range of 2 500 km.
34. In the case of South Africa, mention
should be made of the Arniston system, with a
range of I 500 km, that it is developing in
co-operation with Israel.
35. Argentina, which is now interested in
acceding to the MTCR, has cancelled devel-
opment of the Condor II system (range 900 km)?
designed in co-operation with Egyp!, and, until
1988, with the financial participation of Iraq.
Argentina has also embarked upon the Alacran
progpamme with the aim of developing a missile
with a range of 200 km.
36. To obtain a realistic idea about the pos-
sible threat from ballistic missiles, it should be
recalled that they are pilotless, self-propelled
weapons launchers with a surface-to-surface tra-jectory; they may or may not pass through outer
ipace and be guided to their target. As shown by
the two diagrams below, a Scud-type missile can
5. See table at Appendix II.
6. See table at Appendix III and the Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientist, March 1992.
7. See table at Appendix II.
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reag! a target about 500 km away in 6 minutes
al$ 39 seconds (at a speed of I 600 m/s) with an
altitude of 140 km at the apogee of theii ballistic
trajectory. A Chinese CSS-2+ype missile can
1e_ach. a tatget about 3 000 km away in
16 minutes and 40 seconds (at a speed of 4 OS0
m/s) with an altitude of 650 km atlhe apogee of
their ballistic trajectory
Stages in the flight of Scud-type missiles
AtnoEpheric braking
Range: 500 kn
Flight time: 6 ninutes and 30 seconds
Speed: I 600 o/s
AEROSPATIALE
Shell conponents separatefron each other
Z=120KM
SOURGE:
Stages in the llight of CSS-2-OW missitcs
AFOGEE 650 KtI
APOGEE I{O KM
BalliEtic flight
SOURCE:
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Propelled stage
SEPARATIO}I
,.\ THOMSON.CSF"ACoSvDe
Range: 3 OOO km
Flight tine: 16 minutes anal 40 seconds
Speed: 4 650 ta/s AGoSvDe
Propelled stage(second stage)
BaIlistic stage
Aerodynarnic braking
Propelled stage(first stage)
Re-entry stage
AEROSPATIALE /.\ THOMSON-CSF
tr
Fal I
( first stage )
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37. Assessment of the threat ballistic missiles
reprcsent for Europe is still based mainly on a
hypothetical estimate of future developments
since, at pres€nt, of the two countries " hostile "
to Europe, i.e. Iraq and Libya, only the second
could reach European territory with the ballistic
missiles available to it.
38. However, according to United States esti-
mates:
- 
fifteen third world countris have the
capability to produce their own missiles
between now and the end of the
century;
- 
at least twenty-four third world coun-
will have ballistic missiles by
8. Henry F. Cooper, Enjeux atlantiques, No. 4, November
1991, page 32.
- 
at least six third world countries will
have missiles with a range of uP to
3 000 km by 2000;
- 
by the turn of the century, three third
world countries will have missiles with
a range of up to 5 000 km.
39. However, this assessment would not be
complete without a reference to the ABC
weepons programmes being carried out in third
worid countries interested in developing ballistic
mirsiles.
40. Among those working on nuclear weapons
programmes-are India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, L^ibyq
Norttr Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, South
Africa and Taiwan. In this context, the problem
of nuclear non-proliferation becomes even more
acute, particularly ifaccount is taken ofnuclear
weapons stockpiled on the territory of the
former Soviet Union, and recent press reports
that Iran is believed to have concluded an
agreement with Kazakhstan on the delivery 
-of
nirclear warheads underscore the urgency of the
situation. Moreover, research and development
ate continuing on chemical and biological-
weapons and the danger of proliferation of
equipment and know-how in this area has not
diminished.
41. According to certain American estimates,
bv 2000 thirtv third world countries will have
chemical and ten biological capability 8.
III. Cunent defonce maasares against
the ballistic missile threat
42. At present, only the United States is defi-
nitely carrying out an anti-missile defence pro-
gramme. Whereas, at the outset, the SDI pro-
gramme was aimed primarily at prot-ecting the
North American continent against a large-scale
Soviet intercontinental missile attack - thus, at
the time, leading to fears of a break in the
security link between European countries and
the Uriited States - President Bush announced
on 29th January l99l that the SDI was to
change course. There were two new elements:
first,-defence against limited strikes of theatre
ballistic missiles would be concentrated on and,
second, a world anti-ballistic missile system, of
whatever origin, would be set uP.
43. This recentred programme is now called
Global Protection against Limited Strikes
(GPALS). Mr. Henry F. Cooper, Director of the
iJnited States Strategic Defence Intitiative
Organisation, described the concept of this pro-
gramme as follows e:
* A GPALS defence would consist of
three elements working in concert to
provide the best possible protection
against limited ballistic missile attacks.
First, improved theatre missile defences
could protect against ballistic missile
attacks on United States forces overseas
and on United States friends and allies.
Second, a ground-based defensive system,
at five to seven sites, could defend the
United States against accidental and
unauthorised ballistic missile strikes from
any source. And finally, a global, space-
baied element (Brilliant Pebbles) could
intercept ballistic missiles with ranges
greatei than a few hundred miles,
destroying the targets by colliding with
them. "
44. It is mainly the first element that should
interest Europeans although it is not quite clear
what the prolection of * United States friends
and alliesl means, particularly where the pro-
tection of civilians is concerned.
45. To meet theatre missile requirements, two
ground-based systems now being developed will
carry out the following tasks:
- 
low-altitude interception, i.e. the pro-
tection of pinpoint targets against
attack by cruise and other missiles, will
be the iask of the ERINT (Enhanced
Range Interception) missile, o! which
it is planned to start tests in 1993;
- 
high-altitude interception (between 100
and 200 km) will be ensured bY the
THAAD (Theatre High Altitude
Defence) which will be developed by
Lockheed and will ProbablY not be
tested before 1996.
46. Both anti-missile systems will have to
destroy attacking missiles without any explo-
sives and use only their own cinetic energy.
tries
2000;
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ri47. In regard to the space components of the
system, consideration is being given to placing
in a 400 to 500 km orbit a laige numbefof satl
ellite interceptors known as Brilliant pebbles,
eqch hqviry a lnissile working by cinetic energy.The I 000 Brilliant Pebbles initially planned
have already been reduced to 500, but thepursuit of this progmmme as such is never-
lheless not certain, for budgetary reasons andfollowing the restrictions imfosed by ttre law of
December l99l on anti-missile defence which
limits anti-missile defence work to that in con-
formity with the ABM Treaty.
48. Furthermore, the programme provides for
the 
-development .and launching of about sixtysatellites with infrared captors called Brilliani
Eyes, which will ensure observation for the
entire system and communication between
space- and ground-based components.
49. However, it has been realised that there
lvas a gap between the strategic and tacticalfunctions of the system which would have to befilled by the development of two additional
ground-based systems, one called Ground Based
Interceptor (GBI) and the other Endo-
atmospheric/Exo-atmospheric Interceptor (E2I),
believed to be derived from the HEDI missiie
developed in the framework of the SDI.
50. Figrrres I to IV below illustrate the global
system, its ground-based components and the
functions of the Brilliant Pebbles and Brilliant
Eyes systems.
Frcune I
GPAI^g
i
I
l
l
I
Source: NATO Review, No. 3, June 1992, page 28.
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Source: Enjeux atlantiques, No. 4, November 1991, page 31.
Frcuns II
GPALS ground-ba.sed component
Frcunr III
GPALS spaae-based aomlonents
Source: Enjeux atlantiques, No. 4, November 1991, page 32.
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Frcunr IV
Functioniag of the Brilliant Pebblos system
Pnotoc-tive GoGoons
or suryftml envelopes
containing the
satellitqs
ORDER OF OPERATIONS IN SPACE
Solar pond
supplying the
satellites with
enersr until their
deplolment
Ejected from thc
cocoon, the detectors
detect enemy trails
The pebbles are then
self-propelled for
interception
*---
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Source: Ddfense nationale, October 1990, page l5l.
PROPI'LSIION SYSIEM
Manoeuwe reactors
Fuel tank II
I
I
t
I
i
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51. The total cost of the GPALS programme
is roughly estimated at about $46 000 million. It
has already absorbed most of the sums ear-
marked foi the SDI for the financial year 1992,
i.e. about $4 150 million. In the budget for the
financial year 1993, credits earmarked for the
SDI were reduced to $3 030 million and those
for theatre missile defence to $935 million.
52. Nevertheless, although the programme
has hardly entered its initial research and devel-
opment stage, some American experts fear the
improved types of ballistic missiles equipped
with re-entry vehicles may dodge the inter-
ceptors. The-difficulties Patriot missiles had in
intercepting the not very sophisticated Iraqi
Scuds ire believed to have been observed closely
by certain third world countries.
53. Moreover, the Americans will have to
solve the problem raised by the general concept
of the systtm which, because it means setting up
five to ieven ground-based anti-missile sites and
placing interceptors in space, will. require the
ABM Treaty to be renegotiated. This is why.the
GPALS pr6gramme is evolutive and provides
initially lorlhe Grand Forks (North Dakota)
anti-missile site to be reorganised to receive 100
THAAD ERIS-type interceptors, this being in
conformity with ihe treaty. (However, the choice
of site has already been questioned by the
Director of the SDIO, who has proposed another
site in the north-east of the United States.) The
1991 law on anti-missile defence banned pro-
grammes that did not conform with the tlgqty,
wtrictr is inter alia the case of Brilliant Pebbles.
54. However, since October 1991, the leaders
of the former Soviet Union have already been
informing the Americans that they were pre-
pared to- discuss anti-missile defence matters
with them and, on 29th January 1992, the
Rusian President, Boris Yeltsin, proposed
working out, jointly with the United States, a
global iefence system that might replace the
SDI.
55. At the close of the Russian-American
summit meeting in Washington on 17th June
1992, during which President Bush and Pres-
ident Yeltsin agreed on further reductions in
their arsenals of offensive strategic weapons not
covered by START, the two parties issued ajoint declaration:
" The presidents continued their dis-
cussion- of the potential benefits of a
Globat Protection System (GPS) against
ballistic missiles, agreeing that it is
important to explore the r6le for defences
in - protecting against limited ballistic
misJile attacks. The two presidents agtreed
that their two nations should work
together with allies and other interested
stites in developing a concept for such a
system as part of an overall strategy
regarding the proliferation of ballistic
missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
Such co-operation would be a tangible
expression of the new relationship that
exists between Russia and the United
States and would involve them in an
important undertaking with other nations
of the world communitY.
The two presidents agreed it is necessary
to start wbrk without delay to develop the
concept of the GPS. For this purpose they
agreed to establish a hig!-level ^gr-oup to
eiplore on a priority basis the following
practical stePs:
- 
The potential for sharing of early
warning information through the estab-
lishment of an early warning centre.
- 
The potential for co-operation with par-
ticipiting states in developing ballistic
missile defence capabilities and tech-
nologies.
- 
The development of a legal basis for
co-operation, including new treaties
and agtreements and possible changes to
existing treaties and agreements nec-
essary to imPlement a Global Pro-
tection System. "
56. In spite of some hostitity among Russian
military eiperts about taking part in the GPALS
programme, American-Soviet contacts have
ionlinued and have been intensified. HighJevel
delegations from the two countries met in
Mosiow on l3th and l4th July 1992 and in
Washington on 21st and 22nd September 1992.
Three working goups have been set up:
- 
a working group on the concept of the
global prbtection system 
-to study theitructuie, conditions and functions of a
future Protection system;
- 
a working group on technical
co'operation to examine research and
development projects and possible
tests;
- 
a working group on non-proliferation to
examinelhe tiend of proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and
means of increasing efforts to prevent
such proliferation.
57. The Americans immediately submitted
the GPALS project to their European allies in
the framewoit of NATO, where several studies
on anti-missile defence have been conducted.
When the project was presented to the NATO
ambassadors, ihe United States Delegation pro-
posed to its allies, on lTth Septembmer 1992,
that NATO be assigned the main rOle in
planning a global protection system. Other coun-
tries such is Ruisia might be associated with
NATO, which would form the nucleus of the
system.
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,IIY. The European attitude
58. United States efforts to obtain other coun-
tries' support for its work in the framework of
the SDI led to the conclusion of memoranda of
understanding (MOU) with the United
Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Israel and Japan. The
United States then financed work by industries
in about ten countries on the basis of 301 calls
for tenders worth $833 million. Tenders were
awarded inter alia to firms in the United
Kingdom, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, France,
Canada, Belgium, Denmark and the Nether-
lands.
59. However, except in the United Kingdom
and Israel, for various reasons this work did not
lead to significant government programmes.
Thus, certain countries were hesitant, some
fearing the SDI might weaken nuclear deter-
rence, others being anxious to retain the ABM
Treaty and still others being against the
deployment of weapons in space. However, the
United States'restrictive policy in respect of the
information it gave its allies about its research
was also a major reason for this hesitant
attitude.
60. The most significant result where
co-operation is concerned is the Arrow missile
programme developed jointly by Israel and the
United States for intercepting ballistic missiles
with a range of up to I 000 km. [srael is consid-
ering deploying a first prototype of the Arrow
system in 1997 in spite of disappointment due
to the failure of the first tests. An improved
version, Aces, should be tested in about 1995.
61. In the European framework, the Franco-Italian consortium Eurosam (A6rospatiale,
Thomson-CSF and Alenia) is now developing
the Aster/ARABEL anti-aircraft missile with
anti-missile interception capability. This groupis also working on the development of tw-o
systems in the future ground-to-air missile
family, one of which, the SAMP-T (surface-
to-air medium-range) missile, might be given a
limited anti-ballistic missile capability.
62. These activities concern only low-altitude
interception functions comparable to those of
Patriot and Erint missiles and are set in the
framework of pinpoint defence. They corre-
spond to American studies on the CORPSSAM(corpsJevel surface-to-air missile) defence
system and German work in the framework of
an enlarged air defence concept that is consid-
ering the establishment of a limited anti-theatre
ballistic missile defence capability based on theTLVp (Taktisches Luftverteidigungs System)(tactical air defence system).
63. In regard to high-altitude interception, it
should be noted that a number of European
industries, including the French firms
A6rospatiale and Thomson-CSF, are taking part
as sub-contractors in the development of the
American THAAD (theatre high-altitude
defence) system, designed to protect areas of
more than l0 000 km2.
64. However, no European country now has
an operational interception capability unless it
has qrocured the American Patriot system. Only
Russia has several versions of anti-missile
weapons systems, the most modern of which,
the SA-12 or S-300V, was presented to the
public at the Moscow air show in summer 1992
as an anti-aircraft and anti-tactical and ballistic
missile missile capable of intervening at a dis-
tance of 100 km and at an altitude of 30 000 m.
65. In several Western European countries,
industries have started, either at the request of
their own government or on their initiative, to
study the feasibility of a ballistic missile defence
architecture.
66. These initiatives include the agreement
concluded in 1986 between the French firms
Adrospatiale and Thomson-CSF by which they
set up an economic interest group CoSyDe(defence systems concepts) to develop in
co-operation weapons systems capable of coun-
tering the threat of ballistic or non-ballistic mis-
siles in the European theatre. After taking part
between 1987 and 1989 in the study of the
theatre missile defence architecture study(TMDAS) at the request of the United States
arny, the CoSyDe group is inter alia conductirg
a study for the French Ministry of Defence onthe ballistic missile threat and strategic
defence.
67. In order to improve its knowledge so as to
be better able to express its views on this matter,
the Technological and Aerospace Committee
accepted with pleasure the CoSyDe group's offer
to describe its studies on anti-ballistic missile
defence. This briefing, which was also attended
by representatives of the Italian firm Alenia, was
given during a committee meeting in Paris on
23rd October 1992.
68. The briefing was especially useful in thatit brought out the problems facing Europe in
particular and allowed this major European
defence industry group to deliver a specific
message, i.e. that the technology required for
anti-missile defence is either available or being
developed in Western Europe and that such
defence might be built in the framework of
intra-European co-operation. The briefing alsoprovided important information for the dis-
cussion of further questions developed in
Chapter V of this report.
69. The discussion is particularly important
as the governments of the Western European
countries hold differing views on how to meet
the challenge of the ballistic missile threat.
70. lt is France that has so far adopted the
clearest position described by its Prime Minister,
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Mr. B6r6govoy, who, on lst October 1992, spoke
as follows at the close of the colloquy on a new
strategic debate organised in Paris by the French
Minister of Defence:
* One may also wonder about possible
threats from countries that may possess
strategic weapons and which would be
indifferent to the logic of deterrence. We
have a range of nuclear weapons whose
diversity should allow us to meet all situa-
tions. It is a matter of determination. In
these conditions, I do not believe it
desirable to join the anti-missile space
shield project. The early-warning aspect
of this programme admittedly seems
interesting and might precede an interna-
tional system of space-based monitoring
and transparency. However, apart from
the fact that its capabilities are limited by
technical constraints, it involves the unac-
ceptable risk of relaunching the arms race
and militarising space, thus running
counter to nuclear disarmament efforts.
In reality, the true answer is to be found
in the fight against the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. We are
therefore determined to strive for nuclear
disarmament. "
71. This position may be interpreted as
clearly unfavourable to French participation in
the American GPALS progxamme; it corre-
sponds, moreover, to the negative attitude
expressed publicly this year by a number of
experts among the French political classr0.
However, one might also wonder whether these
remarks are an indication of what the French
position would be towards any European initia-
iives taken in this connection in view of the fact
that, on this matter, governmental and indus-
triat circles do not all hold the same views, the
political class is well aware of the problem and
industrial studies are now being conducted with
a view to establishing a system of European
theatre defence against the missile threat.
72. At the same colloquy, the United
Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, Mr.
Rifkind, adopted a different approach:
* In the medium term, there is also the
welcome prospect of defences against
limited ballistic missile strikes. Although
the development of defences will never
remove the need to be able to take more
active measures, it will be a useful com-
plement to those other capabilities. The
Patriot system played an invaluable r01e
in the Gulf conflict and, whilst the cir-
10. Frdd€ric Bozo: Une doctrine nucl€aire europdenne:
pourquoi faire et comment ? in Politique dtrangdre, No. 2,
iggZ, paee 419; Dominique David: La coop€ration globale
cortrre- des frappes limit6es (GPAIS) et la stratdgie
am6ricaine in Ddfense nationale, June 1992, page 51.
cumstances were special ones which might
never repeat themselves, it is certainly
worth exploring the scope for wider appli-
cation of the same principles.
Defences would be a great boon in the sce-
nario I mentioned earlier, where chemical
or biological attack was threatened yet
uncertainty about the justifiability of
nuclear retaliation cast doubt on the effec-
tiveness of a nuclear deterrent threat. Andtheatre defences would offer
much-improved protection for troops
deployed overseas. Indeed, this would
perhaps make the political decision to
deploy troops easier in some circum-
stances: agreater ability to minimise casu-
alties would be an influential factor in any
calculation of the advantages and disad-
vantages of operations involving
important but not vital interests.
Of course, the development of defences
has to proceed in a way which does not
disrupt strategic stability, to which the
ABM Treaty has contributed so much.
Amendment of that treaty may well be
inevitable if limited defences are to
become a reality: but is clearly crucial that
we avoid unconstrained competititon in
this area. The United States adminis-
tration has made very clear that it will not
take any action which might prejudice the
credibility of the European nuclear deter-
rence, and is proceeding on a sensible
step-by-step basis. It is now important
that the European allies engage on the
issues, and the opportunities, that techno-
logical progress is bringing to the fore. "
73. Although it is not clear from these
remarks whether the United Kingdom is in
favour of European participation in GPALS or a
more European approach, the need to move
towards an anti-missile defence system is
recognised, although the United Kingdom will
find-it difficult to justify continuing with its
nuclear deterrence programme based on the
Trident system.
74. In any event, the United Kingdom Gov-
ernment hal started ministerial studies on the
question with a view to defining the United
Kingdom's own needs for an anti-missile
defence system. In the context of these studies,
consideration is being given to the usefulness of
the American GPALS programme and of
European participation in an integrated system,
whicL would be contrary to the ABM Treaty,
Article IX of which bans the transfer of anti-
missile systems to other countries.
75. The United Kingdom is thinking of
setting up a group to assess the risks and require-
ments of anfi-missile defence. This might be set
up under the aegis of NATO, WEU or even the
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CSCE. However, the United Kingdom tends to
prefer an approach in the NATO framework
with a view to establishing a NATO missile
defence initiative.
76. The German Government's position has
not yet been clearly decided. The prevailing
opinion in the Ministry of Defence is that
Germany is not threatened, but a potential
threat is recognised along the southern flank of
the alliance. The tendency, therefore, is to tackle
all matters relating to ballistic threats in the
framework of NATO. Answering a question put
by Baroness Hooper during the session of the
WEU Assembly in Paris on 3rd June, Mr. Riihe,
German Minister, of Defence, referred to the
problem in the context ofthe European fighter
aircraft (EFA) :
" I also have to ask myself what threats we
may face after the year 2005 up to 2030 or
2040.\n this case I have to try - after 2005
at least - to relate an airborne component,
a fighter aircraft... to a possible threat in
the form of missiles. "
77. German studies in the framework of an
enlarged air defence concept are concentrated
on the establishment of a limited defence capa-
bility against theatre ballistic missiles composed
of improved Patriot and TLVS systems.
78. ln ltaly, no position has been made public
recently, exept for the view of Mr. And6, Italian
Minister of Defence, who said, during the col-
loquy already mentioned, that he was in favour
of further European action to counter the prolif-
eration of ballistic technology.
79. To date, the Italian Ministry of Defence
and air force seem to have considered that the
establishment of an anti-ballistic missile capa-
bility is not necessary immediately. It is believed
that only the island of Lampedusa and the
Central Mediterranean might be within the
range of Libyan Scud missiles. Conversely,
Libya's procurement of Soviet Su-24 long-range
bombers is a threat. In view of Italy's financial
diffrculties, it would hardly be possible to
finance research and development progmmmesfor systems more sophisticated than the
Patriot.
Y. Qyestions for debate
80. By comparing the different attitudes of
the four WEU member countries mentioned
above, one can see how urgent it is for Euro-
peans to agxee to work out a joint approach to
measures to be taken to tackle the growing dis-
semination of ballistic weapons throughout the
world, and in particular along Europe's southern
flank.
81. Even those who still doubt the existence
of a definite ballistic missile threat to Europe
should recognise that Europe can no longer
remain undecided and risk the United Statea 
-pQrhaps together with Russia 
- 
presenting it
with a fait accompli.
82. Many questions face the European cour>
tries. It is therefore time to hold a public debate
to determine what Europe needs to guarantee its
future security.
83. The debate should concentrate on two
main topics: the possibilities of building on
international law as an instrument of security on
the one hand and the measures necessary for
improving defence and protection arrangements
on the other. However, it should be underlined
that these two approaches cannot be alterna-
tives. They are complementary.
84. Legally, every effort should be made to
improve and extend the nuclear non-
proliferation rdgime with a view to making it
truly universal including chemical and bio-
logical weapons. In particular, work should at
last be completed on a universal convention
banning the production and dissemination of
chemical weapons.
85. Furthermore, steps should be taken to
perfect and extend the missile technology
control rdgime (MTCR) on which most encour-
aging progress has already been made. Since it
was set up in 1987, the number of countrieb
acceding to it has risen from seven to
twenty-two and many countries are prepared to
accede to or respect it. According to American
estimates, cancellation of the Argentinian
Condor II ballistic system was largely due to the
MTCR, which limited Argentina's access to the
necessary technology.
86. With particular regard to space, the
question is how far will it be possible to build on
international law to set limits for the military
use of space. It should be recalled that the
January I 967 space treaty banned the placing in
orbit of warheads of mass destruction and the
placing of military installations on celestial
bodies, but made no provision for the
demilitarisation of outer spaoe as such.
87. Conversely, the draft treaty submitted to
the United Nations General Assembly in l98l
provided for a ban on the emplacement of
weapons of all kinds in outer space. Since the
stationing of interceptors in space will probably
be followed by further research aimed at devel-
oping space-based counter-measures and in view
of the fact that the rOle and functioning of the
United Nations have improved considerably
since the end of the East-West confrontation, il
is time to review the abovementioned draft
treaty.
88. Finally, in the framework of efforts to
develop and perfect disarmament and arms lim-
itation measures in respect of ballistic missiles
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and anti-missile weapons, there will have to be a
study of the extent to which one might still
follow the spirit of the ABM Treaty when
drawing up future agreements with a wider
scope.
89. On the second topic, i.e. Europe's defence
requirements, there should first be an exami-
nalion of the nature of the threat, which may
vary in the light of technological developments.
Th6re is already talk of the threat of aerody-
namic missiles, which are quite different from
ballistic missiles and require different protective
me6ures. It is therefore essential to plan a multi-
purpose defence system.
90. Specific protection requirements should
then be examined. The brieflrng by the CoSyDe
srouD showed that technical needs differ consid-
;r"bty in the light of the tasks attributed to the
anti-missile defence system. To protect the
entire population against unforeseeable attacks
requires a far more complex architecture than
fixod targets or allied troops in a given area.
91. According to CoSyDe, a protection archi
tecture covering Europe's southern flank, pa4ic-
ularly in the Mediterranean region, should first
takc- into account the possible threat from
Scud-type missiles or their derivatives. In this
contexl; it would suflice to use warning methods
already available: observation satellites, ground-
based 
- 
radar stations or airborne monitoring
equipment. Next, interception by low-altitude
anti-missile means would be enough to protect
pinpoint targets. Such defence might be set up at
national level and be operational by the year
2000. The protection of French sites alone
would cost about F50 000 million. Such an
architecture might be the first step towards a
wider system of European co-operation.
92. However, according to CoSyDe, pro-
tection extended to embrace the whole territory
of Europe would require a far more complex and
costly aichitecture and would not be operational
until 2010.
93. Since a threat to civilians cannot be ruled
out following experience in the Gulf war, con--
sideration should be given to all the means of
countering it. Here, a distinction is drawn
between passive defence (concentrated on
shelters, warning systems and satellite obser-
vation) and active defence (anti-missile means)
and protection by offensive and preventive mil-
itary means, including nuclear deterrence.
94. In this context, Europeans must inevi-
tably take a decision on their attitude towards
the American GPALS programme providing for
a global anti-missile protection system. If they
opt for this solution, Europeans will have to
ensure that they incorporate the elements nec-
esmry for meeting their own specific needs.
Moreover, by learning the lessons of their parlic-
ipation in th-e SDI, they will have to avoid being
wholly dependent on United States concepts,
decisions, information and finance. The main
problem would remain the United States'
iestrictive policy in respect of technology
transfers and access to information.
95. Framing conditions for European partici-
pation in GPALS will in any event imply truly
European studies and research, but it should be
undeitined that it will be diflicult for Europe to
make up for lost time in relation to this
American programme.
96. Another option would be to work out an
independent European system compatible with
the American one. This concept would have the
advantage of making Europeans independent of
American information poticy and meet Europe's
needs and interests more closely. However, the
drawback would be that it could not be opera-
tional until after the American project.
97. Since Europe, and WEU in particular, is
tending to assert itself increasingly as an
importlnt figure in space-based securilY,
inciuding earth observation, and in view of the
success of national programmes developed and
carried out in Europe, it would be logical for a
more intensive debate on this question to be
held in WEU, bringing together parliamen-
tarians, industry, the Council and the public.
This debate might lead eventually to a decision
to give a mandate to the European industry^to
contuct a feasibility study on the conditions for
setting up a European anti-ballistic missile
defence system.
YI. Conclusions
98. The first aim of this report was to draw
the attention of the Council and the public to a
problem of a new kind that makes it necessary
ior Europe to assess the risks to its security that
may arise from the increasing proliferation of
baliistic technology in third world countries,
particularly those along Europe's southern and
south-eastern flanks.
99. It was important to show that it is not yet
possible to identify the exact nature of the bal-
listic risk to Europe or the consequences Europe
should draw from this because information on
the various aspects of the problem is still incom-
plete. It was therefore necessary to open_a more
in-depth debate on the subject, particularly as
the European governments are divided on the
matter.
100. However, Europe can no longer postpone
working out a joint approach to anti-missile
defencg othenryise it will risk being left danger-
ously far behind in relation to the evolution of
the ihreat. Above all, it will be for the WEU
Council to include this subject in its agenda and
for the Assembly to follow developments with
particular attention.
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APPENDIX I
Treay on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems
signed by President Niron and Mn BrezJtne\ Moscow
26th Moy 1Y72
The United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter
referred to as the parties,
Proceeding from the premise that nuclear
war would have devastating consequences for all
mankind,
Considering that effective measures to
limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a
substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic
offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in
the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear
weapons,
Proceeding from the premise that limi-
tation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as
certain agreed measures with respect to limi-
tation of strategic offensive arms, would con-
tribute to the creation of more favourable condi-
tions for further negotiations on limiting
strategic arms,
Mindful of their obligations under ArticleVI of the treaty on the non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons,
Declaring their intention to achieve at the
earliest possible date the cessation ofthe nuclear
arms race and to take effective measures toward
reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarm-
ament, and general and complete disarmament,
Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of
international tension and the strengthening of
trust between states,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
1. Each party undertakes to limit
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to
adopt other measures in accordance with the
provisions of this treaty.
2. Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM
systems for a defence of the territory of its
country and not to provide a base for such a
defence, and not to deploy ABM systems for
defence of an individual region except as pro-
vided for in Article III of this treaty.
Article II
1. For the purpose of this treaty, an ABM
system is a system to counter strategic ballistic
missiles or their elements in flight trajectory,
currently consisting of:
(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are.
interceptor missiles constructed and
deployed for an ABM r6le, or of a type
tested in an ABM mode;
(b) ABIN/ launchers, which are launchers
constructed and deployed for
launching ABM interceptor missiles;
and
(c) Ar.BM radars, which are radars con-
structed and deployed for an ABM
r6le, or of a type tested in an ABM
mode.
2. The ABM system components listed in
paragraph I of this article include those which
are:
(a) operutioral,
(b) under construction,
(c/ undergoing testing,
(d) undergoing overhaul, repair or con-
verslon or
(e/ mothballed.
ArtiCIC III
Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM
systems or their components except that:
(a) within one ABM system deployment
area having a radius of 150 kilometres
and centred on the party's national
capital, a party may deploy: (i) no
more than 100 ABM launchers and no
more than 100 ABM interceptor mis-
siles at launch sites, and (iil ABM
radars within no more than six ABM
radar complexes, the area of each
complex being circular and having a
diameter of no more than three kilom-
etres, and
(b) within one ABM system deployment
area having a radius of 150 kilometres
and containing ICBM silo launchers, a
party may deploy: (i) no more than
100 ABM launchers and no more than
100 ABM interceptor missiles at
launch sites, (if two large phased-
afiay ABM radars comparable inpotential to corresponding ABM
radars operational or under con-
struction on the date of signature ofthe treaty in an ABM system
deployment area containing ICBM
silo launchers, and (iii) no more than18 ABM radars each having a
potential less than the potential of the
smaller of the abovementioned two
large phased-array ABM radars.
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Article IV
The limitations provided for in Article III
shall not apply to ABM systems or their compo-
nents used for development or testing, and
located within current or additionally agreed
test ranges. Each party may have no more than a
total of 15 ABM launchers at test ranges.
Article V
l. Each party undertakes not to develop, test
or deploy ABM systems or components which
are sea-based, air-based or mobile land-based.
2. Each party undertakes not to develop, test
or deploy ABM launchers for launching more
than one ABM intercep0or missile at a time
from each launcher, nor to modify deployed
launchers to provide them with such a capa-
bility, nor to develop, test or deploy automatic
or semi-automatic or other similar systems for
rapid reload of ABM launchers.
Article VI
To enhance assurance ofthe effectiveness
of the limitations on ABM systems and their
components provided by this treaty, each party
undertakes:
not to give missiles, launchers or
radars, other than ABM interceptor
radars, capabilities to counter stra-
tegic ballistic missiles or their ele-
ments in flight trajectory, and not to
test them in an ABM mode, and
not to deploy in the future radars for
early warning of strategic ballistic
missile attack except at locations
along the periphery of its national ter-
ritory and oriented outward.
Article VII
Subject to the provisions of this treaty,
modernisation and replacement of ABM
systems or their components may be carried out.
Article VIII
ABM systems or their components in
excess of the numbers or outside the areas spec-
ified in this treaty shall be destroyed or dis-
m&ntled under agreed procedures within the
shortest possible agreed period of time.
Article IX
To assure the viability and effectiveness
of this treaty, each party undertakes not to
transfer to other states, and not to deploy
outside its national territory, ABM systems or
their components limited by this treaty.
(a)
(b)
Article X
Each party undertakes not to assume any
international obligations which would conflict
with this treaty.
Article XI
The parties undertake to continue active
negotiations for limitations on strategic
offensive arms.
Article XII
l. For the purpose ofproviding assurance of
compliance with the provisions of this treaty,
each party shall use national technical means of
verification at its disposal in a manner con-
sistent with generally recognised principles of
international law.
2. Each party undertakes not to interfere
with national technical means of verification of
the other party operating in accordance with
paragraph I of this article.
3. Each party undertakes not to use delib-
erate concealment measures, which impede veri-
fication by national technical means of com-
pliance with the provisions of this treaty. This
obligation shall not require changes in current
construction, assembly, conversion or overhaul
practices.
ArtiCIC XIII
l. To promote the objectives and implemen-
tation of the provisions of this treaty, the parties
shall establish promptly a standing consultative
commission, within the framework of which
they will:
(a/ consider questions concerning com-
pliance with the obligations assumed
and related situations which may be
considered ambiguous;
(b) provide on a voluntary basis such
information as either party considers
necessary to assure confidence in com-pliance with the obligations
assumed;
(c/ consider questions involving unin-
tended interference with a national
technical means of verification:
(d/ consider possible changes in the stra-
tegic situation which have a bearing
on the provisions of this treaty;
(e) agree upon procedures and dates for
destruction or dismantling of ABM
systems or their components in cases
provided for by the provisions of this
treaty;
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(fl consider, as appropriate, possible pro
posals for further increasing the via-
bility of this treaty, including pro
posals for amendments in accordance
with the provisions of this treaty;
(g/ consider, as appropriate, proposals for
further measures aimed at limiting
strategic arms.
2. The parties through consultation shall
establish, and may amend as appropriate, regu-
lations for the standing consultative commission
governing procedures, composition and other
relevant matters.
Article XIV
l. Each party may propose amendments to
this treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into
force in accordance with the procedures gov-
erning the entry into force of this treaty.
2. Five years after entry into force of this
treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the
parties shall together conduct a review of this
treaty.
1.
Article XV
This treaty shall be of unlimited
duration.
2. Each party shall, in exercising its national
sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from
this treaty if it decides that extraordinary events
related to the subject matter of this treaty havejeopardised its supreme interests. It shall give
notice of its decision to the other party six
months prior to withdrawal from the treaty.
Such notice shall include a statement of the
extraordinary events the notifying party regards
as having jeopardised its supreme interests.
Article XW
l. This treaty shall be subject to ratification
in accordance with the constitutional procedures
ofeach party. The treaty shall enter into force on
the day of the exchange of instruments of ratifi-
cation.
2. This treaty shall be registered pursuant to
Article 102 of the Charter of the United
Nations.
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APPENDIX II
Number of missilcs *hting
within dilferent third world coantries
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APPENDIX III
Operational ballistic missilos planned or being developed
in third world countries
Country System Range/Payload Type Source Status
Afghanistan Scud-B 300 km/1,000 kg BM Soviet Union o/u
Algeria Frog-4
Frog-7
50 km/250 kg
65 km/450 kg
BM
BM
Soviet
Soviet
Union
Union
R
o
Argentina Alacran
Condor I
Condor II
200 km/500 kg
95 km/365 kg
900 km/450 kg
SLY/BM
BM/SR
BM
Consortium
Consortium
Consortium
D
o (?)
c
Brazil MB/EE-I50
ss-300
MB/EB350
MB/EE-6OO
MB/EE-IOOO
ss-1000
IRBM
Sonda 3
Sonda 4
ws
150 km/500 kg
300 km/990 ks
350 km/N.A.
600 km/N.A.
1,000 km/N.A.
1,200 km/N.A.
3,000 km/N.A.
80 km/135 kg
950 km/500 kg
10,000 km/500 kg
BM
BM
BM
BM
BM
BM
BM
SR
SR
sLv
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
BraziUGer.lFr
BraziUGer.
Brazil
D
D/T
D
D
D
D
P
o
D
P/D
Cuba Frog-4
Frog-7
50 km/250 kg
65 km/450 kg
BM
BM
Soviet Union
Soviet Union
R
o
Egvpt Frog-5
Frog-7
Scud-B
Scud-100
50 km/450 kg
65 km/450 kg
300 km/1,000 kg
600 km/500 kg
BM
BM
BM
BM
Soviet Union
Soviet Union
Soviet Union
N. Korea/Egypt
R
o/u
o/u
D
India Prithvi
Agni
Centaure
Rohini
sLv-3
ASLV
PSLV
GSLV
250 km/500 kg
2,500 km/900 kg
50 km/N.A.
130 km/N.A.
800 km/100 kg
4,000 km/150 kg
8,000 km/1,000 kg
14,000 km/2,500 kg
BM
BM
SR
SR
SLV
SLV
SLV
SLY
India
India
India/U.S./Fr.
India/France
India/(?)
India/Fr./Ger.
India
India
T/D
T/D
o
o
o
D/T
D/T
P
Indonesia RX-250
sLV (?)
100 km/N.A.
1,500 km/N.A.
SR
sLv
Indonesia/Fr.
Indonesia/(?)
D
P
Iran Shahin-2
Nazeat
Mushak-160
Iran-200
Scud-B
Scud-C
60 kmil8O kg
120 km/180 kg
160 km/N.A.
200 kmA.{.A.
300 km/1,000 kg
600 km/700 ks
BM
BM
BM
BM
BM
BM
Iran
Iran/China
Iran/China
Iran/China
China/N. Korea
North Korea
o/u
o/u
o/u (?)
o/u (?)
o/u
o
Iraq * Frog-7
Laith
Nissan
65 km/450 kg
90 km/N.A.
I l0 kmA.{.A.
BM
BM
BM
Soviet Union
Soviet Union
Iraq
o/u
DN
D
Israel Lance
Jericho
Jericho
Jericho
Shavit
I
II
IIb
130 km/275 kg
650 km/500 kg
1,500 km/650 kg
1,300 km/- 700 kg
2,500 km/750 kg
BM
BM
BM
BM
SLV
United States
IsraeUFrance
Israel,/France
Israel
IsraeVFrance
o
o
Tto
T/O (?)
o/u
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Country System Range/Payload Type Source Status
North Korea Frog-5
Frog-7
Scud-B
Scud-C
No-Dong I
50 km/450 kg
65 km/450 kg
340 km/1,000 kg
600 km/700 kg
1,000 kmA.{.A.
BM
BM
BM
BM
BM
Soviet Union
Soviet Union
S.U.A.{. Korea
N. Korea/China
N. Korea/China
o
o
o
T/O
D
South Korea Nike-SSM
Korean-SSM
Honest John
SLV
180 km/500 kg
260 kmA.{.A.
37 krn/580 kg
4,000 km/N.A.
BM
BM
BM
SLV
U.S./S. Korea
U.S./S. Korea
United States
South Korea
o
P
o
P
Kuwait Frog-7 65 km/450 kg BM Soviet Union R
Libya Frog-7
ss-21 (?)
Scud-B
Otrag
Al-Fateh
Ittisalt
65 km/450 kg
120 km/450 kg
300 km/1,000 kg
480 km/N.A.
500 km/tl.A.
700 km/N.A.
BM
BM
BM
BM
BM
BM
Soviet Union
Soviet Union
Soviet Union
Libya/Ger.
Libya/Ger.
Libya/Ger.
o
o
o/u
D/C (?)
D
D
Pakistan Haft-I
M-ll
Halft-II
Halft-III
Shahpar
Suparco
sLv
80 km/500 kg
290 km/800 kg
300 km/500 kg
600 km/N.A.
120 kmA.{.A.
280 km/N.A.
1,200 km/N.A.
BM
BM
BM
BM
SR
SR
SLV
Pak./Fr./China
China
Pak./Fr./China
Pak./China
Pak./Fr./U.S.
Pak./Fr. (?)
Pakistan
o
o (?)
TID
D/T (?)
o
o
P
Saudi Arabia CSS-2 2,000 km/2,000 kg BM China o
South Africa Arniston
Jericho II
1,500 km/N.A.
1,450 km/N.A.
BM
BM
S. Africa/Israel
Israel
T/D
T
Syria Frog-7
SS-2I
Scud-B
Scud-C
65 km/450 kg
120 km/450 kg
300 km/1,000 kg
600 km/700 kg
BM
BM
BM
BM
Soviet Union
Soviet Union
Soviet Union
North Korea
o/u
o
o
o (?)
Taiwan Honest John
Ching Feng
Tien Ma
37 km/580 kg
100 km/275 kg
950 km/N.A.
BM
BM
BM
United States
Taiwan/Israel
Taiwan
o
o
c (?)
Turkey Honest John 37 km/580 kg BM United States o
Yernen Frog-7
SS-2I
Scud-B
70 km/450 kg
120 km/450 kg
300 km/1,000 kg
BM
BM
BM
Soviet Union
Soviet Union
Soviet Union
o
o
o
Key: BM - Ballistic missile R - Removed from service
- C - Cancelled SR - Sounding rocketD 
- 
In development SLV - Space launch vehicleO-OperationalT-TestedP 
- 
Planned U - Used in attacks
Note: The ranges and payloads given represent best estimates based on unclassified sources. Range/Payload trade-offs are
applicabte to many systems, giving increased range with lighter payloads, for example.
* Only systems with less than l50-kilometre range are listed for Iraq, which is required to destroy all other systems
under U.N. Security Council Resolution 687.
Sources: ACA, ACDA, CIA, CEIP, CRS, CSIS, DoD, IDDS, IDR, IISS, JDW, JSIR and RUSI.
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Amendment I lst Decembes 1992
Anti-ballistic missilc defence
AMENDMENT 1'
tabled by Mr. Athinson and others
1. After paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:
* Promote the participation of the largest possible number of countries and competent interna-
tional and national institutions to share the burden of the establishment of a gtobal protection
system; "
Signed: Atkinson, Lopez Henares, Aarts, Ward, Lenzer
l. See l2th sitting, 2nd December 1992 (amendment agreed to).
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Document 1340 6th November 1992
The enlargement of WEU
REPORT 
'
submitted on behaff of the Political Committee 2
by Mr. Ward, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnerr RECoMMENDATIoN
on the enlargement of WEU
ExpLnNetonv MruoneNpuu
submitted by Mr. Ward, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. Relations between WEU and other European states
III. Relations between the WEU Assembly, parliaments of other European
member states of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance, and parlia-
ments of other EuroPean states
IV. Conclusions
ApprNorcrs
I. Petersberg Declaration (Part III)
II. Paragraph 15 ofthe draft budget ofthe administrative expenditure ofthe
Assembly for the financial year 1993
III. Written Question 300 put to the Council by Mr- Goerens
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mrt. Stoffelen (Chairman) ; Lord Finsberg,_-Mr. De D9cke1 (Vice-Clairmen); MM. Aarts(it"iili-viiOiill, Al.s.., Beix (Alteniite: Limoine\, poidey, Cap, De.H_oon-_scng!!5 4pDra,.Feldmann, Forni, Foschi,
boiiini, Homs t f6iret, Siihwsefifot nston (Alternat6:. Sir,enthony Durant), Lord Kirkhill, MM. Kittelmann, Koehl,-Martino,M,;i;,-rtiii;ie".i"ritefi.-iia Chevalier), Pieralli, de Puig, Reddemann, Rodrigues, Rosela, Seeuws, Soell, Ward, Wintgens.
N.B. Tfte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Recommendation
on the ealargemcnt of WEU
The Assembly,
(r) Considering that Part III of the Petersberg Declaration of lgth June 1992 on relations betweenWEU and the other European member states ol the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance needsfurther clarification;
(? 
^ |egrett-,.qg t-h$ the Council has felt it necessary to declare that the field of application of Articlev of the modified Brussels Treaty will be subject to certain restrictions;
(iit/ 
. 
Noting that at an earlier stage-it strongJy expressed the wish for both Greece and Turkey to be
admitted simultaneously as full members and iegrelting that the Council was not willing to acc6pt thii
view;
(i.v) Qo.nsidgrigg that the invitation to become an associate member of WEU falls within the provi-
sions of Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, and that the provisions of Article X calling fbr thepeaceful settlement of disputes between memberi 
- 
whether full or associate 
- 
should be aiplied;(u)- Considering that Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty is the foundation of the Assembly's
r6le and existence;
(vil 
- 
Asserting that as a sovereign body it requires to know the conditions agreed between the Council
and other states acceding to the modified Brussels Treaty before it can estaSlish a status for members
of parliament from those states, who will be required to tike part in the activities of the Assembly;
(u-iil Stressing. that the enhancement of WEU's relations with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia,
flungary, 
-Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania should also find ixpression in specific relationjbetween the wEU Assembly and the parliamentarians of those states;
(vill 
- 
Stressing that the participation of parliamentary representatives of new member states, associate
member states and observer states in the activities of the Assembly will have an important liearing on
the budget, personnel, office space and assembly hall required for the Assembly to perform its ias[properly,
RpcolrlurNos rHAT rsr CouNcr
l. Ensure that the pr.otocols of accession to WEU of members and associate members now being
negotiated by the Council will be subject to ratification in accordance with Article XI of the modifie{.
Brussels Treaty;
2. After satisfactory ne€otiations, admit simultaneously all countries which in the Maastricht
Declaration have been invited to become members or associate members;
3. Conclude no accession agreement with states invited to become members or associate members
of WEU which could lead to a suspension of Article V of the modified Brussels ireaty;
4. 
- . 
Explain whether associate members will take part in adopting the annual report on its activities
and in particular concerning the control of armaments as stipula-ted in Article iX of the modified
Brussels Treaty;
5. Provide clarification on the r6le of associate members in the activities of the Council of WEU;
6. Take into account that the Assembly will not be able to implement the consequences of
enlargement until sufficient accommodation and additional financial means are made availaLle for thispurpose.
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I. Intmduction
1. The Treaty on European Union signed in
Maastricht, the declaration of the nine member
states of WEU at Maastricht and the ensuing
Petersberg Declaration will, if ratified and
implemented, profoundly change WEU. Its
mernbership will be extended, other states will
participate in many of its activities, and it can
also be assumed that the scope and character of
its activities will change considerably.
2. The present report will try to formulate a
clear opinion on the process of enlargement at
the stage now reached and on the consequences
for the Assembly. It is not intended to discuss
relations between various candidates for partici-
pation in WEU's activities.
3. The report will be divided into two parts.
The first part will discuss relations between
WEU and other European states. The Council is
known to have drawn up basic guidelines for
these relations and their nature differs
depending upon whether such nations are
member states of the European Union or the
Atlantic Alliance or if they belong to the devel-
oping democracies in Central Europe. For the
sake of consistency in the discussion, it is
assumed that the Treaty on European Union
will be ratified and come into force.
4 The second part of the report will examine
the consequences of enlargement of WEU for
the Assembly and the policy to be conducted as
regards parliamentary observers.
5. It should be emphasised here that both
the present accommodation and the present
budget of the Assembly do not allow for any rea-
sonable enlargement of the number of parlia-
mentary delegations participating in the
Assembly's activities. If the Assembly is obliged,
through initiatives of the Council and through
the considerable increase in interest in WEU's
activities in general, to increase the number of
parliamentary delegations participating fully or
partly in its activities, it must be granted the
accommodation and financial means to meet
these new legal and political obligations.
II. Relations between WEU
and other Earolaan states
A. Relations between WEU and the other
European member states of the European Union
or the Atlantic Alliance
Expbnatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Ward, Rapprtcur)
6. In a declaration issued on the occasion of
the 46th European Council meeting in Maas-
tricht on 9th and l0th December 1991, the
WEU member states stated the following:
" States which are members of the
European Union are invited to accede to
WEU on conditions to be agreed in
accordance with Article XI of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty, or to become
observers if they so wish. Simultaneously,
other European member states of NATO
are invited to become associate members
of WEU in a way which will give them the
possibility to participate fully in the activ-
ities of WEU.
The member states of WEU assume that
treaties and agreements corresponding
with the above proposals will be con-
cluded before 3lst December 1992."
7. Candidates under the Maastricht decla-
ration for full membership or observer status are
Denmark, Greece and Ireland. Although, after
Maastricht, it would be logical to have parallel
membership of the EC and WEU, there are still
some problems.
(a) Greece
8. Greece made availability of WEU mem-
bership to Greece a condition of agreeing to the
Treaty on European Union. It should be noted
that in spite of Greece's obstinate stands on this
point its membership of WEU should be nego-
tiated seriously. In this framework, it should be
recalled that the Council felt it necessary to
stress, in Part III of its Petersberg Declaration ',
the fundamental principles on which relations
between member states and associate member
states should be based. These include: set-
tlement of their mutual differences by peaceful
means, and refraining from resort to the threat
or use of force. Further, the Council excluded
the possibility of invoking Article V of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty in relations between
members and associate members of WEU.
9. Moreover, in the EC, Greece has to clarify
its policy towards the Macedonian question. As
is known, the independent Republic of Mace-
donia has fulfilled all legal conditions set by the
EC for recognition. Greece has used its veto in
the EC to block recognition of Macedonia for
different well-known reasons. There is a well-
founded fear that the conflict in the former
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Yugoslavia could well be extended to Mace-
donia if the question of its recognition is not
solved. Greek membership should enhance the
mutual coherence and security which is the
objective of the WEU alliance and not be a
source of additional security risks.
10. It is also recalled that in paragraph 3 of
Recommendation 525, the Assembly's Standing
Committee has recommended that the Council
* insists that Greece give the necessary assur-
ances of total compliance with the United
Nations embargo before continuing the present
negotiations for WEU membership. " Until
now, the Council has not yet given a reply to this
recommendation.
(b) Denmark
I l. Denmark is now participating in negotia-
tions to have observer status in WEU. Since the
Danish 'no' voiced at the 2nd June 1992 refe-
rendum, the situation has been confused. The
three opposition parties which control a
majority of votes in parliament have now pre-
pared a position paper detailing the supplements
to the Maastricht treaty that Denmark requires
before it can hold a second referendum on the
treaty next year. This paper, which the gov-
ernment has accepted as a basis for the official
Danish position, contains proposals for special
arrangements, including, in particular, the pro-
posal that Denmark should have no obligation
to participate in a common European defence
policy.
(c) Ireland
12. For Ireland, full membership of WEU
would be diflicult to reconcile with its policy of
neutrality. It is, however, engaged in negotia-
tions to be given observer status.
13. The European member states of NATO
which have been invited to become associate
members of WEU are Norway, Turkey and
Iceland.
(a) Norway
14. Norway has recently shown concern at
being neglected in the European security
framework while it has the Kola Peninsula and
Murmansk with huge concentrations of Russian
armed forces almost on its doorstep. It considers
associate membership of WEU to be a welcome
opportunity to participate in European security
discussions. The public debate on possible Nor-
wegian membership of the EC is still going on,
but it is understood that Norway is planning to
apply oflicially for admission to the EC in
November 1992.
(b) Turkey
15. Turkey would accept associate mem-
bership of WEU, but it has made it clear that
serious negotiations are needed to determine its
rights and obligations in this framework. It has
also rightly insisted on a legally binding protocol
of its associate membership which should be rat-
ified by all the signatory states. Turkey applied
for full membership of the EC in 1987 but it has
not yet received a clear and unambiguous
reply 2.
(c) Iceland
16. Iceland has replied positively to the invi-
tation to become an associate member of IVEU
and its Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr.
Hannibalsson, has said that such a status could
enable his country to defend its interests and
opinions better. It should be noted that the
opposition has criticised the governmenth
policy as regards WEU.
17. Part III of the Petersberg Declaration of
l9th June 1992 has given a number of useful
clarifications as regards the invitation extended
in the Maastricht Declaration of lOth Decemberl99l to countries interested in becoming
members, observers or associate members 3.
However, many questions still remain to be
solved in the negotiations which started on 15th
September 1992.
B. Relations between WEU and states of
Central Europe
18. In an official declaration issued after an
extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council with
states of Central Europe in Bonn on l9th June
1992, it was stated that:
* The enhancement of WEU's relations
with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and
Romania should reflect the specific rela-
tions which exist and are developing
between these countries and the European
Union and its member states. "
19. This declaration clearly confirms the exis-
tence of a parallel development in economic and
security relations of the EC/European Union
and WEU with third countries. It would
therefore be logical for the Council of WEU to
invite those European countries which have con-
cluded association agreements with the
EC/European Union to become associate
members of WEU.
20. The ministers also decided that the
foreign and defence ministers of WEU member
states and of the abovementioned Central
European states would meet once a year, while
additional meetings at ministerial level might
be convened if circumstances require. Fur-
thermore, a Forum of Consultation is to be
established between the WEU Permanent
2. A full discussion of Turkey's position in the European
and Atlantic Alliance's security framework is provided in the
report on Turkey prepared on behalf of the Political Com-
mittee by Mr. Moya (Document l34l).
3. See Appendix l.
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Council and the ambassadors of the countries
concerned which will meet at the seat of the
WEU Council at least twice a year. The first
meeting of the WEU Forum of Consultation
took place on l4th October 1992 in London. In
the Petersberg Declaration it was also stated
that: " Ministers advocated the development of
relations between the WEU Assembly and the
parliaments of the states concerned. "
21. The Assembly could play a useful rOle in
building bridges with these countries through
various kinds of activities which will be
examined in the second part of this report.
III. Relations between the WEU Assembly,
prliaments of other European mcmber states
of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance,
and parliaments of other European states
A. Preliminary remarl<s
22. The decisions taken at Maastricht on l0th
December 1991, combined with the Petersberg
Declaration and the declaration issued after the
extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of
Ministers with states of Central Europe, both of
lgth June 1992, offer an excellent opportunity
to consider the Assembly's policy regarding its
relations with parliaments of other European
stat€s. The objective is to develop a logical and
consistent line of conduct in order to prevent
ambiguities. It should be noted, however, that
with regard to observers the basic principle as
embodied in Rule l7 should remain intacta.
23. Before discussing the Assembly's policy in
more detail, it may be useful to specify some
principles which should always be observed:
- 
Apart from the obligations laid down in
the Charter of the Assembly and the
modified Brussels Treaty as regards full
members of WEU, the WEU AssemblY
will have certain obligations as regards
the parliamentary delegations of states
which will have the status of associate
member or observer in WEU as men-
tioned in Chapter II A of the present
report, depending on the article in the
treaty which will be at the basis of this
relationship. It has full autonomy to
take decisions regarding its relations
with the parliaments of other states. In
this respect there is no compulsion to
follow exactly the line of conduct of the
Council. On the other hand, there
should be no misunderstanding that the
Assembly's granting of special status to
a parliamentary delegation does not
necessarily lead to similar actions being
taken by the Council.
- 
Any new special status of associate
member or observer to be created
should be unambiguous and easy to
understand for everybody concerned.
- 
Major changes in the Rules of Pro-
cedure should be avoided, while those
changes deemed inevitable should not
affect the specific character of the
Assembly's Rules of Procedure and its
activities.
- 
An increase in the number of delega-
tions participating fully or partly in the
Assembly's activities, which is a direct
consequence of decisions taken by the
WEU Council, should be accomPanied
by a proportional increase in the budget
of the Assembly.
- 
The number of members and observers
attending comittee meetings and taking
part in other committee activities may
have to be reviewed in order to
maintain the effectiveness of such
meetings and activities.
- 
If the Assembly creates a status of par-
liamentary observer which could also
be granted to parliamentarians from
European states not members of the
EC/European Union or the Atlantic
Alliance, it should take into account (a)
the truly democratic and parliamentary
nature of the country from which par-
liamentarians are invited; to this end,
the Assembty might follow the deci-
sions taken by the Council of Europe;(b) the determination of the country
concerned to play an effective rOle in a
European security organisation.
- 
The Assembly invites parliamentary
observers with the aim of establishing a
political dialogue that takes into
account the various opinions of both
government and opposition in the
nation concerned. In principle it should
invite not more than two parliamentary
observers from a given country, in the
hope that one of them will represent the
opposition. In some instances, it might
issue an invitation to more than two
observers for a particular meeting in
order to hear a broader spectrum of
opinion.
- 
The Assembly should retain the ability
to invite, whenever it deems necessary,
parliamentary observers from any
country without this constituting an
obligation to renew such invitations.
4. R ule l 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly reads
as follows: ' On the proposal of the Presidential Committee,
the Assembly may admit representatives of parliaments of
non-member states of WEU as observers. These observers
shall sit in the chamber but not be entitled to vote. They may
speak with the authorisation of the President of the
Assembly. "
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- 
Any reasonable enlargement of the
number of parliamentary delegations
participating in the Assembly's activ-
ities will be impossible in the present
accommodation.
B. Proposals regarding different categories of
European states
(i) Member states of the EC which have been
olfered full membership of or observer
status in WEU
(a) Greece
24. Continuing a standing practice, parlia-
mentary observers from Greece should be
invited. They should have the right to speak in
the plenary Assembly. After admission, Greece
will be entitled to send a full parliamentary dele-
gation, i.e. its delegation to the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe.
25. The protocol of accession of Greece may
be signed at the meeting of the Council of Min-
isters on 20th November 1992. As regards Greek
parliamentary representation in the Assembly,
Greece would like the Assembly to adopt the
same procedure as it adopted for delegations
from Spain and Portugal.
26. It is recalled here that in an early stage of
preliminary talks between Spain, Portugal and
WEU, the Assembly had invited parliamentary
observers from Portugal and Spain to partic-
ipate in all committee meetings and plenary
Assembly sessions with a right to speak but
without the right to vote. It should also be
noted, however, that these invitations were
inspired by the Assembly's desire to see both
countries accede to WEU as soon as possible.
27. In the case of Greece, it is Greece itself
which has exerted maximum pressure on the
European Council and on the Council of WEU
to be admitted to WEU. The Assembly has
never seen any specific advantage in early Greek
accession to WEU and, as a consequence, there
would be no reason at the moment to provide
preferential treatment for Greek parliamentary
observers as long as the protocol ofaccession of
Greece to WEU has not been ratified in the sig-
natory countries.
28. The proposal is to continue inviting
Greek parliamentary observers to Assembly ses-
sions with a right to speak until the accession
protocol has been ratified, after which date the
members of the Greek parliamentary delegation
to the Assembly of the Council of Europe may
assume their rights as a full parliamentary dele-
gation to the Assembly of WEU. The conse-
quences of full Greek participation in the
Assembly's activities as regards the provision of
office space, interpretation facilities and per-
sonnel should be worked out as soon as the
Council has provided the necessary financial
means.
29. As regards these financial consequences,
reference is made here to the draft budget of the
administrative expenditure of the Assembly for
the financial year 1993, paragraph l5 ofwhich is
attached to this report (Appendix II).
(b) Ireland
30. With Ireland having responded positively
to the invitation to become an observer in
WEU, parliamentary observers from Ireland
should be invited to attend the plenary session.
They should be given the right to speak.
(c) Denmark
31. Denmark has also responded positively to
the invitation to become an observer in WEU.
For several years now, observers from the
Danish Parliament have attended sessions of the
Assembly with the right to speak. It is proposed
to continue this practice.
32. By inviting parliamentary observers from
both Ireland and Denmark, the Assembly could
act as a bridge to enable parliamentarians from
these countries to familiarise themselves with
discussions in WEU.(ii) European member states of the Atlantic
Alliance which have been invited to
become associate members of WEU:
Iceland, Norway and Turkey
33. According to the Petersberg Declaration,
these countries may participate fully in the
meetings of the WEU Council 
- 
without prej-
udice to the provisions of Article VIII of the
modified Brussels Treaty 
- 
subject to certain
conditions, which are listed in the decla-
ration s.
34. As negotiations over associate mem-
bership of WEU are going on, there is still uncer-
tainty over its legal basis. It also seems that until
now the Council has paid little or no attention to
the consequences of its views on associate mem-
bership for the status of associate members of
the Assembly.
35. As things now stand, the Assembly would
prefer a protocol of associate membership to be
signed by all contracting parties, to be ratified
later in each country. It is, however, likely that
all parties have agreed on a joint political decla-
ration in which the member states and the asso-
ciate member states would subscribe to the
rather vague conditions for associate members
set out in the Petersberg Declaration. [n that
case they would have none of the rights and obli-
gations mentioned in the modified Brussels
Treaty and in its Protocol, and in these circum-
stances it is diffrcult to see what advantages
there are in being an associate member of WEU.
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36. Turkey, which is playing a very active rOle
in the negotiations over associate membership,
has also expressed very clearly its wishes as
regards the status of its parliamentary represen-
tatives in the Assembly. The Turkish authorities
consider that the following essential principles
should be retained in determining Turkey's
associate member status in the WEU Assembly:
- 
as the Charter and Rules of Procedure
of the WEU Assembly at present make
no provision for the status of associate
member, these texts should be revised
and modified accordingly;
- 
it should be made possible for Turkey
to participate fully in all the Assembly's
activities;
- 
in this context, Turkish parliamen-
tarians participating in the WEU
Assembly should be given the right to
speak, vote and originate documents;
- 
in the same context, Turkish parliament-
arians should be represented at all levels
in all the Assembly's committees and
assume corresponding responsibilities.
37. Your Rapporteur would agree with the
Turkish request but he is not in a position to
reach a conclusion until the negotiations with
the Council on associate membership are fin-
ished. It is essential for the Assembly to know
what the specific intentions of the Council are.
38. It may be diflicult, if not impossible, for
the Assembly to meet the Turkish wishes as long
as the legal basis and the nature of associate
membership have not been agreed upon by the
contracting parties. If associate members of
WEU have no specific legal status in which their
rights and obligations are set out, what then
should be the contents of the Assembly's status
for associate members? If in every single case
there is uncertainty over the associate member's
participation in WEU activities, the Assembly
cannot create a status for parliamentarians from
associate member states, including the right to
vote.
39. No difficulties would arise if the Council
considered associate membership as falling
under Article XI of the modified Brussels
Treaty. Each associate member state would then
be a " Brussels Treaty Power " subject to certain
conditions, to be agreed upon, and according to
Article IX would automatically have a parlia-
mentary representation in the Assembly, with a
right to participate in the Assembly's com-
mittees and plenary sessions as full members
with the right to vote.
40. Some of the abovementioned questions
were put to the Council by Mr. Goerens in
Written Question 300, which is appended to this
document 6.
41. If the Assembly were to decide to allow
parliamentary delegations from associate
member states to participate fully in the activ-
ities of the Assembly, including those of its com-
mittees, there would not be enough space in
committee meeting rooms and in the chamber
for delegations from the three associate member
countries 
- 
Turkey, Nonvay and Iceland 
- 
nor
would it be possible to provide additional office
space for the parliamentary delegations of these
new associate member states.
(iii) Central European states which have
developed or are developing special rela-
tions with the European Union and its
member states: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland and Romania
42. As set out in the declaration issued after
the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council
of Ministers with states of Central Europe on
l9th June 1992, ministers have decided to
strengthen existing relations by restructuring the
dialogue, consultations and co-operation in
order to enable the Central European nations to
acquaint themselves with the future security and
defence policy of the European Union and find
new opportunities to co-operate with WEU.
43. It should also be recalled here that the
ministers advocated the development of rela-
tions between the WEU Assembly and the par-
liaments of the states concerned. It is in the
Assembly's interest to continue to intensify the
political dialogue with parliamentary delega-
tions from these countries that had been estab-
lished in previous years. But the question could
be asked whether they should be given a status
of permanent observer or whether they should
be invited each time by special decision. Taking
into account the standing practice and the
opinion of the Assembly as expressed in several
previous recommmendations, it would be
logical to grant delegations from these countries
a status of permanent observer at the Assembly's
plenary sessions with a right to speak if there is
sufficient evidence that the members of the par-
liaments concerned have been elected democrat-
ically. Any other decision would be contrary to
expectations raised.
44. The consequences of the partition of the
Czech and Slovak Republic into two different
republics as regards parliamentary observers
from these republics will have to be taken into
account as soon as the partition has come into
force.
(iv) Neutral European states which have asked
to join the European Union: Austria,
Finland, Sweden and Switzerland
45. Since these countries are either perma-
nently neutral or have adopted a policy of neu-
trality and negotiations on their accession to the6. See Appendix III.
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European Union have not yet started, the only
reason to invite parliamentary observers from
these countries is that it might be interesting to
hear them without any future commitment. As
long as these countries remain neutral and do
not insist on being given security guarantees by
any security organisation, it seems to be of little
use to allow their representatives to attend ses-
sions of the Assembly on a pennanent basis.
46. By inviting too many parliamentary
observers, the Assembly may create a situation
where too many parliamentarians with only a
very remote interest in WEU affairs take part in
the debates at the expense of representatives
from member states.
47. On the other hand, it may be difficult to
respond negatively to requests from these coun-
tries' parliaments to become acquainted with
the work of the Assembly.
(v) The Russian Federation
48. The mere fact that the Russian Federation
has special guest status in the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe cannot be a
reason for giving it similar or comparable status
in the Assembly. On the other hand, it is by far
the most important power in Eastern Europe
and it will certainly try to reaffirm its position as
a leading nation once it has overcome the
present crisis. Russia is recognised as the legal
successor to the former ussR, with which the
Assembly established relations as early as 1987
and it would be helpful for the Assembly to
pursue this dialogue in a way which is satis-
factory for both sides.
(vi) Other Eastern European states: all the
other independent republics on the ter-
ritory of the former Soviet Union
49. These republics are all represented in the
NACC and CSCE. It is far too early to consider
them eligible for a more or less permanent invi-
tation to send a delegation of parliamentary
observers but, on occasion, it might be useful for
the Assembly to invite observers from one or
other of them.
(vii) Other Central European states: Albania
and the new republics on the territory of
former Yugoslavia
50. Whether they are recognised by the
European Community or not, the situation
regarding these states is still very confused.
Their representatives may be invited to follow
debates from the public gallery, but it seems too
early to invite parliamentary observers to attend
sessions of the Assembly. Most of these states
are still involved in a violent conflict for which
no settlement has yet been found. Others are
again or still living in relative peace, but it seems
unwise to make a distinction between them from
WEU's specific point of view for the time being.
(viii) Malta and Cyprus
51. These two countries have applied to join
the European Community, but their applica-
tions have not been accepted. There is a risk of
them wishing to use any European status they
might be granted as a means of pressure on the
Community, whereas they do not seem prepared
to join the Atlantic Alliance, or to co-operate
effectively with WEU in security matters. Their
parliamentarians, therefore, should not be
granted any special status, although this does
not preclude their being invited to attend ses.
sions whenever this may appear to be useful.(ix) The European Parliament
52. The invitation to observers from thc
European Parliament must be the subject of ajoint agreement between the two assemblies,giving equal and reciprocal status to the
observers of both assemblies.
53. As there is no observer status in the
European Parliament, there is no reason for the
WEU Assembly to offer such status to members
of the European Parliament. Relations therefore
have to be considered on a different basis.
54. On 23rd September 1992, the Presidents
of the WEU Assembly and of the European Par-
liament met in Brussels. The two Presidents
have now:
(a) decided to meet regularly. Some
members of the Political Committee
have asked that representatives of
each political group be invited to
attend these meetings;
(b) examined the possibility of exchanges
of ideas and documents between
rapporteurs from the two assemblies
dealing with matters of joint interest.
Such exchanges were obviously
desirable provided they did not allow
a representative of one assembly to
have a prior view of the work of the
other, thus respecting Rule 42, para-
graph 10, of the Rules of Procedure of
the Assembly;
(c/ examined the possibility of meetings
between committees or subcommittees
of the two assemblies.
55. Moreover, a proposal has been made in
the Political Committee for delegations of
not more than six members of the Assembly's
Presidential Committee and the European
Parliament's Bureau to meet in the future in
order to make sure that the agreement between
both Presidents is implemented.
IY. Conclusiots
O Before final decisions are made, clarifi-
cation is needed from the Council on the status
and responsibilities of associate members.
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(ii) Enlargement of the Assembly by inclusion
of new full and associate members should take
place simultaneously.
(iit) With the present rules of the Assembly,
there is no problem in inviting additional
observers.
(iv) Any enlargement of the WEU Assembly
must be accompanied by sufficient additional
funds.
(v) A final report on enlargement including rules
for associate members cannot be prepared before
the sigrung of the agreements between WEU and
the candidates for full and associate membership.
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III. On rebtions baween WEU
and the othet European membet states
of the Europrcan Union or the Atlantic Alliance
A. Following the Declaration released in
Maastricht on l0th December l99l in con-
nection with the Treaty on European Union,
WEU ministers recalled the fundamental prin-
ciples on which relations between member states
and associate member states should be based:
- settlement of their mutual differences
by peaceful means, in accordance with
the obligations resulting from the mod-ified Brussels Treaty, the North
American Treaty and the United
Nations Charter, the commitments
entered into under the terms of the Hel-
sinki Final Act and the Paris Charter,
and the other generally recognised prin-
ciples and rules of international law;
- 
in their mutual relations, refraining
from resorting to the threat or use of
force, in accordance with the United
Nations Charter.
They also stressed that the security guar-
antees and defence commitments in the treaties
which bind the member states within Western
European Union and which bind them within
the Atlantic Alliance are mutually reinforcing
and will not be invoked by those subscribing to
Part III of the Petersberg Declaration in disputes
between member states of either of the two
organisations.
B. In their Maastricht Declaration of lfth
December 1991, the member states of WEU pro
posed that states which are members of the
European Union be invited to accede to WEU on
conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article
XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become
observers if they so wished. Simultaneously, other
European member states of NATO were invited
to become associate members of WEU in a way
which would give them a possibility of partici-
pating fully in the activities of WEU.
In accordance with Part III of the
Petersberg Declaration, ministers agreed that
the following points should be made in
extending the invitation to the countries inter-
ested in becoming members, observers or asso-
ciate members:
Members:
Member states of the European Union
which have accepted the invitation to accede to
WEU undertake,
APPENDIX I
Petersberg Decluation (Part III)
- 
to respect, in accordance with the prin-
ciples and values adhered to by all
WEU member states, the Brussels
Treaty of 1948, modified on 23rd
October 1954, its protocols and asso-
ciated texts, and the agteements con-
cluded among the member states pur-
suant to the treaty,
- to note with approval the agreements,
decisions and rules adopted in con-
formity with the treaty, and the declara-
tions starting with the Rome Decla-
ration of 27th October 1984,
- 
to develop WEU as the defence com-
ponent of the European Union and as
the means to strengthen the Europeanpillar of the Atlantic Alliance in
keeping with the obligation entered into
on lfth December l99l in the Decla-
ration on the r6le of WEU and its rela-
tions with the European Union and
with the Atlantic Alliance attached to
the Treaty on European Union, and
- 
to accept in full the substance of Part
III of the Petersberg Declaration which
will form part of the Protocol of
Accession.
Observers:
Member states of the European Union,
which have accepted the invitation to become
observers,
- 
D&y, although not being a party to the
modified Brussels Treaty, attend the
meetings of the WEU Council without
prejudice to the provisions laid down in
Article VIII of the modified Brussels
Treaty; at the request of a majority of
the member states, or of half of the
member states including the presi-
dency, presence at Council meetings
may be restricted to full members;
- 
may be invited to meetings of working
groups;
- 
may be invited, on request, to speak;
- 
will have the same rights and responsi-
bilities as the full members for func-
tions transferred to WEU from other
fora and institutions to which they
already belong.
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Assciate members:
Other European member states of the
Atlantic Alliance which have accepted the invi-
tation to become associate members of WEU,
although not being parties to the modified
Brussels Treaty, may participate fully in the
metings of the WEU Council 
- 
without prej-
udice to the provisions laid down in Article VIII
of the modified Brussels Treaty 
- 
of its working
groups and of the subsidiary bodies, subject to
the following provisions:
- 
at the request of a majority of the
member states, or of half of the
member states including the presi-
dency, participation may be restricted
to full members;
- 
they will be able to be associated to the
planning cell through a permanent
liaison arrangement;
- 
they will have the same rights and
responsibilities as the full members for
functions transferred to WEU from
other fora and institutions to which
they already belong;
- 
they will have the right to speak but
may not block a decision that is the
subject of consensus among the
member states;
- 
they may associate themselves with the
decisions taken by member states; they
will be able to participate in their
implementation unless a majority of
the member states, or half of the
member states including the presi-
dency, decide otherwise;
- 
they will take part on the same basis as
full members in WEU military opera-
tions to which they commit forces;
- 
they will accept in full the substance of
Section A of Part III of the Petersberg
Declaration which will form part of the
association document;
- 
they will be connected to the member
states' telecommunications system(WEUCOM) for messages concerning
meetings and activities in which they
participate;
- 
they will be asked to make a hnancial
contribution to the organisation's
budgets.
Space activities
For practical reasons, space activities will
be restricted to the present members until the
end of the experimental phase of the satellite
centre in 1995. During this phase the new
members and associate members will be kept
informed of WEU's space activities. Appro-
priate arrangements will be made for associate
members to participate in subsequent space
activities at the same time as decisions are taken
on the continuation of such activities.
Mandate
C. Ministers mandated the Permanent
Council to arrange for discussions to start with
the states concerned.
Ministers confirmed their wish to con-
clude the necessary agreements before 3lst
December 1992.
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APPENDIX II
Paragraph 15 of the dralt budget of the odministative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1993
" 15. Implications of the accession of Greece to
WEU
15.1. The Presidential Committee considered
that, in accordance with the decisions taken in
Maastricht, it is to be expected that Greece will
participate as a full member in both parts of the
thirty-ninth session of the Assembly. The draft
budget for 1993 therefore takes this possibility
into account and the following sums have been
included under the various sub-heads of the
budget for this purpose:
15.2. This represents 1.670/o of the total net
operating budget and 1.5190 of the grand total
budget.
15.3. It should be pointed out that no credit is
requested for an office for the Greek Delegation
and temporary staffsince, when the time comes,
it will be possible to solve this problem only by
redistributing offices in the building in
agreement with the Secretariat-General.
15.4. In view of prevailing uncertainty about
the date of Greece's accession to WEU, the
Assembly is prepared to agree to the sums in
question being frozen until that country effec-
tively joins WEU.
15.5. But it must be established quite clearly
now that the budgetary problems associated
with the accession of Spain and Portugal cannot
be repeated, so the Assembly cannot agree to
Greek membership until the required budget
and administrative arrangements are approved
and put in hand.'
Sub-Head 6.1 - Sittings service
(2 Greek sub+diton)
Sub-Head 6.2 - Interpretation service
(4 Greek interpreters)
Sub-Head 6.3 - Translation service
(2 translators)
Sub-Head 9.2 - Provident fund
for interpreters
Sub-Head 9.3 - Insurance for interpreters
F 75000
F 234000
F 42000
F 17 400
F 600
Sub-Head 12 - Installation of an eighth
interpretation booth in the
chamber of the ESC includ-
ing the purchase of elec-
tronic equipment, building a
dais, labour required for the
installation and hire of thebooth) F 105 000
Sub-Head 30 - Expenses for political group
The Greek Delegation will
probably have fourteen
memben (seven representa-
tives and seven substitutes) F 35 000
Tor* F 509000
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Countries that become associate members
of WEU will be invited to take part in all the
activities of WEU and to contribute to the
organisation's budget. Does this include the
Aseembly's budget? Will they take part in the
drafting and adoption ofthe annual report ofthe
Council? Will their delegations to the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
benefit from Article IX of the treaty? Does the
APPENDIX III
Written Question 300
put to the Council by Mr. Goerens
Council consider that the definition of the status
of associate member or observer in WEU is
covered by Article XI of the treaty and that, con-
sequently, it is for the Council alone to
determine the nature of such status or that it is
covered by Article VIII, paragraph 2, which
would allow the Assembly to draw the conse-
quences of decisions taken by the Council where
it is concerned?
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Turlecy
REPORT 
'
submitted on beholf of the Political Committeez
by Mr. Moya, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnarr RrcouunNoerroN
on Turkey
Expreunronv MruoneNouu
submitted by Mr. Moya, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
IL The political situation
III. The Kurds in south-eastern Anatolia
IV. The south-eastern Anatolia project
V. Turkey and the EC
VI. Black Sea Economic Co.operation Pact
VII. The Cyprus question
YIII. Turkey's relations with Greece
IX. Turkey's relations with Central Asia
X. Turkey's relations with Transcaucasia
XI. Turkey and the conflict in former Yugoslavia
XII. Turkey's relations with Iran, Iraq and Syria
XIII. Russia
XIV. Turkish minorities in neighbouring countries
XV. Modernisation of the Turkish armed forces
XVI. Turkey and WEU
AppBNorcrs
I. Davos joint communiqu6
II. Paragraphs of the Petersberg Declaration with regard to associate mem-
bership of WEU
l. Adopted in committee by 19 votes to 0 with I abstention.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman); Lord Finsberg, Mr. De Decker (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Agnelli,
Alegre, Andreotti, Beix, Benvenuti, Bowden (Alternate: Sir Keith SpeeA, Caro, De Hoop Scheffer, Fabra, Feldmann, Fomi,
Foschi, Goerens, Homs I Ferret, Sir Russell lohnston, Lord Kirkhill, MM. Kittelmann (Alternate: Vogel), Koehl, Maroni(Alternate: Caldoro), Moya, Milller, Picriaux, de Puig, Reddemann, Rodrigues, Roseta, Seeuws, Soell, Ward, Wintgens.
N.B. Tfre names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Recommetdation
on Twkcy
The Assembly,
O Welcoming Turkey's associate membership of WEU, while looking forward to close co-operation
in the framework of the association document;(iil Recalling Turkey's most loyal membership of NATO and its vital contribution to security in
Europe during the many years of East-West confrontation;
(iiil Aware of Turkey's important geostrategic position which has changed to some extent but whose
interest has remained undiminished since the end of the cold war;
(iv) Stressing the importance of Turkey's participation in debates on Europe's future security in the
framework of WEU;
(v) Concerned about the volatile situation in the newly independent republics of Transcaucasia and
Central Asia where political instability and ethnic strife seem to dominate the agenda;(vi) Noting that Turkey, which has historic, cultural, linguistic and religious affinities with the popu-
lations of many of these new republics, can serve as a model for their gradual development into
modern states based on democratic government and a market economy;
(vii) Aware of the specific contribution which Turkey can make in concerted efforts to bring about
stable inter-ethnic and international relations in the Balkans;
(viiil Recalling the report by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the situation of
human rights in Turkey (Document 6553) and Resolution 985 of that Assembly;
(ix) Concerned about the mounting violence in south-eastern Anatolia which stands in the way of
a balanced policy towards the Kurdish population in that area as announced by the Turkish
Government;(x) Condemning all forms of terrorism, even if it is used as a means of attaining political objectives;(x0 Recalling paragraph l0 of the Council of WEU's Venice communiqu6 on 30th April 1986, which
stated that " They gave special attention to the threat to security posed by international terrorism and
underlined the importance of early and effective action to implement the measures that the countries
of Western Europe have agreed upon to combat this scourge. ";
(xii) Convinced that Greece and Turkey, which both wish to be well-respected members of the com-
munity of civilised European states and to participate in WEU, cannot afford to continue to harbour
differences over many issues which could be solved if approached in a positive manner,
RrcovrurNos rHAT rse CouNcn-
l. Afford active encouragement to Turkey in the establishment of close relations with the newly
independent republics in Central Asia and Transcaucasia, in particular in activities which may help to
prevent or solve conflicts in those regions;
2. Be certain to involve Turkey in all its consultations and initiatives regarding the Balkan crisis;
3. Establish close cooperation with Turkey in containing the threat to security posed by interna-
tional terrorism;
4. Make every effort to promote a solution to existing differences between Greece and Turkey in
order to prevent such differences being a strain on security discussions in WEU, particularly taking
into account Section A of Part III of the Petersberg Declaration which refers to the settlement of
mutual differences by peaceful means, among others in accordance with Article X of the modified
Brussels Treaty;
5. Endeavour, as matters now stand, to give Turkey guarantees allowing it to participate at the
highest possible level in the tasks and missions of WEU, account being taken of its status of associate
member as contained in the document on associate membership signed in Rome on 20th November
1992.
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I. Introduction
l. After the end of the cold war, the Gulf war
and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
position of Turkey and its geostrategic impor-
tance have changed. It would certainly be wrong,
however, to conclude that its importance has
diminished. On the contrary, one might say thatit is bound to play a more active r6le in a
changing world than it has ever done before in
the twentieth century.
2. It would also be wrong to think that the
problems which Turkey is facing are easier to
solve. Therc are many problems of a different
scale, size and character, which all demand
attention at the same time, and the country will
have to employ all its resources, be they political,
financial, economic or intellectual, to take
advantage of the extraordinary position in which
it has been placed by the vicissitudes of history.
3. With Turkey having been invited to
become an associate member of WEU, while its
application to become a full member of the EC is
still pending, there is every reason to examine
closely the present situation in Turkey and its
relations with neighbouring and western coun-
tries.
4. One aspect, the position of human rights
in Turkey, has recently been examined by the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe. Your Rapporteur has no intention of
duplicating this work, which led to a debate in
the Standing Committee on 3fth June 1992 and
the adoption of Resolution 985.
5. The present report tries to examine
Turkey's foreign and security policy, its r6le in a
region in turmoil, its relations with its western
allies and its position as an associate member of
WEU. A number of issues related to associate
membership will be discussed in the report on
the enlargement of WEU submitted by Mr.
Ward on behalf of the Political Committee.
II. The political situation
6. In the general glections on 2fth October
1991, Mr. Turgut Ozal's Motherland Party(ANAP) obtained ll5 seats, Mr. Suleyman
Demirel's True Path Party (DYP) 178 seats and
the SHP, led by Mr. Erdal Intinu, in alliance
with the Kurdish nationalist People's Labour
Party (HEP) 88 seats. The Islamic fundamen-
talist Welfare Party (RP) entered parliament for
the first time with 62 seats in an electoral
Explanatory Memorandum
(submided by Mn Moyo, Roppaear)
alliance with the neo-fascist Nationalist Labour
Party (MCP). This alliance was dissolved shortly
after the elections, leaving 19 seats for the MCP(now called MLP) members and the remaining
43 for the RP. The Democratic Left Party (DSP)
of former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit obtained
7 seats.
7. On 3fth November 1991, the Grand
National Assembly approved the coalition gov-
ernment consisting of representatives of the
True Path Party and the Social Democrat Party
under Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel. This
cgalition government held 266 of the total of
450 seats in the Grand'National Assembly.
8. The government's recent decision,
however, to lift the ban on political parties out-
lawed after the 1980 military coup has opened
the door to a revival of the centre-left Republican
People's Party (CHP), which has elected Mr.
Demirel Baykal as its leader. Fears have been
expressed that up to 20 Social Democrat Populist
(SHP) deputies might form a new party as a first
step to joining the CHP. This might reduce the
coalition's majority to just two seats. CHP
members are critical of government policy on
among other things the Kurds. Mr. Baykal is in
favour of lifting the state of emergency in
south-east Turkey. On nationalist grounds, he is
also opposed to the extension of the allied air
operation'over northern Iraq to protect the
Kurds.
9. The coalition partners 
. 
had agreed to
establish a more open ddmocracy, including a
revision of * anti-terrorism " legislation, and
improvements in the field of human rights,
media censorship and academic freedom. It was
stated that Kurdish cultural rights were to be
recognised and that Kurdish regions worild
enjoy increased autonomy in local government.
However, strong measur.es would continue to be
taken against the Kurdish guerrillas in the
south-east region with the proviso that they
should not infringe human rights. The Grand
National Assembly is to start its examination of
the new human rights legislation in October
1992. Reforms envisage changes in the criminal
procedure code as the main thrust in an effort to
reduce the incidence of torture.
III. The Kurds in south-eostera Anatolia
10. Considering the mounting unrest in
south-eastern Anatolia and the steep rise in
armed activities and in the number of victims, it
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is clear that the Kurdish issue will increasingly
be ttle main political and security problem facing
the government. The present repqrt 
-would be
incomplete without a review of this issue.
11. After the first world war, the Ottoman
Empire was dismembered, and in that
framework the Treaty of Sdvres envisaged the
creation of Kurdistan, a Kurdish state. The
treaty was, however, never ratified. It was super-
sedei by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which
omitted the creation of Kurdistan. In 1925, the
League of Nations stipulated some forms of cul-
tural and administrative autonomy for the
Kurds living in Iraq. Otherwise, large numbers
of Kurds alio continued to live in areas which
are part of Iran, Syria and Turkey. It is esti-
mated that approximately 500 000 Kurds are
living in Syria, 4 million in Iraq, 5 million in
Iran and 12 million in TurkeY.
12. About half of the 12 million Turkish
Kurds live in south-eastern Turkey, a part of the
country which has an archaic and uneven distri-
bution-of land ownership, and also higher unem-
ployment and lower literacy and school com-
pletion rates than the rest of the country.
13. Through the huge south-eastern Anatolia
prc{ect (GAF), discussed in Chapter IV of this
iep6rt, ihe government hopes to redress the
social and ecbnomic imbalances in this region.
As bad luck would have it, the decision to build
the Atatiirk Dam, the flagship of GAP, is also
seen as the main reason for Syria to start sup-
porting the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK).
14. Last year (1991), President Ozal alr-eady
started to ease restrictions on the use of the
Kurdish language in order to improve Turkey's
minority rights record and to undercut support
for the Pfk. On taking office, Prime Minister
Dernirel, recognising the " Kurdish reality ", was
determined to continue the policy of easing the
expression of Kurdish cultural identity, while he
al6 promised increased autonomy for the
Kurdiih regions. Since then, the increasingly
forbidding Character of the PKK's action has not
encouraged the government to carry out all its
intentions.
15. The marxist-leninist Kurdistan Workers'
Party (PKK) is conducting an armed campaign
agaiist Turkish Government forces and
ci-vilians in support of its demands for an inde-
pendent Kurdistr state which were first made in
iqA+. tt is estimated that to date this violent
campaign has cost almost 5 000 lives.
16. In recent weeks, the conflict seems to have
intensified. In the most violent engagement
between Kurdish separatists and Turkish trooPs
since 1984, a twelve hour battle near the lraqi-
Turkish border in Hakkiri province on 29th Sep-
tember, more than 210 people were killed, of
ufoich more than 150 were guerrillas.
l'1. In the last week of September 1992, the
Grand National Assembly gave an almost unan-
imous vote of confidence for the Interior Minis-
ter's handling of the conflict with the PKK.
18. On 30th September, Prime Minister
Demirel declared that Turkey was determined
not to give up an inch of its land. He also said
that there was no place for talks with the guer-
rillas and ruled out any devolution of power
from Ankara, even if this fell well short of inde-
pendence. He added that the first priority was to^defeat the terrorists. The government is
planning to exclude Kurdish areas from the pro-
iosed human rights legislation mentioned in
paragraph 9. It this framework, Prime. Minister
bem-irei has warned that the " security forces
will be left with no authority if the same clauses
are implemented in a region where the fight
against terrorism is going on. "The government
c5alition parties are the more likely to.. endorse
this opini-on as they are in a political fight with
the new Republican People's party to retain a
majority in parliament.
19. The 1990-91 Gulf war and the resulting
situation in traq have certainly reduced
Turkey's chances of finding an easy qolution.
True, ihe United States, the United Kingdom
and France have declared that they are in favour
of maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq
and that they-will continue to oppose the cre-
ation of a Kurdish nation in the region. As for
the Kurdish leaders on Iraqi territory, both
Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Dem-
ocratic Party and Jalal Talabani, leader of the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, have shown their
willingness to co-operate with the Turkish gov-
ernmdnt. They had assured the Turkish gov-
ernment that the territorial integrity of lraq was
not in danger through the creation of a-Kurdish
parliameniin the north of the coPnt{y: FeeliltC. a
iommon cause they recognised its right to fight
the PKK. They alsb promised Turkey that they
would not let separatist Turkish Kurds use the
area under theii control as a springboard for
cross-border raids. After a meeting with Foreign
Minister Cetin, they declared they had reached
an understanding " that the security of the
border must be protected and activities of ter-
rorism must be stoPPed. "
20. Of late, new developments have taken
place. On 4th October, the * Kurdish parliament
bf lraq " adopted a resolution in favour of the
creation of a federal Kurdish state within Iraqi
territory. Mr. Massoud Barzani has tried to
explain-the decision, stating that * it is not a dec-
lar-ation of independence, but rather the
expression by the Kurdish pegple of its. right to
self-determination ". In a first reaction, the
Turkish government criticised this decision,
saying tha--t it was * against any step which could
open-the way towards the disintegration of
Iiaq. " On the other hand, Prime Minister
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Demirel, recognising that Iraq will not easily be
reconciled with the rest of the world as long as
the present leadership is in control of -the
country, has suggested that " the initiative of a
federal state in northern Iraq could be trans-
formed into a wish to establish a federation with
Turkey " l.
21. As regards PKK activities in the border
regro-n between Turkey and Iraq, Turkey is
worried that there is no sufficiently powerful
authority on lraqi territory to control tht border
r,eelon and that the PKK has taken advantage of
this situation to establish bases in that area
which have been reinforced after the recent
!y{an decision to close the PKK training campsHelweh and Yanta in the Syrian-controlled
Bekaa valley.
22. Moreover, it is said that the Iraqi lead-
ership has allowed the PKK to establish a camp
near Baghdad with the aim of punishing Turkey
for its support of the anti-Iraq coalition in thLGulf war and stirring up existing dissension
between different Kurdish factions. The Iraqi
Kurds are extremely upset over the PKK
presence and its armed activity on their territory
for several reasons. First, the PKK is disturbin!
the relative peace which has been established
through the protection of coalition forces since
April 1991. Second, because the PKK is effec-
tively blocking the frontier with Turkey, which
is the Iraqi Kurds' only possibility to commu-
nicate with the free world and to receive
essential humanitarian aid. Last, because the
PKK, throu8h its actual occupation of villages,
is preventing Iraqi Kurds who became refugeei
during the Gulf war from returning to their
homes.
23. When the PKK igrored calls by the dif-
ferent Iraqi Kurd factions to stop its armed activ-ities in the border area with Turkey, the
Peshmergas or Iraqi Kurd warriors, at the
beginning of October 1992, started an offensive
against the PKK to drive them out. This is whole-
heartedly and actively supported by Turkey.
24. It has been suggested that Iraqi Kurds
consider the expulsion of the pKK from lraqi
lgrritgry to be the price they may have to pay folTurkish acquiescence in their recently-declhred
semi-independence.
25. Turkey has reached understanding with
both Iran and Syria to prevent terrorists crossing
their common border, but there is no absolute
guarantee that such agreements will be strictly
implemented. Moreover, the Turkish Interiol
Minister has stated that three unnamed coun-
tries from outside the region are responsible for
e_ncoyraging separatist activity among Turkish
Kurds.
26. As has already been stated in the recent
Leport of the Parliamentary Assembly of theCouncil of Europe on the position oi human
rights in Turkey (Document 6553), these ter-
rorist activities must be vigorously condemned,
also because they have a very negative effect on
the government's efforts to achieve a solution to
the problems in the region. On the other hand,
there are indications that the security forces
have overreacted and that their actions do not
always fall within the rule of law. Over-zealous
counter-insurgency tactics may easily be coun-
terproductive and polarise the opinion of the
Kurdish population which is not naturally
responsive to the PKK's extremism. If the
Turkish Government overreacted, it might
thereby also throw away its chances of reaching
a peaceful solution with the reasoning majority
of the Kurdish population.
27. There can be little doubt that the present
situation in south-eastern Turkey is serious, up
to the point where the security and territorial
integrity of the state are under threat.
28. For western Europeans looking at the
unfolding conflict, it is not diflicult to provide
perfect recipes for the solution of a complicated
political problem. The security and territorial
integrity of western European states is by no
means under threat. They can boast long-
standing democratic traditions, which have
developed naturally, may consider the modern
concept of human rights of their own making
and have well lubricated mechanisms foi
reaching a consensus or at least a modus vivendi
among partners with divergent views and
interests.
29. It may be wrong for the Turkish Gov-
ernment to put all its money on one horse, a mil-
itary victory over the PKK, while there are still
opportunities to continue and intensify
co-operation with the reasoning part of the
Kurdish population in that region.
30. 
- 
It goes-without saying that earlier pledges
made by the Turkish Government as regards ihe
granting of cultural rights and certain -f'orms of
administrative autonomy should not be shelved.It makes sense for western European govern-
ments to try to convince the Turkish Gov-
ernment that a government, when fighting to
control a terrorist organisation, should always
try and make sure that it is acting within the rule
of |aw and respecting basic human rights since
such behaviour can only enhance respect for its
authority with those citizens who are the core
and spine of the nation.
31. Turkey's associate membership of WEU
should be an excellent opportunity to recall the
communiqud issued after the ministerial
meeting of the Council of WEU in Venice onl. Le Monde, lOth October 1992.
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29th-30th April 1986 where, in paragraph 10,
the Ministers stated:
" 10. They gave special attention to the
threat to security posed by international
terrorism and underlined the importance
of early and effective action to implement
the measures that the countries of
Western EuroPe have agleed uPon to
combat this scourye. "
32. Compared with the situation in 1986, the
field of action of international terrorism may
have changed, but its methods and objectives
have not. The member states of WEU, who have
a long experience in combating terrorism while
respccting human rights and the rule. of law
coUd netp their Turkish ally to maintain peace
and security within its borders with appropriate
means, als6 keeping in mind the international
dimcnsion of Kurdish terrorism.
IY. The south-eastem Anatolia proiect
33. In a major effort to improve the economic
conditions of its poorest region, Turkey is devel-
oping a huge construction project, the south-
eistern Anaiolia project or GAP, which stands
for its Turkish name Guneydogu Anadolu
Projesi.
34. The GAP comprises a network of dams,
hydropower plants and iqrgation schemes
sianning the Euphrates and Tigns rivers algng
furkey'i borders with Iraq and Syria. The
oroieci plans to increase Turkey's irrigated
iarirtarrO by a third while power from the dams
will doublc the country's electricity capacity. It
also includes land reform in a region where
feudal allegiances still predominate. The gov-
ernrnent hopes that the project will create jobs
in an area facing endemic unemployment and
the country's highest population growth. This
should sterir the how of migrant workers which
has put a heavy strain on public services in cities
such as Istanbul and Izmir. At the same time it
hopes that the project will positively motivate
th6 Kurdish population and undermine support
for the separatist-terrorist movement PKK.
35. By the next century when the Lrrigation
infrastructure and all 2l dams and 19 power-
plants are in place, the total cost of the GAP will
Lave reached 2 billion. However, the GAP has
also caused trouble for Turkey. First, it is a
source of continuing friction with both lraq and
Syria. Syria is dependent on water for 750lo of its
pb,wer generation, while drinking water and
water for irrigation and industrial use from the
Euphrates are essential for the country's sur-
vival. Iraq is less hydropower dependent, but the
Euphrates provid6s water for its agricultural
seclor. Both countries are facing pollution and
degraded supply of water.
36. Most problems have arisen with Syria
where the Euphrates supplies 850/o of surface
water. Turkey, controlling 980/o of the Euplrates'
discharge, his sought to accommodate Syria's
concenis and in 1987, the then Prime Minister
offered to guarantee a flow of 500 cubic metres a
second at the Turkish-syrian border until a
" final allocation of the waters of the Euphrates
between the three riparian states " is achieved.
3'1. Turkish water offtcials estimate that Syria
can only make use of a third of the 500 cubic
metres i second which it receives, while Syria
continues to demand 700 cubic metres.
Moreover, the Turkish position is that there is
no legal case for sharing the waters,.both rivers
having their sources in Turkish territory.
38. The GAP has had other political and
security consequences as well. It is widely
believed that Turkey's decision to start building
the Atatiirk dam in 1983 was the main reason
for Syria starting to support the Kurdish sepa-
ratist- PKK. Because of the continuing riparian
dispute with Syria and lraq, few western donors
arewilling to provide credits for the GAP. Some
economists estimate that the huge government
expenditure for the project accounts for one-
third of Turkey's 70Vo inflation rate.
Y. TurlreY and the EC
39. Turkey, which concluded an association
agreement with the EC in 1963, applied for full
d'embership in 1987, but until now there has
been no positive and unambiguous EC answer.
40. In the conclusions of the presidency, made
public after the European Council in Lisbon on
lOtn and 27th June 1992, it was stated:
'the European Council discussed the
applicationi which have been submitted
by- Turkey, CyPrus and IVIalta. The
European 
-Council 
agrees that each of
these applications must be considered on
its merits.
With regard to Turkey the Eqrope-a1
Council underlines that the Turkish r6le
in the present European political situation
is of the greatest importance and that
there is every reason to intensifY
cooperation and develop relations with
Turkey in line with the prospect laid
down 
-in the Association Agreement of
1963 including a political dialogue at the
highest level. The European Council asks
the Commission and the Council to work
on this basis in the coming months. "
41. Recently, the EC made it known that the
Turkish appliiation will again be considered in
1993 and, ih July 1992, at the request of the EC
ministers for for-eign affairs, the British Foreign
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Secretary, Sir Douglas Hurd, submitted a report
on relations between the EC and Turkey. It was
said that this report received only a lukewarm
welcome because it did not pay suffrcient
attention to the issue of respect for human
rights. During their meeting in Brocket Hall on
l2th and l3th September, the EC foreign min-
isters reaffrrmed their wish to intensify relations
with Turkey, as expressed at the Council
meeting in Lisbon, although the issue was not
discussed in depth at the request of Greece,
which wanted the Ministers to wait for the
results of negotiations on Cyprus, which were to
begin on 26th October in New York. The next
discussion on Turkey in the Council is to be held
on 9th November 1992.
42. It should be noted that the Turkish
human rights record is indeed one of the
stumbling-blocks for the entry of Turkey into
the EC. Others are, as is known, the underdevel-
opment of large parts of the country, a high rate
of inflation, and the danger of massive
migration of unskilled labourers towards
western Europe. Turkey is now seeking acti-
vation of the financial arrangements providedfor by the 1963 association agreement but
blocked since 1981. At the European Council's
request, the European Commission has made
proposals to intensify the EC's co-operation
with Turkey, including the coming into effect of
a customs union by 1995 to promote industrial
and technological co-operation, reactivate the
financial arrangements of the association
agreement and intensify the political dialogue.
43. Even so, Turkey is likely to delay its
ambition of establishing a full customs union
with the EC by 1995 in an effort to protect key
domestic industries. While the country is ready
to eliminate tariffs and introduce a common
external tariff, it intends to negotiate the
extension of import protection for some sectors
beyond the 1996 deadline. All this would mean
that Turkey is considering a rescheduling of the
phased elimination of tariff barriers under the
1963 association agreement with the EC, a first
step to full accession.
44. At the moment, Greece is still using its
right ofveto in order to block any real progress
but there is a growing uneasiness in oihei fC
countries over Greece's attitude.
45. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Mr. Cetin,
has recognised that Turkey is unlikely to become
a full member of the EC before the end of the
century, but he emphasised that Turkey would
p!ryue its long-term objective of becomingpart
of Europe and a full member of the EC: The
Italian foreign minister Emilio Colombo rightly
questioned whether a re-assessed association
agreement between Turkey and the EC, com-
bined with associate membership of WEU,
would in fact lead to the tacit accession of
Turkey to the EC.
46. It is becoming ever more clear that at
some stage in the near future, the EC has to
work out a time-frame for the future accession
of Turkey.
YI. Black Sea Economic Co-operation Poct
47. On 25th June 1992, Albania, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece,
Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and
Ukraine signed the Black Sea Economic
Co-operation Pact in Istanbul. The participating
countries declared that they had decided todevelop multi- and bilateral economic
co-operation and that in particular common
projects would be established in many fields,
such as transport and communications infra-
structure, energy, agriculture, health, protection
of the environment, science and technology.
They also decided to take the measures nec-
essary to encourage co-operation in free trade
zones. In the offrcial document, mention was
even made of the possibility of establishing a
trade and investment bank on the lines of the
European Development Bank.
48. The idea of this co.operation pact was
originally put forward by Turkey. It was thought
that the geographical proximity and mutual corn
plementarity of the economies of the countries
around the Black Sea, the reform and restruc
turing in the former socialist countries and the
Turkish reform experience were natural advan-
tages whose exploitation could yield significant
mutual benefits. It should be mentioned,
however, that even if the pact was conceived in
an exclusively economic context, the broad inspi-
ration behind it was the desire to contribute to
regional peace and security. The inclusion of
Greece and Albania in the pact should be inter-
preted as a clear sign of Turkey's political goal to
have good relations with both countries.
49. Even so, the pact needs to be worked out
in greater detail if it is meant to be effective. It
falls short ofpractical proposals and the national
economies of several participants such as
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia will have little
chance ofdeveloping as long as internal conflicts
and political instability prevail.
5O, Another problem is whether Turkey con-
s_iders the pact as an alternative to the European
Community. The Turkish Government rejects
this suggestion. It should nevertheless be noted
that the creation of one or more free trade zones
around the Black Sea, of which Turkey would be
a pa$, could easily cause problems for Turkey's
admission to the EC.
YII. The Cyprus qtestioa
51. A discussion of Turkey's position would
not be complete without mentioning the Cyprusquestion, which plays an important r6le in
332
I
DOCUMENT I34I
Greek-Turkish relations and, partly as a conse-
quence, in relations between Turkey and the EC.
52. Even if the recent history of Cyprus is well
known, some basic facts should be repeated
here.
53. The independent Republic of Cyprus was
estaHished in 1960. When the government
decided to limit the autonomous rights of the
Turkish-Cypriot minority to cultural and reli
gious issues while its rights in the fields of gov-
ernment and administration, as guaranteed by
the constitution, were suspended, fltghting broke
out between the Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-
Cypriot population. As a result of United
Nations mediation efforts in March 1964,
United Nations peace-keeping forces were
deployed on the island. \n 1967, the Turkish-
Cybriot population established a provisional
Turkish administration, which was not
recognised by the Cypriot government. In.July
1974 oflicers of the Greek-Cypriot National
Guard mounted a successful putsch against the
then President Makarios. The putsch collapsed
when a few days later Turkish troops landed on
the island. These troops occupied the northern
part of Cyprus and Cyprus was in practice
divided into a Greek and a Turkish part, the
latter comprising 37o/o of the island. In
November 1983, the Turkish Cypriots declared
their own state, the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which was recog-
nisod only by Turkey.
54. At the moment, some 30 000 Turkish
troops are permanently stationed in the
northern part of Cyprus. Cyprus is still an unre-
solved problem notwithstanding the more than
seventy resolutions which, since 1964, have
been adopted on this subject by the United
Nations Security Council.
55. After the end of the Gulf war, the EC, the
United States and the United Nations inten-
sificd their diplomatic activity to flrnd a satis-
factory solution to the Cyprus question. In Feb-
ruary- 1992, the Greek and Turkish Prime
Ministers, respectively Konstantinos Mitsotakis
and Suleyman Demirel, indicated in a seven-
point communiqud issued in Davos that the two
governments were working together- towards a
negotiated settlement of the Cyprus issue under
United Nations auspices.
56. The United Nations Security Council
favours a settlement based on the existence of
onc sovereign state of Cyprus with a single citi-
zenship, guaranteed independence, territorial
integriiy and two politically equal communities,
living in a bi-communal and bi-zonal fede-
ration.
57. Some progress has been made in the nego-
tiations on Cyprus's future under United
Nations auspices. Both parties have accepted
certain basic rights of citizens to go back to their
original settlements and to hold property and
their views on territorial adjustments have
drawn closer. Too many questions still remain
to be settled, such as the sharing of power in the
central organs of a future federation and terri-
torial adjustments.
58. The Turkish part of the population, repre-
senting 180/o of the total population, now
occupies 37o/o of the island. According to the
United Nations Secretary-General, they should
reduce their portion of land to 280/o, but the
leader of the Turkish Cypriots considers 3090 to
be the minimum.
59. Both parties will resume their talks with
the Secretary-General on 26th October 1992 and
the Security Council has expressed the hope
that, after direct negotiations between the two
parties, an international conference with the
participation of both communities on the island
as well as Greece and Turkey could conclude a
framework agreement before the end of 1992.
60. After so many years of fruitless United
Nations resolutions and other attempts to find a
satisfactory solution for the existing stalemate,
the importance of an early settlement can hardly
be overestimated. A positive and stimulating
attitude on the part of both Turkey and Greece
would certainly increase the chances of such a
settlement. It should, however, be stressed here
that a genuine solution cannot rest on a simple
agreemint over shares of territory, GNP and
pirliamentary and executive powers. Genuine
iespect for minorities should be the basic prin-
cipie without which a future federal state of
Ciprus will never prosper. Finally, a solution of
the Cyprus question cannot be a prerequisite for
starting talks over other disputes between
Greece and Turkey.
YIII. Turleey's relations with Grerce
61. There are many points of friction between
Greece and Turkey and, especially since 1974,
they seem to have been involved in an undis-
guised cold war.
62. Issues under dispute are among others the
delimitation of the Greek and Turkish portions
of the Aegean continental shelf as well as
Turkish complaints and challenges regarding
present and potential arrangements of Greek
territorial air space and territorial waters,
defensive emplacements on the Greek islands of
the Eastern Aegean and the Dodecanese islands,
civil rights foi the Muslim minority living in
Greek Western Thrace, and both present and
potential command and control responsibilities
within the framework of NATO. Greek com-
plaints, in turn, begin with the continued
Turkish occupation, since July 1974, of
Northern Cyprus, the emplacement of large
Turkish amphibious forces at the western coast
of Turkey, violation of Greek minority rights in
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Istanbul and the islands of Imvros and Tenedos,
and continuing pressures on the Oecumenical
Patriarchate of Constantinople.
63. It would not be wise to try to put the
blame for unsolved conflicts and strained rela-
tions between Turkey and Greece on either of
the two parties. Both countries are carrying the
burden of a long and complicated history during
which the Byzantine and Ottoman empires
struggled to dominate the region. Strictly
speaking neither of them could honestly maintain
that during those many centuries it has been less
aggressive, of a higher moral standing or the sole
party to keep the flame of civilisation burning.
64. History can help to understand and
maybe even explain the course of events in the
past but it should at least be mistrusted if used
as the basis for a nation's behaviour. In fact,
history is the worst when used as an argument tojustify a country's foreign policy because in such
circumstances it always represents a subjective
and selective order of events.
65. Western European nations have lived
through a most violent succession of wars and
conflicts. Nevertheless, after the second world
war they decided to share their future destiny by
establishing the EC. France and Germany, arch-
enemies until 1945, are now forming the core of
European integration and recent events have
again provided clear evidence.
66. If both Turkey and Greece wish to be part
of a future Europe, they will have to solve their
differences without too much looking into the
past and follow the example of France and
Germany. Implementation of the positive and
hopeful joint declaration by the Turkish and
Greek prime ministers at Davos, in February
19922, should be welcomed since it offers a
perfect framework for the global approach which
is much needed. Indeed, it is thought here that
the worst possible approach to the two nations'
existing intricate web of disputes would be to
tackle them one by one in accordance with the
stance taken by some that they are not interre-
lated in any way but that on the other hand the
solution of one problem is a prerequisite for
starting negotiations on the next problem. To
begin with, the solution of the Cyprus question
should not be considered as a sine qua non for
all other questions.
67. The substance ofSection A ofPart III of
the Petersberg Declaration 3, which will have to
be accepted in full by both Greece and Turkey as
a member and an associate member respectively
of WEU clearly states that the relations between
member states and associate member states
should be based on the * settlement of their
mutual differences by peaceful means', among
others * in accordance with the obligations
resulting from the modified Brussels Treaty ". It
is observed here that Article X of the modified
Brussels Treaty provides a satisfactory guide-
line for the peaceful settlement of disputes if the
global approach, chosen by the prime ministers
of Greece and Turkey in Davos fails to achieve
positive results.
68. As regards the problems in the Aegean,
both countries could start by signing a non-
aggression pact, including the mutual denunci-
ation of the use of force. After that, both coun-
tries could start bilateral negotiations in order to
reach a peaceful settlement which will be pos-
sible only on the assumption that the Aegean
cannot be transformed into a " Greek lake " and
likewise that it cannot be subdivided so as to
enclave Greek territories (the Eastern Aegean
and the Dodecanese islands) into a Turkish zone
of functional responsibility. Questions not
leading to mutual agreement should be sub-
mitted to arbitration or to the International
Court of Justice.
69. A solution for the possibility of extending
Greece's territorial waters from the present six
miles to the widely accepted l2-mile limit could
be that both Greece and Turkey would agree to
l2-mile limits for their mainland territory and
to six mile limits for islands belonging to Greece
and Turkey in the Aegean.
70. The issue of minorities in Greece and
Turkey should be dealt with following the prin-
ciples that minority protection should not lead
to claims by either side calling for boundary
changes and that minorities within a country
should be treated as one might wish one's own
people to be treated in third countries.
71. As a general means of building confi-
dence, both countries could contribute to
improving mutual relations by starting to reduce
the level of their armed forces in border areas
along their common frontier.
IX. Turkcy's rulations with Centrol Asia
72. Immediately after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, Turkey started to establish close
diplomatic, cultural and economic relations
with the newly-independent Islamic republics in
Central Asia, which are: Kazakhstan, Kiryizstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The
inhabitants of these republics are mainly Turkic
people except for the Tajiks, who are ethnic Per-
sians. In IUday 1992, the Turkish Prime Minister
paid a high-profile visit to the abovementioned
republics and Azerbaijan and took part in the
summit of Central Asian republics with lran,
Pakistan and Turkey. At this summit, a number
of economic issues was discussed, including
customs, and road, railroad and pipeline con-
nections.
See Appendix I.
See Appendix II.
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73. Recently, on 30th and 3lst October,
Turkey organised a summit in which the heads
of state of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Kirgizstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan par-
ticiprted. It should be noted, however, that the
new Turkic republics were not yet prepared to
sign the important agreements on trade
liberelisation, customs harmonisation and oil
and gas exports sought by the Turkish Gov-
ernment. The Ankara Declaration, which was
signed by all participants, reflects the intention
to intensify relations between the participating
republics, in particular by organising a yearly
summit.
74. In the following chapters some of the
recent developments and prospects for the
futurc will be discussed before drawing conclu-
sions on Turkey's r6le in the region.
Kazakhstan
75. Kazakhstan, although faced with the same
problems as all other former Soviet republics
such as a collapsed economy, rampant inflation,
disastrous pollution of the environment and
ethnic problems, has also a number of promising
advantages. It has many valuable raw materials,
in particular oil, natural gas, gold, diamonds and
uranium and its agriculture is relatively well
developed. Its industry is obsolete, apart from
the high-tech aerospace industry which was part
of tk Soviet military industrial complex. There
is relative political stability under the leadership
of its popular President Nursultan Nazarbajev
who, although a former communist apparatchik,is supported by all the different political
groups.
76. Kazakhstan is making progess in the
implementation of its economic reform pro-
gfimme which also envisages the exploitation of
the huge resources of natural gas and oil.
77. Its 17 million population is composed of
more than one hundred nationalities. The
largest groups of population are the Kazakhs,
with more than 7 million, and the Russians - the
best educated and trained part of the labour
force 
- 
with 6.5 million. The Kazakhs are of
Mongolian origin, but they adopted Turkish
culture and Sunnism long ago.
78. Kazakhstan has an important defence
industry and is one of the former Soviet
republics with nuclear arrns on its territory. It
should be noted that President Nazarbajev is to
be admired if only for the way he is playing his
nuclear arms trump card with ambiguous state-
merfis. After earlier pledges to transfer all nu-
clear warheads to Russia, President Nazarbajev
later stated that his country will keep the war-
heads as long as China, Russia and the United
States retain nuclear arms. Only recently, he
declared (Le Monde, 26-27th September 1992)that Kazakhstan wishes to become a
denuclearised state. In seven years' time it will
reduce the strategic arms in accordance with the
START agreement, which has now been ratified
by Kazakhstan. It is expected that in the near
future, the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan
will conclude an agreement which will enable
Russian military and technicians to be in charge
of the nuclear weapons which remain on Kazakh
territory.
79. In the framework of the CIS, united
armed forces have been created, and
Kazakhstan has placed its nuclear arms under
the unified command of the CIS. With Russia it
has also signed a collective defence agreement
according to which the signatories decide them-
selves where and on which territory they will
deploy their arms.
80. As in all other Central Asian republics,
the main question is whether Kazakhstan will
succeed in achieving positive economic results
within the foreseeable future. If economic per-
formance fails, scenarios for disaster can easily
be imagined.
81. After having participated in the summit
of the newly independent Turkic republics of
Central Asia and the Caucasus in Ankara on3fth and 3lst October 1992, President
Nazarbajev visited Teheran, where he signed
agreements between Kazakhstan and Iran on oil,
energy, transport, finance and culture. Appar-
ently, the Nazakh President does not want to be
seen as favouring either Turkey or Iran.
Kirgizstan
82. A silk revolution took place in Kirgizstan
in the autumn of 1990, when the communist
party's monopoly of power was broken with the
election of the Academy of Science head Askar
Akayev as President on 28th October. After the
coup attempt in Moscow in August 1991, Pres-
ident Akayev banned the communist party. He
has gone further than any other Central Asian
leader in attacking old 6lite power, reforming
local government bodies and ordering the gov-
ernment to cede control over the press. The
president has furthermore pushed strongly for
land reforms, and claimed that in early 1992,
half of the country's farms had been privatised
or converted into co-operatives.
83. It is generally thought that President
Akayev's policy has strongly stimulated the
establishment of Central Asia's most developed
democratic movement. He is trying to prevent
conflicts by balancing political appointments
among regional, ethnic and political groups.
With its 4.4 million inhabitants and little
natural resources, Kirgizstan has a largely rural
economy and is dependent on its neighbours'
b-asic inputs of fuel, foodstuffs and raw mate-
rials. It maintains the closest relations with
Russia and Kazakhstan. It is not certain that
Kirgizstan is safe from ethnic rivalries. In spring
1990, conflicts between Kiryiz and Uzbeks in
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the valley of Och flared up and several hundreds
were killed. In recent years, 200 000 Slavs left
the country, but 850 000 remain, most of them
Russians, whom President Akayev would like to
stay.
84. In October 1992, the President announced
that his country would leave the rouble zone and
introduce its own currency by 1995. It is the first
CIS republic to have adopted an economic
restructuring programme with the IMF, which itjoined in September this year, and which
undertook to lend $300 million next year.
85. According to President Akayev, the CIS
will no longer be a political confederation after
an obligatory transitional period, but he is con-
vinced that economic links between its members
will continue to exist.
86. It should be noted that the majority of
Kirgizstan's population, the originally nomadic
Kirgiz adopted Islam relatively late and that,
except in the Fergana Valley and the south of
the country, the influence of Islam on public life
is limited. The religious leader of the Muslim
Kirgiz, Kimsanbai Abdurakhmanov, insists on
the separation between state and religion and is
a declared opponent of fundamentalism.
Tajikistan
87. Tajikistan, with 5.2 million inhabitants,
has a language and culture of Persian origin and
the Tajik's religion is a version of Islam, quite
similar to Islam as practised in lran.
88. Tajiks view Iranian culture as a major
resource for strengthening their identity. On the
other hand, relations with lran are ambiguous
and the Tajik Sunni religious leaders, weary of
Iranian Shiism, have strained relations with the
Shiites in their own country.
89. The political situation is by no means
settled. In April 1992, Muslim militants, com-
bining forces with a democratic movement,
forced the government to form a coalition with
their representatives.
90. On 7th September 1992, opposition fac-
tions mainly consisting of poorer Tajiks from
the central plains and eastern mountainous
regions, the democratic opposition and a re-
vived Islamic party forced President Rakhmon
Nabiyev out of oflice notwithstanding the fact
that he enjoyed the support ofthe presidents of
Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan
and the protection of units of the Russian armed
forces. President Nabiyev, coming from the
communist party's ruling class, also had strong
support from the security services, the middle
class and the industrial sector.
91. Violent combats between supporters and
adversaries of the ousted president but also
involving regional, ethnic and clan disputes are
still continuing and altogether the fighting has
killed more than 2 000 people this year.
92. Russia ordered more troops to the region,
formally at the request of Tajikistan, but their
main objective, as stated by the Defence Min-
istry, was to stop the capture of armaments,
ammunition and military hardware from
Russian troops and to protect the Russians in
the region. Weapons used by rival movements
which are engaged in a civil war are acquired
from Afghanistan and from raids on Russirr
military bases guarding the Afghan-Tajik
border.
93. It is diflicult to ascertain how far Iran is
involved in the political upheaval in Tajikistan.
It has provided textbooks for PersianJanguage
teaching in schools and offered much needed
economical assistance, but the government
appears to prefer staying out of the ongoing
internal disputes in Tajikistan.
94. On the other hand, the presidents of
neighbouring Central Asian republics are
accusing fundamentalist forces, not necessarily
from Iran, of stirring up the conflicts. It is said
that they are pitting peoples from Kulyab and
Kurgan-Tyube against each other in order to be
able to ask their religious leader to restore order
and create a government to rescue the nation.
95. Political relations have been strongly
polarised and the Islamic leaders behind the new
government have increasingly marginalised their
secular allies in the former opposition against
the then President Nabiyev. It is said that Qaszi(muslim leader) Akhbar Toradzon Zodaandthe
Islamic Renaissance party are now the most
powerful political forces in the republic.
96. On l4th October, conflicting parties in
the south ofTajikistan had accepted a cease-fire
after negotiations between the government,
Russian armed forces and leaders of armed fac
tions. It was accepted that Russian troops would
deploy around the strategic companies in the
country. On the other hand, Kirgizstan has not
yet sent the buffer forces which were requested,
because the conflicting parties were not able to
provide the necessary guarantees.
97. According to President Akayev of Kirgiz-
stan, buffer forces in Tajikistan should be a mul-
tinational force with military personnel from
Kiryizstan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
Russia could provide equipment, but no troops.
All this could be done only at the request of the
Tajik Parliament.
98. The main aim of the proposed CIS peace-
keeping force would be to dislodge warring
forces from the southern region of Kurgan-
Tyube. It would be deployed in Kaleninabad, a
town north of Kurgan-Tyube, and at the
Sharshar Pass, near the southern region of
Kulyab, a stronghold of former President
Nabiyev.
I
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99. Here it is recalled that in May this year,
the opposition, then mainly the Democratic
Party and the [slamic Renaissance Party, had
callcd upon the United Nations, Iran and
Afghanistan to act in order to protect the popu-
lation against CIS forces. Such forces would
therefore certainly encounter strong resistance.
100. At the end of October, the government,
backed by Russian troops and irregular forces,
defcated a two-day coup attempt by supporters
of the ousted former President Rakhmon
Nabiyev. The government of acting President
Akbarshah Iskandarov promised that a special
parliamentary session would be held to decide
whother former President Nabiyev should be
reinstalled. It is, however, expected that the situ-
ation in Tajikistan will not improve soon. The
government is dependent on irregular volunteer
forces, some of which are said to include
criminal gang members, who may soon be
engaged in an internal struggle for power.
Moreover, President Iskandarov's government
controls little territory outside the capital, and
even there his control may be subject to doubt.
Unrest in Tajikistan has caused the greatest
alarm to the President of Uzbekistan (see para-
graphs lll and ll2).
Turkmenistan
l0l. Turkmenistan, with 3.6 million inhabi-
tants is in every respect Central Asia's most
primitive republic. There is no effective oppo-
sition or democratic pluralism and power is con-
centrated in the hands ofthe Teke, the largest of
the country's three rnain tribes. Political
repression is still tight. President Saparmurad
Niyazov and his administration rely heavily on
Russian bureaucrats and the country still has
many Russian troops and sensitive military
installations.
102. Islam is a powerful force in the coun-
trSaide, but the religious establishment is rela-
tively unified and disposed to co-operate with
the government. In general, the Turkmen popu-
lation is not inclined to consider Iranian Shiism
as a basis for the religious and political devel-
opnent of its country. Iran has no particular
influence in Turkmenistan, which finds its
origin in long-standing conflicts between both
populations.
103. Economically, the republic is largely
dependent on Russia, but it has important
reiources of natural gas, which it now hopes to
dorelop with help from Iran. No agreement has
yet been reached over a planned gas pipeline
from Turkmenistan to the Black Sea, which
Turkey would prefer to go through the Caspian
Sea, Azerbarjan and Georgia, while Iran would
prefer to trace it first through Iran and then
through Turkey.
104. In May this year, Turkmenistan con-
cluded a separate agreement with lran on
transport, banking and trade. Both countries will
establish a joint banking and customs system.
Road and rail links will be completed with Iran
largely financing the $500 million cost of the
railway link. lran has also announced a $50
million credit offer to Turkmenistan. There was
also an agreement over building a gas pipeline
from Turkmenistan to Iran for Iranian gas pur-
chases.
105. In October 1992, the Government of
Turkmenistan signed an agreement with a
United States-Turkish consortium envisaging a
feasibility study of the six possible routes for a
pipeline to export natural gas from Turkme-
nistan to Europe.
Uzbekistan
106. With its 20.3 million inhabitants, mostly
Sunni Muslims, Uzbekistan is the most
important new republic in Central Asia. It is the
world's third largest producer of cotton and the
seventh largest producer ofgold. 6890 or billion
of the country's exports are raw cotton and tex-
tiles. After becoming independent, it is now
keen on foreign investors helping it to process
more of its wealth internally rather than export
raw materials. In March 1992, oil was dis-
covered in the Fergana valley and the gov-
ernment hopes to attract foreign investors for its
exploitation, but it is still too early to make
reliable estimates of existing reserves.
107. Uzbekistan is a net importer of consumer
goods, food and energy. It has traditionally
relied on funds from the Soviet Government for
up to 3090 of its budget expenditure. After the
collapse of the Soviet Union, it started trying to
sell its raw materials on international markets
without going througlr Moscow.
108. One of the issues which will certainly
demand the government's greatest possible
attention in the near future is the population
gowth of 600 000 per year which is already
causing a tremendous rise in demand for water
and land resources.
109. President Islam Karimov, a former
hard-line communist, is ruling his country in an
authoritarian manner. He has pledged, however,
to abide by a set of ten principles for democracy
and human rights formulated by the United
States, in exchange for United States diplomatic
recognition. For President Karimov, Turkey is a
model of development for his own country. He
wishes to develop a secular state which respects
the country's Muslim identity but carefully
keeps religion separate from government.
I10. The President, together with the ruling
National Democratic Party is taking hesitant
steps towards introducing a market economy. A
new constitution for a democratic state is being
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prepared, but the first drafts have been criticised
strongly by the opposition for the lack of
political freedom. In any case, President
Karimov has banned the creation of Islamic
parties, while trying to enforce a division
between the authority of the state and the
mosques which are free of state control. Even so,
Islamic politicians and leaders think it is a
matter of time before their ideas prevail. On the
other hand, it should be noted that they are
Sunni Muslims who say that they do not intend
to follow the lranian Shiite model. The religious
opposition is hoping that supporters of an
Islamic state will be able to assume power after
the next presidential elections due to take place
in five years time and they are convinced that
expected economic hardship in the years to
come will help to popularise the Islamic faith.
1l l. Understandably, events in Tajikistan are
causing concern with the leadership of Uzbek-
istan, which is now strongly criticised by the
opposition for authoritarian government.
lL2. In connection with the worsening of the
civil war in Tajikistan with reports of the use of
tanks and artillery and the killing of several hun-
dreds of people on 30th September, President
Karimov sealed the border against refugees from
the fighting, while increasing his control over
the political opposition in his own country. The
President's worries about the civil war spilling
over into Uzbekistan are not unjustified, if it is
realised that 240/o of Tajikistan's population is
ethnically Uzbek.
Turkey's policy
ll3. The sudden high profile adopted by
Turkey in its relations with the new independent
Central Asian republics which were proclaimed
after the collapse of the Soviet Union has not
failed to attract the attention of its western allies
on both sides of the Atlantic.
ll4. Most of them consider this prominent
new r6le a welcome initiative.which could help
to stabilise a region which is in great turmoil. By
now, the arguments to support the Turkish initi-
atives are almost too well known to be repeated
here. In essence it is said that Turkey can boast
strong ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic
ties with these countries. Moreover, Turkey,
although being a Muslim country, has adopted
the principles of a secular and democratic form
of government and could thus be an ideal
mentor. It can also teach the advantages of a
market economy, pointing out its own
remarkable economic growth. Last but not least,
it could save Central Asia from the pitfalls of
fundamentalism which, it is said, Iran is trying
to introduce in the whole region. The merits of
each of these arguments will be discussed in the
following paragraphs.
(a) Close relationship with Turkish calture
I 15. Apart from the population of Tajikistan,
the populations of the other Central Asian
republics are generally referred to as being
Turkic. However, the ethnic, linguistic and cul-
tural unity which this implies does not exist, and
there are significant differences among these
populations, even within the borders of the dif-
ferent republics. Before the important Turkic
migrations, which took place after the tenth
century AD, large parts of this particular Central
Asian region were inhabited by Iranian Indo.
Europeans and, even if the Turkic element
became dominant, also as regards language,
there was an intermingling of Turkic and
Iranian people. Iranian cultural influence and
traditions continued to exist within the Turkic
cultural mainstream. The fact that, at present,
many political and cultural leaders are devel-
oping a purely Turkic cultural identity for their
republics has partly to do with a tradition of cul-
tural and historical revisionism in the Soviet
Union. It has been standing Soviet policy to
force national cultures and histories upon each
of the Central Asian republics which were
created on the basis of rather arbitrary borders.
Now that each of the independent republics is
involved in a process of defining its national
identity, they will barely be inclined to stress
aspects of a broader cultural and political unity.
In conclusion, it should still be noted that, with
the exception of Tajikistan, the Turkic element
dominates in language, population and culture
in the republics of central Asia.
I16. Turkey is therefore well placed to exercise
a stimulating and positive inlluence in most of
the Central Asian Republics. The fear being
expressed by some that an overwhelming
Turkish influence might, sooner or later, lead to
claims for the establishment of a large Pan-
Turkish state, reviving the old idea of a united
Turkestan which would include all the Central
Asian Turkic republics, seems to be far fetched.
At the moment, there are still too many natio-
nalistic ethnic rivalries, and natural centrifugal
forces at work. Moreover, the process of disman-
tling old and existing government institutions,
creating new ones and the struggle for power
within the new republics will still absorb most of
the political energy in the foreseeable future.
(b) The threat of fundamentalism
ll7. Although most Central Asian republics
are still being governed by the same dlites in pol-
itics and administration as during Soviet rule,
communist ideology has lost its authority, and
an ideological vacuum has come into being. The
lack of experience of democratic government
and the existence of an Islamic tradition
together with an increasing politisation of Islam
in that region could easily lead these countries to
turn to Islam as a cure for all ills.
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118. There can be little doubt that Islam is
going to play a more important r6le in all these
reprblics and this has been confirmed by their
leading politicians. It may be a rallying force,
helping to create stability in social and political
life. On the other hand, one should not exag-
gerate the danger of these republics embracing
fundamentalism.
119. The ruling dlites in all these republics con-
sider the West as their model for economic
development and progress. They know that the
establishment of fundamentalism as the leading
system would deter the West from providing
technological and economic assistance which is
so badly needed. Moreover, the Sunni version of
Islam is dominant in the region, even in
Tajikistan.
120. If the population in these republics is
touched by religious influence from abroad, it
cotrles rather from Afghan Mujahidin with
Wahabbi sympathies, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
l2l. Indeed, it would be exaggerated to say that
Iran is trying to play a dominant rOle in the
Central Asian region. It is making efforts to
establish economic and political relations with
these new republics and it has signed a number of
agreements and memoranda of understanding
with them. There are different reasons for this
activity. Understandably, the first is to open
markets with prospects for development in the
future. A second reason is that Iran is worried
about its own security and territorial integrity in a
region where existing frontiers may be called in
question by nationalist and ethnic rivalries. Iran is
coming to the conclusion that its rigorous foreigrr
policy, meant to serve the fundamentalist Islamic
revolution has only led to useless isolation. Now,
it is increasingly feeling encircled and threatened
and its recent policy towards Central Asian
republics may be seen as an effort to enhance its
security and prevent encirclement. It should also
be noted that Iran is not in a position to devote
much money to economic and other assistance.
Again, it is more concerned with its own economic
reconstruction than with exporting the Islamic
revolution, which cannot boast great economic
achievements despite the presence of large natural
resources.
122. In conclusion, it should be said that at the
moment there is no strong fundamentalist
movement in the Central Asian republics. The
Islamic revival in Central Asia is mainly an
indigenous movement which is cultural rather
than political, stemming from the aspiration to
assert the identity which the Soviet Government
had suppressed for many decades. At the
moment, secular government is well rooted in
this area, but the Islamic revival could be the
core of a fundamentalist striving for power if the
smular governments fail to meet the basic aspi-
rations of the population, in particular the hope
for economic revival.
(c) The rille of Turkey
123. What can Turkey do? When visiting
Central Asian republics in May this year, Prime
Minister Demirel generously offered loans.
Turkey's Eximbank has now begun extending
consumer and investment loans of $250 million
for Uzbekistan while Kazakhstan is getting $200
million, and Turkmenistan and Kirgizstan $75
million each. With additional incentives, the
total sum would almost reach $l billion. But at
the same time, Turkish bank officials have
shown some scepticism, considering the coun-
try's foreign exchange reserves and the inca-
pacity of debtor countries to provide adequate
guarantees for the loans. Turkey has started to
train diplomats and military officers from these
countries. Regular flights have been established
between Turkey and Central Asian capitals.
Communications systems for telephone and
telex to the rest of the world through Turkey
have been set up with Turkish help, and
assistance programmes are being planned for
educational and cultural activities.
124. It should be noted that Turkey's financial
resources are too limited to fund major initia-
tives for economic assistance to Central Asia. In
fact, Turkey is well aware of its own limitations
and it knows that, for the foreseeable future, the
conditions in the Central Asian region, which is
rich in natural resources but lacking the banking
infrastructure and the credit worthiness to
warrant extending loans, make it necessary to
resort to economic exchanges through barter
arrangements.
125. Central Asia's economic geography and
structures still need to be examined in depth. On
the other hand, Turkey shares a cultural heritage
and linguistic affinity with Central Asian
republics which may help them to confirm their
identity. It can also provide an example of how a
Muslim country can establish a secular state
based upon a pluralistic democracy.
126. The Central Asian republics still have a
long way to go towards democratic government
and a market economy. Their leaders have
legitimised their position through elections, but
these were only remotely democratic or properly
contested, except for those which took place in
Tajikistan.
127. Central Asia's governments will not be able
to rejuvenate their economies without relin-
quishing essential levels of power, such as state
ownership of land and industry. It is noted that
the economic development required for political
stability is complicated by an extremely hieh
annual population growth of more than 30/o in
many areas and a disastrous environmental
legacy. Existing industry is very ineffrcient and
will have to be abandoned and replaced in many
cases. Education and jobtraining systems in
Central Asia are the poorest in the ex-Soviet
Union.
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128. The only possible conclusion is that
Turkey should be encouraged to intensify its
contacts with Central Asian republics because,
to those countries, it appears to be a natural
partner to be imitated.
129. The conflict on the territory of former
Yugoslavia has shown the importance of early
information, consultation, and conflict pre-
vention. The establishment of a close rela-
tionship between Turkey and Central Asian
republics at different levels of interest and
activity should also be seen as a contribution to
conflict prevention. Clearly Turkey cannot do
everything alone and Western Europe should
therefore be asked to provide support in every
possible way, notwithstanding the overwhelm-
ingly strong centrifugal forces in the former
Soviet Union.
130. Finally, it should be noted that, in a
number of member states of the CIS, a new ten-
dency can be perceived towards what could be
called 'reintegration " of the now independent
republics. Recently, President Nazarbajev of
Kazakhstan not only pleaded in favour of estab-
lishing a strong common defence, but also for
economic integration and setting up efficient
common institutions. Up to a certain point,
these wishes are shared by most of the Central
Asian republics which are dependent on Russia
for their economic survival and for the pro-
tection of their borders. The ruling factions in
these republics also need the support of the
Russian anny in order to maintain their
political power and authority and to maintain
the often volatile and fragile regional stability.
As regards a number of tasks and activities
which are vital for the survival of the new
Central Asian republics, Turkey, for all its good
intentions and the positive influence it can
exercise, will not be able to take Russia's place
in the near future.
X. Tarleey's relations with Transcaucasia
l3l. In the north of the Anatolian peninsula,
Turkey shares its border with Georgia, Armenia
and, for only 12 km, with the autonomous
republic of Nakhichevan, which, although
further enclosed by Armenia, is part of
Azerbaijan. In all these republics, the political
situation is still in a state of flux. The conflict
between Armenia and Azerbaijan has now been
raging for more than four years, and recently,
Georgia also became entangled in thorny ethnic
conflicts.
Georgia
132. Georyia, with its 5.4 million inhabitants,
has not joined the CIS. As everywhere else in the
newly independent republics, the economy has
collapsed. After dropping by 50/o in 1989 and by
120/o in 1990, economic output fell by 250/o in
l99l and there is no indication of improvement
in the near future. Elections for the new par-
liament, which is to replace the unelected State
Council, are to be held on I lth October 1992.
133. Georgia is facing ethnic conflict in south
Ossetia, where the population wants to secede in
order to create an independent republic together
with neighbouring north Ossetia. Both parties
have now accepted the deployment of peace-
keeping forces and at the moment the situation
is relatively quiet.
134. Recently, a conflict broke out between
Georgia and Abkhazia, an autonomous republic
on Georgia's western territory, which declared
its independence in July 1992. Georgia's claim
to the Abkhazian region goes back to the fourth
century BC, saying that Abkhazian tribes
arrived only 600 years later. Later, the
Abkhazians were granted autonomy by the
Czars and Soviets.
135. According to the Abkhazians, their ter-
ritory was inhabited exclusively by Abkhazians
until 100 years ago and they put fonrard that
changes in its population only occurred since
then, in particular through Stalin's forced
migration policy. They also note that they
received the statute of independent Soviet
republic in 1925 and that the republic was
absorbed by Georgia only in 1931. Nowadays,
Abkhazia's population consists of 45Vo west
Georgians and only 18Yo Abkhazians.
136. The Abkhazians converted to Islam in the
16th century when they came under the
Ottoman empire. Nowadays, many deseendants
of Abkhazian emigr6s are living in Turkey.
137. The government of Georgia is the more
worried about Abkhazia because ofthe presence
of armed volunteers coming from other Cau-
casian republics on Russian territory in order to
support their " Abkhazian brothers ". The vol-
unteers sent by the * confederation of northern
Caucasian mountain people ", a mainly Muslim,
pan-Caucasian organisation, yearning for a Cau-
casian state, have announced that they will
retreat only after the withdrawal of Georgian
troops from the region.
138. Indeed, if one looks at the mounting
unrest in other Caucasian republics in the
region, more conflicts may be on the horizon
and the question is whether the governments of
Georgia and Russia will be able to contain them.
139. On 5th September 1992, a cease-fire
between Georgia and Abkhazia came into force
and Georgia agreed to keep only enough troops
in Abkhazia to protect the railroad and highway
network. The cease-fire has now been violated
and fighting has flared up again.
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140. After seizing the Black Sea resort town of
Gagra in early October, Abkhazia separatists are
in bontrol of virtually all northern Abkhazia
from Sukhumi to Russia's southern border.
Russian troops have taken control of the
Abkhazian section of the Moscow Tbilisi
railway, but Mr. Shevardnadze has disputed
their legal authority to do so on Georgian ter-
ritory and he is against intervention by Russian
or CIS armed forces. Georgia has repeatedly
acqrsed Russia of backing the Abkhazians, but
apart from some Russian officers who are
o-penly sympathetic to the Abkhazians and a few
former Russian troops discharged from local
bases who participate in the fighting there is no
proof of official Russian involvement.
l4l. On llth October, Mr. Shevardnadze was
elected President of the Parliament of Georgia,
the highest position in the country. Mr.
Shcvardnadze has said that he would do all that
is possible to find a political solution but that he
would use force if needed.
142. Georgia's ruling state council is now cre-
ating a defence council under the chairmanship
of Mr. Shevardnadze, which will have the power
to pass decisions that will be " mandatory for all
organisations and citizens across the state ". The
establishment of the Council is an important step
in efforts to stop the conflict in Abkhazia.
143. Turkey has no particularly close relations
with Georyia, nor is it particularly alarmed by
thc conflict between Georgians and Abkhazians,
but this may change if the conflict extends in
size and time. In that case, Turkey could face
massive migration of those who prefer to join
thcir kinsmen who have been living in Turkey
for many generations.
Azerbaijan
144. Not unlike some other nations in the
region, Azerbajan has often been a bone ofcon-
tention in the struggle for influence between the
different larger powers in that area. From the
beginning olthe 7th century AD, the territory of
Az-erbaijan was invaded by Turkish tribes from
Central Asia. After Mongolian rule during the
Middle Ages, the Safavid dynasty, extending its
rule from today's lran, introduced Shiism.
Bctween the 16th and lSth century, the territory
of Azerbaijan frequently changed hands between
Persians and Ottomans until, in 1828, Russia
acquired rule over the khanates of Nakhichevan,
Yeievan, Karabakh and the northern part of
Azerbarjan, while its southern part was annexed
by Persia.
145. In Azerbaijan, the political situation has
been fairly unstable since the country declared
its independence on 3fth August 1991. Mr.
Ayaz Mutalibov, a former first secretary of the
communist party who was elected president, had
tried to restore order under the pretence of
frghting Armenian aggression, but his decrees
proclaiming the state of emergency, curfew and
the suspension of political organisations have
had no effect. When President Mutalibov came
back from the l5th and 16th May CIS summit,
the Popular Front, representing the nationalist
opposition, ousted him and also suspended the
pailiament, which had an artificial communist
majority. In June 1992, Abulfez Elchibey, a
former dissident and political prisoner, suP-
ported by the Popular Front of which he is a
io-founder, was elected president. Mr. Elchibey
is a well-known and respected figure in Turkey
and before his election he already had material
support and advice from Turkey's leading
political parties.
146. Turkey attaches great importance to its
good relations with Azerbaiian and this country
has now chosen Turkey's latin script for its
Turkish language over the cyrillic or arabic
letters used by lran. President Abulfez Elchibey
has also made it clear that he is in favour of a
secular state model and of close relations with
Turkey without aiming at pan-Turkism.
147. One of Azerbaiian's problems is that, in
its contacts with Turkey, it cannot completely
ignore Iran with which it has a common border.
Only Nakhichevan, an autonomous Azeri
encl'ave in Armenia, has a common border with
Turkey.
148. Iran has a very active cultural policy
towards Azerbaiian through radio broadcasts,
the opening of schools, the building of mosques
and distribution of literature.
149. President Elchibey has demanded self-
determination and cultural rights for the 20
million Azeris living in Iran since Russia took
the northern Azeri region, now Azerbaiian, from
the Persian empire in the early l9th century, but
he may be aware that an independent South
Azerbaijan with 20 million inhabitants could
easily swallow up the north with its little more
than 7 million inhabitants.
150. A retired Turkish air force general, Yasar
Demirbulak, is adviser to President Abulfez
Elchibey on how to set up Azerbaiian's army.
Generai Demirbulak admits that it will take five
or six years to create a modern and trained
nationai army in the western sense. Apart from
the general, dozens of retired Turkish offrcers
are alleged to be present in the Azerbaiian army.
However, the Turkish defence minister, Nevzat
Ayaz, has stressed that these officers have no
relations with Turkey. He insists that his gov-
ernment wishes to solve the conflicts between
Armenia and Azerbaiian through peaceful nego-
tiations.
151. It is generally thought that the recent
improved performance of the Azei armed
forces has more to do with improved morale
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since the election of President Elchibey than
with anything else.
152. As regards relations between Azerbaijan
and Russia, it shoud be noted that on 8th
October 1992,the Azeri parliament by a vote of
48 to 1 rejected a fieaty signed in December
1991 by their President Mutalibov to join the
CIS. The new President Elchibey agreed with
parliament that the country will develop rela-
tions with the other republics of the former
Soviet Union on a bilateral basis. A bilateral
friendship treaty of co-operation and mutual
security was signed by the Presidents of both
republics on l2th October last. It is the coun-
terpart of a similar treaty between Russia and
Armenia signed about a year ago, which the
Russian parliament has refused to ratify.
Armenia
153. Armenia's history has been at least as an
eventful and sometimes even more tragic than
that of its neighbours. Armenians, coming from
south-eastern Europe, settled in the Transcau-
casian region in 1200 BC. During the reign of
Tiridates III, the kingdom of Armenia adopted
christianity as the state religion around 300 AD.
One hundred years later, the country was
divided into a Byzantine Armenia and a
Persarmenia. A long period followed in which
the Byzantines, Turks, Persians and Mongols
struggled for power in the region. Armenia was
conquered by one or other of them and some-
times succeeded in being independent. After the
capture of Constantinople by the Ottoman
Turks in 1453, Armenia became part of the
Ottoman empire, but later it continued to
change hands between Ottoman and Persian
occupation.
154. In 1813, the Persians were obliged to
acknowledge Russia's authority over Georgia,
northern Azerbaijan and Karabakh, while they
ceded Yerevan and Nakhichevan to Russia in
1828. At the peace of San Stefano in 1878, the
Ottoman empire received the region of Kars,
Ardahan and Batumi, but it was stipulated that
reforms should be carried out in favour of the
Armenians. However, both the Ottoman empire
and Russia were faced with a strong Armenian
nationalist movement. In 1895 and 1896, there
were massacres in the Ottoman provinces
inhabitated by Armenians. In 1915, after the
outbreak of the flrrst world war, the Ottoman
empire, worried over the loyalty of the
Armenian population at its border with Russia,
deported the entire Armenian population of
about I 750 000 to Syria and Mesopotamia, an
operation which cost the lives of around 600 000
Armenians. In 1920, the Treaty of Sdvres
recognised Armenia as an independent state, but
it was immediately attacked by both Turkey and
Russia and in December 1920, according to the
peace treaty of Alexandropol between Armenia
and Turkey, the western part of Armenia came
under Turkey. Moreover, the Armenian sig-
natory had to recognise that there were no
Armenian majorities anywhere in Turkey. The
next day, the eastern part became a Soviet
republic which, under the constitution of 1936,
became a constituent republic of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics.
155. In a referendum on the independence of
Armenia from the Soviet Union on 21st Sep-
tember 1991,94.4% of the population voted in
favour of secession. The Republic was declared
an independent state on the following 23rd Sep-
tember. Presidential elections were held on l6th
October 1991, when Levon Ter Petrosian, an
academic, was elected with 8370 of the votes.
156. Armenia's 3.3 million population is
largely christian. Its economy is in a very bad
state, also since Azerbaijan through which 80Yo
of Armenia's fuel and goods were previously
transported has blockaded its neighbour because
of the conflict over Nagorny-Karabakh. The
country's two nuclear power units, which pro-
vided one-fourth of its total energy needs were
shut down following the 1988 earthquake and
there is strong public opposition to their reacti-
vation, which is said to cost several hundred
million dollars.
The conflict between Azerbatjan and Armenia
157. The conflict between Azerbaijan and
Armenia, which started in 1988 and which has
so far cost an estimated 2 000 victims, is a par-
ticularly thorny problem for Turkey, which
shares a border with Armenia and a 12 km
border with the autonomous republic of
Nakhichevan. Turkey claims that the 1923
Treaty of Lausanne named it the peace-keeper
in the region and charged it with the task of
maintaining borders as they were established in
the 1920s.
158. In the 1920 Treaty of Sivres, the auton-
omous province of Nagorny-Karabakh, origi-
nally attributed to Armenia because of the fact
that 950/o of its population was Armenian, was
finally placed under the government of
Azerbaijan because of historic claims. At the
same time, the autonomous republic of
Nakhichevan was also attributed to Azerbaijan
because of the fact that the majority of its popu-
lation was Azeri.
159. In 1988, the Karabakh Committee, which
now controls Armenia's government, started agi-
tating for the return of Nagorny-Karabakh to
Armenian control, and with the weakening of
Soviet influence the issue developed into a
violent conflict, especially after massacres of
Armenians in the Azerbaijani cities of Sumgait
and Baku in 1988-89. In 1990, the Soviet army
occupied Karabakh in an effort to impose calm,
but this intervention was of little avail and open
hostilities increased when the troops pulled out
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in early 1992.ln May this year, after the capture
of Shusha and the area around Lachin, the
Armenians opened a corridor between Armenia
and Nagorny-Karabakh and at the same time
succeeded in driving the last Azerbaiianis from
the enclave.
160. A new front was then opened up on the
borders of Nakhichevan, which is part of
Azerbaijan, but is separated from it by Armenia.
After the first armed clashes, however, the
Nakhichevan President, Mr. Gaidar Aliev, a
former politburo member who is now a member
of the Azerbaijani Popular Front, agreed with
Armenia's President, Mr. Levon Ter-Petrosian,
to the creation of a security zone along the
border.
l6l. Earlier this year, Turkey accused Armenia
of aggressior-r against Nakhichevan and in May
President Ozal even threatened to send the
Turkish army into the region. This remark led to
a sharp reaction from the commander of the CIS
armed forces, Marshal Shaposhnikov, who gave
warning of war between Turkey and the CIS.
Later, in May 1992, awxe of the dangers of
becoming directly involved in the conflict,
Turkey proposed taking a regional initiative to
solve the Armenia-Azerbaijan dispute.
162. At a meeting of the CIS in Tashkent on
15th May 1992, Armenia signed a mutual security
pact with five other newly independent republics.
The pact, including Armenia, Kazakhstan,
Kirgizstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and
Turkmenistan, stipulates that " an aggression
against one of its members will be considered by
the others as an aggression against them all, " and
it calls for members to provide military aid if one
of them comes under attack. However, the coming
into existence of this pact has had no consequence
for the conflict between Armenia and Azerbarjan.
It seems the other partners are reluctant to get
involved in the conflict militarily.
163. A cease-fire agreement between Armenia
and Azerbaijan, signed in Alma Ata on 28th
August and to come into force on lst September
1992, all under the patronage of Kazakhstan's
President Nazarbajev, was totally ignored by
both parties. Nevertheless, unofficial negotia-
tions started again in Rome on 8th September
under the patronage of the CSCE. A new
cease-fire agreement in Nagorny-Karabakh, con-
cluded on 26th September, was violated on the
very same day, both parties accusing each other
of violations.
164. It is said by some that the final objective
of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan is to occupy
the Armenian territory between Nakhichevan
and Azerbaijan in order to create a pan-Turkish
grcater Azerbarjan which, in the medium term,
should also include that part of Iran along the
border inhabited by ethnic Azeris, but Turkey
categorically rejects such a solution, perfectly
well knowing that it would only wreak havoc on
the entire region.
165. It should be noted that claims of ethnic
and religious kinship with Azerbarjan are not
the only reasons for Turkey's uncompromising
attitude towards Armenia, which it repeatedly
has stigmatised as the aggressor. It has also stra-
tegic and political reasons to resent a possible
Armenian military and political success in the
conflict. One of them is that Armenian success
would only reinforce Armenia's claim to the
region in north-eastern Turkey which used to be
inhabited by Armenians before the mass depor-
tations mentioned in paragraph 152 took place.
Armenian success would also harm Turkey's
stand as tutor and protector of Muslim popula-
tions in Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Fur-
thermore, Armenia has good relations with Iran
which has treated the country and its population
far more benevolently throughout history than
Turkey. Armenian success would therefore also
give a boost to lran's political prestige, not espe-
cially desirable for Turkey.
166. Attempts by Turkey, Iran and the CSCE
to mediate in the conflict have failed and
Armenia has called for the United Nations to
step in. Until now, the Russian Federation has
not reacted enthusiastically to calls for United
Nations' mediation to solve conflicts on the ter-
ritory of the former Soviet Union. After four
years of fighting, however, it seems that only a
settlement mediated and guaranteed by the
United Nations and the great powers can bring
peace to Transcaucasia. There may be pressure
for an arrangement to include a partition along
ethnic lines with a new border betwen the
republics, but such a solution could have dan-
gerous implications. The changing of borders
might open Pandora's box and trigger a never-
ending chain of demands for border corrections
throughout the territory of the former Soviet
Union. Iran is bound to be a fierce opponent
since a border correction might not only depriveit of a connection with Russia through its
trusted neighbour Armenia, it might also rein-
force Azerbaijani calls for reunification, in one
way or another, with Azerbaiianis living in
northern Iran.
XI. Turkey and the confliu
in former Yugoslavia
L67. The conflict on the territory of former
Yugoslavia is only too well known for it to be
necessary to discuss again its origin and devel-
opment in this report. For such details, ref-
erence is made to the reports on European
security policy (Rapporteur: Mr. Goerens),
WEU's operational organisation and the
Yugoslav crisis (Rapporteur: Mr. Marten) and
operational arrangements for WEU the
Yugoslav crisis (Rapporteur: Mr. De Hoop
Scheffer) (Document 1294).
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168. The present report will limit itself to
Turkey's interest and r6le in the conflict.
169. It should be recalled that most of the ter-
ritory of the republics which formed Yugoslavia
has been part of the Ottoman empire from the
fifteenth to the nineteenth century. Croatia and
North Slavonia were liberated from the
Ottomans in 1699, South Slavonia in 1718. In
1878, the Congress of Berlin put an end to
factual Ottoman rule in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and it recognised the independence of Serbia
and Montenegro. Macedonia was annexed by
Serbia in l9l2-13.
170. When Slovenia and Croatia started to break
up the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1990-91,
Turkey initially favoured a diplomatic solution,
declaring that it was in favour of maintaining
Yugoslavia's territorial integrity. However, when
it became clear that the international community
had decided to legitimise the dilferent republics of
former Yugoslavia and when increasingly strong
pressure was exerted by both Bosnia and Mace-
doni4 which had already been recogrised by Bul-
gari4 Turkey understood that it had to change its
policy and in February 1992 it recogrrised collec-
tively Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Macedonia.
l7l. The Yugoslav crisis and possible other
crises in the Balkan area could lead to massive
migration of Muslims and ethnic Turks to
Turkey. Understandably, the Turkish Gov-
ernment has the greatest difficulty in facing the
resulting social and economic problems, well
knowing that, at the beginning of the conflict, in
Bosnia-Herzegovina there were about 1.9 mil-
lion Serbo-Croat speaking Muslims and 200 000
ethnic Turks, while altogether there are l0
million Muslims in the Balkans, of whom
between I and 1.5 million are ethnic Turks. An
estimated 2 million people of Bosnian Muslim
origin are living in Turkey.
172. With Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina
being threatened, harassed, persecuted and
killed for purely ethnic-religious reasons, Turkey
cannot afford to remain idle. Still, for Turkey,
even if it follows events closely, there are other
priorities at and within its own borders which
absorb much of its attention, such as the
mounting tension with Kurdish separatists in
the south-east of the country, strained relations
with Greece over many different issues, and the
conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Moreover, it does not fit the modern Turkish
tradition of a secular nation state to become
directly involved in other nations' policies for
reasons of religious kinship.
173. At the moment, Turkey's greatest concern
is that the ethnic-religious conflicts in former
Yugoslavia might spill over into Macedonia,
Kosovo and possibly other states, which could
lead to the direct or indirect involvement of
Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey.
174. In this framework, Turkey might actively
seek closer co-operation in security policy with
Bulgaria and Albania.
175. In its active search for a solution, Turkey
has joined lran and Tunisia in calling for a
meeting of foreign ministers of the Organisation
of the Islamic Conference (OIC), a forum in
which 46 Islamic countries participate. The OIC
foreign ministers met in Istanbul to discuss the
situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Apart from
worries over the massacre of Muslims and the
failure of the West to respond, an important
Turkish objective was to provide Muslim
support for international action in the
framework of the United Nations and to prevent
unilateral action by Muslim countries.
176. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Hikmet
Cetin, recently said that his government was
becoming * increasingly discouraged " by the
ineffectiveness of United Nations and EC efforts
to stop the killing and persecution of Bosnian
Muslims. He said that the reluctance of the
United States and other members of the Security
Council to contemplate the use of military force
in Bosnia was a serious mistake which only
served to encourage the aggressors. Turkey
advocated " limited military intervention "
under United Nations control, essentially
involving limited air strikes against Serb militias
which did not implement the recent London
agreements. Moreover, an air-exclusion zone
over Bosnia should be imposed. Turkey was pre-
pared to contribute to international action, but
it would not act alone, even if hundreds of thou-
sands of Bosnian Muslims have taken refuge in
the country (Financial Times, 29th September
1992).
XII. Turlrey's rebtions with lran,
Ira4 and Syda
177. Relations with Iran, Iraq and Syria are
rather complicated. Understandably, the Kurdish
problem and in particular the terrorism exerted by
the PKK is playing an important r6le in these rela-
tions. Turkey has accused each of these neigh-
bouring countries of actively supporting the PKK
in order to destabilise Turkey.
178. Recently, the Turkish Minister of the
Interior, Ismet Sezgin, after meetings with the
Iranian Government, declared that " both coun-
tries had the political will to co-operate in the
fight against terrorism ". Mr. Sezgin also stated
that Tehran had provided guarantees concerning
the fight against the Kurdish separatists of the
PKK. Mr. Demirel visited Tehran at the end of
October 1992. Turkey is also worried about the
activities of the Iranian Mujahidins among the
Turkish population.
179. In April 1992, Mr. Sezgin had visited
Damascus in order to discuss Syrian support for
the PKK after Turkish threats to shell PKK
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training camps in the Bekaa valley. Approx!-
mately 600/o of the 500 000 Kurds living in Syria
are thought to support the PKK. Syria has
closed these training camps, but it is still a safe
haven for the PKK's leadership. Turkey and
Syria are further said to have agreed that they
will control illegal border traflic.
180. Another problem in Turkey's relations
with Syria is Syria's claim to part of Turkey's
territory. The area claimed, as mentioned in the
Syrian ionstitution, may include one seventh of
Turkey's territory, including the cities of
Antakia, Iskenderun, Ingirlik, Adana and Iged.
l8l. Water in the Euphrates, which is con-
trolled by the Turkish Keban and Atatiirk dams
is also a cause of tension. Syria is very much
dependent on water from the Euphrates and it
would like the Turks to provide more than the
500 cu.m per second which were agreed on in
l 987.
182. Relations with Iraq are in a state of flux,
in particular since the Gulf war, when Turkey
wai part of the coalition against Iraq. Economic
relations have almost come to a standstill and
the pipeline which transported Iraqi oil through
Turkey is still blocked. There is great uncer-
tainty over the future of Iraq but Turkey is
strongly against any proposals to divide the
country into different parts, also because it
would provide Turkish separatist Kurds with
arguments for complete independence, threat-
ening the territorial integrity of the country.
XIII. Russia
183. Turkey is determined to build a * strategic
relationship " with Russia, embracing both pol-
itics and economics. It is co-operating with
Russia in finding solutions for ethnic conflicts in
Transcaucasia on the assumption that both
states have an interest in preventing such con-
flicts spilling over their own borders. Another
good reason for cooperation is that Turkey
hqes to harness Russia's energy supplies and
high technology with Turkish trading skill and
industrial potential.
184. [n economic relations, the objective of
cqnmon efforts would be a $10 billion annual
trade within five years, which sounds fairly
ambitious, given a total trade of $644 million in
the first trif of $92. On the other hand, it
should be noted that the Turkish official export
credit institution, Eximbank, has earmarked
850/o of all its lending to the CIS, most being ear-
marked for Russia.
185. It should be noted that in 1984, Turkey
and the Soviet Union signed a trade protocol
under which Turkey imports Soviet gas in part
exchange for Turkish goods and services. The
break-up of the Soviet Union also caused the
collapse of Turkish-Soviet trade.
186. In May 1992, the Russian Government
gave assurances that it would settle its out-
itanding debt with Turkey through an extended
gas deal, but it has not been able to keep its
promises, pleading more urgent spending Prlor-
ities, and- this year it owes Eximbank $48
million in arrears. After Prime Minister
Demirel's successful visit to Moscow in May
1992, Eximbank stated that it would unblock its
credit lines to Russia as from June 1992, but, in
view of the worsening situation since that date,
this has not yet happened.
187. Russia and Turkey are developing
projects to make Turkey an international
ihannet for transferring oil and gas from the
former Soviet territory to the rest of the world.
Turkey has indicated that it can also help to
develop the Russian port of Novorossisk on the
Bhck Sea, now that Russia no longer has free
access to Odessa, which is a part of the
Ukraine.
XIY. Turkish minorities
in neighhouring countries
(a) Bulgaria
188. In 1984-85, the Bulgarian Government
under Todor Zhivkov which had gradually
denied Turkish forms of national cultural
expression, started a forced campaign to change
Turkish names into Bulgarian. At that time, the
Turkish ethnic minority, offrcially estimated at
500 000, was thought to be between 700 000 and
I 000 000, or a maximum I l0lo of the total popu-
lation. In addition, there were some 100 000
Pomaks, or Islamised Bulgarians. The Turkish
population was concentrated in the Arda river
baiin in the south and in the mountainous
region in the north-east of Bulgaria.
189. Following earlier emigration agreements
between the two neighbouring countries, in
1950-52 and 1968-78, some 120000 and
I 15 000 Bulgarian Turks respectively had been
allowed to leave for Turkey. As a result of this
forced assimilation policy, some 320 000 Turks,
mainly agricultural workers, emigrated to
Turkey. After this mass migration of ethnic
Turks-to Turkey, around 120000 returned to
Butgaria after United States mediation and rela-
tions between both countries have since
improved.
190. At the moment, the third most powerful
political party in the Bulgarian Parliament,
holding the balance, is the Turkish movement
for rights and freedoms. It should, however, be
noted that this ethnically-based political
movement naturally generates reactions, partly
motivated by fears that ethnic polarisation could
cripple democratic development in Bulgaria.
191. A Bulgarian senator has suggested that
only by treaiing minority concerns in a calm,
resdrained manher, could a nation avoid an
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exacerbation of sensitive concerns. Excessive
public debate provides " free advertisements "
for those who would generate ethnic strife.
192. It is a positive sign that Ahmed Dogan,
the leader of the movement for rights and
freedoms, has declared his party's opposition to
all demands to create separate states or auton-
omous regions. He continued that his party was
committed to guaranteeing the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Bulgaria. The basic
objective of the party is recognition of the
Turkish minority as a constructive force and
helping Bulgaria to become a part of the EC,
which is necessary to the development of " plur-
alism and genuine democracy. "
(b) Republic of Macedonia
193. At the moment, between 80000 and
90 000 Turks are living in the Republic of Mace-
donia. From the beginning of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia after the second world
war, the Turks in Macedonia were recognised as
a nationality and they were allowed educational
and cultural rights from the outset.
194. Although in the first years after the second
world war Turks had been seen as suspect
because of the friendship between Turkey and
the West, such sentiments have long since
calmed down and there is no specific reason to
think that today Turks living in the Republic of
Macedonia do not enjoy full rights as citizens.
195. In preparation for the 8th September
Macedonian referendum on sovereignty, the
Turkish Democratic Alliance (DST) encouraged
Turks in Macedonia to support Macedonian
independence. Both the Macedonian President
Gligorov and Turkey's Prime Minister Demirel
have stated their intention to forge close rela-
tions between the two republics. Turkey has
made special efforts to help Macedonia econom-
ically, but it is unlikely to intervene directly
should any state take military action against the
Republic of Macedonia.
(c) Greece
196. After the first world war, when the
Ottoman government in Turkey was opposed by
Mustafa Kemal, who had established a national
government in Ankara in May 1919, the allied
countries allowed Greece to occupy the region of
Smyrna (Izmir). The following Peace of Sdvres
in August 1920 between the allies and Ottoman
Turkey attributed eastern Thrace, without Con-
stantinople and its surroundings, and the region
of Smyrna to Greece. Immediately after-the
Peace of S0vres, Greece started an offensive
against the nationalist government of Mustafa
Kemal and occupied western Anatolia. This
Greco-Turkish war resulted in the Peace Treaty
of Lausanne in 1923. Greece had to abandon
eastern Thrace and the territories in Asia Minor
and Anatolia. The treaty also stipulated that the
Greek and Turkish populations of Turkey and
Greece respectively were to be exchanged,
except for the Greeks in Istanbul and the Turks
in western Thrace. Some 400 000 Turks residing
in northern Greece were transported to Turkey,
while 150 000 Greeks from Asia Minor joined
those I 250 000 Greeks who had already fled the
advance of the Turkish army in that region.
197. It is thought that the Turkish minority in
western Thrace numbers some 100 000 people.
However, according to the Greek authorities
they are not Turks but 'Greek Muslims " and
there has been a government policy to drive
them out of Greece and to discriminate against
them economically. One of the methods fre-
quently used was to strip these Turks of their
Greek citizenship while travelling abroad and
then refuse them re-entry but there are signs that
this practice would be abandoned. Greece has
fears that, following the Cyprus example, a
Turkish movement could develop in western
Thrace, pressing for autonomy or even union
with Turkey.
198. It should be observed, however, that the
present government seems to be making efforts
to improve the situation in Western Thrace.
European Community funding for regional
development is being directed to Thrace and the
government is trying to change ingrained atti-
tudes among local officials in order to remove
obstacles to active Muslim participation in the
economy. Nevertheless, the situation still needs
further improvement.
XY. Modernisation of the Tu*ish armed forces
199. In 1986, Turkey started a ten year
modernisation programme for its armed forces
at a total estimated cost of $10 billion. Since
then, budgetary problems, a changing strategic
situation and the general elections in October
1992 leading to a change in government have all
had negative effects on the implementation of
the programme.
200. The new government, however, has
realised that growing instability in the region,
which is examined elsewhere in this report, the
lessons learned from the Gulf war and increas-
ingly violent activity by Kurdish separatists in
the south-east of the country are urgent reasons
to continue the modernisation programme and
to restructure the armed forces. The army's
strength will be reduced from 470 000 to
300 000, employing a maximum of 60 000 pro-
fessional soldiers who will replace conscripts
insofar as possible. In order to allow better
mobility and flexibility, divisional and regi-
mental echelons will be replaced by a brigade
and battalion structure.
346
Ir
DOCUMENT I34I
201. Turkey has a positive attitude towards the
multi-national rapid reaction forces to be
formed under the new NATO strategy and is
planning active participation, but so far the
Turkish Government has entered into no
detailed commitments.
202. In the framework of NATO's programme
to remove equipment from its central region to
its flanks, the equipment of the Turkish army
will be considerably modernised at minimal
cost. Turkey will receive I 057 tanks, 600
armoured combat vehicles and 72 artillery
pieces. The tanks include United States
M 60-Al and M 60-43 models and the German
Leopard I Al recently refurbished to A3 config-
uration.
203. ln 1992, Turkey will spend $1.59 billion
from its defence budget on arrns procurement
and in addition to that $760 million from its
defence industry support fund. Defence pro-
curement expenditure for 1993 will reach a total
of $2.7 billion. The major procurement pro-
grammes for the near future for which contracts
ire stifl to be awarded, include 80 F-16s, 54 low-
level air-defence systems, fire-control systems
for air defence artiltery and 130 multiple-launch
rocket systems. Turkey is considering diversi-
fying its defence procurement in the belief that
r-eliance on one main supplier may easily reduce
its political flexibility.
204. In that framework, negotiations have been
held between Russia and Turkey on the acqui-
sition of Russian military equipment, which
could also include the transfer of military tech-
nology and licensed manufacturing of military
equiphent in Turkey. Other suppliers of mil-itirf equipment for Turkey are Spain (CASA
transport aircraft), the United Kingd_o_m
(Ivlarconi radio systems), France (Thomson CSF
radars) and Italy (Agusta trainers).
205. The Turkish Defence Minister, Nevzat
Ayaz, has, however, made it clear that before
taiing concrete steps on lasting co-operation,
issues such as the reliability of the source,
concept of use, standardisation, training and
logistii support must be fully evaluated.
206. It is known that in the past the United
States has set conditions for the use of armaments
to be acquired by Turkey. Recently, Germany and
Switzerland have suspended arms shipments to
Turkey because they were concemed that these
arms could be used against Kurdish insurgents. A
contract with the Swiss company Oerlikon for
25mm guns for Turkey's FMC armourgd per-
sonnel carriers was ca:rcelled following objections
in the Swiss parliament over Turkey's handling of
the Kurdish questions.
207. Last month, Turkey announced that the
United States company Sikorsky had been
selected to negotiate terms for the joint manu-
facture of 50 S-70A multipurpose Black Hawk
helicopters, with a further 25 sold for immediate
delivery. The ltalian firm Agusta and the
French-German consortium Eurocopter had
also competed for the contract but it seems that
the support provided by the United States
Export-Import Bank, which provided Sikorsky
export credit guarantees for 80Vo ofthe contract,
heiped to facilitate Turkey's choice. It is said
thai long-term co-production will pave the way
for an additional supply of 75 helicopters.
208. The helicopters are part of a programme
to enhance Turkey's rapid reaction capability. It
hopes this programme will also help to improve
its stand in the struggle with the Kurdish sepa-
ratist movement.
XYI. Turley and WEU
209. It is impossible to imagine a European
security structure without Turkey, first because
it is the bulwark of the defence of South-Eastern
Europe and second because, as the successor to
the Ottoman empire, it has a r6le to play in the
Balkans.
2lO. For many years, Turkey has played a fun-
damental rOle in western security. Its loyalty as a
member of NATO is real and proven and it
made a major and, for itself, costly contribution
to the Gulf war. During the long period of
East-West confrontation, Turkey played a loyal
and efficient r61e in European security.
2Il. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the
new scenario of risks and threats in Europe
changed but did not diminish the rOle that
Turkey must continue to PlaY.
212. While centres of tension have shifted to
the Middle East, the Caucasian region and the
Balkans, on all these fronts Europe mu.st take
into account Turkey's views and contribution
now that a security strategy has to be defined.
213. Its r0le as a bulwark is too well known to
need detailed examination. It is enough to recall
that its south-eastern neighbours - Iran, Iraq
and Syria - have not, in recent history, been par-
ticulaily peaceful. Moreover, the whole Cau-
casian iegion, along Turkey's north-eastern fron-
tiers, has also been victim to serious ethnic
conflicts which are liable to become increasingly
bitter.
2L4. Turkey is also anxious to settle disputes
by peaceful means and even to avert them by
pieventive diplomacy. Western Europe, with
wtrictr Turkey feels closely linked, could and
should make use of the Turks' knowledge of the
region, one of the most disturbed in the world
toiay, in order to pursue a balanced security
poliiv. Turkey is thus destined to make a major
iontiibution fo a European security policy in the
framework of WEU. At the same time, its r6le
might increase in the framework of preventive
diplomacy in the CSCE.
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215. There can be no question of Europe trying
to pursue an external security policy in the
Balkans without taking account of Turkey's
opinion in view of the fact that the region is
inhabited by millions of Muslims, some of them
ethnic Turks.
216. Obviously, there is a Western European
interest in co-ordinating its policy towards the
Balkans with Turkey. Any future security
arrangement for the Balkans should include a
settlement of Turkish-Bulgarian and Turkish-
Greek relations. Guarantees for the existence of
an independent Macedonia within the present
borders would be important. Even more
important would be the limitation of armed
forces of all the nations in and around the
Balkans. Participation of both Greece and
Turkey in WEU consultations and other activ-
ities could certainly contribute to enhanced
security in that region.
217. After the member states of WEU meeting
in Maastricht on 9th and lfth December 1991,
had invited Turkey to become an associate
member of the organisation, they set out their
conditions in the Petersberg Declaration a. The
proposed status of associate member was met with
a mixture of disappointment and hope from the
Turkish authorities: disappointment because of
their desire to become a full membet hope since it
was a step forward and a real contribution to the
idea of a European defence identity in which
Turkey wishes to play a full part.
218. What does associate membership of WEU
mean for Turkey? Strictly speaking, Turkey will
find itself in a difficult position. It may partic-
ipate in the WEU Council meetings, but it may
not block a decision which is the subject of con-
sensus among the member states, as is the case
with all important decisions. It can still be
excluded from participation by a majority of
member states or half the member states
including the presidency.
219. In fact, it is giving up its freedom of
action by associating itself with a European
security alliance without having the protection
offered by that alliance. It may participate in the
implementation of decisions taken by member
states without having been able to participate in
the decision-making process other than as a con-
sultant. It might even become a target of choice
for a possible aggressor if it is known that others
will not come to its aid because they have no
contractual commitments to it. Conversely, a
country attacking a member state of WEU might
expect Turkey to be prepared to afford
assistance to the members of WEU, including
Greece, because of Turkey's associate status. It
is not the associate state that might involve
member states in international conflicts, but the
latter that might involve Turkey. Iogically
speaking, it might even be concluded that
Turkey would weaken its own security in the
region by accepting the status of associate
member of WEU.
220. The Council's decision to suspend the
application of Article V of the modified Brussels
Treaty in relations between members and asso
ciate members of WEU may be understandable
for those who are afraid of a situation where
Greece might invoke this article against Turkey,
but your rapporteur wonders why the modified
Brussels Treaty had to be weakened in order to
allow Greece to become a member of WEU. If
the Council had decided that associate mem-
bership came within the terms of Article XI of
the modified Brussels Treaty 5, there would have
been no problem since, in that case, Article VII
of the treaty would have provided enough
guarantees 6. Also, associate membership would
then have had a sound legal basis, to be ratified
by all the member states of WEU, a procedure
which seems appropriate if a country is invited
to be an associate member and to * participate
fully " in the activities of a security alliance.
221. For political reasons, however, the
Council has chosen a different approach. Pre-
ferring to make a clear distinction between
members and associate members, it has nego-
tiated with the candidate for membership in
accordance with Article XI of the modified
Brussels Treaty, while for candidates for asso-
ciate status a different procedure was chosen.
222. At the moment, it is not yet clear whether
the association agreement 
- 
or document, as it is
called in the Petersberg Declaration 
- 
will have
to be ratified by all signatory states. The Decla-
ration of the nine WEU member states in Maas-
tricht may also give rise to different
interpretations 7.
5. Article XI reads: 'The high contracting parties may, by
agxeement, invite any other state to accede to the present
treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the state
so invited. Any state so invited may become a party to the
treaty by depositing an instrument of accession with the
Belgian Government. The Belgian Government will inform
each of the hiEh contracting parties of the deposit of each
instrument of accession. "
6. Article VII reads: " The high contracting parties declare,
each so far as he is concerned, that none ofthe international
engagements now in force between him and any other of the
high contracting parties or any third state is in conflict with
the provisions of the present treaty. None of the high con-
tracting parties will conclude any alliance or participate in
any coalition directed against any other of the high con-
tracting parties. "
7. On enlargement, this declaration reads as follows: " States
which are members of the European Union are invited to
accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance
with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to
become observers if they so wish. Simultaneously, other
European member states of NATO are invited to become
associate members of WEU in a way which will give them
the possibility of participating fully in the activities of
WEU. "4. See Appendix II.
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223. The definition and scope of commitments
that Turkey considers stem from the status of
associate member - the subject of current nego-
tiations - must be agreed upon to the satis-
faction of both parties, i.e. Turkey and WEU'
224. It would be desirable for the negotiations
between the Turkish authorities and WEU for
fixing the conditions of Turkey's participation
in the activities of WEU to be concluded with a
balanced agreement for both parties, guaran-
teeing Turkey's rights and obligations vis-i-vis
WEtl, bearirig in mind the requirements laid
down in the Petersberg Declaration.
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1. The Prime Ministers of Turkey and
Greece with the presence of their foreign min-
isters, met in Davos, Switzerland on lst Feb-
ruary 1992. They had a comprehensive ex-
change of views on the issues affecting their
bilateral relations as well as on matters of
common interest on regional and international
developments. Their discussions were held in an
atmosphere of mutual understanding and in a
constructive spirit.
2. The two Prime Ministers reiterated their
mutual desire and readiness to develop and
expand their relations effectively in all areas.
They, accordingly, decided to give a new
impetus to their relationship by engaging in a
meaningful and substantive dialogue.
3. The two Prime Ministers underlined the
desirability and importance of highJevel visits
and contacts between the two countries.
4. The two Prime Ministers reaffirmed that
their relationship rests on friendship, good-
neighbourliness and co-operation in all fields,
reflecting the common interests and aspirations
of their two nations. To enhance this rela-
tionship, they confirmed their readiness to con-
clude an agreement of friendship, good-
APPENDIX I
Davos joint communiqud
(Davos, Switzerland - lst February 1992)
neighbourliness and cooperation between thetwo countries. In this connection, they
instructed their foreign ministers to undertake
the necessary preparations for this agreement
which would be signed on the occasion of the
visit of the Greek Prime Minister to Ankara.
The two Foreign Ministers will meet at a date to
be decided through diplomatic channels.
5. The two Prime Ministers reviewed the sit-
uation concerning the Cyprus problem. They
noted that both sides shared the objective ofan
early negotiated settlement in Cyprus which
would be just and lasting. They agreed that the
good offrces mission of the United Nations
Secretary General should be supported. They
expressed their will to contribute to a mutually
acceptable solution in Cyprus by providing
appropriate encouragement.
6. The Prime Minister of Turkey informed
the Prime Minister of Greece that Turkey sup-
ports the participation of Greece in the -gta6k
Sea Economic Co-operation Project.
7. The two Prime Ministers expressed their
conviction that successful and timely implemen-
tation of the steps they agreed to take in their
meeting will chart a new course of mutually ben-
eficial ielations between their countries.
350
ri
ti
!it
,i
APPENDIX II DOCUMENT 134I
APPENDIX II
Paragraphs of the Petersberg Declaralign w-ith regard to
- 
a.ssociate membershiP of IUEU
" Following the Declaration released in
Maastricht on 10th December l99l in con-
nection with the Treaty on European Union,
WEU ministers recalled the fundamental prin-
ciples on which relations between member states
and associate member states should be based.
Moreover, the Petersberg Declaration
recalled the fundamental principles on which
relations between member states and associate
member states should be based as follows:
- 
settlement of their mutual differences
by peaceful means in accordance with
thebbligations resulting from the mod-
ified Brussels TreatY, the North
American TreatY and the United
Nations Charter, the commitments
entered into under the terms of the Hel-
sinki Final Act and the Paris Charter,
and the other generally recognised prin-
ciples and rules of international law;
- 
in their mutual relations, refraining
from resorting to the threat or use of
force, in accordance with the United
Nations Charter.
- 
They also stressed that the security
guarantees and defence commitments
in the treaties which bind the member
states within Western European Union
and which bind them within the
Atlantic Alliance are mutually rein-
forcing and will not be invoked bY
those subscribing to Part III of the
Petersberg Declaration in disputes
between member states of either of the
two organisations.
Associate members:
Other European member states of the
Atlantic Alliance which have accepted the invi-
tation to become associate members of WEU,
although not being parties to th-e modified
Brussels Treaty, may participate fully in the
meetings of the WEU Council - withoul PLei:
udice to the provisions laid down in Article VIII
of the modified Brussels Treaty - of its working
groups and of the subsidiary bodies, subject to
the following provisions:
- 
at the request of a majoritY of the
member states, or of half of the
member states including the Presi-
dency, participation may be restricted
to full members;
- 
they will be able to be associated to the
planning cell through a Permanent
liaison arrangement;
- 
they will have the same rights and
responsibilities as the full members for
functions transferred to WEU from
other fora and institutions to which
they already belong;
- 
they will have the right to speak but
may not block a decision that is the
subiect of consensus among the
member states;
- 
they may associate themselves with the
decisions taken by member states; they
will be able to participate in their
implementation unless a majority of
the member states or half of the
member states including the Presi-
dency, decide otherwise;
- 
they will take part on the same basis as
full members in WEU military opera-
tions to which theY commit forces;
- 
they will accept in full the substance of
Section A of Part III of the Petersberg
Declaration which will form part of the
association document;
- 
they will be connected to the member
states' telecommunications system(WEUCOM) for messages concerning
meetings and activities in which they
participate;
- 
they will be asked to make a financial
conlribution to the organisation's
budgets.
Space activities
For practical reasons, space activities will
be restricted to the present members until the
end of the experimental phase of the satellite
centre in 1995. During this phase the new
members and associate members will be kept
informed of WEU's space activities. Appro-
priate arrangements will be made for associate
members to participate in subsequent space
activities at the same time as decisions are taken
on the continuation of such activities. "
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Amendments 1, 2 and 3
'i
30th November 1992 ii
Turleey
AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and 3t
tabled by Mr. Speroni and Mn Bosco
L Leave out paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert: i
* Concerned about the repression of the Kurdish people living in Turkey;
?... After paragraph (x) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph asfollows: 
:
* Wishing the rights of the Kurdish people to be recognised by peaceful, democratic I
means; "
3. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:
'Establish as a condition for the accession of Turkey recognition of the Kurdish people's right to
self-determination in accordance with the principles of the Helsinki declaration. t'
Signed: Speroni, Bosco
1. See lfth sitting, lst December 1992 (amendments I and 3 withdrawn; amendment 2 negatived).
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1. Since the committee adopted its report on
Turkey on 6th November 1992, there have been
certain new developments which should be
taken into account. At the same time, the
Turkish authorities have kindly informed the
committee that some passages in the report
might lead to misunderstandings.
2. First of all, it is noted that, on 20th
November 1992, the document on associate
membership of WEU for Iceland, Nonway and
Turkey was signed in Rome. This document is
not necessarily subject to ratification by the sig-
natory states. The Council, in its answer to
Written Question 300 put by Mr. Goerens,
stated that associate members are not parties to
the modified Brussels Treaty.
3. For semantic reasons, the word " gue-
rillas" in paragraphs 9, 16 and 18 should be
replaced by " terrorists " which, according to
Chembers Enelish Dictionary more appropri-
ately identiflres persons who take part in " an
organised system of intimidation, especially for
political ends ".
4. In addition to the text of paragraph I I of
the report, the Turkish Government has made it
known that it estimates the number of Kurds
living on its territory to be between 8 and 12
million.
5. The operations against the PKK in
nofthern Iraq mentioned in paragraph 23 of the
report have now been concluded and they seem
to have been successful.
6. The Black Sea Economic Co-operation,
discussed in Chapter VI of the report, which is
widely referred to as a pact, is in fact a decla-
ration.
7. In order to avoid misinterpretation, in
paragraph 60 the words " Genuine respect for
minorities " should be replaced by " Mutual
confidence between the two communities of the
island and respect for their equal political
rights ".
8. It should be noted that the Turkish com-
plaints referred to in paragraph 62 speak of
" militarisation of " rather than of " defensive
30th November 1992
emplacements on " the Greek islands of the
eastern Aegean and the Dodecanese islands.
9. As regards paragraphs 87-199 on
Tajikistan, it is worth mentioning that the
movement of former communists is making a
remarkable come-back. In recent weeks, militias
loyal to the former communists have inflicted
heavy losses on the Islamic forces and the
capital Dushanbe is now under siege. The par-
liament meeting in Khojand for a special session
elected Mr. Imamali Rakhmanov as its speaker
and effective head of state to succeed to Mr.
Iskandarov.
10. It should also be noted that, according to
the Turkish Government, there are not ethnic
Turks in Bosnia-Herzegovina as is mentioned in
paragraph 171 ofthe report. On the other hand,
people of Turkish origin are living in Kosovo,
Macedonia and Sandjak.
ll. As regards NATO's multinational rapid
reaction forces mentioned in paragraph 201 of
the report, the Turkish Government has now
allocated a division consisting of one
mechanised and one tank brigade to the allied
reaction corps which is also open to the partici-
pation of other allies. Furthermore, NATO
authorities have been informed that Turkey
could place one commando brigade with the
southern region multinational division, one
combat engineering company with the corps
support unit, one Howitzer battery and one
combat engineering company with the imme-
diate reaction land force. It has also expressed
its willingness to host the headquarters of
the southern region multinational division(MDN-S).
12. According to the Turkish authorities,
Prime Minister Demirel never made any decla-
ration such as was quoted from Le Monde in
paragraph 20 of the report. They have made it
known that Turkey was, and still is, in favour of
the territorial integrity of Iraq. In a press con-
ference on 24th Ocotber 1992, Prime Minister
Demirel once again declared: " We are opposed
to steps which might open the way to threats to
the territorial integrity of Iraq and to unilateral
action ".
Turley
ADDENDUM
to the report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee
by Mr. Moya, Rqtporteur
3s3
Document 1342 6th Novembet 1992
European security policy 
-
reply to the thirty-seventh annual repon of the Council
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf of the Political Committeez
by Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur
PART ONE
Europnan Union, WEU and the consequences of Moastricht
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnerr RrcouurNoenoN
on European security policy 
- 
reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the
Council European Union, WEU and the consequences of Maastricht
Expr-nNetonv MruoRaNouu
submitted by Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. The direct consequences of Maastricht for WEU
III. The Petersberg Declaration
IV. The WEU Assembly and the European Parliament
V. The dialogue with the Central European countries
YI. Conclusions
YII. The meeting of the committee on 6th November 1992
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mt. Stoffelen (Chairman) ; Lord Finsberg, Mr. De Decker (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts(Alternate: Verbeek), Alegre, Beix (Alternate: Baumel), Bowden, Caro (Alternate: Lemoine), De Hoop Scheffer, Fabra, Feldmann,
Forni, Goerens, Homs I Ferret, Sir Russell Johnston, Lord Kirkhill, MM. Kittelmann, Koehl, Moya, Miiller, Pdcriaux (Alternate:
Chevalier'1, de Puig, Reddemann, Rodrigues, Roseta, Seeuws, Soell, Ward, Wintgens, N..., N..., N..., N..., N...
N.B. 7he names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Recommendation
on Eumlnut suurity pliq -
ruply to thc thirty-seventh annual rcport ofthc Councib
Eumpean Ilaiov WEU and tho aonsequeilces of Maostricht
The Assembly,
l. Is resolutely in favour of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by all signatory countries;
2. Considers the modified Brussels Treaty to be the only treaty providing the foundations for truly
European solidarity in defence matters and, as such, the inevitable basis of a European Union in this
area;
3. Recalls its Recommendations 490 and 504 urging the Council to revise the treaty to adapt it to
the new situation in Europe without weakening the commitments it includes;
4. Notes that the Maastricht Treaty recognises this fact and specifies that WEU is part of the
process of European Union;
5. Believes that, for WEU to assume the r61e attributed to it by Article I of the modified Brussels
Treaty and by the Maastricht Treaty, it is essential for the modified Brussels Treaty to continue to be
strictly applied;
6. Notes that the Council is apparently using various means to diminish the importan_ce andjuridical significance of the treaty, to circumvent iti provisions and to weaken its political significance,
e.g by:
(i) feigfingto ignore the way the responiibilities of WEU under Articles I, I[ and III of the mod-
ified tirusseis Triaty,-the exercise,of which has been entrusted to other organisations,.are effectively
carried out, as can 56 seen from paragraph 4 of the reply to Recommendation 517, while.paragraph 3
oi ttre answer to Written Questions 302 and 303 recognises the Assembly's responsibility for " any
matter arising out of the Brussels Treaty ";
(ii) not reaching agreement with NATO to avoid duplicqtion of work, as_requ-ired by Article IV,
as it emerges from thipa-rallel decisions taken by NATO and_WfU on the naval deplo-yment to enforce
ifrc e.Uurlo against S&Uia and Montenegro deiided by the Security Council and on the deployment of
armed fories Irom member countries to escort humanitarian assistance for Bosnia-Herzegovina;
(iii) introducing in the Petersberg Declaration a reservation that seems to be of general signifi-
cance relating to the application of Article V;
(lv/ wrongly taking Article VII as a basis for justifying this reservation, as it does in its answer to
Written Question 301;
(v) maktngno reference, in the second part of its_thirty-seventh annual repgrt, to.the A_ge_ncy for
the Cdntrol of Armaments, a subsidiary body of the Council in accordance with Article VIII;
(vi) thereby violating Article IX;
(viil timiting the signifrcance of this article by:
(a) not communicating to the Assembly important documents on its activities;
(b/ providing for the implementation of the Petersbgrg Declaration in regald 
. 
to the
' ' inlargem?nt of WEU ahd the creation of the status of associate member and of observer
without the Assembly having been able to discuss the matter;
(viii) not applyrng the provisions of Article XI to states that it is inviting to become associate
members of WEU;
(ixl insisting on an arbitrary interpretation of Article XII and not followinq gP paragraph 2l of
Reconimendation-517 which states that ihe Assembly considers that the period of fifty years ran from
t954 and where the Assembly invites the Council of Ministers to submit this issue to independent
arbitration;
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7. Considers that, by acting in this way, the Council, far from preparing the establishment of a
European Union with clearly specified competences and responsibilities, is apparently weakening such
a prospect.
Ir nrcouurxDs rHAT rnr Cour.rcrl
l. Report effectively to the Assembly on every aspect of the application of the modiflred Brussels
Treaty, even in cases where the responsibilities attributed to it by the treaty are exercised in other fora
as it has undertaken to do on several occasions;
2. Seek an understanding with NATO to avoid duplication, while leaving WEU the possibility of
exercising fully the responsibilities assigned to it by Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty;
3. Proceed to no modification in the scope of the modified Brussels Treaty by any process other
than international agxeements subject to ratification;
4. Report in its annual report on the application of Protocols Nos. II, III and IV;
5. Provide the Assembly in time with all the information it needs to exercise the mandate assigned
to it by Article IX, inter alia by:
- 
answering without delay Written Question 305 asking the Council to communicate its
organogram to the Assembly;
- 
reversing its refusal to answer Written Question 304 asking for details of the results of the
operations of the naval force co-ordinated by WEU in the Adriatic;
- 
communicating:
- 
the report on practical measures necessary for the development of close working relation-
ships with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance;
- 
the proposals of the Permanent Council for promoting ceoperation between the respective
secretariats of those organisations;
- 
its report on the mandate of the WEU planning cell;
- 
its report on the possible tasks of WEU forces;
- 
its report on co-operation in armaments matters;
- 
its report on current WEU activities in space matters;
- 
its report on current WEU activities in regard to the verification of arms oontrol agreements
and implementation of the Open Skies Treaty;
- 
its report on the activities of the Mediterranean Sub-Group;
6. Follow up paragraph 2l of Recommendation 517 according to which:
" Noting that the Assembly believes that the period of fifty years laid down in Article XII of the
modified Brussels Treaty starts from the ratification of the 1954 Agreements while the Council
considers the starting date is 1948,
THr AssrMsLY sTRoNGLY URGEs
That the issue be referred to a group of independent European legal experts for arbi-
tration. "
II
The Assembly,(t) Considers that the European Union has a vocation to associate all Central European countries;(ii) Welcomes the fact that the Council, after the Assembly, has started to examine with those coun-
tries the conditions for a collective security organisation in Europe;(iii) Notes that the information it has received concerning requests from some of those countries
about their approaches to the Council do not correspond to the information it receives from the
Council;
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(iv) Considers that the rapprochement between the Central European countries and the European
Union means that they must henceforth base their relations on the principles governing relations
between the member countries of WEU.
Ir RrcorrurNDs THAT rnp Coutcll
l. Develop its exchanges with the CSCE with a view to making a more effective contribution to
maintaining peace in Europe;
2. Offer the Central European countries any technical assistance they may request, in particular to
allow them to play a better part in operations to verify all the disarmament or arms limitation agree-
ments they may have signed;
3. Respond favourably to the requests some of those countries have made so as to improve the res-
toration of confidence and maintenance of peace in Central Europe;
4. Arrange for requests sent to the Chairmanship-in-Office to reach the Council and be the subject
of real consultations;
5. Urge the Governments of Hungary and Slovakia to submit the dispute between them to concili-
ation procedure similar to that provided for in Article X of the modified Brussels Treaty.
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I. Introduction
1. Several aspects of your Rapporteur's
mandate relate to the activities of the WEU
Council, although it is nevertheless diffrcult to
prepare a homogenous, coherent text.
2. (a) The reply to the thirty-seventh annual
report of the Council to the Assembly is of little
interest. The second part ofthat report, covering
the Council's activities in 1991, did not reach
the Assembly until 25th May 1992, thus ruling
out the possibility of preparing and adopting a
reply at the June 1992 session. It relates to the
Council's work prior to the adoption of the
Maastricht Treaty and, in particular, prepa-
ration of the treaty in respect of matters for
which WEU is responsible. Once the treaty was
signed, with its appendices relating to WEU, this
work became of purely historical importance
and the Assembly's opinion on it pointless. Your
Rapporteur will therefore propose that the
thirty-seventh annual report of the Council be
approved in principle. This will concern only the
fact that the Council took part in drawing up the
treaty and will disregard the regret that it was
not possible to uphold more strongly the
requirements of the modified Brussels Treaty
which, it should be noted, moreover, is increas-
ingly frequently called in government communi-
cations " the WEU treaty ", an incorrect title
which merely illustrates the juridical laxism that
now seems to prevail. This is a curious title for a
treaty that the Council is anxious to date back to
1948 and not 1954, when it was the 1954 Paris
Agreements that gave birth to WEU.
3. It is probably also due to this laxism that
the thirty-seventh annual report says nothing
about the activities of the Agency for the
Control of Armaments. As everyone knows, the
r6le of the Agency is now a residual one. Never-
theless, as long as the treaty has not been
revised, it remains statutory and the Council
has no right to violate Article IX of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty according to which the
annual report of the Council relates to * its
activities and in particular... the control of
armaments ". The thirty-seventh annual report
also said that the ACA was following the
Geneva chemical disarmament negotiations
and the Assembly is entitled to know what con-
clusions it drew from them. Furthermore, the
first part of the thirty-eighth annual report,
covering the period lst January to 30th June
1992, has not reached the Office of the Clerk of
the Assembly in time for your Rapporteur to
take it into account.
Exphnatory Memorandum
(submined by Mn Goereu, Rqporteur)
4. (b) The Political Committee asked another
Rapporteur to deal with the enlargement of
WEU. For the Assembly in particular, enlarg-
ement raises a number of specific problems
which your Rapporteur will therefore not
address. Conversely, it seems impossible to deal
with the question of European co-operation in
security matters without referring to some of the
consequences of the new relationships that
WEU is in the process of establishing with coun-
tries that are not at present members.
5. (c) At its meeting on 22nd July, the
Assembly's Presidential Committee decided to
assign to your Rapporteur the task of reporting
on WEU's activities in matters relating to the
conflicts on the territory of former Yugoslavia.
In fact, this work has its place in the estab-
lishment of a new security system in Europe
affording WEU an opportunity to play a r6le
that should be defined. It is also set in the spe-
cific framework of Yugoslav affairs. To facilitate
the debates in the Assembly, your Rapporteur
has been asked to divide his report into two sep
arate parts, one on WEU, the other on Yugoslavia.
6. At its meetings on 24th September and
l5th October, the committee noted once again
that the Council was not doing enough to sustain
a useful relationship with the Assembly. Apart
from the tardy communication of the annual
report for 1991, the committee received the
replies to a number of recommendations
adopted at the June session only on 2nd
November. Written questions which had been
put in order to facilitate the work of rapporteurs
were not answered until the same date, i.e. more
than three months after having been put.
7. Quite apart from any reservations about
the content of these answers, the work of the
Assembly's committees is made diflicult because
of the Council's slowness in answering texts
addressed to it by the Assembly which relies on
these answers to maintain a dialogue with the
Council in accordance with Article IX of the
modified Brussels Treaty.
8. In fact, the Council's conduct rules out
any useful exchanges of views between it and the
Assembly. For instance, it was after the first part
of the thirty-eighth session of the Assembly, the
date of which (lst to 4th June 1992) had been
fixed many months earlier, that the Council, on
19th June, adopted the Petersberg Declaration
that your Rapporteur will analyse below. This
declaration includes decisions of great impor-
tance for the future of WEU, particularly in
regard to the application of the treaty and the
I
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creation of observer and associate member
status. A number of points required clarification
by the Council which several members of the
Assembly asked for in written questions. The
Council was well aware that the second part of
the session was to be held from 3fth November
to 3rd December but it nevertheless decided that
several documents implementing the Petersberg
Declaration would be signed on 20th November,
making it impossible for the Assembly to discuss
the matter in time to convey its opinions to the
Council. The Assembly will therefore hardly
have been able to hold any discussions before
the meeting between the Presidential Com-
mittee and the Chairmanship-in-Office of the
Council in Rome on 18th November and its pro-
posals, which it will have been impossible to
debate in plenary session, will be made far too
late for the Council to study them before its
ministerial meeting on 20th November. It
therefore has to be considered that the Council
has done its utmost to avoid any form of dia-
logue whatsoever with the Assembly on these
matters that are essential for the future of WEU.
9. The Assembly also notes that a wholly sat-
isfactory, open and fruitful exchange between
two Assembly committees and the permanent
representatives of the sixteen member countries
of the Atlantic Alliance was held in Brussels on
23rd September, although it has never been able
to arrange the same kind of discussion with
members of the WEU Permanent Council. It
can but conclude that it is not the governments
that place obstacles in the way of such an open
dialogue but the Permanent Council. It therefore
trusts that, once the Council is installed in
Brussels, these obstacles will be removed.
Finally, it has to note that the Council, in spite
of the soothing remarks of successive chairmen-
inoflice, is unwilling to take into account the
budgetary consequences for the Assembly of
decisions reached by the Council or even the
need for the Assembly to know in time the sums
on which its budget can be based so that it may
organise its work.
10. Hen@, in analysing the developments on
which it should report, the present document
will have to be based mainly on the declaration
adopted by the Council at Petersberg on l9th
June. However, it can take into account the
serious discussions in committee on 24th Sep-
tember and l5th October which led your
Rapporteur to make substantial changes to his
preliminary working paper.
II. The diruct consequences
of Maastricht for WEU
ll. At the time of writing, the Maastricht
Treaty has not been ratified by all the signatory
countries. On 2nd July, the Danish electorate
rejected ratification and the consequences of its
decision are not yet known, although it may be
expected that Denmark will not accede to the
modified Brussels Treaty in the near future. In
fact, from a legal point of view, the Maastricht
Treaty is, in present circumstances, null and
void, even if there is still a possibility that
Denmark may ratify it subject to reservations.
One needs to know how Denmark intends to par-
ticipate in a European Union in order to see what
shape it will be. In any event, the Danish white
paper published on 9th October 1992 shows thatit is out of the question for a Rome Treaty
revised in Maastricht to coexist with an unre-
vised Rome Treaty for Denmark and the Danish
referendum makes it essential to re-examine the
decisions taken in Maastricht. It would be unac-
ceptable for the smaller European countries if the
other members of the Community failed to take
account of the vote by the Danish electorate since
this would be tantamount to establishing the
European Union on a basis of contempt for the
principle of equality between states.
12. Moreover, the very small majority by
which the French electorate approved the ratifi-
cation of the Maastricht Treaty on 20th Sep-
tember 1992 showed that in France and in a
number of other countries the public is not com-
fortable about the interpretation ofthe treaty. In
particular, the monetary crisis in Europe in the
second half of September raised the question of
how realistic were the deadlines fixed in the
treaty for introducing a single currency. The
extent and nature of the Commission's powers
in the future European Union are also being
questioned. The definition of the subsidiarity
principle is being challenged everywhere. In
short, there are ample signs that the implemen-
tation of the treaty will be slower and more dif-
ficult than expected.
13. One may therefore already wonder what
will be the effects of these delays and of the
Danish vote on the measures decided at Maas-
tricht in regard to WEU, since an early
alignment of WEU and the European Com-
munity was planned. This view emerges from
two declarations adopted by the Nine on that
occasion and, in its answer to Written Question
295, the Council said:
* The two WEU declarations are closely
related politically to the Maastricht
Treaty and can only be understood in its
context. This is clearly reflected in the fact
that Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty
on European Union is quoted in full in
the declaration of the Nine 'on the r6le of
Western European Union and its relations
with the European Union and with the
Atlantic Alliance'. "
14. On receiving this answer, your Rapporteur
put Written Question 299, as follows:
* The declarations by the nine member
countries of WEU adopted in Maastricht
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are part and parcel of the legal arrange-
ments agreed upon in Maastricht. Would
they still be valid in the event of the
Maastricht Treaty not being ratified? "
The Council's reply, received by the Assembly
on 16th October, does not correspond to the
remarks made by the Chairmanship-in-Office to
Assembly committees in June and reveals a
certain state of mind when it says that:
" As far as formal aspects are concerned,
the declarations of the Nine, given their
political nature, are not subject to ratifi-
cation and would thus remain valid even
'in the event of the Maastricht Treaty not
being ratified'. "
15. This is useful confirmation of the
Petersberg Declaration adopted on l9th June
1992 by the Council at ministerial level. The
declaration is a purely WEU text which is not
governed by the adoption of the Maastricht
Treaty. However, it contains a section entitled
" Implementation of the Maastricht Decla-
ration ", which amounts to saying that the
Council did not wait for the treaty to be ratified
before considering this declaration as binding
upon itself. It distinguished between the com-
mitments contained in the declarations forming
part of the group of agreements signed in Maas-
tricht and their political link with the treaty. If
this is truly the case, neither the Danish decision
nor even possible delays in ratifying the
Maastricht Treaty in other countries shouldjeopardise the implementation of the declara-
tions by the Nine, particularly as these declara-
tions do not seem to be in contradiction with the
modified Brussels Treaty. This point is essential
for the present and future of WEU. It is
therefore hard to see why the Council is trying to
reduce a juridical consideration of such impor-
tance to a " formal aspect " unless it is because it
has an growing tendency to treat application of
the modified Brussels Treaty as a formality with
which it too willingly dispenses.
16. The Council's interpretation is thus
correct but leaves certain questions open, e.g.:
17. (i) What would be the relationship between
WEU and the European Community if it were
not based on Article J.4 of the treaty but only on
a declaration by the Nine which is obviously not
binding upon the Twelve?
18. (ii) lf the union is not set up, what would
be WEU's obligations towards any member
countries of the European Community that
decided to accede to WEU or to become
observers? In particular, the undertaking
entered into with Greece is known to have been
given in exchange for its accession to the Maas-
tricht Treaty. Would this commitment be valid
in 1992 if ratification of the Maastricht Treaty
were delayed? Would the reservation 
- 
which is
clearly aimed at relations between Greece and
Turkey 
- 
in the Petersberg Declaration that
Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty would
not apply to disputes between member states of
WEU and the Atlantic Alliance be maintained?
The Council's answer to Written Question 301
asking about this point is far from satisfactory.
19. (iii) The decision to move the head-
quarters of the WEU secretariat to Brussels in
autumn 1992 was very largely the consequence
of the implementation of Article J.4 of the
treaty. Will the move still be made if this article
is not implemented before the end of 1992, as
planned? Would all member governments agree
to apply a decision whose sole effect would be to
move WEU headquarters nearer to those of
NATO? Would it be possible for member coun-
tries' permanent representatives to the Com-
munity to compose, wholly or partly, the WEU
Permanent Council? One may well wonder
whether these considerations are not a reason
for the Council's delay in carrying out this
decision as there are clear signs that speed is not
of the essence. Perhaps the difficulty of finding
suitable premises mentioned in the reply to Rec-
ommendation 517 is nothing more than a
pretext for a a politically-motivated delay.
20. (lui Would references in the Maastricht
Treaty to a 1998 deadliner on which the fate of
WEU would be called in question still make
sense if the treaty did not come into force at the
end of 1992? lt is no secret that the Assembly
has always challenged this interpretation of the
modified Brussels Treaty and Recommendation
517 asked for an opinion to be given by inde-
pendent legal experts. The Council seems to
have rejected this request, judging by its reply,
which reaffirms the Council's point of view
without taking into account the Assembly's
request. Written Question 306, put by l,ord
Finsberg, and Written Question 309 ask it to
spell out its position on this point. This attitude
will confirm the Assembly's conviction that,
here too, the Council has taken a political
decision without being too concerned about the
legal aspect. It may do so, but why not say so?
Generally speaking, what would be the signifi-
cance of the statement that WEU is part of the
process of European unification if this process
was delayed?
21. (v/ Would the governments' encour-
agement to the Assembly to develop closer
co-operation with the European Parliament,
which the Assembly has endeavoured to follow
up in spite of the difficulties to which your
Rapporteur will refer later, still apply in the
latter case?
22. Your Rapporteur believes that, when the
Maastricht summit meeting was being prepared,
l. The English text, which refers only tg " th,e date of 1998 "
is, moreover, more accurate than the French text, but both
texts are authentic.
i,
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the Council was far too keen on promoting a
policy aimed at giving the European Union an
institutional architecture giving an impression
of ooherence and did not pay enough attention
to two aspects of building Europe that he con-
siders essential: the juridical dimension, i.e. the
consideration that it is the modified Brussels
Treaty and not WEU which is the essential
element of a European Union covering defence
matters, and a pragmatic dimension, according
to which, if WEU is to be able to help to
advance this process, it must realise all Europe
can accomplish in the areas within its purview.
Clearly the approach adopted by the Council has
now placed it in a position which, although its
action in the operational area is not paralysed,
makes it difficult, in the political area, to carry
out the programme it set itself in Maastricht, at
least within the time span then agreed.
III. The Petersberg Declaration
23. The Petersberg Declaration, adopted by
the Council on l9th June 1992, is of particular
importance since, to the same extent as the
Rome Declaration and the Platform of The
Hague, it, or at least its third part, is one of the
texts to which countries will have to subscribe if
they wish to be given observer or associate status
or become members of WEU. It tries to explain
how the Council intends to apply its two Maas-
tricht declarations and is in three parts:
24. The Jirst concerns WEU's place in the
system ensuring Europe's security. It emerges
from this that:
25. f, WEU is associated with all the agree-
mcnts on arms control already concluded or to
be concluded in June 1992 and will co-operate
with all measures aimed at their application
(START, CFE, Open Skies, chemical weapons).
26. (iil WEU endorses the CSCE's efforts to
obtain the status of regional arrangement under
Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United
Nations. The Council declares its preparedness
" to support, on a case-by-case basis and in
accordance with our own procedures, the
effective implementation of conflict-prevention
and crisis-management measures, including
peace-keeping activities of the CSCE or the
United Nations Security Council " . What this
article (I.2) of the declaration does not say is
whether this support is to be decided directly by
the WEU Council or whether it is a matter for
the European Council to decide, WEU merely
bcing responsible for ensuring its implemen-
tation. The relative paralysis of the CSCE, at
least in the areas referred to above, as shown by
the Yugoslav conflicts, does not allow an
assessment to be made of whether this aflir-
mation effectively applies.
27. (iii) The Council " welcomed the ongoing
reform process of NATO with a view to estab-
lishing a strong new transatlantic partnership ".
What the declaration does not say is to what
extent the future activities WEU organises will
depend on NATO decisions. The Council seemsto have wished to avoid a geographical
breakdown of the areas of responsibility of the
two organisations, which has the advantage, in
each case, of allowing one or other to be called
upon, but it might easily lead to overlapping,
confusion or even rivalry between them. The
coexistence of NATO and WEU co-ordinationin the system for monitoring the embargo
against Serbia and Montenegto and the dual
decision by WEU, on 28th August, and NATO,
on 2nd September, that member countries of
both organisations will help to protect humani-
tarian convoys in Bosnia-Herzegovina suggest
that the question has still not been settled, the
result being that, in due time, WEU will adapt
itself to decisions taken by NATO. Paragraph l3
of the reply to Recommendation 517, moreover,
lets this be clearly understood. Moreover, at its
meetings with NATO authorities on 23rd Sep-
tember, the committee was able to see that the
decision to introduce " joint positions agreed in
WEU into the process of consultation in the
alliance " was not a firm decision but still
subject to a future NATO decision. The Council
has not informed the Assembly of the " report
on the practical measures necesssary " for the
development of " close working relations with
the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance "
or the proposals that the Permanent Council is
responsible for making with a view to promoting
co-operation between their respective secre-
tariats. It is quite impossible, on the basis of the
information about the joint meeting held by the
North Atlantic and WEU Councils in Brussels
on 21st May 1992 given in the NATO commu-
niqud and the letter from the Secretary-General
of WEU of lst July 1992, to assess the results of
that meeting.
28. Greater participation by France in
NATO's politico-military activities, as referred
to by the French Minister of Defence, Pierre
Joxe, in his opening speech at the colloquy on
* A new strategic debate " on 29th September
1992, might obviously alleviate much of the sus-
picion that some alliance countries have of
WEU and promote the establishment of better
working relations between the two organis-
ations. Everything points to the French Minister
envisaging a possible return of his country to the
Defence Planning Committee and the Military
Committee, but he ruled out France's partici
pation in the Nuclear Committee and - he was
explicit on this point - the integrated military
structures, which would give France a status
comparable to that of Spain. This position
seems logical because, as long as NATO has not
adopted a perfectly clear doctrine on the use of
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its nuclear and conventional forces, it would be
hard to see any meaning in France returning
other than the abandonment of the position it
adopted in 1967. Conversely, France's partici-
pation in working out alliance strategy should
make the necessary sharing of responsibilities
between NATO and WEU easier, and if France
takes this step it should make the United States
realise that the establishment of a European
pillar of the alliance is not intended to separate
Europe from America.
29. During its talks with Mr. Wiirner, Secre-
tary-General of NATO, on 23rd September, the
committee was given an official summary of a
speech by Mr. Wrirner in Annapolis on l8th
June and this summary is also a synthesis of his
remarks to the committee. The main passage
reads as follows:
" In order to accelerate the emergence of a
European security and defence identity,the Secretary-General believed that
Western European Union should be given
effective means for military action 'with
NATO's assistance but not at NATO's
expense'. This did not mean'that Western
European Union should or would be sub-
ordinated to NATO' but rather that
'NATO remains the primary instrument
in defence of the security of our member
nations'. Mr. W<irner reminded his
audience that alliance governments had
all agreed that 'the primary responsibility
of forces assigned to NATO will be the
collective defence of the alliance under
the Washington Treaty'. He was con-
vinced that there 'is no need for a com-
peting military structure in Western
Europe 
- 
nobody could afford it at a time
of shrinking defence budgets, so it could
only be built at the expense of the existing
NATO military structure'.
The Secretary-General thus concluded
that the practical way to make a European
security and defence identity fully com-
patible with NATO was for the latter to
make available to Western European
Union its 'assets or NATO-committed
forces in cases where NATO does not
choose to act. Such a double assignment,
or double-hatting, does not create any
major problem as long as the priority for
NATO is clearly established'. Comment-
ing on the proposal to create a Franco-
German corps, Mr. Wtirner informed his
audience of the assurances he had
received to the effect that 'the corps shall
be available to the alliance for the purpose
of collective defence and that NATO will
be deprived of none of the German
units'. "
However, this concept raises certain ques-
since, while one can imagine cases in
which WEU decided on an action that NATO
does not wish to take, particularly if it is not
directly a matter of " the security of our member
nations ", how could it do so if there 'is no need
for a competing military structure in Western
Europe "? For instance, how could NATO
undertake a priori to give WEU a logistic infra
structure, as the committee was told on 23rd Sep
tember, if the members of NATO were not unan-
imously in favour of such an action? Operational
decisions taken in the framework of WEU since
June l99l are specifically aimed at eventually
giving it its own means of observing and moni-
toring the application of disarmament agree-
ments, planning possible action and having stra-
tegic transport means. It is quite possible for the
same national units to be placed, if necessary,
under NATO command or under WEU
command. It is logical that, when the sixteen
NATO countries are agreed on a joint action,
there is no call for a specifically WEU action.
However, for WEU to be deprived of * effective
means for military action " without * NATO's
assistance " means giving up all hope of making
WEU the instrument of a European Union and
reducing its r6le to that of a branch of NATO and
denying the Twelve any means of basing a
common external and security policy on the pos-
sibility of recourse to force. It is hard to under-
stand what part the WEU planning cell would
play in this case.
31. Your Rapporteur considers relations
between WEU and NATO should be based on a
form of subsidiarity in security, defence and, no
doubt, armaments matters. Elements of this
stem from the modihed Brussels Treaty:
(a/ National states recruit and maintain
armed forces. They use them, as necessary, for
matters that concern them (internal affairs, com-
mitments peculiar to each state) without having
to call on their partners other than to inform
them so that their actions do not harm alliance
cohesion. They produce the armaments nec-
essary for these forces insofar as they are able
and so wish.
(b) These states may come to an agreement
with one or more partners on setting up joint
forces and their deployment or on the joint pro-
duction of armaments.
(c) Under the modified Brussels Treaty,
they are obliged to assist any of their partners
that are the object of an armed attack and to
consult each other in the event of a threat to
international peace, which means that they must
be able to take joint action in certain cases. This
requires mechanism for consultation (the WEU
Council), prior preparation of joint action(planning cell, meetings of chiefs of defence
staff, study of satellite images, etc.) and the joint
development of facilities that WEU member
countries no longer have the means to produce
on an individual basis (space-based observation
and strategic transport).
30.
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362
I
,l
i
t
1i
I
I
I
rl
I
DOCUMENT I342
(d/ NATO's task is to ensure peace in a
defined area, which implies political action on
its part and the availability of large armed forces
with modern equipment. This means joint
command of forces made available to it by its
members and interoperability of their anna-
ments. However, in no case must NATO be
called upon a priori to take the place of its
members or WEU. If it did, it would have to
play a r6le that would soon be challenged by
everyone just as, in economic matters, the
authority of the Community is now being chal-
lenpd by those who feel they are being affected
by questionable initiatives it is taking.
32. As Mr. Giscard d'Estaing points out in
articles on Community subsidiarity which he
published in various newspapers on the eve of
the Birmingham meeting of the European
Council, it is at one and the same time necessary
to say in which cases subsidiarity can and must
be applied and impossible to fix it permanently
because it depends on economic developments.
The same is true in the security and defence
sector and one of the Council's main aims
shorld be to draw up and constantly keep up to
date a list of points on which it intends to
intervene. This is what it did in regard to the
naval blockade of Iraq and military space-based
activities, is considering doing in respect ofstra-
tegic transport and the armaments agency but
failed to do in the case of Yugoslavia. However,
the modified Brussels Treaty provides an
exoellent basis for proceeding in this manner,
while the North Atlantic Treaty has, from the
outset, suffered from the difference between the
meagre commitments it contains and true
European defence requirements. This led NATO
to replace international commitments by the
integration of forces and, now integration is no
longer forced upon us by a specific external
threat, NATO is in a delicate situation.
33. (iv/ Nor has the Assembly seen the report
made to the Council on the meetings of chiefs of
defence staff. It notes, however, that the
decision to hold twice-yearly meetings of chiefs
ofdefence staffand to reinforce national delega-
tions with military delegates corresponds to its
recommendations.
34. (v) The Assembly will also welcome the
fact that the IEPG and NATO's Eurogroup are
studying the possibility of regrouping their
respective activities round WEU. It was
therefore pleased to receive the IEPG's annual
report for 1991, following that for 1990 since
this shows recognition of its r6le as the only
European assembly with defence responsibil-
ities, thus indicating that the governments of the
IEPG member countries are prepared to move
towards restructuring round WEU the various
bodies that contribute to Europe's security, as
announced in the Petersberg Declaration.
Moreover, this declaration gives an assurance
that all the IEPG member countries will play a
full part in the activities of WEU organs respon-
sible for tasks now carried out by the IEPG.
However, the most recent information received
by your Rapporteur suggests that significant dif-
ficulties have been raised by some members of
the IEPG that are not, and are not required to
become, full members of WEU. Probably, they
may use this means to try to obtain a status in
WEU different to the one the Council is pre-
pared to offer them.
35. (vi) The Assembly can but wonder about
the nature of the terms of reference adopted by
the ministers " for the establishment by WEU of
a gradual and phased dialogue with the Maghreb
countries " . While considering this dialogue to
be essential for organising a peaceful order in
the Western Mediterranean, your Rapporteur
wonders why WEU has been chosen rather than
common foreign and security policy. Does it
mean the dialogue is to relate to defence? If so,
can this be envisaged at present? If, on the con-
ttary, it is to relate to more general aspects of
security, it would appear to be more a matter for
the European Union.
36. (vii) The Assembly will note that the
Council welcomed " the considerable progress
which had been made in setting up the experi-
mental WEU satellite centre " but also that the
title of the centre was changed in the Petersberg
Declaration, which reduced it to an " experi-
mental " function, and that the date of its inau-
guration, initially June 1992, as the Secretary-
General informed the Assembly at its December
1991 session, has been postponed to an unspe-
cified date. What can be the reasons for this
delay?
37. (viii)Transfonmation of the WEU Institutefor Security Studies into an " academy ",
decided in Maastricht, has disappeared from the
Petersberg Declaration. Your Rapporteur has
never really understood what this term covered,
nor does he understand why it seems to have
been abandoned.
38. In this connection, it will be noted that
when the Clerk of the Assembly asked the Secre-
tary-General for an organogram of the Council,
with a view to preparing the information
booklet that Mr. Tummers, Chairman and
Rapporteur of the Committee for Parliamentary
and Public Relations, is to submit at the forth-
coming session, he was sent only an' illustrative
presentation of ministerial organs in Brussels ",
i.e. quite unofficial and making no reference to
bodies such as the Agency for the Control of
Armaments, the Torrej6n satellite centre or the
Paris Institute for Security Studies. One may
wonder what prevented the Council answering a
similar request in 1990 and made it give such an
incomplete answer in 1992. There is an
impression that the notion of " subsidiary body
of the Council ", as referred to in Article VIII
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of the treaty and as applied by the Council to
those three institutions, is very imprecise. The
Assembly will therefore pay the greatest
attention to the Council's answer to Written
Question 305 put by our colleague, Mr. Lopez
Henares, on this subject.
39. These various remarks make your
Rapporteur feel that the Council is embarrassed
because it has been unable to obtain from the
Maastricht Treaty a clear idea of the future rOle
of the European Union. On the one hand, the
treaty provides, in terms that are more evocative
than clear, for WEU to be disbanded in favour
of the Union in 1998. Furthermore, the govern-
ments are considering extending WEU's activ-
ities in various directions that would associate it
with the CSCE, NATO, the IEPG or Eurogroup,
thus implying the participation in its work of
countries which are not now members of the
union and probably will not be in 1998 but
leaving out countries which are members or may
be in 1998. For this reason, and also because of
the measures relating to the creation of the
new status of member, associate member or
observer, WEU is so to speak separated from the
modified Brussels Treaty by which it was set up
and attached by links that are juridically very
tenuous to a number of other organisations,
starting with the European Union with which it
is not * identifiable in legal terms ", as the
Council said in its answer to Written Question
298. In particular, it can be seen that the WEU
Council may either implement measures taken
by the European Council or prepare and take
certain decisions in foreign policy and joint
security matters since these are worked out by
countries which are not and will not all be
members of NATO.
40. Here we are dealing with an essential
problem which first arose during the negotia-
tions of the intergovernmental conference pre-
paring the Maastricht Treaty and that has never
been settled. The governments, instead of
defining WEU's r6le for itself and in terms of
the modified Brussels Treaty, tried to do so on
the basis of its links with other institutions
based on other treaties: the European Union and
NATO first and, to a lesser extent, the CSCE.
Nor did they agree on the priority to be given to
these various relationships among themselves
and all they managed to agree on was a sort of
equidistance evoked by ideas ofthe " European
pillar of the alliance " and * armed branch of the
Community " or words such as * observer " and
" associate member " whose juridical content, in
relation to the modified Brussels Treaty, seems
very hard to determine. However, these ideas or
words merely defer solving problems to later
and today they are resurfacing. Thus the Council
is having to take decisions that it was unable to
take in 1991, but in worse conditions, because
states outside WEU are now concerned and
have every intention of obtaining, in their own
interests, advantages going further than what the
governments were prepared to grant them. Your
Rapporteur can recall that the Assembly warned
the Council, inter alia in Recommendation 517,
about the drawbacks of the way it was pro-
ceeding. It could not foresee that the Petersberg
Declaration would hasten this day.
41. The hold-ups the Council is now facing
are due to the juridical cloud in which it pursued
this procedure. The following are the main ones,
but this is not a complete list:
- the conditions for Greece's accession to
WEU;
- 
definition of a status of " associate
member ", particularly in the case of
Turkey;
- 
the establishment of new relations with
NATO in view of the fact that not all
the European members of NATO are
invited to accede to WEU, except with
an inferior status;
- the integration of the IEPG in WEU,
for the same reasons;
- 
the establishment of new relations with
the European Community, in view of
the fact that not all members of the
Community are prepared to join WEU;
- 
the constitution of the WEU Per-
manent Council, because it raises the
direct question of the equidistance
between WEU, on the one hand, and
NATO and the Community, on the
other;
- the establishment of co-operation
between the Assembly and the Euro-
pean Parliament for reasons that your
Rapporteur will analyse below;
- 
the Assembly's relations with countries
whose relations with WEU have not yet
been defined.
Your Rapporteur believes that most of these
questions could be solved satisfactorily if the
Council agreed to re-examine the situation on
the basis of the modified Brussels Treaty and
not on that of relations with other organisations
and applied the treaty more rigorously.
42. The second part of the declaration relates
to the strengthening of WEU's operational r6le
and is therefore more within the purview of
the Assembly's Defence Committee. Your
Rapporteur will merely refer to certain points
which relate to the very nature of WEU and,
through it, the common foreign and security
policy of the European Union.
43. While the setting up of a WEU planning
cell means WEU may become engaged in opera-
tions not involving NATO since, otherwise,
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there would be no reason for it, the notion of
" military units answerable to WEU " is far from
clear. Would these be military units made
available to WEU by member states for tasks
" conducted under the authority of WEU "? It is
stated that " participation in specific operations
will remain a sovereign decision of member
states ", which means that the decision will not
be taken collectively either by the Twelve or by
the Nine. It is known, for instance, that France
is linked to certain African countries by military
assistance treaties and that Germany's Basic
Law does not allow it to deploy forces outside
Europe in any framework other than the United
Nations. Hence it is only after a national
decision that the forces ofany countries having
so decided may take part in " military tasks con-
ducted under the authority of WEU ". But can it
be thought that countries which have not
decided to take part in these operations would
have a say in'the authority of WEU "? What is
meant by units being 'answerable " to WEU if
their deployment depends on a national
decision? It is also known that, during the
present reduction of armed forces in all WEU
member countries, there can be no question of
drawing from them in order to form WEU units
in addition to those assigned to national tasks.
The units will always be the same ones and this
hardly clarifies the relationship between WEU
and NATO. In paragraph 1l of the reply to Rec-
ommendation 517, the Council specifies that
military " bilateral initiatives " by member
states 
- 
and here everyone thinks ofthe Franco-
German Eurocorps - are no more set in the
institutional framework of WEU than are
national forces.
44. Particularly noteworthy is the wording
used in the declaration that refers twice to the
use of forces under * WEU auspices ". The
term seems to have been carefully chosen to
describe, with no details, the nature of relations
between these forces and WEU: Command?
Coordination? Under high-level military or
political direction?
45. The participation of some member coun-
tries' forces in operations in Yugoslavia sheds
little more light on the matter: some of member
countries' naval forces engaged in monitoring
missions in the Adriatic are under NATO
command, others are co-ordinated by WEU.
Member countries' ground forces assigned to
tasks for which the United Nations is respon-
sible are under United Nations command, and
those helping to protect humanitarian convoys
remain under national command, while subject
to the conditions set out in Security Council res-
olutions. This is perhaps not illogical and may
not have too many drawbacks on the ground,
but it makes it very difficult to assess the opera-
tional r6le of WEU as the body responsible for
implementing the common foreign and security
policy of the Twelve.
46. The third part concerns relations between
WEU and the other European member states of
the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance. It
defines three principles on which relations
between member states and associate member
states of WEU should be based and therefore
does not relate to observers. " Settlement of
their mutual differences by peaceful means " is
included in the modified Brussels Treaty and
" refraining from resorting to the threat or use
of force " is the obvious corollary thereof.
However, the third principle deserves attention.
It reads as follows:
* They also stressed that the security guar-
antees and defence commitments in the
treaties which bind the member states
within Western European Union and
which bind them within the Atlantic
Alliance are mutually reinforcing and will
not be invoked by those subscribing to
Part III of the Petersberg Declaration in
disputes between member states of either
of the two organisations. "
47. Everyone is aware that this declaration is
rendered necessary by the poor relations
between Greece, a member of the Atlantic
Alliance and of the Community, which is thus
invited to accede to the modified Brussels
Treaty, and Turkey, a member of the alliance
but not of the Community, which can thus
become only an associate member of WEU. The
purpose is to avoid Greece being able to invoke
Article V in order to feel protected against
Turkey, which might encourage it to adopt pro-
vocative measures vis-i-vis the latter. This
seems logical, but nevertheless is disturbing in
that, by a simple declaration, the Council estab-
lishes an important reservation concerning the
application of the essential article of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty, i.e. that it considers the
accession of Greece to WEU as more important
than the treaty signed and ratified. This is
probably the most serious aspect of this
" juridical laxism " about which your Rapporteur
complains, but it also means that the European
Union is to be built on very shaky foundations if
one problem in the " process " of European
Union is to take priority over an international
treaty undertaking. It would have been quite
understandable for such a reservation to be
made in the protocol of accession of Greece to
the modified Brussels Treaty. This is not so,
since it is a general declaration, adopted by the
Council, which restricts the field of application
of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty.
48. Close examination of Article XI of the
treaty makes one question the justification of
the Council's approach since this article draws a
distinction between the high contracting parties,
i.e. the seven founder countries of WEU, in
accordance with Article I of Protocol No. I, and
countries invited by the high contracting parties
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" to accede to the present treaty on conditions to
be agreed between them and the state so
invited ". This wording was obviously designed
first and foremost to allow the accession of new
members to WEU without their being ipso facto
invited to take part in the arms controls pro-
vided for in Protocols Nos. III and IV. This was
the procedure that was applied to Portugal and
Spain. It will be noted, for instance, that those
two countries did not subscribe to all the agree-
ments concluded between the high contracting
parties in application of the treaty but to only
two of them. In Written Question 308, your
Rapporteur asked the Council to conf,rrm that
Portugal and Spain were not concerned by all
the obligations of Protocol No. I binding the
high contracting parties.
49. On that occasion, member states also
issued the following declaration:
'During the consultations which were
held with a view to the enlargement of
WEU to include Portugal and Spain, the
member states of WEU with Portugal and
Spain, taking into consideration the spirit
in which their security co-operation has
recently developed, found that a number
of the provisions of the Brussels Treaty, as
modified in 1954, did not correspond to
the way in which they intend to pursue
and strengthen that co-operation, on the
basis of the Rome declaration on 27th
October 1984 and of the platform on
European security interests, adopted in
The Hague on 27th October 1987.
Consequently, the member states of WEU
with Portugal and Spain consider that the
relevant provisions of the Brussels Treaty,
as modified in 1954, and its corre-
sponding protocols will be re-examined,
as appropriate, having regard for the
practice and achievements of, and the
prospects for, their co-operation in
security matters. "
50. [t should be noted in passing that this dec-
laration has still not been followed up in spite of
the Assembly's recommendations on the subject.
One may wonder whether it will be taken up in
the protocol of accession of Greece, but it is
already known that the conditions agreed with
that country include its endorsement of Part III
of the Petersberg Declaration with the restric-
tion it contains about the application of ArticleV. However, your Rapporteur believes the
Council does not intend to apply similar pro-
cedure to " associate members " in general and
to Turkey in particular but is proposing to that
country accession by means of a text of no
equivalent juridical worth and not subject to rat-
ification while, on the contrary, Turkey intends,
quite rightly taking as a basis Article XI, the
status of " associate member " to be defined
solely in accordance with conditions negotiated
between each country concerned and the high
contracting parties.
51. That is why your Rapporteur put Written
Question 309 to the Council, as follows:
" Article XI of the modified Brussels
Treaty draws a clear distinction between
the high contracting parties to the treaty
which, account being taken of Article I to
Protocol No. I, include Germany and
Italy, and any other state invited subse-
quently to 'become a pafty to the treaty'
'on conditions to be agreed between them
and the state so invited'. In these condi-
tions, can the Council say, basing its
answer on serious legal considerations:
l. Whether it is possible to consider
Germany and Italy as high contracting
parties and at the same time claim that
the period of fifty years provided for in
Article XII started in 1948?
2. Whether, in the event of Greece
acceding to the modified Brussels Treaty,
it would be entitled, as a state acceding to
the treaty, to participate in the decision
relating to the conditions for the accession
of other countries as they have to be
agreed with the high contracting parties to
Protocol No. I?
3. If the Council is prepared to submit to
recognised experts in international law the
Assembly's well-founded considerations
concerning the interpretation of Article
XII of the treaty or whether it intends to
confine itself to its 'opinion' which has
never been justified, even in the answer to
Written Question 297, in order to reject
the Assembly's point of view on this
matter? "
52. Furthermore, our colleague, Mr. Caro, put
Written Question 310, with a similar aim, as
follows:
" The Petersberg Declaration is an under-
standing between states with a view to
creating, modifying or abolishing a legal
relationship between them in two respects:
l. because it provides for non-application
of a fundamental article of the modified
Brussels Treaty (Article V) in the event of
a dispute between a country acceding to
that treaty and a country having acceded
to the North Atlantic Treaty,
2. because it creates a status of'associate
member' in an organisation set up by the
1954 Paris Agreements.
Does the Council not consider that the
adoption of acts having such effects
requires the intervention of constitutional
authorities in member states conversant
with the conclusion of treaties? Can it
specify the nature of these acts? "
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53. Since these two questions were put on
l9th October, it is normal that the Assembly has
not yet received an answer, but it is entitled to
hope that, this time, the Council will ensure that
its answers have a firmer legal basis than earlier
answers. It may contest the formal distinction,
for which your Rapporteur believes there are
grounds, between 'high contracting parties "
and " members acceding " to WEU, but it is dif-
ficult to deny that countries which were not
founding members of WEU have a different
status to that of founding members.
54. It will also be noted that, whereas para-
graph 9 of Recommendation 517 urged the
Council " to develop a defence and security
policy for WEU in accordance with the treaties
in force ", paragraph 7 of the reply " testifies to
the willingness of WEU member states to con-
tinue to develop the organisation as the defence
component of the European Union and as the
means to strengthen the European pillar of the
Atlantic Alliance in accordance with the
decision contained in the declaration of the
member states of WEU at Maastricht on l0th
December 1991 ", which means the Council
does not intend to refer to the modified Brussels
Treaty.
55. Your Rapporteur will not deal here with
the problems that would arise for WEU from
enlargement to include several categories of
states, since this is the subject of the report pre-
sented to the Political Committee by Mr.
Ward.
56. An analysis of the Petersberg Declaration
shorvs plainly that it is a prolongation of the dec-
larations by WEU member countries appended
to the Maastricht Treaty where the activities of
WEU are concerned and that it has the merit of
cleerly distinguishing between the decisions it
implies and the treaty proper. However, it may
be wondered whether some of them are still rel-
evant in the event of the treaty not being rat-
ified. If it is ratified, they raise a number of
questions in regard to the " 1998 deadline " , the
main one being how the governments are con-
sidering integrating WEU into the European
Union on that date.
57. Apparently, and in view of the highly
arbitrary decision to fix a deadline for the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty, which does not contain
on€, and to fix it in 1998, the governments hope
that by that date all member countries of the
Union 
- 
including, consequently, those which
may join it in the meantime 
- 
will be prepared
to take part in " a common defence policy,
which might in time lead to a common defence ",
to quote Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty.
This is possible and, if so, the provisions of the
modified Brussels Treaty would be out of date
because their fundamental aim would have been
attained: to set up a true European Union. If this
is not so, in order to achieve the desired result it
would be necessary to continue to weaken the
commitments imposed on member states by the
modified Brussels Treaty in order to shift
WEU's activities to the context of a new treaty
organising the European Union and acceptable
to twelve, or more probably sixteen, members or
even more, as the Council is already doing in
order to bring Greece into WEU. It is doubtful
whether this approach is to Europe's advantage.
Some of WEU's activities might perhaps then be
transferred to the union, but it is hard to see
how, as long as member states alone are
empowered to decide whether their armed
forces should intervene, as specified in the
Petersberg Declaration, an enlarged European
Union could do more than WEU does unless it
is in areas not directly concerned with defence,
such as economic sanctions. On the contrary, it
can be seen how any action by Europe involving
armed forces might thus be paralysed.
58. On 6th November, i.e. the very day the
Political Committee was to adopt the present
report, your Rapporteur took cognisance of the
English version of the Council's answer to
Written Question 300, but before this answerhad been officially communicated to the
Assembly. The answer confirms his impression,
referred to in paragtaph 50, since it specifies
that " neither associate members nor observers
are parties to the modified Brussels Treaty " but
that special procedure will be applied to assG
ciate member countries since * the precise moda-
lities of this provision [i.e. those countries' con-
tribution to the organisation's budgets] will have
to be specified by the Council in the dialogue
with the states concerned ". The choice of the
word * dialogue " is interesting since it seems
intended to avoid the word " negotiation ",
probably so as to evade the obligation to con-
clude with a protocol subject to ratification. The
answer also says that " only the representatives
of the 'Brussels Treaty powers' [this no doubt
means the 'modified' treaty] (i.e. full member
states of Western European Union) to the Con-
sultative Assembly of the Council of Europe
could be full members of the WEU parlia-
mentary Assembly ". The Assembly will obvi-
ously have to grant the delegations of associate
member countries and observers appropriate
rights, but it is hard to see how it could grant the
right to vote to delegations from countries not
participating in the adoption of the annual
report. These rights will of course imply that the
Council takes account of the implications of the
arrival of these delegations when taking deci-
sions on the financial resources it grants the
Assembly.
59. Your Rapporteur also wishes to draw
attention to the fact that the Council bases
WEU's invitation to other members of the
European Union or the Atlantic Alliance on the
preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty which
specifies that the high contracting parties are
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" resolved... to promote the unity and to
encourage the progressive integration of Europe,
to associate progressively in the pursuance of
these aims other states inspired by the same
ideals and animated by the like determination ".
If this means anything, it is that member coun-
tries are determined to support the principle of
the candidature to the European Union of any
" associate member " country of WEU, thus
including Turkey. Your Rapporteur wishes to be
sure that this is really what the Council
intends.
60. However, this answer reveals a degree of
incoherence on the part of the Council. The pre-
amble to a treaty is merely the statement of prin-
ciples to which the provisions of the treaty cor-
respond and the passage quoted by the Council
sets out the very principle on which Article XI is
based. Why then refuse to apply Article XI to
" associate members "? What is interesting
about the answer to Written Question 300 is
that it shows the Council's embarrassment now
that it has to tackle the application of the texts it
adopted at Maastricht and Petersberg, with a
lack of reflection that the Assembly has already
underlined. There is every reason to doubt
whether the legal views expressed in this answer
are well-founded enough to provide a satis-
factory solution to the problems it has put so
badly.
IY. The WEU Assembly
and the European Parliament
61. Clearly, the existence of the WEU
Assembly is linked with the modified Brussels
Treaty remaining in force. If the 1998 deadline
is to lead to the signatory countries denouncing
the treaty in order to place their co-operation in
defence matters in the framework of the
European Union, the Assembly will no longer
have a juridical basis and will disappear.
However, as long as the modified Brussels
Treaty continues to exist, including Article IX,
the Assembly is the Council's de jure parlia-
mentary interlocutor, and the Council again
confirmed this in its reply to Written Question
298 of 17th June 1992, as follows:
" ...the Council stressed that it remains
fully aware of the WEU parliamentary
Assembly's independence and its powers,
as expressed in the Charter of the
Assembly, which is in itself an application
of the provisions of Article IX of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty... "
This recognition by the governments of the value
of the Charter of the Assembly, which is the work
of the Assembly, should be underlined.
62. However, this r6le is constantly chal-
lenged by the European Parliament. In its Reso-
lution A 3-0123192, adopted after Maastricht,
the European Parliament holds that the Maas-
tricht Treaty " provides for defence matters tD
be delegated to WEU without providing for
appropriate parliamentary control of the activ-
ities of this organisation ", which is tantamount
to saying that the WEU Assembly does not fulfil
the r6le assigned to it by Article IX of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty. As far as your Rapportetrr
knows, this allegation is not based on a real crit-
icism of the work of our Assembly but on a
belief that the European Parliament is the only
parliamentary assembly entitled to speak on
behalf of Europe. This view is diametrically
opposed to the opinion of the French Constitu-
tional Council on the Maastricht Treaty, quoted
by Mr. De Decker in Written Question 298,
which, to show that the powers attributed to the
European Parliament do not encroach upon
those of the French Parliament, says that " the
European Parliament has only the responsibil-
ities defined by the treaties attributing them ",
which concurs fully with the concept that the
WEU Assembly has always had of its own
responsibilities and the views of the WEU
Council on the Charter of the Assembly quoted
above. There is every reason to think that the
relevant jurisdictional authorities of the other
member countries will react in the same way as
the French Constitutional Council.
63. Some members of the Assembly have
regretted that the Secretary-General of WEU is
not being more firm in respecting this point of
view. For instance, our colleague, Mr. Fourr6,
put Written Question 302 to the Council, the
main points of which read as follows:
*..just before the ministerial meeting of
WEU on l9th June l992,the WEU Secre-
tary-General spoke to the Security and
Disarmament Sub-Committee of the
European Parliament to describe the
change in the rdle of WEU with a view to
the implementation of the Maastricht
Treaty, whereas he communicated infor-
mation to the WEU Assembly on this
question only after the ministerial
meeting.
l. Does this mean that the Council sharesthe view expressed in Resolution
A3Olnl92 of the European Parliament?...
2. Does this mean that the Council
envisages transferring to the European
Parliament the responsibilities attributed
to the Assembly of WEU under Article IX
of the modiflred Brussels Treaty?
3. Does the Council consider that Article
J.7 of the Maastricht Treaty providing for
a direct link between the presidency of the
European Union and the European Par-
liament is liable to render null and void
either the modified Brussels Treaty as a
whole, or Article IX of that treaty?
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64. It is indeed evident that the European
Parliament's claims make more difficult the
" clmer co-operation between the parliamentary
Assernbly of WEU and the European Par-
liament " that the Council expressed a wish for
in the declaration appended to the Maastricht
Treaty. On 23rd October, Mr. Soell, President of
the Assembly, met Mr. Egon Klepsch, President
of the European Parliament, to examine the con-
ditions in which such co-operation might be
established.
65. Informing the committee of the results of
this meetinB, Mr. Soell recalled that exchanges
between the two assemblies could be based only
on equality and reciprocity. As there was no
observer status in the European Parliament,
there was no reason for tlre WEU Assembly to
offer such status to members of the European
Parliament. Relations therefore had to be con-
sidered on a different basis. The two Presidents
had:
(i) decided to meet regularly. Some com-
mittee members had asked that rep-
resentatives ofeach political group be
invited to attend these meetings;
(ii) examined the possibility of exchanges
of ideas and documents between
rapporteurs from the two assemblies
dealing with matters ofjoint interest.
Such exchanges were obviously
desirable provided they did not allow
a representative of one assembly to
have a prior view of the work of the
other, thus respecting Rule 42, paru-
graph 10, of the Rules of Procedure
of the Assembly;
(iii) examined the possibility of meetings
between committees or subcom-
mittees of the two assemblies.
66. However, first and foremost, it should be
specified on what juridical bases the Council's
encouragements are based. Lord Finsberg put
the question extremely clearly in Written
Question 303, when he asked:
" A. Can the Council say whether its
'encouragement' is based:
1. On Articles J.7 and J.ll of the Maas-
tricht Treaty which establish the Euro-
pean Parliament's consultative powers in
the European Union's common foreign
and security policy, completed by Article
J.4,paragraph l, which specifies that this
policy 'shall include all questions related
to the security of the union, including the
eventual framing of a common defence
policy, which might in time lead to a
common defence'? Does this imply pre-
paring a transfer of WEU's responsibil-
ities to the European Union referred to in
paragraph 6 of Article J.4 and hence of
the responsibilities of the WEU Assembly
to the European Parliament?
2. On Article J.4, paragraph 3, which
excludes the procedures set out in Article
J.3 'Issues having defence implications'?
In this case, is it a question of endeav-
ouring to distinguish between the
respective responsibilities of the two
assemblies?
3. Does the Council consider that, as long
as the governments of the member states
retain their full sovereignty, from the
moment recourse to force is envisaged,
the European Parliament, elected by
direct universal suffrage and with consul-
tative powers under Article J.7 of the
Maastricht Treaty in regard to measures
taken by the European Union for the
common defence, is an adequate demo-
cratic instrument of supervision? Does it
not believe, on the contrary, that the
WEU Assembly, formed of delegations of
the parliaments of the member countries
and with supervisory powers under
Article IX of the modified Brussels
Treaty, is in a better position to exercise
true democratic control over the defence
of the union and to uphold Europe's
defence requirements with the authorities
which have effective power in this
field? "
67. The Council's single reply to the questions
put by Mr. Fourrd and Lord Finsberg has the
merit of setting the problem on a sound basis by
specifying that the European Parliament has
only the responsibilities attributed to it by the
Maastricht Treaty and the WEU Assembly those
attributed to it by the modified Brussels Treaty
and it again confirms that it subscribes to the
Assembly's Charter in that the WEU Assembly
has responsibility for any matter arising out of
the Brussels Treaty (the word " modified "
should no doubt be added), thus obliging the
Council to give an answer even in cases where
the Council itself is not actually dealing with
such a matter. Its encouragement of closer
co-operation between the two assemblies is
therefore based only on the concern " to develop
a close working relationship with the lJnion ",
without prejudice to any legal position. Finally,
the Council * takes due note " ofthe considera-
tions of the two members of the Assembly con-
cerning the democratic legitimacy of the WEU
Assembly, without adopting a clear position on
the future implications of that legitimacy. In any
event, WEU's own bodies should adopt an
attitude towards the European Parliament par-
allel with that of the Community bodies towards
the WEU Assembly. So far, the President of the
European Commission has not followed up the
invitations addressed to him by the Assembly.
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68. It is indeed to be feared that, as long as
the governments allow doubt to prevail about
the nature of the responsibilities they acknow-
ledge for each of the assemblies, it may be dif-
ficult for the latter to co-operate because of the
radically opposite concepts of their respective
attributions. The WEU Assembly for its part has
always endeavoured to avoid any controversy
with the European Parliament because it
thought such a course would be detrimental to
the cause of Europe. It is difficult to understand
why the European Parliament, using juridical
bases that are, at the very least, fragile in today's
Europe, does not show similar discretion.
69. The WEU Assembly has a very soundjuridical base: the modified Brussels Treaty,
which gives it very wide responsibilities,
including in economic, social and cultural
matters under Articles I, II and III of the treaty,
whereas Rule 223 of the Rome Treaty, which
was not modified by the Maastricht Treaty,
excludes defence matters from the responsibil-
ities of the Community and hence of the
European Parliament.
70. The WEU Council admittedly renounced
the exercise of its economic, social and cultural
responsibilities, but it admitted that the
Assembly was entitled to ask it how these
responsibilities were being exercised by other
organisations. Your Rapporteur was therefore
surprised to learn from paragraph 4 ofthe replyto Recommendation 517 that the Council
refused to answer a recommendation relating to
the accession to the Community of countries
that are not members of NATO on the pretext
that this matter concerned the Twelve and not
the Nine. It is in fact application of the modified
Brussels Treaty that is in question, since the
matter concerns the process of European Union,
although it is the Twelve that effectively deal
with it in accordance with the Rome Treaty,
revised in Maastricht. This reply therefore
seems unacceptable. Moreover, the Twelve did
not hesitate, in Maastricht, to adopt (dubious)
interpretations of the modified Brussels Treaty,
particularly when they referred to the 1998
deadline.
71. This means that, should the European
Union be in a position to assume responsibil-
ities that now belong to WEU, it would have to
do so on the basis of a new treaty that should
include all the provisions of the modified
Brussels Treaty that are still relevant. Moreover,
it is hard to see why the date on which this is
done should be determined by the date on which
member countries are authorised to give one
year's notice of their withdrawal from the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty, whether in 1998, as fixed
arbitrarily by the governments, or in 2004, as
the Assembly believes. The governments have
the power to revise the treaty when they like,
provided they are unanimous in wishing to do
so, and, consequently, to integrate provisions of
the modified Brussels Treaty in a treaty of
European Union immediately. If they did not do
so in Maastricht, it is not for legal reasons but
for purely political reasons. It should be recalled
that several times the Assembly has asked, par-
ticularly in Recommendations 490, 491 and
504, that the Council revise the treaty to remove
obsolete provisions as it undertook to do in its
declaration accompanying the protocol of
accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU.
72. The question raised by the Maastricht
Treaty reference to the 1998 deadline suggests
that this is not how the governments intend to
act. It is just as if they wanted, here and now, to
allow the modified Brussels Treaty to lapse and
to withdraw from it when they can by trans-
ferring to the union in its present form activities
that they are now pursuing in the framework of
WEU. This would therefore lead to co-operation
in defence matters no longer being based on a
treaty of alliance. The danger of proceeding in
this manner is clear because it would replace a
binding treaty by a practice whose fragility has
been confirmed by recent problems with the
European monetary system. It is clearly such a
development that the European Parliament is
claiming to forestall in the name of its claim to
be the only parliamentary assembly of the
European Union.
73. Your Rapporteur believes that, in any
event, Maastricht is the last step the govern-
ments have managed to take 
- 
assuming they
succeed 
- 
without taking a clear decision on the
kind of Europe they intend to build. Whatever
the final decision, each time the people have
been consulted regarding ratification of the
treaty it has been seen that the public no longer
accepts the building of Europe if it is not based
on a clear definition of the responsibilities and
powers of each institution and that it is no
longer possible to propose a movement whose
aims are not clear. Similarly, where defence is
concerned, the same public is also not prepared
to accept the full consequences of a transfer of
national sovereignty to a European body.
74. This was the basis of your Rapporteur's
aflirmation in Document 1308 that a European
Union that did not aim at setting up a
centralised state, of which there is no question,
but a more or less federal system different from
the rather hybrid edif,rce that emerges from the
Maastricht Treaty would, in any event, need a
bicameral system allowing national parliaments
to be represented in European affairs, alongside
direct representatives of the people. President
Pontillon defended this idea in several lectures
he gave in 1991 and President Soell took the
idea up again in his talks with President Klepsch
and at his press conference in Brussels on 24th
September. In other words, a merger of the
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Rome Treaty, revised in Maastricht, and the
modified Brussels Treaty should lead to a union
integrating Community and intergovernmental
structures, with a bicameral parliament, one
elected by direct universal suffrage and repre-
senting the citizens of the union and the other
appointed by the parliaments of member states
and representing the countries forming the
union. Both might deal with all the union's
affairs, but the first would give priority to
matters that are the responsibility of the Com-
munity and the second to those which remain
intergovernmental matters.
75. However, your Rapporteur fears that the
approach adopted by the governments, particu-
larly in the WEU Council, may lead not to a
strengthening of the European Union, as some
seem to think, but to a weakening of its juridical
foundations. There is every reason to fear, as
lord Finsberg and Mr. Fourr6 mentioned in
Written Questions 302 and 303, that if, in 1996,
a decisive step is not taken towards a political
union covering " common defence policy " or
even " common defence ", the governments may
agree to apply Articles J.3 and J.ll, as well as
Article J.4, paragraph l, of the Maastricht
Treaty, by purely and simply transferring the
WEU Assembly's responsibilities to the
European Parliament. This would in no way rep
resent progress towards the European Union or
offset the democratic deficit about which many
are complaining. On the contrary, it would
submit to an assembly with no power over
member governments control of an area which
remained an intergovernmental matter. Once
again, it would be one of those false starts by
means of which the governments claim to build
Europe while strengthening rather than relin-
quishing any of their prerogatives.
Y. The dialogue
with the Central European countries
76. The decision to start a dialogue between
WEU and a number of Central and Eastern
European countries was taken more than a yeat
ago but implemented only on l9th June, when
ministers from eight countries (Bulgaria,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania and Czechoslovakia) met in Bonn with
the WEU Council. It had to be decided which
corntries should be invited to take part in such
exchanges, i.e. in what political context they
wcre set. It would, in fact, have been possible to
invite some of the Soviet Union's successor
states, in particular Russia, Ukraine and
Bclarus, and also those republics that used to
form part of Yugoslavia and had been
rwognised by the Twelve, which would have
been logical if priority had been given to
organising security throughout the continent.
However, such an initiative would have placed
WEU in competition with NACC, organised by
NATO, and with the CSCE. By choosing to
discuss security matters with the eight countries
invited, WEU decided, rightly, your Rapporteur
believes, to set itself in the context of Maastricht
and to establish relations with countries which
seem, in the more or less long term, likely to join
the European Union with which three of them
are already associated.
77. This initiative corresponds more or less to
those taken by the Assembly since 1990 in
inviting parliamentary observers from some of
those countries and organising the Berlin sym-
posium in April 1992 in which most of them
participated at a high level. Hence the action of
the Council and of the Assembly are in parallel
and it is not surprising that the ministers " advo-
cated the development of relations between the
WEU Assembly and the parliaments of the
states concerned ". It is to be hoped that the
Council will grant the Assembly the material
means necessary to follow the direction it
" advocates ".
78. At that meeting, the ministers " agreed to
strengthen existing relations by structuring the
dialogue, consultations and co-operation " and
went on to say:
" ...The focus of consultations will be the
security architecture and stability in
Europe, the future development of the
CSCE, arms control and disarmament, in
particular the implementation of the CFE
and Open Skies Treaties, as well as the
1992 Vienna document. Developments in
Europe and neighbouring regions will be
of particular interest to the participants.
In this way, WEU's Central European
partners will be able to acquaint them-
selves with the future security and defence
policy of the European Union and find
new opportunities to co-operate with the
defence component of the union and with
the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance as these develop. "
79. Furthermore:
" The Foreign and Defence Ministers
adopted the following concrete measures:
- 
Foreign and Defence Ministers will
meet once a year. Additional meetings
at ministerial level may be convened if
circumstances require.
- 
A forum of consultation will be estab-
lished between the WEU Permanent
Council and the ambassadors of the
countries concerned. It will meet at the
seat of the WEU Council at least twice
a year.
- 
These meetings will provide an oppor-
tunity to monitor the implementation
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of the measures adopted and, where
appropriate, to make proposals for the
inclusion of other fields of co-operation.
- 
Consultations at ministerial and WEU
Permanent CounciUambassador level
on security issues may be comple-
mented by meetings with an ad hoc
WEU troika at senior offrcial level. "
The first forum met in London on l4th October
1992.The communiqu6 issued on that occasion
gives no significant information about the
results of the meeting.
80. The Assembly, which has for long
attached the utmost importance to the devel-
opment of such relations, will unreservedly
welcome the fact that the Council managed to
place its approach in a framework that colre-
sponds to the need for a rapprochement between
these countries and the European Union. This
does mean it is leaving the former Yugoslav
republics out of the process, but it was obviously
wise not to associate them before a solution is
found to their present crisis. However, the
Assembly has several times expressed the wish
that the Council commit itself rather more than
in the past in the context of a simple dialogue
and have these countries participate in the
security system now being developed round the
European Union and WEU. That is why, in Rec-
ommendation 511, it proposed sending military
observers to the frontier between Hungary and
former Yugoslavia to deter the belligerents from
violating the frontier and, in Recommendation
525, it proposed responding to Romanian
requests for help in monitoring respect for the
embargo decided by the Security Council against
Serbia and Montenegro. Your Rapporteur has
learned from Romanian sources that the
Romanian Government has twice approached
the Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council in
this sense but apparently the matter has not
been effectively raised in the Council. He recalls
that the same confusion occurred in 1991, as he
indicated in paragraph I 19 of Document 1293,
over a Polish approach to the then French
Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council. He
therefore wonders whether there is a
proper exchange of information between the
Chairmanshipin-Oflice and the Permanent
Council.
81. The Assembly also expressed the wish that
the Council examine, on a case-by-case basis,
with those Central European countries so
wishing, the possibility of associating them with
some of the activities of the Council's subsidiary
organs. Paragraphs 3 and 14 ofthe reply to Rec-
ommendation 517 suggest that it is willing to do
so in a manner that the Assembly can but
approve. On 19th June, the Council confirmed
the vocation of the Institute for Security Studies
to turn in this direction, which it had already
been doing from the very start. However, it is
above all the opening of those countries towards
the West in armaments matters that would be an
important step in their rapprochement with the
European Union in security matters. As matters
now stand, it is not a question of giving a formal
security guarantee to the Central European
countries but ofencouraging the stabilisation of
democracy there by reassuring them that this is
not at the expense of their security.
82. Western Europe must pay particular
attention to the current serious dispute between
Hungary and Slovakia over the completion of a
vast project to divert the waters of the Danube
above Bratislava at a point where the river
forms the frontier between the two countries.
Slovakia is taking as a basis a 1977 agreement by
which Czechoslovakia and Hungary agreed on a
hydraulic programme that concerned both of
them. However, pressure by a section of Hun-
garian public opinion, in particular ecologists,
led Hungary to renounce the project in 1989
and, in 1991, to denounce the 1977 agreement.
The advanced stage reached in the work and the
needs of the Slovak economy led the Slovak
Government to continue the work, which is now
being completed. It is accusing the Hungarian
Government of wishing, on this occasion, to
cause unrest among the large Hungarian
minority in Slovakia, grouped particularly in the
region concerned by the Gabcikova dam.
Attempts by the European Community to bring
the positions of the two countries closer have so
far been unsuccessful.
83. [t is certainly not for our Assembly to
express its opinion on this delicate, complex
question. However, its responsibility for security
matters makes it concerned about how this
question will be handled and solved. Your
Rapporteur feels the governments of the WEU
countries are entitled to ask the two countries,
which wish one day to join a European Union in
which WEU is to participate, to agree, here and
now, to respect conciliation procedure commen-
surate with the provisions of Article X of
the modified Brussels Treaty. They should be
informed very quickly that creating faits
accomplis before negotiations is not likely to
facilitate their rapprochement with the European
Union.
YI. Conclusions
84. Both the positive and the negative aspects
of the Yugoslav affair demonstrate the state of
the European Union in external and security
policy and military matters. The most positive
aspects are the smoothness of relations between
the European Council and WEU and the
effective co-ordination of WEU and NATO
naval action in the Adriatic. This shows that, in
a period when the ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty is still in the balance, the WEU countries
are applying without difliculty the principles
I
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they defined in their Maastricht and Petersberg
Declarations: transparency and complemen-
tarity vis-d-vis NATO and placing WEU at the
service of common foreign and security policy in
the framework of the application of decisions
taken by the Security Council. Moreover,
Europe has shown that it is not allowing itself to
be divided by certain differences of views:
between Germany and France in summer 1991
and between Greece and its eleven partners over
Macedonia at the Lisbon conference.
85. Conversely, Europe has shown that, from
the moment the United States avoids involve-
ment, as is the case for any intervention on the
ground in Yugoslavia, its military means of
action remained limited. It was not even ready
to group the forces of WEU member states
under a single command even in application of
measures decided by the United Nations.
Admittedly, the WEU planning cell is not yet
functioning and truly collective action had not
been prepared. Nevertheless, the will shown by
all governments to keep the forces they assigned
for humanitarian operations at their full dis-
posal shows that we are far from the " common
defence policy " and, a fortiori, " common
defence " mentioned in the Maastricht Treaty.
Are these policies attainable by the 1998
deadline which, in the eyes of the authors of the
treaty, should allow defence to be included
among the responsibilities of the union by inte-
grating the functions and organs that WEU will,
in the meantime, have organised or regrouped?
In view ofthe positions adopted by several gov-
ernments during parliamentary debates or the
campaign for the referendum on adopting the
treaty, this seems doubtful.
86. This doubt should lead to the realisation
that WEU's specific mission might have to con-
tinue well after the date on which the signatory
states are authorised to denounce the modified
Brussels Treaty, particularly if that date remains
arbitrarily fixed at 1998. This consideration
should lead to two practical conclusions:
87. (a) The modified Brussels Treaty, as it
stands, is still the firmest cornerstone for any
European security organisation and it should be
ensured that the value of the treaty is not dimin-
ished by a desire to ensure at all costs that the
geography of WEU coincides with that of the
union. There are signs, noted in the present doc-
ument, suggesting that the governments are
nevertheless sorely tempted to do so.
8E. (b) Every part of WEU, including the
Assembly, must be able to continue to exercise
the mission assigned to it by the modified
Brussels Treaty for what may be some consid-
erable time. The governments must not, for
what may be quite understandable budgetary
r@sons, moreover, deprive it of the necessary
nrcans to do so. Nor must they, in an attempt to
show public opinion that " progress ", more
apparent than real, is being made towards the
achievement of the European Union, proceed to
dismantle WEU in advance. There are signs that
they may be only too prepared to do so, in par-
ticular where our Assembly is concerned.
89. At the present juncture, there are many
indications that the development of WEU, as
envisaged by the Nine in Vianden, Maastricht
and at Petersberg, is held up by uncertainty
among members of NATO about that
organisation's new tasks. It is understandable
that this uncertainty is making NATO fear com-
petition from a European organisation that
might act in its place or jeopardise the smooth
running of the alliance, and it may be said that,just as the difficulties facing NATO are holding
up WEU's activities, doubts about the political
development of Europe since Maastricht are
holding up those of the alliance. This was seen in
connection with Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the
Americans' decision not to intervene prevented
direct action by NATO and concern not to make
WEU a rival of the Atlantic Alliance led some
members of WEU to avoid having the Nine take
significant collective initiatives at this juncture.
The feebleness of action taken by both organ-
isations in Bosnia-Herzegovina illustrates this
mutual paralysis.
90. Any alliance has three foundations:
political aims, legality and effectiveness. In
times of tension, effectiveness takes priority
over the others. The preponderance enjoyed by
NATO for forty years was due to its effec-
tiveness. WEU survived only thanks to its
founding treaty whose political aim was lost
from sight. The effectiveness requirement has
now lost ground and this has weakened NATO
particularly since its legitimacy stems from no
precise political plan. However, the North
Atlantic Treaty still provides it with a solid
foundation. WEU was given new legitimacy by
the governments' decision to associate it with
the process of European Union, but the ref-
erence to the 1998 deadline in the Maastricht
Treaty limits this legitimacy significantly and
will reduce it even more if the governments hes-
itate to say how it will fit into the European
Union. Attributing to WEU aims that are
limited in time, i.e. a transitional r6le, is liable
to diminish its effectiveness. Your Rapporteur
therefore considers that the modified Brussels
Treaty, which allows WEU to to take its due
place in the European Union, should not be
abandoned in 1998, nor at some other date, but
should be one of the foundations of the union.
He regrets the attitude adopted by the govern-
ments, who treat it off-handedly to show their
preference for a movement whose success is
even more uncertain as its very existence now
seems in doubt.
91. One may wonder whether the twofold
approach adopted in Maastricht, which was to
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make WEU at one and the same time the
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and the
armed branch of the Community, does not
include factors that are incompatible from the
moment one tries to move from the level of easy
ideas to juridical and political realities. Reality
is that twelve-power Europe cannot be linked to
NATO and does not want to rule out the possi-
bility of enlargement to include countries that
are not members of the Atlantic Alliance. Nor
does it want to open its door to all the European
member countries of NATO. If the governments
refuse to face up to this reality, they will be
exposing themselves to pressure from all the
countries to which they do not wish to divulge
this truth. This is their present position vis-i-vis
the Greek and Turkish applications for mem-
bership of WEU. The result is a weakening of
the modified Brussels Treaty, the failure of
attempts to draw the IEPG and NATO'S Euro-
group closer to WEU and a NATO blockage in
face of any initiative by WEU. Another result
will probably also be crises in relations between
WEU and twelve-power Europe. If, on the con-
trary, the Council agrees to recognise WEU for
what it is, i.e. the modified Brussels Treaty
organisation, it will find it much easier to handle
problems raised by its relations with candidate
countries and with the two organisations and the
other countries that are members of them. This
is the approach the Assembly has been sug-
gesting that it adopt for a long time and it is the
only one that seems reasonable and beneficial to
the cause of Europe.
92. Having prepared several reports on
various aspects of the modified Brussels Treaty,
your Rapporteur has had to study closely the
text of the treaty and he is consequently con-
vinced that the work accomplished by the gov-
ernments in 1954 is of exceptional quality
because they managed to set out in appropriate
legal terms intentions that they still share today:
to contribute to the unification of Europe and to
ensure openness and complementarity between
WEU and NATO. He believes the negotiations
conducted in the framework of WEU in 1991
and 1992 fall well short of producing texts of the
same standard and he regrets that they resulted
in doubt being cast on the value of the 1954
treaty, assuming that their aim is not to reduce it
to the status of a scrap of paper.
VII. The meeting of the committee
on 6th November 1992
93. At its meeting on 6th November 1992,the
committee considered that some parts of the
preliminary draft recommendation duplicated
the draft recommendation it had adopted the
same day in Document 1340. It therefore
decided to give them at the end of the present
report.
These are:
SECTION I
Draft recommendation proper:
Paragraph 4
4. Enlarge WEU to include new members
- 
whether or not called associates 
- 
only in
accordance with the procedure provided for in
Article XI, specifying the conditions laid downby tqe high contracting parties for their
accessron.
Renumber subsequent paragraphs accord-
ingly.
Paragraph 7
7. Implement the provisions of the
Petersberg Declaration relating to the
enlargement of WEU (and the creation of the
status of associate member and of observer) only
after considering the Assembly's recommenda-
tions. dealing with the problems raised by these
provlsrons.
Renumber subsequent paragraphs accord-
ingly.
SECTION II
The Assembly,
Notes that the concern expressed by the
Nine in the Maastricht declarations to make
WEU at one and the same time the Europeanpillar of the alliance and the defence
organisation of the European Union is encoun-
tering serious diffrculties because:(i) it is leading to the accession of Greece and
Turkey to WEU in accordance with statuses
established a priori and not only in accordance
with conditions appropriate to each of the coun-
tries as intended in Article XI;(ii) it aims to merge NATO's Eurogroup and
the IEPG with WEU without all members of
those two bodies being given member status;(iii) in the new constitution of the Permanent
Council in Brussels it adopts no clear principle
common to all members of WEU;(iv) it does not allow a coherent European
armaments policy to be defined;(v) it emerges from the Petersberg Decla-
ration that there is a tendency to establish
WEU's action on bases other than the modified
Brussels Treaty.
Ir nrcouurNDs THAT rsp CouNcrr-
l. Admit no new memberto WEU, whatever
their status, without specifying the conditions
for its accession in accordance with the pro-
cedure provided for in Article XI of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty;
i
I
I
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2. Constitute the new Permanent Council of
WEU only after reaching agreement between all
the present members of WEU specifying how
this Council will be composed;
3. Invite all the countries it accepts as
mernbers of WEU to participate in the planning
cell and the organs for promoting the joint
organisation of military space activities;
4. Explain, in a public document, the tasks it
intends to assign to the future WEU armaments
agency;
5. Make it plain that the modified Brussels
Treaty is still the only basis for military action
by WEU, whatever organisation may have
defined the aims of such action.
SECTION III
The Assembly,
O Considers that the modified Brussels
Treaty is required to remain the juridical basis
for European defence;
(iil Notes that neither the European Com-
munity in its present form nor, a fortiori, a
Community enlarged to include countries
attached to a neutral status or policy will be
able, for a long time to come, to bear responsi-
bility for defence policy or common defence;
(iiil Believes that, as long as defence remains a
matter for state sovereignty, only an assembly
composed of delegations from the parliaments
of those states will be able to exercise the
responsibilities attributed by Article IX of the
modified Brussels Treaty to the WEU Assembly
in respect of European co-operation in defence
matters;
(iv) Recalls that a political organisation of a
federal or confederal type requires the super-
vision of a two chamber parliament in which
representatives of the parliaments of the fede-
rated or confederated states constitute a
chamber with powers adapted to the specific
features of the union.
Ir turnrronr RTCoMMENDS Trnr tge CouNCtI-
Take into consideration, in the exami-
nation it has to make in 1996 of the implemen-
tation of the nine-power declarations in Maas-
tricht, the r6le that the WEU Assembly will be
required to play in the organisation of a
European Union and accept no measure that
might jeopardise Article IX of the modified
Brussels Treaty.
SECTION IV of the preliminary draft rec-
ommendation becomes SECTION II of the draft
recommendation.
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Draft Recommeadation
on Eumpean securitY PlicY -
reply to the thirty-seventh annual repofi of the Councih
rope and the crises ia former Yugoslavia
The Assembly,
O Recalling its Recommendation 525;(it) Noting with satidaction that, in a number of respects, this recommendation has been followed up;
(iii) Noting, however, that the decisions taken in WEU and NATO to protect humanitarian
assistance to the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina are being implemented very slowly;(iv) Considering that the approach of winter makes the conditions for the survival of these people a
matter of supreme concern;
(v) Noting that the measures decided by the Security Council to ensure a cease-fire in Bosnia-
Herzegovina still fall short of achieving such a result;
(vi) Noting the slowness with which Security Council decisions are applied in the parts of Croatia
that are outside the authority of that republic;
(vit) Insisting that a statute must be created for the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina by qualified rep-
resentatives of the three principal components of the population of that republic;
(viii) Fearing a spread of hostilities to regions of former Yugoslavia which have remained safe from
them, particularly in the region of Kosovo,
RrcouueNos rHAT rHn CouNcII-
1. Speed up intervention by forces of member countries to protect the transport of humanitarian
relief to Bosnia-Herzegovina;
2. Approach the Security Council to ensure that it makes effective the coercive measures it has
tuf., to make the parties t6 ttre conflict put an end to military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina;
3. Offer the United Nations a larger contribution to the peace-keeping operations it has under-
taken;
4. Consider the possibility of extending the UNPROFOR mission to Kosovo;
5. Agree to its members urgently recognising the independence of the Republic of Macedonia with
a name acceptable to the population of that republic.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Goerens, Rqpoaeur)
I. Introduction
l. The Yugoslav crisis started just when the
European Community was preparing the Maas-
tricht Conference, which was intended to asso-
ciate member countries more closely in a better-
welded European Union and help them to meet
the new situation created by the disappearance
of the Warsaw Pact and then the Soviet Union.It seemed that Western Europe was going to
have to assume more responsibility for estab-
lishing a new European order and that, politi-
cally and militarily, it was inadequately pre-
pared to do so. The Yugoslav affair had a
twofold effect since, during summer l99l in par-
ticular, it brought to light serious disagreements
among the Twelve about the nature of what they
could do to keep peace in the region, but, at the
same time, it led those countries to speed up
their effort to consolidate political Europe and
gave them a testing-ground for the implemen-
tation of a European policy in which WEU had a
place alongside the joint external policy. The
Maastricht process therefore influenced the
Twelve's reactions to the Yugoslav crisis, while
that crisis influenced the process of European
Union.
2. It has been deplored that Europe managed
neither to prevent nor to solve nor even to mod-
erate the conflicts on Yugoslav territory. It has
perhaps not been sufficiently underlined that,
thanks to action by the Twelve, Europe managed
to contain the crisis within the territory of
former Yugoslavia. It is because the European
Community offered former Yugoslavia's neigh-
bouring countries prospects of security, eco-
nomic recovery and, eventually, in the more or
less long term, integration that they managed to
remain above purely national interests, some-
times quite legitimate, which would at any other
time have involved them in armed confron-
tation. It is because it was taking part in the
search for a new, peaceful order for the whole of
Europe that Russia has, so far, managed to resist
calls from traditionalist and nationalist elements
urging it to demonstrate active solidarity with
the Serbs, traditional Slav, orthodox allies,
whose government was still in the hands of
former communists. Finally, it is a mystery to
no one that the Community countries tackled
the Yugoslav problem with different historical
memories: at the beginning of the cor,!flict, some
were more in sympathy with Serbia and the
Yugoslav state while others were more sensitive
to the national claims of the Slovenes, Croats or
Macedonians. It is therefore quite remarkable
that these differences did not lead to serious
tension among the Twelve and that the latter
were able to work out political action and evenjoint military action. This may be considered
insuflicient, but one should recall that, only
three quarters of a century ago, the fate of
Bosnia-Herzegovina triggered off the first world
war. This may be measured by the progress
achieved in Europe thanks to the Community,
and also to WEU, and how far the will for
understanding and joint action now prevails
over national reactions. It should be added that,
in the framework of the United Nations, several
member countries are helping to monitor
respect for the cease-fire between Croats and
Serbs in the north-eastern part of the Republic
of Croatia, now controlled by what are effec-
tively Serb authorities with the support and
assistance of the authorities in Belgrade.
3. The governments of the Twelve seem to
have been very anxious to safeguard this situ-
ation, which perhaps led them to be more cau-
tious than many would have liked when consid-
eration was given to the possibility of military
action. However, it should be underlined that
any undertaking that did not have the consent of
all member states of the Community would have
significantly weakened Europe just when it was
negotiating the Maastricht Treaty and then pro-
ceeding to ratify it. In the light of the scenes that
daily show us the atrocity of the struggle in
Bosnia-Herzegovina or even in Croatia, the res-
ervations of Community Europe may appear to
be a shameful failure. However, a military
engagement that divided Europe might have
such serious consequences, even for the peoples
of former Yugoslavia, that this caution cannot
be condemned, particularly as it is known that,
with passions as they now are, any real military
intervention can produce results only if it is
massive and prolonged. It would involve such
heavy losses for those participating that none of
our countries seems prepared to accept them. So
far, no really credible plan to restore lastriirib
peace has been worked out, be it in the
framework of the United Nations, the CSCE, the
Twelve or even at the London Conference held
on 26th and 27th August 1992. lt may even be
wondered whether the principles laid down in
these various forums are likely to facilitate the
search for a peaceful solution which, in any
event, requires the prior agreement of the
parties to the conflict. WEU, for it part, has had
only to consider or implement the use of mil-
itary means to ensure that measures decided in
one or other of these frameworks are applied
and apparently it has carried out the tasks
assigned to it satisfactorily. It cannot be re-
i
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proached for the fact that these measures are
far from sufficient to meet the concern of all
Europeans to put an end to the conflict as soon
as possible.
less controlled by Belgrade, reacted with force
against those republics, first in the hope of
bringing them back into the federal system and
then, realising the inevitability of their sepa-
ration, of constituting a new Yugoslav fede-
ration which would in fact merely be a greater
Serbia grouping present-day Serbia (with the
two autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and
Kosovo) and Montenegro. It laid claim to the
territories of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
where the population includes large groups of
Serbs. A series of armed conflicts ensued
involving not only the federal armed forces and
those of the Republics of Slovenia, Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina but also local militias with
the support of one side or another without being
really under their control.
6. It should be noted that Serbia and Croatia
have contradictory ambitions. Quoting the right
ofthe Serbs to be grouped in a Serb state, Serbia
is claiming parts of the Republics of Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina but is refusing the right to
self-determination of Hungarians in Vojvodina
and Albanians in Kosovo. Croatia is refusing to
allow Serbia what it is claiming in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, i.e. the regrouping of the Croat
populations in that republic round Croatia. This
is leading Serbs and Croats to associate with
each othel in their struggle against the authority
of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while
they are fighting each other in Dalmatia,
Krajina and Slavonia.
7. In Slovenia, where there were few alien
elements, the situation became stabilised fairly
quickly and its constitution as an independent
rbpublic within its present frontiers seems estab-
lished.
8. Nor does the existence of a Croatian
Republic seem in question, but the Croats are
involved in the wai in two ways: a large part of
the territory of the Croatian Republic is effec-
tively occupied by Serb armed forces following
murderous, destructive military operations, and
a large pan of the Croatian population has been
brutally driven out. While a United Nations
buffer force moved in after flrghting ended in the
northern regions of the republic, this is not so in
the southern part of Dalmatia, particularly
round Dubrovnik, which is still under siege and
being shelled by Serb forces. Furthermore, Cqo-
atian forces have intervened in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, where almost a quarter of-the pop-
ulation are Croats. They control part of the ter-
ritory of that republic and are pursuing a policy
of eipelling Serbs and Muslims and regrouping
Croats similar to the policy the Serbs are pur-
suing in other regions of Bosnia and in the parts
of the Croatian Republic that they occupy.
9. The war is now at its worst in the
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most of the
territory of that republic, where Serbs, Croats
IL The situation on the terrttory
of former Yugoslavia
4. Created on 19th October 1918, the
Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes
replaced Serbia, the Ottoman Empire and the
Austro-Hungarian Empire for the region
peopled by the southern Slavs. While earlier
iegimes had proved increasingly incapable of
miintaining peace in the area, in particular with
the crises that occurred in 1878, 1908, 1912,
1913 and 1914, the Yugoslav Kingdom was far
from achieving a satisfactory order, mainly
because of the political preponderance of the
Serbs. The second world war provided an oppor-
tunity for many scores to be settled in a particu-
larly cruel manner and made way for Marshal
Tito's communist dictatorship. Whatever that
r6gime might rightly be reproached for, it should
nevertheless be borne in mind that it succeeded
in creating a true Yugoslav national feeling -
although claims were still being made, in par-
ticular by the Croats, Slovenes and Albanians -
and in ensuring that real order prevailed in the
country, not only through the monopoly of
power in the hands of the Communist lrague
but also by making the Yugoslav people take a
stand against the Soviet threat since 1948 and
laying the foundations for a certain type of fed-
eralism. To that end, as from 1943 Tito had
weakened the strength of the dominant national
element, i.e. the Serbs, in a plan to organise the
country worked out by the resistance movement
and implemented when the country was lib-
erated. This federal organisation attributed to
certain republics, in particular Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina, territories on which there
was a Serb majority and separated from Serbia
proper the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina
and Kosovo. In the framework of a federation,
the Serbs accepted these amputations and they
continued to play an important r6le in the
federal state. After the death of Tito in 1980, the
Serb element resumed a dominant position in
the state, which is one of the main reasons why
Albanians in Kosovo then, in 1991, Slovenes
and Croats and, finally, Bosnians and Macedo-
nians rejected a state that they considered too
authoritarian, too stamped with communism
and too dominated by Serbs.
5. The crisis that had existed in Yugoslavia
for several years grew considerably worse in
spring 1991 and in June led to successive procla-
mations of independence by the Republics of
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Macedonia. Together with the Yugoslav Federal
Army, Serb and Montenegrin elements, more or
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and Muslims each represent a significant pro-
portion of the populationt, although none of
those national groups is in the majority, is
occupied by Serb or Croat forces. The gov-
ernment seems quite powerless and the Muslim
element is finding it very difficult to remain in
place, either in besieged and constantly shelled
towns or in the country where ethnic grouping is
brought about at the cost of massacres,
destruction, internments in concentration
camps where living conditions are lamentable
and the deportation of populations. It should be
underlined that prevailing uncertainty about the
outcome of the conflict is leading each side to
erase from the territories it occupies all trace of
the presence of other peoples, not only by elimi-
nating them physically but also by the sys-
tematic destruction of historic monuments, reli-
gious edifices and memories of the past, thus
making the conflict particularly barbarous and
irreparable. It is becoming increasingly clear
that, although, on the ground, Croats and
Muslims are collaborating in opposition to a
military take-over of this republic by the Serbs,
the Serbian and Croatian Governments have
agreed on a sharing of Bosnia-Herzegovina
which leave only a small place for the Muslims,
in spite of the fact they are the largest ethnic
group in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
10. So far, the war has spared the Republic of
Macedonia, but its independence has still not
been recognised by the international com-
munity, with the exception of seven states (Bul-
garia, Turkey, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Lithuania, the Philippines and Russia). Because
Greece is opposed to recognising a state bearing
the name of Macedonia that might one day take
advantage of this to claim territories that are
part of Greece, the Twelve, at a meeting of the
European Council in Lisbon on27th June 1992,
refused to recognise the Republic of Macedonia,
unlike their attitude towards the other republics
stemming from former Yugoslavia. The Greek
Government now seems prepared to be more
flexible on this point, but it is encountering a
strong reaction from the opposition parties.
1 l. The two autonomous provinces of
Kosovo and Vojvodina also pose a problem.
They are part of the Serbian Republic but the
majority of the population of Kosovo is
Albanian and Muslim. It constantly demon-
strated its opposition to Serbian domination in
l. Your Rapporteur has to note that all sources, whether or
not official, from 1850 onwards that refer to nationalities
and, a fortiori, give figures and percentages in respect of
them are divergent and subject to caution. They emanate,
directly or indirectly, from sources more inclined to defend
national views than to respect sociological realities which, in
spite of efforts at conceptualisation and objectivity by
western experts, are difficult to translate into definite data.In this connection, he will therefore confine himself to
prudent, but vague, appraisals.
the former Yugoslav state and there is every
reason to fear that it would find it even more
difficult to accept more overwhelming domi-
nation in the new Yugoslav Federation and that
the war may overspill into it. This might also be
the case of the Sandjak of Novi Bazar, a small
territory in the Republic of Serbia, on the fron-
tier with Montenegro, where the majority of the
population is Muslim. Some of them have
already fled the region to take refuge in Bosnia-
Herzegovina where they have suffered particu-
larly badly from the measures taken by the Serbs
or Croats against Muslims. In Vojvodina, alarge
Hungarian minority and the Croat minority also
fear a strengthening of Serb domination, partic-
ularly as they are under strong pressure, or are
even being coerced, by the Serbian army and
police who are urging them to leave the province
to make way for the Serbs chased out of Croatia
and to take refuge in Hungary or Croatia.
12. We are thus witnessing a vast operation,
mainly by the Serbs, but also by the Croats, to
precede any settlement of the conflict by
regrouping, by force and in particularly brutal,
inhuman conditions, each of the Yugoslav
ethnic groups in a national territory that does
not correspond to that of the republics in their
present form but which foreshadows a new
political carving up of what used to be Yugo
slavia.
III. Europe and Yugoslav problems
13. The problems raised by the state of war
that has existed since June 1992 on the territory
of former Yugoslavia have, ever since, been
prominent among the concerns of Europeans in
general and the work of WEU in particular.
Admittedly, there was no defence commitment
associating members of WEU with the former
Yugoslav Federation, nor has one been entered
into in respect of its component republics.
However, Europe could not remain indifferent
to events on that territory because:
14. (i) The war has reached a scale and degree
of cruelty, particularly vis-i-vis the civilian pop-
ulations, that have profoundly moved public
opinion throughout Europe. The shelling and
destruction of towns in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the proliferation of summary exe-
cutioni and the discovery, in Augusf and
October 1992, of concentration camps and mass
graves have been all the more disturbing since
the international agreements subscribed to in
the framework of the CSCE had convinced the
public that the European continent was now
secure from such practices.
15. (i/ Confrontations over the southern
Slavs were at the origin of the first world war;
they suffered particularly badly from the second
world war and energetically and effectively
resisted Soviet threats during the cold war.
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16. (rD Neiehbouring countries of former
Yugosiavia are threatened by a spread of the
conflict: the influx of refugees, particularly in
Hungary and Austria, the possible calling in
question of Macedonia's frontiers and the sensi-
tivity of a section of the Russian public to the
fate of the Serbs mean that Europe's peace is at
risk. It should be added that quite a strong
feeling of solidarity with the Muslims of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo and the sanjak is
becoming increasingly apparent among.Arabs,
Turks and Iranians, who are reproaching the
West for being far less firm in defending the ele-
mentary righti of the Yugoslav Muslims than in
defending Kuwait's interests in 1990 and 1991.
Finally, Greece feels threatened by an inde-
pendent Macedonia, where Bulgaria seems to be
making claims, and Turkey seems tempted to set
itself up as the protector of Albanians and
Muslims in Bosnia.
L7. (iv) The presence of many workers from
the former Yugoslav territory in Western
European countries alerted public opinion to the
fate of the populations of the region. Req}ests
for asylum- fiom Yugoslavs, victims of the
flrghting, are increasingly numerous and the
attitude of western governments has been
extremely reserved. Only Germany has acce-pted
them in-sigrrificant numbers but part of the
German pu-blic is now reacting strongly against
the inflow of immigrants.
18. For these various neasons, many see the
pursuit of the war as a demonstration of failure
bn the part of Europe, in all its forms, and in
particular the European Community, not
-because the latter had special responsibilities
towards the countries concerned, but because it
seerned to be the strongest European
orsanisation around which Europe would unite.
Fr6m this point of view, just as the Maastricht
agreements were being concluded, the Yugoslav
afTair revealed the limits of the influence that
the Community could effectively exercise
outside its fronti-ers. Those opposed to the ratifi-
cation of the Maastricht Treaty have taken this
as an argument in favour of their cause, while
those in favour of it pointed out that the
strengthening of political and military 99-
operition prbvided for in the treaty is specifi-
cally designed to increase that influence.
19. In order to assess the decisions taken by
governments in the framework of WEU, a
iareful examination should therefore be made of
what Europe is at one and the same time entitled
and able tb do in terms of effective action to
restore peace in what used to be Yugoslavia, to
promote humanisation of the methods used in
ihe *ar and to help people who are victims of
the conflict or who are threatened by its
extension, without thereby endangering interna-
tional peace or affecting the cohesion of the
Twelve.
20. In summer 1991, it became clear that the
Yugoslav Federation was no longer able to keep
order within its frontiers by acceptable means,
thus justifying the decision taken by the Twelve
and ihen itre UniteO Nations to recognise, in
December 1991, the Republics of Slovenia and
Croatia as independent states followed, in April
1992, by Bosnia-Herzegovina. Only Greece's
oppositi6n is still preventing the Twelve
r&ognising Macedonia. However, such. recog-
nition raiies a number of problems since it
implies, in accordance with a principle affirmed
sevtral times when the Warsaw Pact was dis-
solved and the Soviet Union broke up, keeping
those republics within their present frontiers
and reJpecting the rights of minorities.
However, while those frontiers were more or less
generally accepted within a federation, t-hey a,re
6eing - contested by soqe of the
newly-independent republics. The Hungarian
minority in Vojvodina and the Albanian
majorit! in Kosovo are in a far more diffrcult
situatioir inside the new Yugoslav Federation
where the Serb element is much more dominant
than in former Yugoslavia. But the Serb popula-
tions of certain Croatian regions, where they
form compact groups, and of a large proportion
of Bosnia-Herzegovina fear that they may
become minoritiei in new states where national
sentiments are strong and they may be
threatened. Their revolt is thus not at all sur-
prising, nor is the fact that Serbia is giving them
armed support. This has led some people,
including - President Mitterrand, to wonder
whether, in 1991, the Twelve should not have
accompanied their recognition of the indepen-
dence bf tne republics by more precise condi-
tions than those accompanying recognition of
the successor states of the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia, particularly in respect of the rights
of -minoritiei or even the rectification of the
internal frontiers of the former federation.
21. This situation now belongs to the past and
the Twelve's action can be developed only
within relatively narrow margins. In present cir-
cumstances, there can indeed be no question of
Western Europe taking unilateral, massive mil-
itarv action in order to impose its own kind of
peaie, however tragic the fate ofthe people con-
ierneit may be. First, such an intervention
would have to be decided upon by an interna-
tional authority empowered to do so, i.e. the
United Nations. Second, it would have to take
as a basis extremely precise objectives accepted
by all parties, othenruise its action would appear-
t6 be unilateral to the advantage of some of
them. Although the armed forces of the
Yugoslav state, in its successive forms, and now
of Serbia and the Serb militias in Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the support of the
Serb army, seem to bear particularly heavy
responsibiiity for the innumerable attacks on the
moit elementary human rights, starting with
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their physical integrity, they do not have a
monopoly. Although the uncompromising
attitude of the authorities of the Republic of
Serbia was the main cause of the armed conflict
and did much to ag$ravate it, it does not bear
sole responsibility. While most of the collective
massacres so far known may be attributed to
Serb groups, and while the Serbian Government
bears very heavy responsibility in the implemen-
tation of a policy of ethnic cleansing using the
most barbarious methods, it would appear that a
series of attacks on United Nations forces pro-
tecting the delivery of humanitarian aid to
Sarajevo are attributable to Bosnian groups,
whether or not controlled by the authorities of
that republic. The aim of the perpetrators of
those attacks would seem to be to make the
United Nations or, in any event, the western
countries, take military action going far beyond
the protection of humanitarian assistance and,
eventually, to make them become involved in a
conflict in which they do not wish to partic-
ipate.
22. In short, twelve-power Europe cannot
confine itself to supporting the causes of the
Republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
and perhaps tomorrow Macedonia or Kosovo.
Nor can it impose its own political solution on
the populations of Yugoslavia. It can but bring
pressure to bear on the belligerents to encourage
them to negotiate a settlement and perhaps then
help them to facilitate the implementation of
any conventions agreed to by the various
parties. As long as the confrontations last, its
direct action can but be confined to the imple-
mentation of measures decided by the Uniled
Nations, particularly in Security Council Reso-
lutions 713 and 7 57 (and this is the framework
within which air and naval operations designed
to monitor respect for the embargo on trade
with Yugoslavia should be set), sending humani-
tarian assistance to the civilian population,
under the protection of armed forces, and the
participation of certain countries in the United
Nations force monitoring respect for the cease-
fire, wherever it is applied.
23. Hence separate initiatives by Europe must
be distinguished, as these have differeni aims:
24. (a/ Assistance to refugees, going so far as
to receiving some of them on the national ter-
ritory of some Community countries, in par-
ticular the Federal Republic of Germany.
25. (D/ Sending humanitarian relief to
civilian populations, mainly in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, where the fighting is now the most
cruel for civilians and most of the people torn
from their homes are concentrated. lid is of
many.kinds and is distributed by very diverse
organisations, brlt it has to be protected by
United Nations forces, particularly at Sarajevo
airport. Its delivery is still not assured and it is
not reaching many regions of Bosnia-Herze-
govina. The attack on an Italian aircraft carrying
humanitarian aid to Sarajevo on 3rd September,
followed by another serious attack on a land
convoy protected by a French unit on 8th Sep-
tember, shows that even this form of assistance
involves serious dangers. The air lift to Sarajevo,
suspended after the incident on 3rd September,
was resumed early in October, but it is still
threatened and its suspension increased the
sho-rtages from which the people of Sarajevo are
su,ffering at the approach of a wintei during
which their survival seems threatened.
26. (c/ Measures to detect, denounce, prevent
or punish infringements of the law of war and
human rights: massacres, torture and ill-
treatment, detention in inhumane conditions,
deportation of persons, etc. The international
press played a considerable rdle in revealing and
denouncing such practices. The International
Committee of the Red Cross has endeavoured to
play its due r6le in this area. However, only at
the end of September did the international com-
munity receive news of the massacre of 3 000
Muslims interned in the part of Bosnia con-
trolled by the Serbs. The fact that, to date, all
direct armed action has been ruled out lends
little credence to the would-be deterrent declara-
tions of the western allies.
27. (d) Action to terminate war operations or
to limit death and devastation. For instance, the
United Nations force can exercise meaningful
control over the use of force in apart of Croatia
occupied by Serb forces. However, this is not
enough to allow Croatian refugees to return
home and United Nations forces have had to
use force to hold them back so that they will not
be massacred by the Serbs. One of the aims
pursued by the Twelve in this area is to group
and neutralise heavy weapons in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The aim of the embargo decided
by the United Nations is to induce Serbia and
Montenegro to put an end to their armed inter-
vention on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
This was also the aim they set themselves in
deciding to exclude (new) Yugoslavia.
28. (e) An attempt to induce the parties to the
conflict to negotiate a global political settlement
to Yugoslav problems. This is the r6le of the
conference on restoring peace, a meeting of
which was organised by the Twelve in tggt
under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington. The
ill-will shown by the parties concerned was a
decisive factor in the resignation of Lord
Carrington and in holding the London Con-
ference on former Yugoslavia in London on
28th August 1992, under the aegis of both the
United Nations and the European Community.
The following countries took part in this con-
&rence: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,Canada, China, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania,
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Rusia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, the United
Kingdom and the United States. Serbia and
Montenegro sent a joint delegation on behalf of
the (new) " Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ",
the governments of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,
Macedonia and Slovenia were represented there
as were the non-recognised entities known as the
" Serb Republic of Krajina ", the " Republic of
Kosovo ", the " National Council of Sandjak
Muslims " and the " Democratic Union of Hun-
garians of Vojvodina " . The London Con-
ference adopted a declaration of principles to
govern a negotiated settlement. These principles
are as follows:
1. effective application of a cease-fire;
2. non-recognition of any advantages
gained by force;
3. the opening of negotiations between
all parties concerned;
4. respect for human rights;
5. constitutional guarantees of human
rights and the rights of minorities and
application of the right to self-deter-
mination;
6. condemnation of forcible expulsions,
illegal detentions and attempts to
change the ethnic comPosition of
populations, the closure of detention
camps and the safe return to their
homes of all disPlaced Persons;
7. compliance with the Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949 and the Personal
responsibility of those who breach
them;
8. respect for the independence, sover-
eignty, territorial integrity and fron-
tiers of all states in the region;
9. a final settlement of all questions of
succession to the former Yugoslav
state to be reached by consensus or by
arbitration and the commitment of all
parties to recognise each other
mutually and to share the duties and
responsibilities of successor states;
10. full compliance with all United
Nations resolutions;
11. the obligation for all to allow humani-
tarian assistance to be distributed;
12. the obligation on all parties to
co-operate in international moni-
toring, Peace-keePing and arms
control operations;
13. the need to provide international
guarantees to ensure the full imple-
mentation of all agreements reached
within the framework of the interna-
tional conference.
29. One may wonder to what extent the
various Yugoslav parties feel committed by their
endorsement of these principles. In particular,
Serbia now seems to be divided into two camps.
One, round the government of the Republic of
Serbia, which will consider a return to peace
only on the basis of a strong position allowing all
Serb-populated territories to be regrouped in a
single political entity and maintaining Serb
domination over Kosovo. The other, round the
authorities of the new Yugoslav Federation, sup-
ported by the government of Montenegro and a
large section of the Serb population, which is
prepared to negotiate on the basis of the prin-
cipfus laid down at the l,ondon Conference.
Consequently, on his return from London, the
Prime Minister of the present Yugoslav Fede-
ration, Mr. Milan Panic, was accused by part of
the Serb opposition of selling off Serbia's vital
interests.
30. Hence it now appears that the possibilities
of a return to reasonable peace depend on a
show of force in Belgrade between the Serbian
Government, probably supported by part of the
anny, Serbs from other republics and nationalist
elements of Serb society, and the government of
New Yugoslavia, supported by the government
of Montenegro and a large, but impossible to
calculate, part of the population of Serbia. In
particular,-the Federal Government sayq that it
is prepared to renounce all ethnic cleansing and
revert to peace on the basis of frontiers between
republics which could be changed only by
agleement between all the parties and also to
give some degree of autonomy to Kosovo. This
policy, which would also tend to give the
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina federal 
-status,is iontrary to that of the Republic of Serbia,
which is s6eking agreement with the Republic of
Croatia to share Bosnia-Herzegovina, leaving
only a small portion for the Muslim Bosnians.
The aim of the economic blockade measures
taken under the aegis of the United Nations
would then be to increase the lassitude now
becoming apparent in Serbia about continuing
the war and to facilitate the victory of the gov-
ernment of New Yugoslavia over that of Serbia.
However, there is a contradiction between this
attempt and the refusal to recognise New Yugo-
slavia and consider the Republics of Serbia and
Montenegro as being the only responsible
authorities.
31. As long as the parties to the conflict have
not subscribeO to the principles of a political
agreement on the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina'
oi that of the regions of the Croatian Republic-
occupied by the Serbs and on the status of
Kosovo, it is highly unlikely that the measures
intended to contain the conflict, limit its
intensity and ensure respect for human rights
will be really effective. In these circumstances,
Europe can do little more on the ground than
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afford humanitarian aid and protect its delivery.
At diplomatic level, it can but continue the task
of drawing the parties together that it started
over a year ago, with little success.
32. Apart from the declaration of principles,
the London Conference adopted eight other doc-
uments concerning its programme of work, the
conditions for a return to peace in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the application of sanctions,
humanitarian issues, confidence, security and
anns control, as well as a formal notice
addressed by the co-Chairmen to Serbia and
Montenegro and * specific decisions' con-
taining a long series of concrete measures with a
view to implementing the principles laid down.
Finally, the conference decided to organise per-
manent negotiations between participating
parties under the co-Chairmanship of Mr. Cyrus
Vance for the United Nations and Lord Owen
for the European Community. They were startedin Geneva on 7th September. It therefore
appears that, far from concluding international
action to promote the restoration of peace, the
conference establishes a perrnanent system of
interaction by the international community and
the parties to the conflict which probably corre-
sponds better to the complexity of the situation.
But its effects are still subject to the will of all
parties to reach an agreement and this will is as
yet still far from clearly confirmed. To date, it
has been possible to see only the start of imple-
mentation of the l,ondon agreements on the part
of the Federal and Bosnian Governments, which
have started to regroup the heavy weapons
deployed round Sarajevo. Furthermore, the
Serbs have evacuated some of the territories
they occupied in the Croatian Republic, south of
Dubrovnik, and the motorway from Zagreb to
Belgrade has been reopened under United
Nations control. However, these measures are
not yet of real significance.
33. At a meeting held at Brocket Hall near
London on l2th September, the Ministers for
Foreign Affairs of the Twelve drew up a pro-
gramme designed to obtain a de-escalation of
the conflict. This process, whose effects would
be felt only progressively, would consist of:
(i) a stiffening of the international
blockade on Serbia and Montenegro,
mainly in order to strengthen the
conciliatory tendency represented by
the leaders of the new " Yugoslav
Federation " as compared with the
uncompromising attitude of those
grouped round Mr. Milosevic, Pres-
ident of Serbia;
(il) support for an American proposal to
create an air exclusion zone in part of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, without involv-
ing western intervention by air;
(iii) the setting up of a court of justice to
try those responsible for war crimes;
(iv) action to ensure that the Serbian,
Croatian and Bosnian Governments
regroup their heavy weapons under
United Nations control;
(v) the closure of detention camps and
the return home of any refugees who
so wish;
(vy' confidence-building measures, includ-ing the deployment of United
Nations forces along Bosnia's fron-
tiers and in certain towns, and air
cover of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
These various measures are the subject of nego-
tiations in Geneva with the parties to the con-
flict and were proposed to the Security Council
which, on l4th September, adopted Resolution
776 authorising the enlargement of the mandate
and an increase in United Nations troops to
protect humanitarian convoys on condition this
was at no cost to the United Nations.
34. At the time of writing, the implemen-
tation of all the points in this programme has
been started, but new difficulties are being
encountered which show how little control the
various Yugoslav leaders have over their own
forces. For instance, in spite oforders from the
leaders of the Serb community in Bosnia, Serb
pilots stationed in Banja Luka have refused to
evacuate their base, planned exchanges of pris-
oners have had to be postponed, evacuation of
the Dubrovnik region by the 'Yugoslav' army
has led to resumed fighting between Serbs and
Croats and various incidents have led to the
intemrption of overland humanitarian convoys
to Sarajevo.
IY. WEU in the Yugulav crtsis
35. WEU's action in Yugoslav affairs has
been marked by the concern of member govern-
ments to conline the organisation to the r6le
attributed to it at the Maastricht Conference, i.e.
to be the armed branch of the future European
Union. The course to be followed by the Twelve
was examined in the framework of foreign
policy and joint security, including recognition
of the independence of the republics stemming
from former Yugoslavia. They have therefore
not shown much enthusiasm about denouncing
those members of the European Community
who were not very eager to apply joint decisions,
particularly in regard to the blockade of Serbia
and Montenegro. It was also in that framework
that decisions concerning the possible use of
force were taken. In September l99l and again
in August 1992, WEU, for its part, was made
responsible for studying the possible military
options implied by recourse to force in precise
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circumstances and, if appropriate, how to
imflement them.
36. The Twelve have also been most con-
cerned not to take any initiatives outside the
framework of decisions adopted by the interna-
tional community, either in the CSCE or in the
United Nations. Thus, the WEU Council met
twice at ministerial level during the summer: at
the close of the CSCE meeting in Helsini on
10th July and at the close of the London Con-
ference on peace in former Yugoslavia on 28th
August 1992.
37. On lfth July, the WEU Council decided
to co-ordinate member countries' naval opera-
tions to ensure respect for the embargo against
Serbia and Montenegro reinforced by the
Security Council on 30th May (Resolution 757).
These operations were confined to monitoring
navigation in the Adriatic and provided for no
recourse to force. They are co-ordinated with
similar measures taken by NATO. A delegation
from our Assembly's Defence Committee visited
the area at the end of August where it was able
to see the perfect organisation of the allied
alrangements and the excellent way in which
they were working. But they are still of very
limited effectiveness due to the fact that WEU
and NATO flotillas, despite the air cover
deployed, were not allowed to stop and search
suspicious vessels. The embargo was not total
and concerned only certain goods, in particular
weapons. There were no similar controls along
the land frontiers of Serbia and Montenegro.
Thc very fact that the fighting is continuing indi-
catcs that the armed forces of the various
parties, whose autonomy of action was esti-
mated in June l99l at a fortnight, have had and
continue to receive supplies of arms, munitions,
equipment and various materials from abroad.
Information so far obtained by your Rapporteur
is not reliable enough for him to be able to
estlblish their origin. However, shortcomings
stemming from Security Council decisions
cannot be attributed to a failure on the part of
WEU in carrying out its mission.
38. The meeting of the WEU Council on 28th
August at the close of the London Conference
was held in response to a convocation by the
Italian presidency, itself urged to do so by the
President of the Assembly to whom the
chairmen of two political groups had written
calling for a strong reaction by the WEU
Asrembly following the discovery of concen-
tration camps in the part of Bosnia-Herzegovina
under the control of Serbia. It was indeed logical
for the WEU member countries to meet to
examine what armed foroes they were prepared
to make available for an international action
and in what conditions to help to implement
decisions taken at the London Conference.
39. When he spoke to the Standing Com-
mittee of the WEU Assembly on 3rd September
1992, Ml Andd, Italian Minister of Defence,
provided the following list of forces:
- 
Belgium: 100 men and 24 tanks;
- 
France: I 100 men from all services,
including tanks and helicopters;
- 
Germany: medical and logistic support(l 000 tons of equipment);
- 
Italy: I 300 men from all services, heli-
copters and a medical unit;
- 
Luxembourg: a financial contribution;
- 
Netherlands: 60 lorries, 500 tons of
equipment and 200 men;
- 
Portugal: medical personnel and means
of transport 2;
- 
Spain: an annoured unit of 300 to 400
men;
- 
United Kingdom: I 800 men from all
services, including an arrnoured bat-
talion.
40. It should be noted, however, that these
forces are supposed to intervene only to protect
humanitarian convoys and thus only in the
event of such convoys effectively being
organised. They afford means of escorting
convoys but not the possibility of permanently
occupying the regions these conveys would have
to cross, particularly between the Dalmatian
coast and Sarajevo.
4L. It should also be pointed out that these
are national means which are not a priori meant
to form a real WEU force. Since the member
countries of NATO, for their part, said on lst
September that they would make available 6 000
men for such missions, it might seem legitimate
to add these 6 000 men to the 5 000 envisaged
by the WEU Council. In fact, as these were
national decisions and not decisions to make
troops available to each of the two
organisations, it would appear that the two con-
tingents cannot be added together: the same
troops were taken into account at both meetings,
at least by the WEU countries. Finally, some
governments are not empowered to decide alone
to send national forces in such cases and their
engagement is then subject to a vote in their par-
liaments. For all these reasons, the impact of the
decisions taken by both WEU and NATO is
fairly limited. Although, in Resolution 756 of
14th September, the Security Council authorised
the deployment of these 6 000 additional men,
some countries are insisting on a delay of several
months before they carry out their com-
mitment.
42. The WEU Council also offered to take
part in verifying procedure aimed to neutralise
heavy weapons in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The
2. A Portuguese member of the committee said his country
had decided to make a larger contribution to this operation,
but your Rapporteur has not been able to obtain precise
information on this point from the Portuguese authorities.
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parties to the London Conference certainly sub-
scribed to this neutralisation process and even
undertook to carry it out within a very short
lapse of time (96 hours). This time-limit was not
respected, but a start has been made with
regrouping round Sarajevo under United
Nations control. This has been only partly suc-
cessful. In these circumstances, WEU does not
yet have a r6le to play. This situation may well
continue since it is hard to see the warring
Yugoslav parties laying down their heavy
weapons as long as the process designed to guar-
antee peace has not been started more seri-
ously.
43. Finally, answering concerns expressed by
Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman of the Assembly's
Defence Committee, at the close of his visit to
the Adriatic, the Council decided to urge the
United Nations to transform into a real
blockade the embargo measures taken against
Serbia and Montenegro. This means WEU is
prepared to adopt more coercive measures to
enforce a blockade, but on condition the United
Nations takes the decision.
44. Hence the decisions of the WEU Council
cannot be considered as effective military mea-
sures but simply as gestures designed to
encourage the United Nations to be firmer and
more active in its action to promote the resto-
ration of peace and induce the parties to the
conflict to co-operate more effectively in that
restoration.
45. Was this a weakness on the part of the
WEU Council? Can it be thought that a greater
degree of organisation of military co-operation
in Europe would allow more important initia-
tives to be taken? In your Rapporteur's opinion,
this is not at all the case. Apart from a few
points of detail, all the western governments are
equally anxious to limit their military com-
mitment on the territory of former Yugoslavia
and not to become involved in a conflict that
they do not feel they have the means to control.
This was the position they adopted in Sep-
tember l99l when they made their choice
among the options they had had worked out by
the group set up by the WEU Council in Metz
and that they have constantly maintained since
then. They can do no less because ofpublic reac-
tions and also because they do not wish to give
the other countries of Central and Eastern
Europe the impression that they would allowjust anything to be done. They cannot do much
more without running the risk of becoming
embroiled in a cruel conflict to which they
cannot impose a solution.
46. Consideration was given to air operations
to reinforce action to promote peace. These
might be of three kinds:
- 
air cover for humanitarian convoys;
- 
a ban on overflights of Bosnia-
Herzegovina by aircraft of the warring
republics;
- 
selective bombing of military targets, in
particular any heavy weapons detected
At first sight, these have the advantage of not
exposing forces engaged in such operations to
unduly heavy losses. It may be hoped that the
two first options at least would not affect
civilians. However, the first applies solely to
humanitarian measures and does not claim to
obtain political results. The second was effec-
tively adopted by the Security Council on lOth
October 1992 (Resolution 781) but with no asso-
ciated coercive or retaliatory measures. Such
interventions, like air raids, seem hardly com-
patible.with the pursuit of humanitarian mea-
sures since convoys and their military escorts
would become possible hostages and marked
targets for possible retaliation by parties victims
of air operations. Hence it is understandable
that the governments are hesitating to embark
upon ventures which might well lead to a wors-
ening and extension of hostilities.
47. However, it may be wondered whether, in
this matter, they were not wrong to suggest that
they were prepared to take more decisive action
than they actually decided upon, thus encour-
aging some of those concerned to accelerate
their use of force to occupy territorial positions
before being compelled to negotiate and others
to call for independence that they did not have
the means to ensure, thereby giving many people
the impression that the atrocities in former
Yugoslavia mean a serious setback for European
Union and WEU, just when the parliaments, or
even the people, ofseveral countries that signed
the Maastricht Treaty are required to vote on
the ratification of the treaty.
48. It is also thought that Western Europe's
relative abstention in Yugoslav affairs might
encourage other peoples of Central and Eastern
Europe to resort to force in order to try to settle,
to their own advantage, national problems that
have arisen since Soviet power stopped
imposing its order in the region. Allowing con-
flicts to continue and deteriorate may tempt
certain neighbouring countries to intervene to
protect their nationals or to obtain bargaining
chips to back up their interests when peace is
restored. Allowing a policy such as ethnic
cleansing to be pursued may encourage other
countries to use such methods against their own
minorities. However, systematic European
support for national claims, however legitimate
they may be, would probably increase the risk of
destabilising a large number of southern and
eastern European countries and also endanger
the application of principles embodied in the
1991 Charter of Paris. However this may be, the
Twelve might ask for far stricter application of
sanctions decided by the Security Council and it
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is hard to see why some countries, suspected of
not applying the embargo, might, with no
further explanation, be allowed to accede to the
modified Brussels Treaty.
49. It is probably not by trying to arbitrate the
affairs of the whole European continent that the
union of the Twelve will be able to safeguard
perce there; it is more likely to succeed through
its economic influence and the hope it offers to
the peoples of the rest of Europe of acceding,
within a reasonable lapse of time, to a Europe of
prosperity and progress. The manner in which
Czcchs and Slovaks have started to handle and
settle the matters that divided them is certainly
due in part to Czechoslovakia's association with
the Community and the Twelve's undertaking
that it may join as soon as it is capable of shoul-
dering the commitments this involves.
50. It would appear, however, that WEU
might, in the immediate future, act more posi-
tively to promote peace in the region. In
Daember 1991, the Assembly recommended, in
Recommendation 5ll, that the Council deploy
small numbers of forces on the territory of any
of Yugoslavia's neighbouring countries which
might so request to provide a guarantee against
any violation of their frontiers. This deployment
might also help to ensure application to roads
and waterways of the embargo measures, or
evcn blockade, decided by the United Nations
against the belligerents. In its reply, the Council
said a United Nations mandate would be
required for this purpose, which does not seem
evident. But the possibility of a military
prcsence in Romania to s€e that the embargo is
respected on land and watenvays was considered
by the WEU Council at its meeting in London
on 28th August and it is to be hoped that it will
follow this up, although, in its reply to Recom-
mendation 525, it denies having received any
calls from the countries concerned in this
respect.
Y. Conclusions
51. Recommendation 525, adopted by the
Standing Committee of the Assembly at an
urgent meeting held on 3rd September 1992,
sets out exactly what the Assembly believes it
can expect of the Council at the presentjuncture. It can already be noted that several of
the points set out in Recommendation 525 have
been taken up in the Council's requests to the
United Nations, including strengthening the
blockade and creating an air exclusion zone. In
the meantime, Lord Owen's address to the Par-
liamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
on 3rd October has allowed a better idea to be
obtained ofthe type ofaction taken by the inter-
national conference on peace in former Yugo-
slavia of which he is co-Chairman.
52. Lord Owen described the principles this
conference intended to take as a basis. First,
there must be a return to the frontiers between
republics except in the case ofchanges obtained
by agreement between the parties, i.e. the return
home of refugees and cohabitation of persons of
different nationalities in states stemming from
former Yugoslavia, which means totally aban-
doning the policy of ethnic cleansing pursued
mainly by the Serbs and also the maintenance of
Kosovo in the Republic of Serbia. Second, the
search for illusory cease-fires must be aban-
doned in favour of a progressive end to hostil-
ities, helped by the extension ofareas controlled
by UNPROFOR throughout Bosnia-Herzego-
vina and the disarmament of armed forces
frghting on the territory of that republic. Finally,
Lord Owen proposed that the Council of Europe
take the initiative of setting up a body to
monitor respect for human rights, separate from
the jurisdiction created by the United Nations
to punish those guilty of violating human rights
and intended above all to inform the interna-
tional community of the crimes thus com-
mitted.
53. It now seems that internal developments
in the new Yugoslav Federation offer a possi-
bility of action by the international community
to promote the progressive restoration of peace
that did not exist at the beginning of October.
The limited intervention by WEU can but form
part of a much vaster undertaking that now
seems to have some chance of succeeding. It is
in the light of this still very fragile hope that an
assessment should be made of what has been
done to date.
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I. Introduction
As far as the activities of the WEU minis-
terial organs are concerned, the first halfof 1992
saw the start of implementation of the declara-
tions adopted in the margins of the Maastricht
summit. These texts represent a major step in
the definition of the r6le and place of WEU in
the new European security architecture. The
dual mission now incumbent on WEU has been
clearly set in the context of building a European
Union and strengthening the European pillar of
the alliance.
The Permanent Council has organised its
discussions and work around three main
topics.
Firstly, WEU's contribution to stability
and co-operation in Europe, including arms
control and disarmament. In this context, the
proliferating conflict in the former Yugoslavia
Itth November 1992
and the initiatives to contain and end it have
been uppermost in the Council's mind. The
strengthening of WEU's operational r6le was the
second major topic on the Council's agenda.
Thirdly, the Council has set about the task of
clarifying the commitments of the states
applying for accession and the respective rights
and responsibilities of future observer or assG.
ciate states in consequence of the WEU decla-
ration issued by Ministers on lOth December
l99l in Maastricht.
The fruit of this work is clearly set out in
the three parts of the Petersberg Declaration 
- 
a
stage in the reinforcement of co-operation
between the Nine. The guidelines it contains are
paving the way for the implementation of the
WEU declarations adopted at Maastricht.
This declaration will determine the way in
which WEU's relations with the European
Union and the alliance will develop following
Firct part of the thiq-eighth annual report
of the Council to the Assembly
(lst January to 30th July 1992)
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the strengthening of the organisation's opera-
tional rOle and its enlargement. It will require
prrctical measures to which the Council has
been giving detailed thought. New relations will
gfadually develop, based on mutual trans-
parency and complementarity.
WEU's d6marche will therefore continue
to be marked by a three-fold requirement:
firstly, conformity with the United Nations
Charter and Security Council resolutions; sec-
ondly, compatibility with the operating proce-
dures of the Atlantic Alliance; and thirdly,
strcngthening of the CSCE whilst continuing to
contribute to the arms control and disarmament
negotiations. Success of this d6marche requires
enhanced cohesion on the part of WEU member
states, which the Council and presidency have
made a major objective of their work during this
half of the year. That objective has been
achieved since, under the German presidency,
WEU enhanced its standing in the new configu-
ration of institutions responsible for European
security.
II. Situatiot in Yugoslavia
In January, the Permanent Council was
briefed by the Portuguese Ambassador, on
behalf of the presidency of the Twelve, on the
decision to recognise the Republics of Slovenia
and Croatia, Lord Carrington's mediation
efforts and preparations for the deployment of a
United Nations force, partly based on studies
conducted within WEU. In general, throughout
the first quarter the Permanent Council was
kept informed of developments in the situation
on the ground and the many diplomatic initia-
tives aimed at securing compliance with cease-
fires. The constitutional problems facing Bosnia-
Herzegovina and its recognition by the
European Community were also extensively
debated, as was the mediation by the Twelve
between Greece and Macedonia.
With the marked deterioration in the situ-
ation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in May, at every
meeting the Council debated the advisability of
a possible concrete contribution by the
o,rganisation towards stabilising the conflict.
The Council had to admit that none of the
political conditions that might justify WEU
action were met. The adoption by the United
Nations Security Council of its Resolution 757
on 30th May, duly noting the failure to comply
with the provisions of Resolution 752 and
deciding upon various embargo measures, led to
consultation within the Permanent Council on
the ways in which WEU could contribute
tovards monitoring the implementation of the
embargo at sea.
The enlarged Council of 10th June had
been asked to consider the prospects for
European co-operation on the reopening of
Sarajevo airport in order to facilitate the
movement of humanitarian aid. This question,
as well as the possible contribution by WEU to
the monitoring of the maritime embargo, were
on the agenda for the Ministerial Council on
19th June. In addition to adopting a declaration
on Yugoslavia, which is attached to this report,
ministers decided to convene an ad hoc group
consisting of representatives of the foreign and
defence ministries to consider the resources that
member states could deploy in order to con-
tribute towards the implementation of the
United Nations Security Council resolutions.
This group met on 26th June.
III. Contacts with the countries of Central
and Eostern Europe
From 2lst to 24th January 1992, the
German presidency and the Secretary-General
visited the three Baltic states on a fact-finding
mission. This was an opportunity for detailed
discussions on their security concerns with both
foreign affairs and defence ministers and with
many senior oflicials in these new republics.
On llth-l2th May, the third seminar on
Central Europe was held in Budapest under the
auspices of the WEU Institute for Security
Studies.
In accordance with the decision taken by
the Ministerial Council on l8th November
1991, the foreign and defence ministries of the
eight Central European countries were invited to
an extraordinary meeting with their counter-
parts in the WEU countries at the Petersberg in
the afternoon of l9th June 1992.
During their discussions, the foreign and
defence ministers adopted several practical mea-
sures:
foreign and defence ministers will meet
once a year. Additional meetings at
ministerial level may be convened if
circumstances require.
A forum of consultation will be estab-
lished between the WEU Permanent
Council and the ambassadors of the
countries concerned. It will meet at the
seat of the WEU Council at least twice
a year.
These meetings will provide an oppor-
tunity to monitor the implementation
of the measures adopted and, where
appropriate, to make proposals for the
inclusion of other fields of co-
operation.
Consultations at ministerial and WEU
Permanent CounciUAmbassador level
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on security issues may be comple-
mented by meetings with an ad hoc
WEU * troika " at senior official level.
- 
The following initiatives will be con-
tinued and encouraged:
(a) regular exchanges of documents and
information;
(b) growing co-operation between the
WEU Institute for Security Studies
and the corresponding bodies in the
countries concerned. An increasing
number of seminars and colloquia
would be organised. The pro-
gramme of scholarships will be
continued.
Ministers recommended the development
of relations between the WEU Assembly and the
parliaments of the countries concerned.
In the declaration on Nagorny-Karabakh,
issued after this extraordinary meeting of the
WEU Council of Ministers with the States of
Central Europe, ministers reiterated their appeal
to the parties to the conflict to establish immedi-
ately an effective cease-fire and to take addi-
tional steps, including withdrawal from
occupied areas.
IV. Council activities
With the exception of meetings relating to
a specific subject in response to events, the
Council agendas continued to include items on
the results of working group meetings and on
topical questions.
The Permanent Council devoted parti-
cular attention to monitoring the work of pre-
paring draft decisions for submission to the
Ministerial Council and also their implemen-
tation after adoption. The Council kept itself
directly informed on the activities of the WEU
Institute for Security Studies and on the estab-
lishment of the satellite centre in Torrej6n. It
placed special emphasis on the institutional dia-
logue with the Assembly and followed with par-
ticular interest the discussions in the I-rrst part of
the thirty-eighth ordinary session. Lastly, the
Council reached decisions as appropriate on
administrative and budgetary matters, on the
advice of the Budget and Organisation Com-
mittee.
l. Topical questions
(i) The Council was regularly briefed on
developments in the situation in Yugoslavia (see
section III of this report).
(ii) The Council also kept a watching
brief on the main events within the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS) and the
Russian Federation.
(iii) The Council discussed the work of
the CSCE. Following an agreement reached at
the level of the Committee of Senior Officials,
the Council was invited to send a representative
as guest of honour at the meeting of the CSCE
Council of Foreign Ministers in Prague on 30th
and 3lst January 1992. The Council was also
represented at the fourth CSCE follow-up
meeting which opened in Helsinki on 24th
March 1992.
(iv) l-astly, at its June meetings, the
Council devoted a substantial portion of its time
to considering the impact of the Danish refe-
rendum on the Maastricht Treaty ratification
process.
2. Activities of the intergovernmental
organs
(il Council working groups.
The Council took note of the results of
working group meetings held in the period
leading up to each Council meeting. The sum-
maries of these negotiations were discussed as
appropriate.
(ii) WEU Institute for Security Studies(rss).
The Director of the Institute attended
every Council meeting where the agenda jus-
tified his presence. The Institute's annual and
quarterly reports to the Council provided an
opportunity for an exchange of views on the
ISS's current activities.
3. Relations between WEU and other
European member states of the
European Union or the Atlantic
Alliance
The Council, supported by the Council
working group, had regular exchanges of views
on the two aspects of this subject: WEU enlar-
gement, and practical measures for co-operation
between WEU, the European institutions and
the Atlantic Alliance. For example, the Council
discussed the draft of a declaration on enlar-
gement which was approved by ministers at
their meeting in Petersberg on l9th June. A
report has been produced on the practical mea-
sures.
The enlarged Council meeting on l0th
June 1992 drew up the text of the draft decla-
ration by member states on enlargement and the
draft protocol of accession and draft mandates
for discussions. At this same Council meeting,
the text of the report on the practical measures
and its annex on concrete measures for
co-operation between secretariats were also
agreed with a view to their inclusion in the
dossier for ministers.
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Y. Activities of the Special Working Group
(SWG) in scparate sessioru and in ioint sessiorl,s
wfrh the Defence Reprcsentatives Group (DRG)
l. Joint SWG and DRG sessions
The SWG held two joint meetings with
the DRG in preparation for the Ministerial
meeting on l9th June 1992.
2. SWG meetings
(i) The purpose of the meetings was to
implement the Maastricht Declarations issued
by WEU member states in the margins of the
European summit.
The SWG prepared the Council's discus-
sions and ministers' decisions on relations
between WEU and the other European member
states of the European Union or the Atlantic
Alliance. Consolidated documents on the
respective rights and obligations of the future
associate members and observers were drawn up
in the course of various meetings.
At its meeting on 26th June, the SWG
agreed, on the basis of the Petersberg Decla-
ration, to entrust the Italian presidency with the
task of pursuing the discussions and opening
nqotiations at a meeting of the enlarged
Council in Rome with the candidate coun-
tries.
The SWG also debated relations with
third countries, in the broad sense of the term,
whether from EFTA or the CIS.
(ii) The SWG discussed the follow-up to
be given to the CSCE Helsinki summit and both
the implementation of the Open Skies and CFE
Treaties and the continuation of the CFE la.
(iii) Lastly, the SWG proposed an
increase in co-operation between WEU and the
CSCE through the exchange of information and
documents and through the presentation of con-
tributions to the work of CSCE bodies.
YI. Activities
of thc Defence Representatives Group
(, DRG meetings provided an oppor-
tunity to discuss in greater detail the missions
that could be envisaged for WEU's operational
capability and the resources needed for their
implementation. The DRG discussed " military
units answerable to WEU ". It was briefed on
the plan for the creation ofa * European corps "
on the joint initiative of Germany and
France.
Delegations considered future relations
between the Council, chiefs of defence staff and
the DRG on the one hand and the planning cell
on the other.
As to the evaluation of requirements for
WEU co-ordination and planning structures, the
DRG agreed on draft terms of reference and
establishment table for a WEU planning cell,
whose creation was decided by ministers on
19th June. The DRG expressed the wish that
key personnel for the cell be in place in
October.
The question of arms co-operation was
also raised and proposals examined for the
development of relations between WEU and the
IEPG.
(i/ Experts on the verification of arms
control agreements continued their work on
practical procedures for CFE inspections. They
considered the effects ofthe creation ofthe CIS
on the verification of the CFE Treaty. Lastly,
experts held several meetings on the problems of
implementing the Open Skies Treaty.
YII. Activities of the Mediterranean Sub-Group
The Mediterranean Sub-Group held three
meetings during the first half of 1992.
The group continued its work on defining
principles likely to contribute to a resolution of
security questions in the Mediterranean. An
annotated list of seven principles was agreed.
The group produced a preliminary review
of the development of the Five + Five
process.
The group also completed its study on
security in the Maghreb and discussed the impli-
cations of the situation in Algeria for the
security of its neighbours and of Western
Europe. On the basis of the report by the Secre-
tary-General, the Ministerial Council of l9th
June gave a mandate to the group for the step-
by-step establishment of a dialogue with the
countries of the Maghreb, with due regard for
developments in the political situation in these
countries and in the region.
Finally, the group exchanged information
on conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and
Western Sahara, and on the Cyprus question.
YIII. Activities of the ad hoc Sub-Gtoup on Space
In essence, the purpose of meetings of the
ad hoc sub-group was to monitor the implemen-
tation of decisions reached by the Ministerial
Council in Bonn on lSth November l99l as
regards:
- 
establishing the WEU satellite centre in
Torrej6n near Madrid, whose Director
had been appointed for a three-year
period from lst Jantary 1992;
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- 
launching the work of the multinational
team set up in Paris with the responsi-
bility of the management of long-term
studies on a European satellite obser-
vation system.
In these two essential fields of space
co-operation within WEU, considerable pro-
gress has been achieved both by the ad hoc sub-
group and by the many meetings of experts
which addressed the more technical aspects of
the problems. The Ministerial Council took due
note in the part of the Petersberg Declaration
relating to WEU and European security.
On 6th lNlay 1992, a ceremony for the
signing of the contract for the first phase of the
satellite observation system feasibility study
took place at the head office of Dornier GmbH
in Friedrichshafen. The purpose of this study is
to consider the mode of operation and the time-
table for the creation of a complete system.
On 22nd April, the Council approved the
WEU budgets for 1992 for the WEU satellite
centre and studies on medium- and long-term
space co-operation.
IX. Activitias of the Agency for the Control
of Armaments (ACA)
The Agency for the Control of Armaments
continued its residual tasks as regards the limi-
tation of atomic, biological and chemical
weapons, at a level of activity corresponding to
that obtaining at the time of the 1984 Rome
Declaration and in accordance with the proce-
dures approved up to that time.
In the first halfofthe thirty-seventh year
of monitoring within WEU, the legal sources
used to justify the control levels and procedures
have remained unchanged. The number of
agreed verifications in 1992 will be the same as
for previous years (four in 1990 and in l99l).
They will take place during the second half of
the year.
X. Activities of the IAEU Institute
for Security Stadies
L. Research staff
Dr Peter Schmidt, from the Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik, completed six months
at the Institute, during which time he worked on
Franco-German relations. Dr Mathias Jopp,
from the Hessische Stiftung Friedens-und
Konfliktforschung, took up his post as a research
fellow in April 1992.
2. Documents intended for the Council
and its working groups
(i) The Institute prepared discussion
papers on topical subjects for the Council and its
working groups: " CSCE and peace-keeping in
Europe " and " the consequences of the Danish
referendum result for European Union and
Western European Union ". It commissioned a
paper on " Algeria: adversaries in search of
uncertain compromises' from Professor Rdmy
Leveau. The report of a military fact-frnding
mission to Moscow, Minsk and Kiev by four
West European researchers, which took place in
February, was also sent to the Council.
(ii) The Institute forwarded reports to the
Council on the seminars it had arranged, as well
as quarterly reports for the period I st October
l99l to March 1992.
3. Seminars
The Institute organised the following sem-
inars during the first half of 1992:
- 
The implications of the " republica-
nisation " ofdefence and nuclear policy
in the Soviet Union;
- 
Five challenges for European security: a
seminar for heads of policy research
institutes and senior representatives
from foreign ministries;
- 
Europe and the future of conventional
arrns control: a seminar organisedjointly with the Clingendael Institute in
The Hague;
- 
Towards a new transatlantic part-
nership: two meetings with researchers
of the Rand Corporation, one held in
California and the second in Paris, to
discuss outlines of papers for this joint
project;
- 
Second meeting of the defence indus-
tries task force;
- 
A seminar to discuss the report, men-
tioned above, on a fact-finding mission
to Moscow, Minsk and Kiev;
- 
Neutral EFTA countries on the
doorstep of European Union;
- 
The third seminar for senior officials
from WEU countries with colleagues
from Central European countries.
In addition, the Institute hosted one in the
series of meetings of major institutes of interna-
tional affairs in Western Europe to discuss the
preparation of a report on security issues in
Eastern Europe.
4. Activities in conjunction with the
Assembly
A paper on security and defence in
Central and Eastern Europe was commissionedby the Institute as a contribution to the
Assembly symposium on a new security order in
,l
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Europe, held in Berlin from 3lst March - 2nd
April.
The Director of the Institute addressed
the Presidential Committee of the Assembly at
its meeting in May.
5. Institute Rencontres
The third meeting in this series of occa-
sional meetings of a study group of specialists on
European security was held on 12th March,
when the invited speaker was His Excellency
Ambassador Carlos Miranda, Permanent Repre-
sentative of Spain to NATO.
6. Meeting for members of the Council
On lst June, the Institute invited
mernbers of the Council to a meeting to discuss
topical questions of joint interest.
7. Fellowships and study awards
Institute fellowships, for scholars from
WEU member countries, were awarded to be
taken up in the second half of 1992. Study
awards for researchers coming from Central and
Eastern Europe to spend time at West European
research institutes were made to scholars from
Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria.
8. Publications
(i) Book: Western Europe and the Gulf
The Institute's first bookJength study,
Western Europe and the Gulf, was published in
May. It was composed of chapters commis-
sioned from both external and internal authors
and was jointty edited by Nicole Gnesotto and
John Roper.
(ii) Quarterly newsletter
The fourth and fifth issues were published
in February and May respectively.
9. Other activities
The Director and research fellows took
part in a number of conferences and seminars
organised by other institutes, and received vis-
itors from a wide range of countries.
XI. Administrative questions
In paragraph D6 of the Declaration of
WEU member states issued on 10th December
1991, it was stated that " to facilitate the rein-
forcement of WEU's r6le, the seat of the WEU
Council and Secretariat will be transferred to
Brussels ".
Accordingly, the Secretariat, in close
co-operation with the competent authorities in
the future host country, embarked on a search
for a building. The new requirements created by
the proposals submitted to the Ministerial
Council for the planning cell meant that the
scope of this d6marche was broadened in late
June. As a result, the necessary arrangements
were made so that the transfer could take place
by January 1993, provided that all the physical
pierequisites for housing the Council, Secre-
iariat and planning cell under the same roof
were satisfied.
XII. Activities of the Puhlic Administration
Committee (PAC)
The Public Administration Committee
held the first of its biannual meetings in London
on 27th April 1992, providing an opportunity to
exchange views on the future of the PAC and the
adaptation of its future activities to WEU's new
rOle. At the end of the debate among the dele-
gates, it was agreed to ask the Secretariat to draw
up a summary document as a basis for future
discussions on these questions by both the PAC
and the Permanent Council. Delegates also had
a free exchange of views on the administrative
developments in member countries. The report
on this meeting may be consulted at the
Assembly Secretariat.
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Recommendations 516 to 525 and replies of the Council
RECOMMENDATION 516 
'
on a neilt security order in Europe2
The Assembly,
A Concerned about the revival of ethnic, territorial, nationalist and other conflicts in Central and
Eastern Europe;
(ii) 
. 
Aware that the yo3ng ald still fragile democracies in this region are all encountering serious eco-
nomic crises resulting from the transformation of their societieJand economies;
Qiil Recalling the principles of the November 1990 Charter of Paris in which all signatories con-firmed their intention to maintain freedom of expression for all and respect for the rights-of minoriiieq
(iv) 
__Bqer-eplng the failure of CSCE attempts to solve conflicts, but noting the efforts being made atthe Helsinki follow-up meeting to e_nhancelhe capability of the CSCE for-conllict prerentlon, Crisis
management and the peaceful settlement of conflicts and suggesting that increas-ed concenfration
should be directed to these approaches;
(v) Welcoming the Treaty on European Union which should allow the member countries of the
European Community to take a decisive step towards establishing a European Union meeting the
requirements of an economic and monetary union and capable 6f deveto'ping a joint foreigriand
security policy, which might in time lead to common defence;
(ri) 
. 
Noting that the decisions taken at the Maastricht summit give the WEU Council the ability to
take initiatives in external and joint security policy matters;
(u.ii) Ul9_firttngthat the common foreign a-nd security policy, and the accompanying further defi-
nition of WEU's r6le_and the development of a common European defence policy *itiin the future
also help to prepare Europeans to assume their responsibilities lnd contributi to ihe management ofinternational crises and contingencies in which military assets could be required;
(viii) Recalling that the positive aspect of the two Gulf exercises in 1987-88 and 1990-91 has demon-
strated that WEU can act as an effective European forum for establishing political concertation andpractical co-operation among member countries in crisis situations in whic-h iheir security interests ire
affected;
Ql Cofisidering that Western- Europe has a vital interest in present developments in Central and
East-ern Europe insofar as the foundations are now being laid- for parliameniary democracy and a
market economy in nations which should eventually be able to join the European Union, in 6rder togive greater assurances of peace and security for tlie whole of Europe;
@) Recalling Recommendation 500 on the consequences of developments in Central and EasternEurope for European security, adopted by the Assembly on 5th June 1991,
RrcoulvrcNos rHAT rHr CouNcrr-
L.__ 
_ 
Starting this year, associate the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary and poland withWEU;
2. Conclude a 
^peace-keeping agreement with those countries and accordingly hold, at least twice ayeat, a meeting of the Council enlarged to include their ministers for foreigi ifai.s anO Oefenci;
1 . $lso h_o!d, at least once a year, consultations at ministerial level extended to the Baltic countries,Bulgaria and Romania;
l. Adopted by the Assembly on lst June 1992 during the hrst part ofthe thirty-eighth ordinary session (2nd sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Caro on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1309).
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4. Establish in WEU an automatic mechanism for mobilising politico-military consultation in
order to react to serious crises in Central and Eastern Europe;
5. Endow WEU with the permanent structures it needs to reach joint decisions in consultation and
co-operation with NATO and, where necessary, effectively to implement ad hoc contingency plans, tai-
lored to possible theatres of operation, including those within Europe;
6. Take all preparatory measures needed to provide WEU peace-keeping and peace-restoring forces
at short notice if they are required for CSCE or United Nations operations on European territory and
for WEU operations in the framework of agreements as mentioned in paragraph 2 of this recommen-
dation;
7 . Urge, in the light of continuing conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, the leaders
of the CSCE at the forthcoming Helsinki summit to review current machinery for the prevention of
conflict and the peaceful resolution of disputes, with a view to establishing a process of binding arbi-
tration and peace enforcement.
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
'
to Recommendation 516
l. The Council welcomes the keen interest shown by the Assembly in developing WEU's relations
with Central European states. In its reply to paragraphs l-3 of Recommendation 516, the Council
wishes to draw the Assembly's attention to the declaration agreed in Bonn on l9th June 1992 by the
extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers together with the foreign and defence min-
isters of Central European states. This declaration states that " the enhancement of WEU's relations
with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, I,atvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania should
reflect the specific relations which exist and are developing between these countries and the European
Union and its member states. Other appropriate forms of cooperation could be set up in the light of
the development of these relations. "
On 19th June 1992, the WEU Council of Ministers together with the foreign and defence min-
isters of Central European states adopted a number of concrete measures including the decision that
foreign and defence ministers should meet once a year. Additional meetings at ministerial level may be
convened if circumstances require.
2. As regards the Assembly's proposal for the establishment in WEU of " an automatic mechanism
for mobilising politico-military consultation in order to react to serious crises in Central and Eastern
Europe ", the Council wishes to quote Article VIII, paragraph 3 of the modified Brussels Treaty, which
reads: " At the request of any of the high contracting parties the Council shall be immediately convened
in order to permit them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace,
in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability. "
3. Part II of the Petersberg Declaration of l9th June 1992 states that 
- 
in accordance with the
decision contained in the Declaration of the member states of WEU at Maastricht on lOth December
1991 to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to
strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance 
- 
WEU member states * declare that they are
prepared to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces
for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU. " Part II of the Petersberg Declaration also
states that'decisions to use military units answerable to WEU will be taken by the WEU Council in
accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Participation in specific operations will
remain a sovereign decision of member states in accordance with national constitutions. " Apart from
contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article
V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, the Petersberg Declaration identifies the following tasks
for which military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU, could be
employed: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis man-
agement, including peace-making. The Petersberg Declaration underlines that 'the planning and exe-
cution of these tasks will be fully compatible with the miltiary dispositions necessary to ensure the col-
lective defence of all allies. "
4. In its reply to paragraph 6 of Recommendation 5I6, the Council wishes to quote from Part I " on
WEU and European security " of the Petersberg Declaration which states in paragraph 2: * As WEU
develops its operational capabilities in accordance with the Maastricht Declaration, we are prepared to
support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with our own procedures, the effective implemen-
tation of conflict-prevention and crisis-management measures, including peace-keeping activities of
the CSCE or the United Nations Security Council. This will be done without prejudice to possible con-
tributions by other CSCE countries and other organisations to these activities. " This excerpt of the
Petersberg Declaration was also quoted in full in paragraph 4 of the declaration adopted on 19th June
l992by the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe.
5. In Part I * on WEU and European security " of their Petersberg Declaration of l9th June 1992,
ministers emphasised * the importance of strengthening the r6le and institutions of the CSCE for peace
and security in Europe (...). In the light of the establishment of a new CSCE forum for security
co-operation, they considered that decisions to enhance the CSCE s capabilities for conflict prevention,
crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes are of primary importance. They supported
the proposal under discussion at the Helsinki follow-up meeting for the CSCE to declare itself as a
regional arrangement under Part VIII of the United Nations Charter. Ministers considered that the
/4
I
l. Communicated to the Assembly on l6th October 1992.
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CSCE should have the authority to initiate and pursue peace-keeping operations under its own respon-
sibility. "
In this context, the Council welcomes the approval on 10th July 1992, by the heads of state or
government of the states participating in the conference on security and co-operation in Er19pe, of the; CSCB Helsinki document 1992 - the challenges of change. " Parag.raph l0 of the Helsinki summit
declaration of 10th July 1992 states that " Wesfern European Union (WEU) is an integral 
.part of the
development of the European Union. It is also the means to strengthen the European pillar_of the
Attantic Alliance. It is developing an operational capacity. It is opening itself to additional
co-operation with new partners and has offered to provide resources in support of the CSCE. "
Mor-eover, the CSCE Helsinki decision on " early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management
(including fact-finding and rapporteur missions and CSCE peace-keepillB), peaceful.settlement of dis-
iutes " sfecifies under the heading of " co-operation with regional and transatlantic organisatiols ":a The CS-C3 may benefit from resources and pbssible experience and expertise of existing organisations
such as the EC, NATO and WEU, and could therefore request them to make their resources available
in order to support it in carrying out peace-keeping activities ".
The Council welcomes the fact that the CSCE has declared itself as a regional arrangement under
Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. It considers that this does not affect the ex_clusive compe-
tenc-e of the Security Council of the United Nations concerning decisions on peace enforcement. The
Council is of the opinion that the Helsinki decisions will make the CSCE more operational and
effective, and thus gleatly enhance its central rOle in fostering and managing change in Europe.
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Tnr Assruuv welcomes the fact that the treaty drawn up in Maastricht in December l99l
permits the member countries of the European Community to take a decisive step towards establishing
a European Union 
-meeting the requirements of an economic and monetary union and capable ofdeveloping a joint foreign and security policy;
It wishes this treaty to be ratified by all member countries;
It is satisfied to note that the strengthening of WEU and the development of its activities are
taking their place in the process of setting up the union;
It considers, however, that the wording of the declarations by the nine member countries of
WEU is not precise enough;
It notes that the WEU Council will consequently have to take forthwith a number of important
decisions;
It also notes with satisfaction that the decisions taken in Maastricht give the WEU Council the
ability to take initiatives in external and joint security policy matters;
It recalls that the Maastricht Agreements are but one stage in the building of the European
Union and that priority should still be given to setting up a union *ith substantial powers in the area of
external and security policy;
It further recalls that no time-limit has been set for the validity of the modiflred Brussels Treaty;
It emp_hasises that the modified Brussels Treaty makes WEU an instrument for maintaining
peace throughout Europe,
Ir rHrnrronr RECoMMENDS THAT rnr CouNcrr-
Implement without delay, in areas within its purview, the decisions contained in the nine-power
declarations in Maastricht and to this end:
l. Make it known that the modified Brussels Treaty remains one of the juridical bases of the union
and that wEU, as it exists in its ministerial and parliamentary bodies, is, in parallel with the organs of
the European union, a part which will have its place in the European structure;
2. Decide without delay the points to be considered in negotiations leading to the accession to
WEU of each of the member countries of the European Community that apply foimembership so as to
ensure that accession-signifies that lerr members adopt in full the principles guiding the joint foreign
and defence policy, thus allowing WEU to intervene, if necessary, to apply them; -
3_. 
__ 
Explain what is meant by the status of observer for those countries if they do not accede to
WEU;
4. Explain what is meant by the status of associate member of WEU for countries which are not
members of the Community;
5. D^raw_up proposals for countries associated with the European Community to be involved in
some of WEU's operational activities;
6. Make it abundantly clear to what extent accession to the Community may be granted to coun-
tries which do not intend to join WEU;
7_.___ 
_-Arrange forthwith the synchronisation of dates and places of meetings and the harmonisation ofWEV" working m-ethods with those of the European Union without, however, reducing the number
and importance of specifically WEU ministerial meetings;
RECOMMENDATION 517 
'
on WEU after Maastrtcht2
Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd June 1992 during the first part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session (3rd sitting).
Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf of the Political Committee (Document l30g).
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8. Proceed here and now with installing the Permanent Council in Brussels and specify which
responsibilities will then be assigned to the permanent representatives of member countries to NATO
and to the European Community respectively;
9. Continue to develop a defence and security policy for WEU in accordance with the treaties in
force;
10. Examine how it is possible to organise the development of effective methods for conflict pre-
vention, the restoration of peace, crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes for use in
the framework of the CSCE, the European Political Union or the United Nations;
11. Have a directive drawn up and adopted on exports of armaments by member countries in the
light of the decisions taken by the European Council in the context ofjoint foreign and security policy;
12. Follow up quickly the intention expressed in Maastricht to set up a European afinaments agency
in the framewoik of WEU, associate the activities of the IEPG closely with those of WEU in this area
and, with this in mind, continue to transmit to the Assembly the annual report of the IEPG;
13. Associate the European Commission with the activities of that agency;
14. Set all the bilateral initiatives of its members clearly in the institutional framework of WEU;
15. Instruct a working group to examine Europe's requirements in respect of deterrence in the new
cirqrmstances with a viEw to defining a European concept of the r6le of nuclear weapons and devel-
oping consultations between its members on the possibility of resorting to such weapons;
16. Seek agreement with NATO on adapting to the new European security requirements the ap-pli-
cation of reciirocal * transparency " between the two institutions in accordance with the principles laid
down in Article IV of the-modified Brussels Treaty in both political and operational matters;
L7. Specify the conditions for * complementarity " between WEU and NATO, in particular in regard
to exchingeiwith countries which are hot membeis of these organisations, in connection with possible
operationi designed to maintain peace inside and outside Europe;
18. Establish procedure for consultations at an appropriate level prior to NATO ministerial
meetings on matters on the agenda of those meetings;
19. Pursue exchanges with those Central and Eastern European countries which so wish with a view
to ensuring that thJ progressive rapprochement of those countries with the European Union is
extended to include defence matters;
20. Ask signatory states to correct the error in paragraph 6 of Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty
noted in its ieply io Written Question 297 before the text is submitted for ratification;
21. Noting that the Assembly believes that the period of f,rfty years laid down- ir-r Article XII of the
modified Brirssels Treaty starti from the ratif,rcati,on of the 1954 Agreements while the Council con-
siders the starting date is 1948,
THr AssrMsLY sTRoNGLY URGES
That the issue be referred to a group of independent European legal experts for arbitration.
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
'
to Recommendation 517
l. The points made in paragraph I of Recommendation 517 are addressed in the Council's replies
to Written Questions 296,297 and 298.
2. In its reply to paragraphs 2-4 of Recommendation 517, the Council wishes to draw the
Assembly's attention to Part III " on relations between WEU and the other European member states of
the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance' of the Petersberg Declaration adopted by ministers on
l9th June 1992, which spells out the points to be made in extending the invitation to the countries
interested in becoming members, observers or associate members.
3. The Council takes due note of the suggestion made in paragraph 5 of Recommendation 517 to
* draw up proposals for countries associated with the European Community to be involved in some of
WEU's operational activities. " According to Part III " on relations between WEU and the other
European member states of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance " of the Petersberg Decla-
ration, European member states of the Atlantic Alliance which are not member states of the European
Union and which have accepted the invitation to become associate members of WEU, although not
being parties to the modified Brussels Treaty, may participate fully in the meetings of the-WEU
Council. They will be able to be associated to the planning cell through a pennanent liaison
arrangement.
In this context, the Council wishes to remind the Assembly that one of the countries eligible for
associate membership of WEU has an association agreement with the European Community. As
regards WEU's relations with Central European states 
- 
some of which have association agreements
with the European Community 
- 
the declaration adopted in Bonn on lgth June 1992 by the extraor-
dinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe specifies that " the
enhancement of WEU's relations with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland and Romania should reflect the specific relations which exist and are developing between these
countries and the European Union and its member states ".
4. Questions relating to the * accession to the Community " of new members are a matter for the
Twelve, not for the Nine.
5. How systematically the synchronisation of WEU's meetings with those of the European Union
dealing with security or having defence implications and those of NATO will be applied will have to be
examined once WEU bodies have been established in Brussels and decisions taken on the composition
of the WEU Council and on the institutional arrangements for common foreign and security policy.
The same provisions apply to questions relating to the harmonisation of working methods. Infor-
mation on the outcome of the discussions on these questions and their follow-up willbe made available
to the Assembly in due course.
6. On 19th June 1992, ministers instructed the Permanent Council and Secretary-General to
" expedite the necessary arrangements so that the transfer of the WEU Council and Secretariat-General
from London to Brussels could become effective by January 1993. " The Assembly will be kept
informed on progress made with the transfer of the WEU Council and Secretariat-General. The tim-e-
table of the transfer is, inter alia, dependent on agreement being reached on a suitable building able to
accommodate both the Secretariat-General and the planning cell.
7. The Assembly will doubtless agree with the Council that the outcome of the WEU Council of
Ministers in Bonn on l9th June 1992 testifies to the willingness of WEU member states to continue to
develop the organisation as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to
strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance in accordance with the decision contained in the
Declaration of the member states of WEU at Maastricht on l0th December 1991.
8. The Council fully shares the Assembly's views on the importance of the questions raised in para-
graph l0 of the recommendation. It wishes to draw the Assembly's attention to the fact that, in Part I
of the Petersberg Declaration, " on WEIJ and European security', WEU ministers * emphasised the
Lmportan-ce_of strengthening the- r6le and the institutions of ine CSCE for peace and security inEurope. " The Council is aware of the need " to organise the development of effective methods for ion-
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 29th September 1992.
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{lict prevention, the restoration of peace, crisis management and the peacef ul settlement of disputes "
for use in a framework of mutually reinforcing institutions such as WEU, the European Union, NATO,
the CSCE and the United Nations. In this context, it should be recalled that the Council has welcomed
the outcome of the CSCE Helsinki follow-up meeting in its reply to Recommendation 516.
9. Questions pertaining to exports of armaments are addressed in the Council's reply to Recom-
mendation 520.
10. Meeting in Bonn on l9th June 1992, WEU ministers welcomed the IEPG defence ministers'
decision, at their Oslo meeting on 6th March 1992, to analyse the future r6le of the IEPG in the new
European security architecture. Part I of the Petersberg Declaration, 'on WEU and European
gget{_ity ", states that * this represents a positive development fully in line with the objective set by
WEU member states in Maastricht further to examine enhanced co-operation in the field of anna-
ments with the aim of creating a WEU European armaments agency. WEU ministers propose that both
WEU and IEPG experts analyse this issue in depth, carry out an initial examination of the r6le and
functions of a possible European armaments agency and submit a report for consideration ".
The Assembly's suggestion for " associating the European Commission " with the activities of a
future European armaments agency in the framework of WEU will have to be examined in due course.
The Council will continue to request and transmit to the Assembly a report on the IEPG as soon as it is
made available and has been considered by the Council's members.
I l. The Council is not competent for * setting all the bilateral initiatives " of WEU member states
" clearly in the institutional framework of WEU ". It is the sovereign decision of WEU member states
to sct any of their relevant bilateral initiatives in a WEU framework, if they so wish.
12. The " definition of a European concept of the r6le of nuclear weapons " and the ' development
of consultations between its members on the possibility of resorting to such weapons' are not at
pres€nt on the agenda of the Council and its working groups.
13. In the Council's opinion, the contents of the Petersberg Declaration and of the declaration
adopted by the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe
both testify to the fact that WEU member states are actively seeking " transparency " and " complt-
mentarity " between WEU and NATO. The intensification of co-ordination by WEU member states on
alliance issues representing an important common interest will encompass activities ranging from prior
discussion within WEU to the introduction of joint positions agreed in WEU into the process of con-
sultation in the alliance. The alliance will remain the essential forum for consultation among its
members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of
allies under the North Atlantic Treaty. The kind of issues on which joint WEU positions should be
ag;red is linked to the future division of labour between the common foreign and security policy and
WEU. Holding WEU meetings prior to meetings of the alliance will assist the process of timely intro-
duction of joint WEU positions into the alliance.
14. The declaration adopted in Bonn on l9th June 1992 by the extraordinary meeting of the WEU
Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe states that * the enhancement of WEU's relations
with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania should
reflect the specific relations which exist and are developing between these countries and the European
Union and its member states. Other appropriate forms of co-operation could be set up in the light of
the development of these relations. " Ministers agreed to strengthen existing relations between WEU
and these states by structuring the dialogue, consultations and co-operation. In this way, " WEU's
Central European partners will be able to acquaint themselves with the future security and defence
policy of the European Union and find new opportunities to co-operate with the defence component of
the union and with the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance as these develop. "
15. As stated in its reply to Written Question 297, the Council is of the opinion that references to the
modified Brussels Treaty contained in the declaration on Western European Union leave no doubt that
it is Article XII of the treaty of economic, social and cultural collaboration and collective self-defence,
signed at Brussels on lTth March 1948, as amended by the protocol modifying and completing the
Brussels Treaty, signed at Paris on 23rd October 1954 
- 
and not a non-existent Article XII of the treaty
signed in Brussels on l Tth March 1948 
- 
that is actually referred to in paragraph 6 of Article J.4 of the
Treaty on European Union.
16. On the issue raised in paragraph 21 of Recommendation 517 the Council can only confirm its
position as stated in its replies to Written Questions 288 and 297.
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RECOMMENDATION 518 
'
on WEU: the operational organisationz
The Assembly,
(i) Welcoming and endorsing the WEU declaration made at Maastricht on lfth December 1991,
whereby membei states agreed- on the need to develop a genuine European security and defence
identity and a greater European responsibility on defence matters;
(ii) Pleased that member states are decided to strenglhen the operatlgryI r0le of WEU in the
ionger+erm perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union which might in time
lead to a common defence;
(iit) Delighted at the reaffirmation, therefore, of WEU's paramount r6le as the unique instrument to
b*iress Euiope's defence identity, and determined to continue to provide the parliamentary dimension
required to oversee WEU's operational responsibilities;
(iv) Confident that the setting up of the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrej6nwill enable WEU.to play a
iuiler operational r6le in co-oferition with all other bodies concerned with verification, crisis marr
agement and environmental control;
(v) Recalling recommendations:
- 
456 on naval aviation;
- 
469 on the state of European security - intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre
and the north;
- 
488 on the consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: operations in the Gulf;
- 
493 on the consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region;
- 
498 on the Gulf crisis: lessons for Western European Union;
- 
502 on arrns control: force reductions and the r6le of multinational units;
- 
505 on the r6le of women in the armed forces;
- 
512 on operational arrangements for WEU - the Yugoslav crisis,
as well as Written Question 294 put to the Council by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on 1 7th December 199 I ;(vi) Gratified that so many of its recommendations above have been accepted PV tttg Council, at leqS
in'part, and trusting that all-its recent recommendations, toughing oq!!-e operational3spe9ts of WEU,
wili now be re-examined with a view to implementation within WEU's new operational context;
(vii) Conscious that as long as a minimum nuclear deterrent is to be maintained by any WEU
member state it should remain effective and credible;
(viii) Considering that Europe's arms procurement needs would be best s91v9d by creating a European
Armaments Agency which would associate all European countries so wishing,
RrcouurNos rHAT rIm CouNctI-
l. Take the necessary decisions at the next ministerial meeting to give substance to the WEU
declaration at Maastricht by:
agreeing the arrangements for setting up a WEU military planning cell with appropriate and
detailed terms of reference;
deciding the parameters for closer military co-operation in the fields of logistics, lransport
and training,-and giving the necessary mandate for action to the relevant WEU bodies;
confirming the need for a committee of WEU chiefs of defence staff and considering the cre-
ation of a WEU military committee;
progressing the idea of earmarking certain forces for WEU and giving particular consider-
ition to the creation of a European rapid action force to comprise elements of the future
European corps and airmobile units from those WEU member nations possessing such
forces;
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd June 1992 during the first part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session (4th sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1307).
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2. Investigate as a matter of priority the various areas for possible WEU action once an operational
organisation is in place;
3. Define the status and responsibilities of associate members and observers to include the possi-
bility of participation in WEU's operational activities (notably the work of the Torrej6n Centre) and
also give due consideration to including other NATO states or European Community associates in
WEU operations on an ad hoc basis;
4. Ensure that the WEU satellite centre in Torrej6n establishes firm links with:
(a) the WEU military planning cell to be established in Brussels;
(0,) NATO's Verification Co-ordinating Committee;
(c) the CSCE's Conflict Prevention Centre;
(d) the Open Skies Consultative Committee;
5. Set up a defence representatives procurement sub-group to examine ways to bring WEU and
IEPG closer together, instituting a special liaison with the IEPG secretariat in Lisbon;
6. Include co-operation on armaments production and reduction on the agenda for discussion with
the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe;
7. Encourage France and the United Kingdom in co-operation if possible to maintain an effective
and credible minimum nuclear deterrent and, in parallel, consider the desirability of instituting a WEU
" nuclear consultation group " to give practical expression to the principles of nuclear deterrence reite-
rated in the Hague Platform as well as helping to define a European opinion on nuclear disarmament
and anti-proliferation measures;
8. Ensure that all arrangements aimed at giving a stronger operational r6le to WEU are discussed
with the Atlantic Alliance to make them fully compatible with present and future military dispositions
designed to safeguard allied collective defence and institute channels of communication to maintain
such transparency and complementarity between NATO and WEU.
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
'
to Recommendation 518
l. In accordance with the decision contained in the declaration of the member states of WEU at
Maastricht on 10th December l99l to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union
and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, WEU member states haveUi* !*amining anO defriing appropriaie missions, structures and means covering,_ in qarticular, a
WnU ptanningiell and militiry unitianswerable to WEU, in order to strengthen WEU's military r6le.
(a) At its meeting in Bonn on lgth June 1992, the WEU Council of Ministers.agtreed that'a
planniii! cett witt be esiablished on lst October 1992, subject to practical considerations, ulder the
;rrtidt-y of tnr Council. It will be located with the Secietariat-General in a suitable.building in
grussets. " The Council of Ministers also approved the terms of reference for the planning cell.
(b/ Questions pertaining to closer military co-operation complemenlary^tg the alliance, in par-
ticular iir tie fields of logistici, transport and triining-remain on the agenda o[ the Council's Defence
fl.pr"ti"t"iives Group. ivhereuer appropriate, information on the outbome of the discussions on this
issue and their follow-up will be fed lnto the ongoing dialogue with the Assembly.
(c) On lgth June 1992, WEU ministers aqreed * that the chiefs of defence staff should meet
twice a year prior to the regular Ministerial Councils and on an ad hoc basis whenever ne-ce-ssary ". Th.e
Council does not envisagi, at present, the creation of a WEU " Military Committee'. However, it
should be recalled that - ic'cording to paragraph 12 of Part I " on WEU and European security " qf th-ep.1grr$rg Dechration 
- 
followin! the transfei of the Council and Secretariat to Brusse_ls, natio:ral del-
iguiionJ iootd be ieinforced with-'military deleg4es'-to develop an-d provide advice for the Council
i5 i"tioOu"i the views of the chiefs of defence stiffto the planning cell and to monitor the profession4;*d;dJ"iihi planning cell's work. In the future, an enhanced rdle of the WEU chiefs of defence staff
would be envisageable in principle, in line with the organisation's evolution.
(d) ln its reply to sub-paraeraph (d)of paragraph 1 of the recommendation, the Council wishes
to dra# the Asseh'bly's att6ntioi fo pirt Ii, 'on ltrengthening WEU's operational rOle ", of the
Petirsberg Declaratioi. In this declaration, WEU member states " declare that they are qrePared to
111ut analtuUte mititary units from the whoie spectrum of their conventional armed forces for -ililqty
tasis conducted undei the authority of WEUr'. Decisions to use milita-ry ulits.answerable to WEU;*iU Ue taken by the WEU Counci[in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.partiiipation in specific operations will remain a sover_eign decision of member states in accordance
*ittt nitional constitutions^. " The declaration also specifies that " military units will be drawn from the
forces of WEU member states, including forces with NATO missions - in this case after consultation
with NATO 
- 
and will be organised on a multinational and multi-service basis ". Furthermore, 'lall
WEU member states will sooi designate which of their military units and headquarters they would be
willing to make available to WEU for its various possible tasks. Where multinational formations drawn
from itre forces of WEU nations already exist oi are planned, these units could be made available for
use under the authority of WEU, with agreement of all participating nations. "- WEU member states;lntorO to develop and exercise'the appiopriate capabilities to enable the deployment of WEU mil-
itary units by land, sea or air to accompftsh-these tasks. ' The possibility of the creation of a European
aer6naval force with the capability foriorce projection is currently under consideration by.the Council
and its working groups, as ire the related teChnical questions. The Assembly will be kept informed on
the outcome o-f ihese discussions and on any follow-ups in due course.
2. Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Y"t!!U!gl
Treaty and Article V of the iodified Brussels Treaty respectively, Part II." ol strg+$hening WEI-f's
opeiational r6le " of the Petersberg Declaration ideniifiesthe following tasks. for which.military units
oi WfU member states, acting under WEU's authority, could be employed: humanitarian and rescue
tasks; peace-keeping tasks; tas[s of combat forces in crisis management, including-peace_-making. Tl]e
Peteisberg Declirat-ion specifies: " The planning and execution of these tasks will be fully compatible
with the inititary dispositions necessary to ensure the collective defence of all allies. "
3. On lgth June 1992, WEU ministers agreed that a number of points should be made in extending
the invitation to the countries interested in becoming members, observers or associate members. In
this context, the Council wishes to draw the Assembly's attention to Part III " on relations between
I
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l. Communicated to the Assembly on l6th October 1992.
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WEU and the other European member states of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance " which
specifies: " Other European member states of the Atlantic Alliance which have accepted the invitation
to become associate members of WEU, although not being parties to the modilied Brussels Treaty, may
participate fully in the meetings of the WEU Council - without prejudice to t-h9 provisions laid down
in Artiite VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty - of its working goups and of the subsidiary bodies ",
subject 
- 
inter alia 
- 
to the following provisions: (...) they will be able to be associated to 
-the 
planning
celithrough a permanent liaison arrangement; (...) they will take part on the same basis as full members
in WEU military operations to which they commit forces (...). "
For " practical reasons ", however, " space activities will be restricted to the pres€nt members
until the end of the experimental phase of the satellite centre in 1995. During this phase the new
members and associate members will be kept informed of WEU's space activities. Appropriate
arrangements will be made for associate members to participate in subsequent space activities at the
samelime as decisions are taken on the continuation of such activites. "
The possibility of observers participating in the WEU planning cell and in WEU'9 space^activ-
ities is not ioreseen in the Petersbeig Dechration. While possible, in principle, the inclusion " of other
NATO states or European Community associates in WEU operations on an ad hoc basis " would have
to be addressed on a case-by-case basis.
4. Possibilities for co-operation between the experimental WEU satellite centre and the planning
cell as well as the desirability and feasibility of ensuring " firm links " of the WEU satellite centre in
Torrej6n with non-WEU bodies will be examined in due course, as the satellite centre becomes more
ope,fational.
5. WEU's relations with the IEPG are addressed in the Council's replies to Recommendations 517
and 523.
6. The declaration adopted in Bonn on lgth June 1992 by the extraordinary meglilg_gf the- WEU
ibuncit of Minirt.rs with itutes of Central Europe states that " the enhancement of WEU's relations
;fth Brtg"ria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, l-atuia,-Lithuania, Poland and Romania should
reflict ttri speiific relations which exist and are developin-g between these countries and the European-
Urion and its membei states. Other appropriate formi oflo-operation could be set up- in the tiglr-t-gf
tt r O.uifopment of these relations. " Miniiters agreed to stre_ngthen existing relations between WEU
unlit.iJit"tes by structuring the dialogue, consultations and co-operation..The dlclaration spe^cifiesih;i; ih; io""r o'f consultatiSns wifl bJthe security architecture and stability in Europe, the future
O-.rlfop-."t oi itr. CSCE, arms control and disarmament,,in particuEr the implementation of the
afE ild Open Sti." treaties, as well as the 1992 Vienna document. Developments in Europe and
"6igt 
U6r.i.i iegionJ will be of particular interest to the participants. In this way, WEU's Central
Euiopean pirtners wi[ ba 
"Ute 
to icquaint themselves with the future securilV and defence policy of
tfri fr-p6* Union and find new opportunities to co-operate with the defence component of the
union and with the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance as these develop. "
7. Questions pertaining to the " maintenance of an effective and credible minimum nuclear
deterreit " and tir the des-irability of instituting a WEU 'nuclear consultation group " are not at
present on the agenda of the Council and its working groups.
8. The contents of the Petersberg Declaration as well as the declaration of the extraordinary
meeting of it. WnU Council of Mini-sters with states of Central Europ-e,.both adopted on l9th June
liyj;-6riify io tt. iact that WEU member states are fully conscious of the need to develop relations
Uii*6"" NnfO anO WfU on the basis of the dual purpose of transparency and complementarity.
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RECOMMENDATION 519I
on the opplication of United Nations Resolution 757 2
The Assembly,(t) Recalling Recommendations 506, 5ll and 512 on the Yugoslav crisis;(ii) Anxious that the peoples concerned should no longer be exposed to the terrible suffering which is
currently prevailing, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia;(jii) Wholeheartedly endorsing United Nations Resolution 757 voted in the Security Council on
Saturday, 30th May 1992;(iv) Determined to ensure that the trade and oil embargo designed to bring Serbia and Montenegro
to realise the errors of their actions should prove effective;(v) Strongly supporting the WEU Secretary-General's appeal for European action and calling for the
application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty,
Uncnurly REcoMMENDs rHAT rnn CouNcn
Take immediate steps to invoke Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and prepare appro-
priate action by WEU states to help apply United Nations Resolution 757. Further measurei should be
considered if Resolution 757 does not have the desired effect;
Take immediate initiatives to ensure that war criminals will be judged following the guidelines
of the proposal of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of May 1992.
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd June 1992 during the first part ofthe thirty-eighth ordinary session (4th sitting).
2. See: draft recommendation submitted by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document l3l9).
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
'
to Recommendation 519
l. Meeting in Bonn on lgth Jtne 1992, the WEU Council of Ministers adopted a declaration on the
Yugoslav crisis in which ministers expressed the determination of their states " to abide fully by the
provisions of the United Nations Security Council Resolution '757 and to implement comprehensively
the sanctions which it contains. In this connection, they noted that the United Nations Security
Council has decided to consider immediately, whenever necessary, further steps to achieve a peaceful
solution in conformity with relevant resolutions of the Security Council, based inter alia on Part VII of
the United Nations Charter. "
Furthermore, " Ministers declared that WEU is prepared, within the bounds of its possibilities,
to oontribute towards effective implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions in con-
nection with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. They charged an ad hoc group composed of repre-
sentatives from foreign affairs and defence ministries to examine WEU's possibilities to contribute to
the implementation of the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. "
In accordance with decisions taken at the WEU Ministerial meeting in Bonn on l9th June 1992,
the ad hoc Group on the former Yugoslavia met in London at the WEU Secretariat-General on 26th
June 1992 to examine ways of contributing to the implementation of relevant United Nations Security
Council Resolutions and further steps the Security Council might take to achieve a peaceful solution.
Subsequently, two groups of military experts met in Rome to consider requirements for possible naval
measuies in support of the United Nations embargo and other sanctions, as well as possible WEU con-
tributions in support of United Nations humanitarian efforts in Sarajevo. On 3rd July 1992, both
groups reported back to a session of the ad hoc group.
On lOth July 1992, in the margins of the CSCE Helsinki summit, an extraordinary meeting of
the WEU Council of Ministers was held on the situation in Yugoslavia. WEU ministers, having taken
note of the report of the ad hoc Group on Yugoslavia, decided to implement the operations of moni-
toring at sea, as proposed by the ad hoc Group on Yugoslavia at its Rome meeting of 3r-d July. Fur-
thermore, ministers adopted a decision on WEU humanitarian aid efforts on the basis of the recom-
mendations of the ad hoc group.
The implementation of the operations of monitoring at sea started immediately after the
extraordinary WEU Council of Ministers in Helsinki. They are conducted in close co-ordination with
NATO forces.
The foreign and defence ministers of WEU member states met in London on 28th August 1992
following the conclusion of the London conference on former Yugoslavia. The-y expressed their " firm
conviction " that " the principles agreed at that conference should provide the foundations for progress
towards a peaceful and just iesolution of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. In particular, they reaf-
firmed the urgent necessity for the parties involved to cease the fighting and the use of force immedi-
ately and strictly respect the agreed cease-fires. They strongly urged all parties involved in the conflict
to adhere to the principles through positive actions and to contribute effectively to the implementation
of specific decisions also adopted by the London conference ".
On 28th August 1992, ministers noted and endorsed the contributions which WEU and its
member states werd aheady making and were prepared to make to the United Nations efforts to bring
peace to the former Yugoslavia, in the following fields: delivery of humanitarian assistance, super-
vision of heavy weapons and strenthening the embargo.
As regards the strengthening of the embargo, ministers noted the success of operation sharp vigi-
lance to mo-nitor the embirgo in ihe Adriatic. They agreed that strengthening the effectiveness of the
embargo established by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757 would be " an
importint means of promoting a political solution to the crisis in former Yugoslavia ". Tlr.y welcomed
thC conclusions of the London conference and expressed the willingness of WEU member states 'to
co,ntribute to any further measures necessary to make the embargo as effective as possible ". Member
states of WEU could, if requested, offer expertise, technical assistance and equipment to the_ govern-
ments of the Danube riparian states to prevent the use of the river Danube for the purpose of cir-cum-
venting or breaking the sanctions impoied by United Nations Security C_ouncil Resolutions 713 and
Z5Z. Ministers also supported the cafi by the London conference to the Security Council to consider
l. Communrcated to the Assemblv on l6th October 1992.
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further measures to ensure rigorous implementation of sanctions in the Adriatic. Furthermore, min-
isters decided that the ad hoc group should continue its work in this field.
The texts of the communiqu6s of the extraordinary meetings of the WEU Council of Ministers
on the situation in Yugoslavia were officially transmitted to the Aisembly. Whenever appropriate, the
Assembly will continue to be regularly informed on the implementation of the relevint ririnisterial
decisions. Developments in the Yugoslav crisis will remain on the agenda of the Council and its
working groups.
2. The Council takes due note of the Assembly's request in the second paragraph of the recommen-
dation. It wishes to draw the Assembly's attention to the fact that 
- 
in theiistrong -condemnation of the
ulacceptable polic-ies of ethnic cleansing and forced expulsions in former Yugoslivia 
- 
senior members
of governments of.individual WEU member states have deemed it appropriate to speaft in favour of
international sanctions for the perpetrators of war crimes in the conteit of ihe conflic-t in former yugo-
slavia.
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RECOMMENDATION 520 
'
on arms export policy2
The Assembly,
O Recalls the international public debate during and immediately after the Gulf war expressing
embarrassment regarding earlier large sales of arms to Iraq and calling for reductions in the interna-
tional sale of armaments;(iil Is preoccupied that continuing uncontrolled international armaments transfers might worsen
existing tensions and latent conflicts in a number of world regions;(iiil Also fears that economic difficulties among the members of the now defunct Warsaw Pact may
enourage the development of the black market in armaments because of the large stocks that exist;(iv) Welcomes therefore the declared determination of the CSCE member countries to support the
new United Nations Register of International Arms Transfers and to provide it with comprehensive
information;(v) Underlines the rising danger of nuclear proliferation and know-how and the imperfection of
existing international r6gimes responsible for preventing the dissemination of chemical and biological
weaponry and of missile technology;(vt) Welcomes therefore the decisions of France and the People's Republic of China to sign the
nuclear non-proliferation treaty and of North Korea to join the nuclear safeguards agreemen!(viil Also welcomes the decision of the European Community, the United States, Russia and Japan to
esteblish an international Science and Technology Centre in Russia in order to discourage scientists of
the former Soviet Union from selling nuclear, biological and chemical know-how to third coun-
tries;
(viii) Recalls the need to restrict arms exports and to harmonise arms export policies and regulations
governing dual use items within the European Community prior to the abolition of frontiers and
internal controls on lst January 1993;(ix) Also recalls the special responsibility of Western European Union in the arms export area since
it has implications for the defence and essential security interests of its member contries,
THr Assrl,tsI-y THEREFoRE RECoMMENDS THAT rnr CouNcrr-
l. Elaborate and implement the necessary decisions of the European Union for a harmonised arms
export policy restricted in accordance with common criteria identified by the European Council in
Luxembourg;
2. Take a joint initiative in the United Nations in order:
(a) to make the information to be sent in to the United Nations Register of International Arms
Transfers a binding obligation for all United Nations member countries and enforceable by
sanctions;
(b) to call on all United Nations states to join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and the safe-
guard agreements making the United Nations Security Council responsible for supervising
their observation;
(c/ to strengthen the IAEA's rdle by increasing its budget, giving it the power of sanctions and
placing it under the authority of the United Nations Security Council and the Secretary
General of the United Nations;
(d) to draw up an international convention in order to complement the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty and to prevent the export of nuclear know-how or technology;
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd June 1992 during the first part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session (4th sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Aarts on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee(Document 1305).
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(e) to call for the early conclusion of a worldwide convention on chemical weapons and to make
the chemical list of the Australia Group a worldwide exportation ban list under United
Nations supervision;
(/) to make the missile technology control r6gime a worldwide r6gime;
3. Call upon the- next Munich economic summit to held in July 1992 to support vigorously the
strengthened rOle of the United Nations in monitoring a worldwide arms export rdgime;
!. Urge its_member countries to provide financial contributions for establishing and operating theInternational Science and Technology Centre in Russia.
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
'
to Recommendation 520
l. The WEU Council fully endorses the declaration UV ltre European Coyncil oT areas which could
UL tn.-ruU:irl of :oiriuciioh of l0th December 1991.-The impl-ementatio:r of joint action by the
Twelve in the ur.u, .rriiuiia in ttrir declaration is contingent, however, on the entry into force of theii;;iy q; ir.opiun tin-i*'.ln view of Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty,-any_possible r6le for WEUi, th6 itauoratjo, urd l.pr.-.ntation of the necessary decisions of the European Union for a
harmonised arms export poiicy would necessarily be subject to the same provision.
Z. The Council is aware of the importance of questions such as those mentioned i!-na-raBraPhs 2
and 3 of Recommenoation sjo. wittrin the framework of the European community, wEU member
;t"d fiG together *iit, iupun, introduced a comprehensive but non-discriminatory register of 3rm;
transfers in order to enhance anil make worldwide ihe process of greater transparency in conventional
armi *iit a view to .ooiriUuting to greater restraint. The Council has already set o-ut this posilion in its;;ild6 A*i-uty R;;;-;auii5n. 502 and 513. The Council also rema_ins fully aware of the needf;;;;il iti proiif.rition of nuclear wea.pons and to seek.greater respect for the Missile Technologv
dolrtioinegimi. r"rtrriimoi., th" corrncij wishes to recalfthat - at their meeting in Bonn on l9thi*. f gqZ I WfU .fii;6*;;piessed their conviction that a chemical weapons convention " can be
ieJched within ttre niii-iiw m6nttrs. They are confident that this convention can play an impo4ant
;;rd;i;r;;;irg iOr. i. *oitOwiOe multilat'eral arms control and call on all member states of the Con-f;;";* Oiiarmameniio tJnO itiir s,rpport to the emerging consensls..They repeat their com-
miiment to be amonjiil;;gi;;irignato.iei of this conventidn ind ask all other nations to follow this
;;;;;.; fni Counci"t welcories the-successful conclusion of the negotiations on the chemical weapons
.iir.rtiori-Cwaiil C.nir" in August 1992. wEU member states will co-sponsor a United NationsG;#f Aisemblv reSolution that cdmmends the chemical weapons_ convention drafted by the Con-
fiience on Disarma*.nt unO calls upon all states to sign and ratlfy the convention at the earliest pos-
sible date.
3. The Council would not favour a worldwide exportation ban on !h-e eoods contained in the Aus-
iiaiu cioup risi, ri"cilrre* Loooi ur. dual use in niture, and are mainly used for legitimat.: :t"-r1i11irrp;. WfU -.*ber stat6s nevertheless remain committed to the aim of preventing the spread ol
incirri.a weapons, 
"na 
i"iit ut iea.on they continue to co-operate in the Australia Group, in order to
control the eiport of, inter alia, chemical weapons precursors'
4. Individual WEU member states are providing financial contributions for establishing and oper-
ating the International Science and Technology Centre in Russia.
l. Communicatcd to thc Assembly on l6th October 1992
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iRECOMMENDATION 521 
'
on the budgets of the^ministerial organs of western European unbn
for the financial year 19922 -
The Assembly,
(i) Considering that:
(a) in Maastricht the ministers of the WEU member countries decided to transfer the
Secretariat-General of WEU to Brussels;
(b) the budget of the Secretariat-General of WEU for 1992 does not consider the financial impli-
cations of this transfer and is therefore of a provisional nature;
(c/ credits in this budget, in particular those relating to the mission expenses of members of the
Secretariat-General of WEU, are estimated on the basis of restrictive criteria; ;
(d) the budget of the Institute for Security Studies sets out the financial requirements of that
Institute without modifying the organogram authorised last year; 
r(e) the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU are extremely cost-effective;
(fl problems relating to staffpolicy are still being studied by the co-ordination bodies concerned
and that, among these, the problem of financing the pension scheme is becoming increas-
ingly important; 
i(ii) 
. 
Welcoming- the fact that the budgets of the ministerial grgans of WEU are presented clearly and 
iefficiently and allow a detailed examination of those organs' needs, 
r
RrcouunNos rHAT rHe CouNcrr-
l. Give the Secretariat-General the wherewithal to exercise its activities during a period which,
although transitional, is no less important and complex;
2. Notify the Assembly of any structural changes that are envisaged on the occasion of the transfer
of the Secretariat-General to Brussels and of the measures taken irrespect of staffnot wishing to be
transferred;
3. Inform the Assembly of decisions taken in regard to staff policy in the framework of the
co-ordinated organisations, particularly in respect of the financing of the pension scheme.
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd June 1992 during the first part ofthe thirty-eighth ordinary session (5th sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: seethe.report tabled by Lord Mackie of Benshie on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs
and Administration (Document 1303).
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to Recommendation 5211
l. The Council assures the Assembty that it will examine in a constructive spirit the proposals
which the Secretary-General will submit to it in this regard.
Z. Any changes of structure arising from the transfer will also be communicated to the Assembly
togettriiiitfr iG-.asur.r to be taken-for the benefit of those staffunable to follow the organisation.
3. The question of the financing of the pension scheme is still being studied by the Co-ordinating
Committee on Remunerations (CCR).
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 29th September 1992.
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The Assembly,
Q) - Agreeing that the develooment of a European security identity and defence r6le, reflected in thefurther strengthening of the-European_pillar within the alliince, *itt ieinfoici-ttre irti,griti ina;fli;tiveness of the Atlantic Alliance and that the enhancement of the rdle and ieipoftiUifit,-of thtEuropean members is an important basis for transforming the alliance;(ii) Noting.that-NATO's Rome declaration onleace and security calls for a new security archi-tecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the European iommunity, WEU-and the Councit 
"id;;i;;;-plement each other;(iit) Convinced that the Atlantic Alliance will be of lasting value as long as it provides the essentialtransatlantic link, demonstrated by the significant presencJ of North erierican forces in E"ropl; -
(lu/. 
. 
Recognising that the.development of WEU as the instrument for a common European security
and defence policy is a logical and inevitable consequence of a determined effort by ruiofea, ;d-tries to achieve greater integration;(v) Convinced that.the creatiort of ge_{ruine multinational forces in a European framework, which
could be. deployed in both NATO and WEU operations, is the best guarantei fo. iuioie ii.r.it, iri
lurope, insisting in this connectio_n that, in accordance with the Uaistriitrt agrie-ent, the Franco-9.*]1, Eurocorps must be placed under WEU authority and that ita aoungffie"ti must strengthenthe alliance military structure;
(I,1, 
, 
p.gTridering that in some quarters in the United States there is still uncertainty due to lack oftnstght into and understandin_g^of the motivation of Western European nations for d6velopinga spi-cific Eu-ropean security and-defence identity, notwithstanding the'mrttipt.iiifr".ges and c|nsulia-tions taking place in the different existing oigans and institulions oitte-eu.antic-iiriarrc";---------
(viy'. Recognising the useful r6le being accomplished by the wEU Institute for Security Studies in
making European views known to the -foreign folicy ani defence co*-""iiy i, tti. uritea states;(viii) Awate that, notwithstanding the repeated assurances given by the present American adminis-tration, there is uncertainty over tht level and corresponding 6ffectiv6nesi dtem..Gn troops based inEurope;
(in Recal[nB that,_in Rome, all NATO member states pledged to support all steps in the countries ofCentral and Eastern Eqrope towards reform and to give fraciicat asJiiiince i, h;i;r"g the- 6 ;G;edin this diflicult transition;(x,) C9.19id-e1iqc the apparent growing anomaly between the determination of the United States to
ex.ert political influence_on developmenls in Europe and its diminishing *iff unO uUifiiy to 
-;i,r;i"-;military presence and financial-ecbnomic commiiments in Europe;
Qi) Colsidering that notwithstanding the recent Canadian decision to withdraw all its forces fromEurope, Canada remains committed to NATo ard Europe's security by ..6i;il; tle auiiityi; i.;a
contingency forces and must therefore be included in thi transailanti.'Oi"i"gri-"*iih wEU,
RscotvtMrNns rHAT rnr CouNcl-
l. Define more cl_early, in consultation with its transatlantic allies, the respective r6les of the armedforces of NATO, WEU and the United States in maintaining ieiuritv;a;;;;r-in ruropi;
2. Establish with the United States more clearly-defined criteria for the maintenance of UnitedStates forces in Europe;
3. Continue to support the r6le of the wEU Institute for Security Studies in making European
views on security better known across the Atlantic, also by publishing ind ails-ili;atirg;;.,oi'Jery
the results of its work;
RECOMMENDATION 522 
'
on new Euro-American relations2
Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd June 1992 during the flirst part ofthe thirty-eighth ordinary session (5th sitting).
Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Soell on behalf of the political Committee (Document l3l0).
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4. Co-ordinate more clmely the policy of allied partners on both sides of the Atlantic to satisfy the
security needs of the new democracies in Central Europe, while recognising that, for the moment, no
formal security guarantees can be provided;
5. Take account of the fact that a new concept of security means developing cap-abilities allowiltg
tt e Aepfoymint at the appropriate time of politicil, as well as-diplomatic, economic, financial and mil-
itary means for peace-keeping and peace-restoring;
6. (ai Reinforce the joint allied political instruments in order to make sure that, in crisis pre-
ventioii, a joint assessm6nt can be made as a precondition for co-ordinated action;
(D/ Establish a joint high level group consisting of political, diplomatic, economic and military
expcrti in order to make up-io-date [trreat assessments and develop adequate models to respond to
such threats.
415
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l. The Council has taken note of the ideas expressed in Recommendation 522 on new Euro
American relations as well as in the remarkable report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee
at its last- session Uy Vr. S.o9ll. IJ fully.subscribes to the conclusion of this report, ' that possiUie tin:
sions in the long-standingAtlantic relationship can be averted or neutralised oity iithe aui;a, poiriUie
conseqlences and related issues are discussed in an atmosphere of opennesi and without^mutual
recriminations ".
The Council is confident that a clearer definition of the respective r6les of military units
answerable to WEU and the armed forces of NATO and the United States in maintaining security andpeace in Eprope is already emerging as a result of bilateral and multilateral consultaiions witir the
transatlantic allies. Moreover, the Council is of the opinion that Part II, on strengthening WfU" oper-
ational r6le, of the Petersberg Declaration will contribute to this clearer defini-tion.
2. The establishment with the United States of " more clearly-defined criteria for the maintenance
of United States forces in Europe " should be primarily addreised in an allianie framework-
3. The Council encourages the WEU Institute for Security Studies to develop its activities, in order
1o +*. European views on segrgity better known across the Atlantic. It fully supports the Inititute inits joint Project with- the nul.a-9o_ryqlqtion " Towards a new transatlanti. danr^,s;it ip '; , -_---- -
recalled tlrat, on l9th June 1992, WEU ministers * noted with satisfactionihe activiiies of the wEUInstitute for Security Studies in Paris. Its publications, seminars and colloquia had greatly cont.iUoftO
to.deepening- understanding lol_the oJlgolng development of a European iecu.ilv id6raity ;;A i;enhancing relations between WEU and othei countri-es. "
4. The Council is fully- awale of the necessity " to co-ordinate more closely the policy of alliedpartners on both sides of the Atlantic to satisfy the security needs of the new d6mocricies in Centrat
Europe ". In this context,. it should be stressed that WEU's relations with Central European countriejdo not aim at the creation of a scaled-down version of the North Atlantic Co-opeiatG bouo.il(NACC)- Th-e Nine wish to offer their Central European partners an opportunity to conduct in an
appropriate framework a security dialogug, which they greatly value taking'into account their pia*iO
or existing.association agreements with the European eommunity. Neith-er is there anv inteiiion iodgnlicate NACC activities. The declaration agreed by the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council
of Ministers with states of Central Europe on-l9th Jrine 1992 in fact eiplicitly itr"ssed tnJ;rnrtuaff,
ggm_p_lementary and reinforcing' nature of the respective activities coirduct6d in the frame*orks otWEU and the Atlantic Alliance. In their Petersberg Declaration, the Nine also underlined the * vai-
uable contribution " of NACC in connection with the establishment of a new order of peace in furope
which, in accordance with the charter of paris, will be based on co-operation.
5. The Council fully agregs with the Assembly th.at * a new concept of security means developing
capabililies allowing-the.-deployment at the apprbpriate time of political, as well'aJdiptomatic,'eco:
noqric, financial and military_means for peace-kptping and peaie-restoring". It waii" fact;;;ry
similar_as1e=s-sment by the WEU member stites whicli ted to ttr6 adoption of tf,e petersberg ni"iaiatioiby the WEU Council of Ministers.
6. The Council is grateful {or the valuable suggestions expressed in paragraph 6 of Recommen-dation 522 and concurs with the Assembly on the need to " relinforce tne joini iitieO potiti;;i i.stri-
ments in order to make sure that, in cris-is prevention, a joint assessment cari be made aia preconditionfor co-ordinated action ". The Council witt teep in niinA the Assernbtvt irggJrtion, o, the estab-lishment of 'a joint high level Foup consisting oipolitical, diplomatic, ei,o"orfrIC"rA roiiii".yiip;tin order to m-ake_up-to-date threat assessmdnts ind dev'elo| adequite mooeti io responA to iuchthleats', as the Council advocates close institutional links- between the Secretariats'and with all
suitable WEU and NATO bodies.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 29th September 1992.
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
'
to Recommendation 522
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RECOMMENDATION 523 
'
on tlv doelopment of a European qruce-based obsenation system2
The Assembly,
(i) Welcomes the establishment of the WEU Satellite Centre and the fact that the management team
to study conditions for developing a European space-based observation system has started work;(jr) Emphasises that this first multinational effort to make use of space to establish a control system
for international peace-keeping and security is unique in the world;(iit) Underlines the importance of obtaining public support in order to carry out the planned project;(iv) Considers the definition of the tasks of the system requires a more intensive, regular dialogue
between the Council and the Assembly than has been the case hitherto;(v) Recalls its Recommendations 465 and,466;
Ql) Welcomes the conclusion of the Open Skies Treaty and trusts it will be ratified as soon as pos-
sible by all the countries concerned;
(vii) Is convinced that, in setting up the observation system, WEU should take the fullest possible
advantage ofthe services and experience, on the one hand, ofthe European Space Agency (ESA) in car-
rying out earth observation programmes and, on the other, of national agencies;
(viidi Recalls the work carried out by the IEPG in the context of the Euclid programme on radar tech-
nology and satellite observation;(ix) Considers it essential for the principle oftransparency to be applied to the interpretation ofsat-
ellite data and for all aspects of the activities of the Centre and observation system as a whole to be
subject to parliamentary scrutiny,
THe AssrN,tst,y THEREFoRE RECoMMENDs rHAT rne CouNcrr-
l. Design the planned system in such a way as to serve the security of WEU member countries and
also to be useful to wider organisations with a European, Atlantic or universal vocation;
2. Inform the Assembly regularly
(a) abottt each stage of the entry into service of the Satellite Centre, its organogram and the
progress of feasibility studies;
(b) about criteria governing the choice of space industries to equip the Centre and establish the
observation system;
3. Define
(a) the consequences of the Open Skies Treaty for satellite verification and for the tasks of the
WEU Satellite Centre;
(b) the exact significance of the expression crisis observation and the consequences of closer
WEU co-operation in strategic observation for the tasks of the Centre and of the space-based
observation system;
and submit its conclusions to the Assembly;
4. At the earliest possible opportunity, contact the European Space Agency (ESA) in order to work
out with it the possibilities for co-operation between WEU and ESA in space-based observation and
arrange to be represented at the next meeting of the ESA Council of Ministers in Spain in November
1992;
5. Contact the IEPG to co-ordinate the work carried out by that group on space technology in the
context of the Euclid progmmme with WEU's activities in this area;
6. Keep the public better informed about its space policy.
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd June 1992 during the first part of the thiny-eighth ordinary session (6th sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mrs. Blunck and Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Technological and Aero-
space Committee (Document I304).
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to Recommendation 523
l. The Council takes due note of the Assembly's wish that - in addition to * serving the security of
WEU member countries " 
- 
a possible future WEU space-based observation system should be designed
'in such a way as to also be useful to wider organisations with a European, Atlantic or universal
vocation ". However, it must be borne in mind that in designing any possible future WEU space-based
observation system, a number of technical and financial constraints will have to be taken into account.
2. The Assembly will be kept informed about progress with the experimental WEU satellite centre
and the main system feasibility study.
3. The question of possible relationships of the experimental WEU satellite centre with security ini-
tiatives such as Open Skies could be addressed by the Council and its ad hoc Sub-Group on Space in
the very near future. Information on the outcome of such discussions and their follow-up would be
made available to the Assembly in due course.
The precise consequences of closer WEU co-operation in strategic observation for the tasks of
the experimental WEU satellite centre and for a possible WEU space-based observation system will be
examined in the light of progress in these fields. The Assembly will be kept informed of the outcome.
The significance of the terms " crisis' and * crisis observation " has to be seen in conjunction
with Article V and paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty.
4. Initial contacts with ESA have already been made. Possible specific forms of co-operation will be
investigated in due course.
5. Meeting in Bonn on l9th June 1992, WEU ministers welcomed the IEPG defence ministers'
decision, at their Oslo meeting on 6th March 1992, to analyse the IEPG's future r6le in the new
European security architecture. Part I " on WEU and European security " of the Petersberg Decla-
ration states that " this represents a positive development fully in line with the objective set by WEU
member states in Maastricht further to examine enhanced co-operation in the field of armaments with
the aim of creating a WEU European armaments agency. WEU ministers propose that both WEU and
IEPG experts analyse this issue in depth, carry out an initial examination of the r6le and functions of a
possible European armaments agency and submit a report for consideration. "
In the opinion of the Council, questions such as the one addressed in paragraph 5 of Recommen-
dation 523 could be examined in the framework of such an in-depth analysis.
6. The Council agrees, in principle, with the Assembly that the public should be kept better
informed about WEU's space policy. In the Council's opinion, this could be done only in the overall
framework of WEU's public relations effort, which should be commensurate with the organisation's
expanding r6le. However, WEIJ's public relations can be developed only gradually, in line with the
organisation's evolution.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 4th November 1992.
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RECOMMENDATION 524 
'
on arms control; CSCE and WEaz
The Assembly,
(i) Welcoming the signing of the Maastricht Agreements which give new impetus to the building of
the European Union and offer prospects of future joint defence;
(it) Aware of the challenge to WEU raised in the Maastricht agreements which make WEU an
iniegral part of the European Union and, in the long run, the instrument of a joint defence policy;
(iii) Pleased that the Maastricht Treaty and the WEU declaration confirm the rOle of WEU and
iherefore of its parliamentary Assembly as Europe's paramount defence body both at present and for
the foreseeable future;
(iv) Congratulating the Council and the Secretary-General on the various initiatives taken by WEU
in'the realm of armJcontrol, notably over verification and for open skies, and pleased generally with
the fuller and more constructive answers given to Assembly recommendations;
(v) Taking into account the development of the peace and disarmament process low under way in
Europe and in particular welcoming the 1992 Vienna document as a major contribution to this process;
(vl Aware of the importance of current negotiations on European security and arms control being
held in the framework of the Helsinki meeting;
(vir) Following attentively the process of political and military restructuring in the states of the
former Soviet Union;
(viii) Convinced that WEU must take part in the system of peace and security outlined UV lle
brginisation and operation of the new CSCE structures and that consequentlY pur own Assembly
sh6uld take every opportunity to support the development of the CSCE Assembly, both politically and
practically;
(ix) Considering that there should be much greater co-operation between the CSCE and the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council, even to the extent of combining the two;
(x) Recalling Recommendations 481, 513 and 514 and restating in particular two recommendations
which it urges the Council to tackle without further prevarication:
" Elaborate and subscribe to a policy of minimum nuclear deterrence which takes account of
recent changes but which safeguards European interests;
Encourage member countries and CSCE colleague states to pay gfeater attention to the environ-
mental p-roblems linked with the destruction of both conventional and nuclear weapons,.stqdy
and report on avoiding this type of potential pollution, thus ensuring greater transparency in this
important domain; ",
RrcouurNps rHAT rnr CouNcll-
l. Pursue its'action to promote peace and disarmament in co-operation with all international
organisations dealing with security problems, in particular by encouraging close co-operation between
th6 member countri6s of WEU so-that they may express a joint position during the negotiations at the
CSCE conference in Helsinki and future conferences;
2. Afford political and practical assistance to the Central and Eastern Elrropean countries in over-
coming problems linked with military and strategic reorganisation by.helping to speed up the imple-
rnentai=ion of decisions essential for their full integration in the collective security system being set up
in the framework of the CSCE;
3. Establish contacts with the " neutral' countries applying for membership of the European Com-
munity so as to examine jointly the evolution of the present situation, the futu-re of European security
and piogress to be made to meet the commitments entered into in Maastricht;
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th June 1992 during the first part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session (7th sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. de Puig on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1306).
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4. Establish co-operation links with Central and Eastern European countries so wishing; 
]5. Contribute to the adoption and application of the new confidence- and security-building mea-
sures (CSBMs) to be included in the Helsinki final document by co-ordinating member countries' .
action in this area;
6. Promote the ratification of the CFE Treaty and its immediate application to all the CSCE coun-
tries, in particular the new states of the CIS, by taking part in the name of WfU in procedure for infor-
mation, control and verification of disarmament;
?. Help to apply the Open Skies Treaty by offering the support and means available to WEU, forinstance the Torrej6n observation satellite centre;
8. 
- 
Throgeh its deliberations, contribute to planning the future European defence system and the 
.
reduction of armed forces to allow the establishment of a true security sysiem corresponding to the new
geostrategic situation of the European continent;
9. Resolutely support plans to eliminate chemical and biological weapons and to reduce nuclear
weapons, by adopting joint positions, bearing constantly in mind the strict application of the non-
p_roliferatio! treaty (NPT), encourage the establishment of a register of arms tiansfers by the United i
Nations and complete this initiative with measures aimed at limiting arms exports at world level;
10. Take the following immediate steps, under the auspices of the Chairman-in-Office:
/ai ggntique the WEU consultations in Vienna which have proved so effective an impetus for
NATO action in the domain of arms control;
(b) ensure that such consultations bring a qositive approach to helping refine disarmament dis-
cussions among the Twelve in Helsinki; 
l
(c) further specific arms control initiatives already begun with certain CIS states, notably I
Russia;
(d) \tclude discussion on a possible CSCE security treaty and on open skies co-operation at theforthcoming ministerial meeting between the WEU Nine and the Central and Eastern
European Eight;
(e/ consult the non-WEU members of NATO with a view to establishing the NACC as part of
the infrastructure of the CSCE.
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
'
to Recommendation 524
1. In its reply to paragraph I of Recommendation 524,the Council wishes to draw the Assembly's
attention to Part I " on WEU and European security " of the WEU Petersberg Declaration of l9th June
1992, in which ministers emphasised the importance of strengthening the CSCE's r6le and institutions
for peace and security in Europe.
Aspects of the CSCE follow-up conference in Helsinki - including confidence- and security-
building measures - are very high on the agenda of the Council and its working groups, as will be future
CSCE conferences.
2. Questions pertaining to the enhancement of WEU's relations with Central European states are
addressed in the Council's reply to Recommendations 516 and 518.
3. The Council expects to address the issue of contacts with EFTA member states in the second half
of 1992.
4. The Council is convinced that the action of WEU member states has greatly contributed to pro-
moting the ratification of the CFE Treaty. In this context, it should be recalled that, at their meeting in
Bonn on 19th June 1992, WEU ministers " welcomed the agreement reached at the CFE extraordinary
conference on 5th June 1992 in Oslo which provides the basis for the entry into force of the CFE
Treaty which has been and remains a major objective of their arms control agenda. Its full and
effective implementation will increase stability and open the way to a new co-operative security order
in Europe. 'tMinisters called upon the new states parties to the treaty " to ensure its ratification by the_
time oflhe CSCE summit in Helsinki ". Ministers also attached great importance to the conclusion of
an agreement on the limitations of personnel strength (CFE lS). In the field of veri_fication, they
" not-ed with satisfaction that a set of rules for the operation of multinational teams in CFE had been
prepared in WEU and had subsequently been adopted in the alliance. This represented the first
example since the Maastricht Declaration of the introduction ofjoint positions agreed in WEU into the
process of consultations in the alliance. "
5. Possible consequences of the Open Skies Treaty for satellite veriflrcation and for the tasks of the
experimental WEU satellite centre could be addressed by the Council's ad hoc Sub-Group on Space in
the very near future.
6. The Council is convinced that the development of WEU as the defence component of the
European Union and as the means of strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance is a
substantial contribution to * the establishment of a true security system corresponding to the new
geostrategic situation of the European continent ". WEU member states reafftrmed in Bonn their reso-
Iution to contribute further to the establishment of a new order of peace in Europe which, in
accordance with the Charter of Paris, will be based on co-operation.
7. WEU ministers also welcomed steps recently taken by the states concerned to allow for the entry
into force of the START Treaty and the important agreement on further strategic reductions reached
between the United States andRussia in Washington on lTth June l992.They expressed their con-
viction that a chemical weapons convention can be concluded within the next few months. The
Petersberg Declaration specifies in this context: " They are confident that this convention can play an-
important and pioneering r6le in worldwide multilateral arms control and call on all member states of
thC Conference on Disarmament to lend their support to the emerging consensus. They repeat their
commitment to be among the original signatories of this convention and ask all other nations to follow
this course. "
WEU member states fully support the strict application of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Within
the framework of the Europeari Community, WEU member states, together with Japan, introduced a
resolution at the 46th United Nations General Assembly calling for a comprehensive but non-
discriminatory register of arms transfers in order to enhance and make worldwide the p_rocess_ of
greater transparency in arms transfers with a view to contributing to greater restraint. The Council is
also fully aware of ihe need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to encourage wider
adherence to the Missile Technology Control Rdgime guidelines.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on l6th October 1992.
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8. The Council takes due note of the constructive suggestions contained in paragraph l0 of the rec-
ommendation. [t welcomes the interest expressed by the Assembly in the WEU consultations which
have taken place in Vienna.
In Bonn, ministers stressed the readiness of WEU to co-operate on the implementation of the
Open Skies Treaty with third parties at a later stage, and in this context welcomed the contacts which
had taken place with other European allies, and with the Russian Federation. They agreed that experts
should investigate ways of intensifying co-operation with the Russian Federation, which could include
a joint feasibility study and/or a trial overflight.
In the declaration on the occasion of the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers
with states of Central Europe in Bonn on l9th June 1992, ministers resolved to *strengthen existing
relations between WEU and these states by structuring the dialogue, consultations and co-operation.
The focus of consultations will be the security architecture and stability in Europe, the future devel-
opment of the CSCE, arms control and disarmament, in particular the implementation of the CFE and
Open Skies Treaties, as well as the 1992 Vienna document. Developments in Europe and neighbouring
regions will be of particular interest to the participants. "
The Petersberg Declaration stressed the * valuable contribution of NACC in connection with the
reaflirmation by WEU member states of their resolution to contribute further to the establishment of a
new order of peace in Europe which, in accordance with the Charter of Paris, will be based on
co-operation'. In the Council's opinion, however, any questions pertaining to the relationship between
NACC and the CSCE will have to be addressed primarily in these two fora.
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RECOMMENDATION 525 
'
on WEU and the situation in former Yugoslavia
The Assembly,
(i) Acting through an urgent meeting of its Standing Committee;
(ii) Recalling Recommendations 506, 5ll,5l2 and 519 which have all sought to prompt specific
WEU action to help resolve the Yugoslav crisis;
(iit) Fully endorsing United Nations Resolutions 713, 7 57 , 770 and 77l;
(iv) Welcoming the progress made as a result of the London Conference but saddened that in spite-of
miny attempts i; variing UoOies, to find a political solution t9 the crisis, the suffering of the O^eonlgs
concLrned ii intensifying to a devastating degree, not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina but also in Croatia
whcre Dubrovnik is still being shelled nightly;(v) Regretting that the United Nations embargo on Serbia and Montenegro is not being applied
effectively, except at sea;
(vt) Congratulating the Italian presidency of WEU for its initiatives in convening an extraordlna.rl
b6uncil oiMinisters-meeting in London ori ZSttr August, as requested on behalf of the Assemb.ly by.its
piesiOent, and approving th6 communiqu6 issued which offers the United Nations assistance in deliv-
ering humanitariin aid,ln the supervislon of heavy weapons and in strengthening the embargo;
(vit) Pleased that a majority of WEU countries are contributing_forces !o_r Operation 'Sharp Vigi-
ian". " and are prepared to make forces available to support United Nations efforts in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, butilso hoping for a more equitable cost-sharing agreement between member countries;
(viii) Welcoming the North Atlantic Council's decision to make NATOIs logistical infrastructure
iraitaUte to co-oierate in WEU action in the framework of United Nations Security Council directives
and also welcoming offers by the United States,
Uncrrvruv RrcouurNos rHAr rHs CouNctl-
1. Seek immediate United Nations approval to impose a complete and total land,. air and sea
blockade of Serbia and Montenegro, the Lessation of all financial, economic and other international
assistance and the exclusion of SerUia and Montenegro from all international organisations until such
time as they comply completely with all United Naiions resolutions and the decisions of the London
Conference;
2. Respond favourably to Romanian requests for help in policing the border with Serbia and help
to establish similar arrangements with other neighbouring countries in the region;
3. Insist that Greece give the necessary assurances of total compliance with the United Nations
embargo before continuing the present negotiations for WEU membership;
4. Offer to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to keep WEU forces available to the
United Nations under European command and operational control in order to maintain cohesion and
to carry out Resolution 770 effectively, and in close coordination with the United Nations;
5. Ensure that the WEU military planning cell is fully operational when established on lst October
L992 in order to play a specific r6le in the present crisis;
6. Institute a formal liaison mechanism with NATO headquarters and appropriate commands and
also with the relevant United States authorities to help promote efficient and cost-effective
cooperation and to avoid duplication of effort;
7. Prepare, in conjunction with other bodies, the future military requirements which may become
necessary'should SerSia not respect the London engagements and, in particular, study the need to:
(a) develop the alternative options for action considered on 28th August;
(b) plan appropriate anti-submarine and mine-hunting operations in the Adriatic;
l. Adopted by the Standing Committee on 3rd Septembet 1992.
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(c/ ensure air superiority in the area of operations and if necessary an air exclusion zone;
(d) take steps to ensure sufficient air protection for WEU forces made available to the United
Nations;
(e) confine all naval assets based in Kotor and Bar;(i develop electronic counter-measures (ECM) to best effect and, more specifically, jam and
neutralise military communications as well as fire control systems;
(g/ provide military hospital facilities in the region for the treatment of the wounded, both
service and civilian, and organise facilities for refugees;
8. Invite non-member nations to co-operate in furnishing military forces to complement WEU
assets;
9. Examine action to be taken, including military action, not only to stop present fighting but also
to prevent present conflicts spreading to Kosovo, Sandjak, Vojvodina and Macedonia and, in con-junction with the CSCE, consider the timely deployment of protective forces.
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1. Meeting in London on 28th August 1992 followpg 4. conclusion of the London conference on
ior1a.iyugoslauia, the foreign and delence ministers of WrU member states noted the success of oPer-
"ii"" it "6 uigifunte to mon'itor the embargo 
in the Adriatic. They agreed.that strengthening^ the effec-
iirin* oi thi embargo established by U-niteO Nations Securit! Council Resolutions '113 and 757
*o"fO Ur-; an importa-nt meanr of promoting a political solution to the crisis in former Yugoslavia ".
if,.l,-*"rcorn.0 tt e concturionr oi the Lon?oil conference and expre_ssed the willingness of )VEU
member states " to contiiUute to any further measures necessary to make the_embargo^as effective as
il;ibG'i. Minirt.rr also supporteaine call by_the London conference to the Security. Corrncil to con-
iider further measures to erisure rigorous imilementation of sanctions in the Adriatic. Furthermore,
-irri.t.ts decided that the ad hoc 
-gtoup 
should continue its work in this field.
2. At that same meeting, ministers agreed that member states of WEU could, if.req9ested, offer
e*pertise,-iectrnicA assistan'i:e and equiiment to the governments of the Danube riparian states topi6riiiilni;;; 
"f iriJ rin.r oanub6 fbr the_purposE of circumvenlr_ng 
or breaking the sanctions
^imposed by United Nations Security council Resolutions 713 and 757.
As such requests would be of a civilian nature, they would not, howevel, collcern WEU as such.
They could be better handled in other frameworks, such as the EC or the CSCE'
3. The Council takes due note of the suggestion made in paragraph 3 of Recommendation 525.
4. The Council takes due note of the suggestion made in paragraph 4 of Recommendation 525.lt
ricalls tliat on 28th august 1992, WEU mii'Isters approved the planning carried ouj !V WEU experts
;ffi;d;i. p-td.ti""""f turnunituriun convoys byririlitary^escorts. They welco*:-{ tlg yllingness of
itr" uriTra Nutions Secretary-General to recommend to the-security Council that.UNPRoFoR oper?-
tions in Bosnia-Herz.go"iri UJ intranced to provide such escorts, and expressed the.view that humani-;""* ;t *tions anO-associated protective zupport t!qy!!_9e organised by the United Nations. They
"oOiirirr'irO 
the coleCtive *iu of the member stites of WEU to contribute- to such operations by mil-
it"*-ronistic. financial and other means and decided to keep the United Nations informed from that
e;';f;f,;e;Ui[ 
"f ;r.h contributions. 
The Nine also decidLd to offer collectively, through lh9 nresi-
A;iry, io tfir UritiO Naiioriit. iesults of WEU's planning.They asked the ad hoc Group and Contin-
gency'Planning Group to elaborate further the necessary planning.
5. At present, the Council does not foresee a * specific r6le in the present crisis " in the former
Yugoslavia for the WEU planning cell.
6. In its reply to the Assembly's suggestion for instituting * a formal liaison mechanism with NATO
t LaOquart.ts ir'O app-ropriate c<immai'Os and also with the relevant United States authorities to help
ffi;;6;ff;.iirt i,iO-6osi-effective co-operation qnq to avoid duplication^o.f .-f-fg.t", the Counciliriifr.i to Oiaw ttre niieroUiv;r aitention to paragraph 3 of the communiqu6 of the 
-wEU extraordinary
council of Ministers;itsiiiAfirii iq9z. parafapitr 3 reads: * MinisterJdecided that the Italian presi-dil;;;fud ioriirri-to entrii u full exchan{e of gr{o1:911io1 and the necessary co-ordination with
tnJ.itfr.r organisations involved (United Nations, EC, NATO and CSCE). "
7. Measures and options such as those listed in paragraph 7 of Recommendation 525, could be pre-
pared by WEU and other bodies, if and when deemed necessary.
8. In principle, invitations to non-member states " to co-operate in furnishing. military forces to
complemint W-EU assets " can be extended by the Council on a case-by-case basts.
g. The Council is fully aware of the risk of the present conflict in the former Yugoslavia .snr.qading.
[o Kosouo, Sandjak, Vojvodina and Macedonia. In the opinion of the Council, any " examinatlon ot
;rtffi; & t"6ir; iircruirini mitiiarv action ", as well as " th9 timely deployment of protective forces "
iJ best undertaken in the larger framework of the United Nations.
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
'
to Recommendation 525
l. Communicated to the Assembly on l6th October 1992.
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co m m u niq ud and dec tarat io ir";J"tr:r{ Xi'#iX;X ed aft e r t he meet i ng
Foreign and defence ministers of WEU member states met in Rome on 20th November 1992.
. . . 
They reaffirmed their determination to implement the Maastricht and Petersberg Declarations
which were landmarks in WEU's reactivation, a process begun in 1984 with the Rom-e Declaration.
They_stres^sed t_!41he_enlargement of the organisation, the stiengthening of its operational r$le and the
transfer of the WEU Council and Secretariat to.Brussels, opened a new chapter in WEU's development
as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar
of the Atlantic Alliance.
Ministers also issued a declaration on the situation in former Yugoslavia.
For the first time, the presidency of the Twelve and the Secretary-General of NATO had beeninvited to attend.
Enlargement of WEU
l. 
. V-4_i!tg^-.lpressed their profoutd satisfaction that an important step in the process of strength-
ening WEU had been taken today with the successful conclusi-on of the discussions on enlargeni'ent
held with the countries concerned in line with the objectives set out in the WEU declarations oiMaas-
tricht and Petersberg.
Ministers from WEU member states together with their colleagues from the states invited have
today agreed the necessary documents so thaf Greece will become a-full member of WEU, Denmark
and Ireland will become observers and lceland, Norway and Turkey will become associate members of
WEU.
Development of WEU's operational rille
2. Ministers stressed the importance of the development of WEU's operational capabilities, in
accordance with the Maastricht and Petersberg Declarations, in order to allow a more effective contri-
bution to humanitarian tasks, peace-keeping and peace-making in co-ordination with NATO and other
organisations and in accordance with the United Nations CLarter and national constitutions. ThusWEU member states would increase their contribution to international peace and stability.
3. Ministers took note of the progress made since their June meeting in strengthening WEU's oper-
ational r6le. They were given an account of thq recent meeting of WEU chiefs 6f Oefeice staff. They
welcomed the establishment of the WEU planning cell in Brusiels on lst October and looked forwari
to it becoming operational by April 1993. Ministeis asked the Council and its working groups to guide
and encourage the planning cell in implementing its tasks and responsibilities inctrid'ing develSping
planrrin^g options and designating military units for missions undei WEU auspices. Min'istert tuit.E
the Defence Representatives Group to finalise the guidelines for selecting head^quarters for ttrese mis-
srons.
4. Ministers noted that the planning_cell will take forward work on the proposal for European air-
maritime co-^operation in connection with its r6le of drawing up contingency plins for the emflovmi"tof a range of national and multinational forces.
5. Ministers a-greed that a transfer of IEPG functions to WEU would represent an important step
towards enhanced co-operation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a WEIJ Buropeai
armam^ents agency. The WEU Permanent Council has been mandated to take a[ ndcessary steps in thelight of the results of the next meeting of the IEpG ministers.
6. WEU ministers also took note of an interim report on the possible transfer of certain Eurogroup
activities to WEU. They agreed tha! a final report shbuld be prepared for decision by WEU;i.ftaet;
lt,:plllg 1993 on the basis of positions prepared within WEU^and the subsequenf uie*i .fl1;iliWEU/Eurogroup working group.
Rome, 20th November 1992
CommuniquC
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7. Ministers agreed to the progress report on space activities. They welcomed.the fact that the
WEU satellite ceitre would ripidly become operational, as the refurbishment of the building in
fJrri:0, had now been completed and the choiceof consortium to equip the centre had been made.
Transfer to Brussels
8. The transfer of the WEU Council and Secretariat-General to Brussels in January 1993-will-con-
iiiUut" to the development of WEU's specific relations with the European_Unlon 
-on 
the one hand and
with NATO on the other as they have been defined by the Maastricht Declaration, and- to the
.niu*-.nt of WEU's operation;l r01e. In this respect, ministers stressed the importance of imple-
menting the necessary practical measures.
WEU co-operation in the lield of arms control and disarmament
g. Ministers reaffrrmed their commitment to the objectives on disarmament and arms control,
iecurity io-operation and conflict,prevention set out in the CSCE's Hensinki document of 1992. They
i^;iif-pi6-"te-ifri actrievement of significant results in the CSCE forum of security co'operation in
Vienna.
10. Ministers reiterated their commitment to the early entry into force of the Open Skies T...r.lV.
iirry toofrotiofirr. progress report prepared by experts andiasked them to continue the search for
.ortl.ffrrtir. solutions'for-implementingitre Op6n Skies Treaty, including the possibilities for estab-h[ilt; WnU poot. fvtinisteristressed t[e readiness of WEU to co-operate with_third-parties and wel-
;6aa;A ih. int"irtion of the presidency to inform them of the state of play of WEU's work.
1 l. Ministers welcomed the co-operation between WEU member states on the opening of natio.nali^p..ii*-iia-r ioi tne baseline vilidation phase of the CFE Treaty and looked forward to similar
arrlngements for the next phase of inspections.
Dialogae with other countries
lZ. Fotlowing the extraordinary ministerial meeting in_Bonn on 19th June 1992 between the WEU
for.ig" unO A.f?n.i ministers ani their colleqgues 1t6a1 lulgaria, Czecho:lo_vakia, Estonia, Hungary,
iiiiiu, Liirrou"iu, poland ind Romania, the f,irst meJlilg of the Forum of Consultation at Ambassa-
oo.iuii&.r was lieto in Iondon on l4th October. WEU ministers welcomed this step in th.e de-ve!
6;;;t 
"ilelations 
with the partner.countries of Central Purope and looked fonrya.rd to meeting.their
;;[.Aigsi"if,iipii"iof ig,;1. Ministers also took note of a report on relations with third countries.
13. In accordance with the decision adopted at Petersberg on lgth June 1992 grqdga[y to establjsh a
Oiaogri;ith iil Mugh..b iountries, ministers welcomed the flrrst contacts which had been made by
tfr" p?.iiO"riy and siretariat wittr itre London Embassies of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.
***
Ministers expressed their gratitude to the United Kingdgm Government, as representative of the
trost couniw wheri the Perman-ent Council and Secretariat-General had resided since 1956.
Declaration on former Yugoslavia
Ministers discussed the extremely grave situation in former Yugoslavia and in particular the
deterioraiinl .onoitio"r in Bosnia-H6riegovina. They expressFd dilmay pt continuing acts-- of
f;il;ila"nd ,iot;;ln Bosnia-Herzegoiina, at lle inagceptable practice.of 'ethnic cleansing " as
*Eu ir at the r.p"ut.diiori nioiutionr oT hu.in rights. They-condemned all forms of obstruction of
rrr-"riti.i", oi.*tioni. rtr.v cutt.o on all parties io respect the principles and decisions agreed at the
Gndon conference uno to *oik *ith the United Nationiand ECipecial envoys to seek a peaceful and
negotiated settlement to the problems of former Yugoslavia.
They reaffirmed the need for strict compliance with.all relevant United Nations Security^
Council-iesoluiions unO-iti.irio ttrat viotations bf these resolutions would call for consideration of
further measures by the United Nations Security Council.
They also reaflirmed their determination to reinforce the contribution WEU and its member
states wii6 *uting i" iopport of the efforts of the whole international community to bring.peacgtg6;;iG;L;i;";d tdi.ii.u. tt e suffering of its peoples. In this regard, they noted that, since -l6thjfuy-i-9%;u.rt ipr anOiircraft of WEU mJmbe. sAtea, under Italian operational control, have been
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carrying o_ut operations to monitor at sea compliance with the embargo established by United Nations
Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757. So far,3 649 ships have-been monitored Uy WEU opera-
tions and 7l suspected violations have been reported.
Ministers therefore welcomed the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 787.
The;t d-eclded that WEU will contribute to its implementation and that, to this end, warships and air-
craft of WEU member states, on the basis of approved joint planning, will start operationi aimed at
ensuring the strict implementation of the embargo at sea. These will lnclude stop ind search actions
and other measures as necessary The participation of the member states will be subject to the provi-
sions of their national constitutions.
WEU operations in the Adriatic have been undertaken and will continue to be carried out in
close co-ordination with NATO. WEU will continue to ensure that the two organisations work closely
together.
WEU member states emphasised the importance of the sanctions assistance missions to which
they contribute as members of the EC. They appealed to the Danube riparian states to ensure the strict
application of the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutioni and confirmed that they were
prepared-to offer, if requested, expertise, technical assistance and equipment to those states to pievent
the use of the river Danube for the purpose of circumventing or breaking sanctions. They also affirmed
their willingness to make similar contributions to the implementation of the control of the land
embargo at the frontiers.
WEU member states are contributing in a variety of ways to the enhanced operations of
UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina which are now beginning their task of ensuring the delivery of
humanitarian assistance. They reaffrrmed the collective determination of WEU mem6er states to;on-
t4bute to the protection and delivery of humanitarian assistance to the population of Bosnia-
Herzelgvina under the respglrsibility of the United Nations and to offer further support to these opera-
tions. The member states of WEU are also prepared to study the possibility of andihe requiremenis for
the promotion of safe areas for humanitarian purposes.
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Action by the Presidential Committee
REPORT
submitted on behalf of the Presidcntial Committee
by Mr. Foschi, Yice-President of the Assembly
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Political action
II. Organisation of the Assembly's work
I. Political aetion
l. In ensuring the continuity of the
Assembly's work in the period between sessions,
the Presidential Committee has had two main
political concerns: the protection of the people
of former Yugoslavia and the future of WEU.
A. The situation in former Yugoslavia
2. At its meeting in Bonn on 25th June 1992,
the Presidential Committee " strongly em-
phasised the helplessness of European govern-
ments in face of the tragic events in the last year
in former Yugoslavia and particularly in the last
three months in Bosnia-Herzegovina ". It urged
Mr. Kinkel, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Chairman-in-Offrce of the WEU Council, to
convey its reactions to the ministers of the
Twelv-e meeting in Lisbon. The Presidential
Committee said the time had come to ask the
governments " to act immediately to halt the
barbaric f,rghting which is devastating former
Yugoslavia ".
3. The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina
having deteriorated seriously last August, Mr.
De Decker, Chairman of the Liberal Group, and
Mr. Caro, Chairman of the Federated Group of
Christian Democrats and European Democrats,
agreed with Mr. Soell on the need for the
Aisembly to notify the Council of its conster-
nation at the peoples' suffering and Europe's
powerlessness and to make recommendations on
lhe course to be followed. However, it was
impossible to organise an extraordinary session
at such short notice. The President of the
Assembly therefore decided to convene, for the
first time, a meeting of the Standing Committee
in Paris on 3rd September 1992.
4. Set up last year on the same lines as the
Standing Committee of the Assembly of the
Council of Europe, our Standing Committee was
set up for the specific purpose of adopting rec-
omm-endations without its action being subject
to subsequent ratification by the Assembly. The
members of the Presidential Committee sit on
the Standing Committee together with members
appointed by the Assembly on a proportional
baiis so that the representation of delegations is
weighted in accordance with the number of their
members. The Standing Committee therefore
votes in conditions similar to the rules for
plenary sessions.
5. The Standing Committee was informed
by Mr. Andd, Minister of Defence of.Italy about
tlie latest developments in the situation in
former Yugoslavia and the arrangements made
by WEU. i had previously given an account of
niy talks with Mr. Emilio Colombo, who had
received me specifically so that I could explain
his views to the Standing Committee. Conse-
quently, the Italian Chairmanship-in-Office,
*nicn had also organised a study mission in the
Adriatic for the ehairman and Rapporteur of
the Defence Committee, allowed the body that
is a miniature assembly to deliberate in full
knowledge of the facts. After a detailed exchange
of viewi, the Standing Committee adopted
Recommendation 525 on strengthening the
embargo. This text was transmitted to the
Council in the same way as the recommenda-
tions adopted during the first part of our
session.
6. The study of the problem of former Yugo-
slavia has beeri continued by the Defence and
Political Committees. At the present part-
session, their reports are to be the subject of a
ioint debate which the Presidential Committee
prepared by holding a joint meeting with the
Chiirmanstrip-in-Office of the Council in Rome
on l8th November, just two days before the
ministerial meeting.
7. The Presidential Committee had asked
the Italian presidency to resume the custom ofjoint meetings which allowed it to hold talks
*ittr ttre Chairmanship-in-Office prior to minis-
terial meetings to ensure that its members and
the committei rapporteurs concerned were kept
informed and to explain the Assembly's views
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on topical matters. Mr. Colombo and Mr. Andd
met this wish in full. The meeting allowed par-
ticipants to describe the positions adopted by
the Defence and Political Committees and to
have a detailed dialogue with the ministers on
the conditions in which the embargo was moni-
tored, on violations of the embargo and on pos-
sible solutions to put an end to the ethnic con-
flicts which are endangering the survival of the
populations. The Presidential Committee noted
with satisfaction that the Council was at last
starting along the course advocated in the rec-
ommendation transmitted to it on 3rd Sep-
tember.
B. The future of WEU
8. Tackling the question of the enlargement
of WEU at the joint meeting on I 8th November,
the Presidential Committee referred to the
position adopted by the Political Committee
which was concerned by the prospect of the
accession of Greece and Turkey to WEU on dif-
ferent dates and in different conditions. The
Rome communiqud seems to have partly sat-
isfied our Political Committee.
9. The Presidential Committee had stressed
the value it attached to the enlargement of
WEU. We are gratified that at least one of the
three members of the European Community
that are not members of WEU, i.e. Greece,
signed a protocol of accession on 20th
November that will allow its delegation, once
the last parliament has ratified the protocol, to
play a full part in the work of our Assembly.
10. Last June, in Recommendation 517, the
Assembly contested the aflirmation in the Maas-
tricht Treaty that 1998 might be a deadline for
WEU and asked that legal experts be consulted
on this subject. At the joint meeting in Rome,
Mr. Colombo gave favourable consideration to
this proposal. The Presidential Committee wel-
comed this because it believes it is essential for
the authority of WEU not to be weakened just
when it is given a vital rOle in ensuring security
in Europe and the world.
II. Organisation of the Assembly's work
A. Preparation of the session
ll. As is customary, the Chairmanship-in-
Office, held by ltaly since lst July, is repre-
sented at this session by the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Mr. Colombo, and the Minister of
Defence, Mr. Andd.
12. The Presidential Committee also decided
to invite Mr. Rifkind, Secretary of State for
Defence of the United Kingdom, whose views
on the matters we are to debate will be heard
with the greatest attention.
13. In June, the Presidential Committee
invited the Minister of Defence of Sweden. At
this part-session, it is the Minister of Defence of
Austria who is to address our Assembly. It is
particularly important for the Assembly to hold
a dialogue with the representative of a country
that wishes to accede to the European Com-
munity with full knowledge of the prospects
offered by the Maastricht agreements. Austria's
position at the heart of Europe confers special
weight on the opinions of its government on the
problems affecting part of our continent.
14. I would stress the value the Assembly
attaches to associating with its deliberations rep
resentatives of the parliaments of neutral coun-
tries. The Presidential Committee decided to
send, for the first time, an invitation to the Swiss
Parliament, which showed its satisfaction at
taking part in the work of our Assembly.
15. After hearing in turn the Ministers for
Foreign Affairs of Poland, Hungary and Czecho-
slovakia, our Assembly will be addressed at this
part-session by the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Romania. Mr. Melescanu's contribution to
our work is set in the context of a European
security that necessarily transcends the narrow
framework of defence organisations and
requires the establishment of an order of justice
and peace throughout Europe.
16. Finally, the Presidential Committee has
made the necessary arrangements to allow the
Assembly to elect a new Clerk. Document 1347
on the election of the Clerk gives all necessary
details on this matter.
B. Budgetary questions
17. With a view to implementing Assembly
Order 80 on improving procedure for organising
the dialogue with the Council on budgetary
matters, the President of the Assembly, accom-
panied by the Chairman of the Committee on
Budgetary Alfairs and Admin istration, in formed
the Permanent Council at its meeting in London
on 24th June of the guidelines for our draft
budget for 1993 and the Assembly's wish to
know the Council's opinion earlier than in the
past. Indeed, the relevant Assembly bodies must
have the time and the facts to discuss the
attitude to be adopted in response to the Coun-
cil's opinion and to take the necesary steps to
amend the draft budget, i.e. reorganise the
Assembly's activities, in the light of the credits
available.
18. To speed up procedure, our Committee
on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and
the Presidential Committee adopted this draft
budget on 22nd, July 1992 and it was immedi-
ately transmitted to the Council, whereas it was
not usually transmitted until the end of Sep
tember.
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19. It is the more regrettable that the WEU
Budget and Organisation Committee did not
exariine the Assembly's budget until l3th
November 1992. I wish to emphasise the
backing the Assembly was givel on that
occasion by the Italian presidency. Its represen-
tatives reiognised that the Assembly should
have resources commensurate with its tasks. We
can but regret that the Italian presidency wa.s
unable to c-onvince all members of the Council
to examine the Assembly's requests more benev-
olently.
20. The Council's opinion finally reached us
on 27th November 1992. The Chairman of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration will explain in greater detail the reasons
invoked by the Couniil to justify this tardy
answer. These reasons are linked with the
transfer of the seat of the Secretariat-General to
Brussels. However this may be, the Presidential
Committee will do its utmost to ensure that, in
1993, the Assembly's requests in its Order 80 are
met and the Assembly's budgetary dialogue with
the Council is held in more harmonious condi-
tions than in the past. The Secretary-General
and members of the Permanent Council can
testify to the efforts made by the Presidential
Committee to this end.
21. The Presidential Committee's efforts to
develop a fruitful dialogue with the Council and
to orginise the work of the Assembly will be
crowned with success if the present session mea-
sures up to the hopes that members of the
Assembly have placed in it.
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Ekction of the Clcrk of the Assembly
Document not published in the proceedings.
25th November 1992
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Declaration on WEU obsemers hsaed after the
meeting of the WEU Council of Ministen
Rome, 20th November 1992
l. The ministers of foreign affairs of the WEU member states and the representatives of the
Kingdom of Denmark and of Ireland met in Rome on 20th November 1992. They recalled the decla-
ration in which the WEU Council of Ministers in Maastricht on lOth December 1991 invited those
statcs to become members of WEU or observers, the invitation issued on 30th June 1992 by the
German Minister of Foreign Affairs, the then Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council, to open discus-
sions on the basis of the Petersberg Declaration,of l9th June 1992, and the replies of the Kingdom of
Denmark and Ireland indicating their interest in becoming WEU observers.
2. Following these discussions, the ministers of foreign affairs of WEU confirmed their wish to see
the Kingdom of Denmark and Ireland become WEU observers.
3. Accordingly, and without the following factors entailing any changes to the modified Brussels
Treaty, the Kingdom of Denmark and lreland will become WEU observers.
4. They may attend the meetings of the WEU Council, without prejudice to the provisions laid
down in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty; at the request of a majority of the member states,
or of half of the member states including the presidency, presence at Council meetings may be
restricted to full members.
5. They may be invited to meetings of working groups.
6. They may be invited, on request, to speak.
7. The Kingdom of Denmark will have the same rights and responsibilities as the full members for
functions transferred to WEU from other fora and institutions to which the Kingdom of Denmark
already belongs.
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QUESTTON 298
put to the Council by Mr. De Decler
on 14th May 1992
The Council's reply to Written Question
296 raises the following additional questions:
l. What is meant by the fact that Article J.4
of the Maastricht Treaty is " essentially of a
political nature' and that it is not " identifiable
in legal terms ", when it is part of a treaty that
has been signed and submitted for ratification?
Is it a policy or a treaty that has to be rat-
ified?
2. Can the Council say what are the
" powers " attributed to the European Par-
liament, referred to in paragraph 3 of its reply,
and whether it endorses the opinion of the
French Constitutional Council that the
European Parliament has only the responsibil-
ities defined by the treaties attributing them?
3. Can the Council say whether the fact thatit refers in paragraph 3 of its reply to its
" opinion' means that it is based on a political
option and not on the juridical certainty that the
text of the modified Brussels Treaty appears tojustify?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on 9th July 1992
l. The honourable parliamentarian will note
that in its reply to Written Question 296, the
Council spoke of the 'relationship " between
WEU and the European Union as described in
Article J.4 relating to the common foreign and
security policy of the Treaty on European
Union. In this context, the Council stressed that
this " relationship " is essentially of a political
nature and cannot be seen as implying that
Western European Union is identifiable in legal
terms with the European Union. Treaty Article
J.4 constitutes a legal basis for this rela-
tionship.
2. The Council's reply to Written Question
296 spoke in very general terms of the fact that
the Maastricht Treaty does attribute * certain
powers " to the European Parliament in regard
to its application. For obvious reasons, the
WEU Council has no competence for defining
the powers attributed to the European Par-
liament.
3. In its reply to Written Question 296, the
Council expressed its " opinion " that the fact
27th November 1992
that the Maastricht Treaty on European Union
does attribute * certain powers " to the
European Parliament in regard to its application
does not in any way impart the r6le attributed to
the WEU parliamentary Assembly by virtue of
Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty. Fur-
thermore, the Council stressed that it remainsfully aware of the WEU parliamentary
Assembly's independence and its powers, as
expressed in the Charter of the Assembly, which
is in itself an application of the provisions of
Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty.
However, the WEU Council has no competencefor defining the powers attributed to the
European Parliament. Therefore, the Council
can only express its * opinion " that provisions
of the Maastricht Treaty on powers attributed to
the European Parliament will not impart the
r6le attributed to the WEU parliamentary
Assembly by virtue of Article IX of the modified
Brussels Treaty.
QUESTTON 299
put to the Council by Mr. Goerens
on 26th lune 1992
The declarations by the nine member
countries of WEU adopted in Maastricht are
part and parcel of the legal arrangements agreed
upon in Maastricht. Would they still be valid in
the event of the Maastricht Treaty not being rat-
ified?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on 16th October 1992
WEU member states are fully committed
to the goal of European unity and progressive
integration, as expressed in the preamble to the
modified Brussels Treaty. Furthermore, in their
platform on European security interests of
October 1987, WEU member states recalled
their * commitment to build a European Union
in accordance with the Single European Act ".
The Petersberg Declaration adopted by the
WEU Council of Ministers on l9th June 1992
clearly testifies to the commitment of WEU
member states to achieve significant progress in
developing the r6le of WEU as the defence com-
ponent of the European Union and as the means
to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance in accordance with the declaration
adopted by WEU member states at the Maas-
tricht European Council in December 1991. The
Wriuen questions 298 to 310 and replies of the Council
i
t
I
i
I
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WEU Council's tasks for the next six months are
clear and will promote a quantum leap in the
organisation's capabilities and responsibilities.
As to the declaration adopted by the nine
member countries of WEU in Maastricht,
indeed they are politically homogeneous to the
Maastricht Treaty and respond to the same
finalities of European intqration. In fact they
are aimed at the objective of a European inte-
grated dimension in the field of security and
defence, in line with the October 1987 platform
on European security interests (according to
which'the construction of an integrated Europe
will remain incomplete as long as it does not
include security and defence "). As far as formal
aspects are concerned, the declarations of the
Nine, given their political nature, are not subject
to ratification and would thus remain valid even
* in the event of the Maastricht Treaty not being
ratified ".
In any case, the member states of the
European Community have repeatedly con-
firmed their willingness to ratify the Maastricht
Treaty within the planned timeframe.
QUESTTON 300
put to the Council by Mr. Goerens
on 29th lune 1992
Countries that become associate members
of WEU will be invited to take part in all the
activities of WEU and to contribute to the
organisation's budget. Does this include the
Assembly's budget? Will they take part in the
drafting and adoption ofthe annual report ofthe
Council? Will their delegations to the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
benefit from Article IX of the treaty? Does the
Council consider that the definition of the status
of associate member or observer in WEU is
covered by Article XI of the treaty and that, con-
sequently, it is for the Council alone to
determine the nature of such status or that it is
covered by Article VIII, paragraph 2, which
would allow the Assembly to draw the conse-
quences of decisions taken by the Council where
it is concerned?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on 4th November 1992
l. According to Part III of the Petersberg
Dcclaration " on relations between WEU and
the other European member states of the
European Union or the Atlantic Alliance ",
" European member states of the Atlantic
Alliance which are not member states of the
European Union and which have accepted the
invitation to become associate members of
WEU, although not being parties to the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty, may participate fully in
the meetings of the WEU Council - without
prejudice to the provisions laid down in Article
VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty - of its
working groups and of the subsidiary bodies ",
subject to a number of provisions. These provi-
sions include the following: " they [the associate
membersl will be asked to make a fltnancial con-
tribution to the organisation's budgets ". The
precise modalities of this provision will have to
be specified by the Council in the dialogue with
the states concerned.
2. As regards the drafting and adoption of
the Council's annual report, the modified
Brussels Treaty clearly states that a Council
created by the High Contracting Parties (Article
VIII, paragraph l) " shall make an annual report
on its activities... " (Article IX). It is pointed out
that Part III of the Petersberg Declaration spec-
ified that neither associate members nor
observers are parties to the modified Brussels
Treaty.
3. It should be recalled that Article IX of the
modified Brussels Treaty states: " The Council
of Western European Union shall make an
annual report on its activities and in particular
concerning the control of armaments to an
Assembly composed of representatives of the
Brussels Treaty powers to the Consultative
Assembly of the Council of Europe ". Part III of
the Petersberg Declaration speciflres that asso-
ciate members and observers are not parties to
the modified Brussels Treaty. Hence it appears
that only the representatives of the " Brussels
Treaty Powers " (i.e. full member states of
Western European Union) to the Consultative
Assembly of the Council of Europe could befull members of the WEU parliamentary
Assembly.
4. According to Article XI of the modified
Brussels Treaty, " the High Contracting Parties
may, by agreement, invite any other state to
accede to the present treaty on conditions to be
agreed between them and the state so invited.
Any state so invited may become a party to the
treaty by depositing an instrument of accession
with the Belgian Government ". As specified in
Part III of the Petersberg Declaration, neither
associate members nor observers are parties to
the modified Brussels Treaty. Hence associate
membership and observer status are not covered
by Article IX or Article VIII of the modified
Brussels Treaty. The definition of a status of
associate state or observer state cannot therefore
be considered as creating a subsidiary body
within the meaning of Article VIII, paragraph 2
of the modified Brussels Treaty.
The invititations extended by WEU to
other member states of the European Union and
other European member states of the Atlantic
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Alliance reflect the preamble of the modified
Brussels Treaty which states: * [The High Con-
tracting Parties,] resolved:... To promote the
unity and to encourage the progressive inte-
gration of Europe; to associate progressively in
the pursuance of these aims other states inspired
by the same ideals and animated by the like
determination... ".
QUESTTON 301
put to the Council by Mn Goerens
on 29th June 1992
Does the reservation in the Petersberg
Declaration that Article V of the modified
Brussels Treaty would not apply to disputes
between member states of WEU and the
Atlantic Alliance apply only to countries yet to
accede to the modified Brussels Treaty or does it
also relate to countries that have already signed
the treaty?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on 16th October 1992
In Part III of the Petersberg Declaration,
WEU ministers " also stressed that the security
guarantees and defence commitments in the
treaties which bind the member states within
Western European Union and which bind them
within the Atlantic Alliance are mutually rein-
forcing and will not be invoked by those sub-
scribing to Part III of the Petersberg Declaration
in disputes between member states of either of
the two organisations ". This statement is
derived from Article VII of the modified
Brussels Treaty. It is indeed a transposition of
this article to relations between member states
and associate members. Article VII states: " The
high contracting parties declare, each so far as
he is concerned, that none of the international
engagements now in force between him and any
other ofthe high contracting parties or any third
state is in conflict with the provisions of the
present treaty. None of the high contracting
parties will conclude any alliance or participate
in any coalition directed against any of the high
contracting parties ".
QUESTTON 302
pat to the Council by Mr. Fourrd
on 22nd July 1992
In its reply to Written Question 296, the
Council said that, in its opinion, the powers
attributed by the Maastricht Treaty to the
European Parliament do not " in any way
impair the rdle attributed to the WEU parlia-
mentary Assembly by virtue of Article IX of the
modified Brussels Treaty. " Furthermore, just
before the ministerial meeting of WEU on 19th
June 1992, the WEU Secretary-General spoke to
the Security and Disarmament Sub-committee
of the European Parliament to describe the
change in the rOle of WEU with a view to the
implementation of the Maastricht Treaty,
whereas he communicated information to thc
WEU Assembly on this question only after the
ministerial meeting.
l. Does this mean that the Council shares
the view expressed in Resolution A3-0123192 of
the European Parliament, according to which
the Maastricht Treaty * provides for defence
matters to be delegated to WEU without pro-
viding for appropriate parliamentary control of
the activities of this organisation "?
2. Does this mean that the Council envisages
transferring to the European Parliament the
responsibilities attributed to the Assembly of
WEU under Article IX of the modified Brussels
Treaty?
3. Does the Council consider that Article J.7
of the Maastricht Treaty providing for a direct
link between the presidency of the European
Union and the European Parliament is liable to
render null and void either the modified
Brussels Treaty as a whole, or Article IX of that
treaty?
QUESTTON 303
put to the Council by lard Finsberg
on 22nd tuly 1992
In their declaration annexed to the Maas-
tricht Treaty, one of the measures listed by the
nine governments of the WEU member coun-
tries was * encouragement of closer cG'operation
between the parliamentary Assembly of WEU
and the European Parliament'. The Council has
subsequently reiterated its encouragement.
However, implementation of this encour-
agement is encountering a number of diffi-
culties, the first of which being the uncertainty
regarding what this co-operation should be.
A. Can the Council say whether its * encour-
agement " is based:
l. On Articles J.7 and J.l1 of the Maas-
tricht Treaty which establish the European
Parliament's consultative powers in the
European Union's common foreign and security
policy, completed by Article J.4, paragraph l,
which specifies that this policy " shall include all
questions related to the security of the Union,
including the eventual framing of a common
defence policy, which might in time lead to a
common defence "? Does this imply preparing a
transfer of WEU's responsibilities to the
European Union referred to in paragraph 6 of
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Article J.4 and hence of the responsibilities of
the WEU Assembly to the European Par-
liament?
2. On Article J.4, paragraph 3, which
excludes the procedures set out in Article J.3
" issues having defence implications "? In this
case, is it a question of endeavouring to distin-
guish between the respective responsibilities of
the two Assemblies?
B. Does the Council consider that, as long as
the governments of the member states retain
their full sovereignty, from the moment recourse
to force is envisaged, the European Parliament,
elected by direct universal suffrage and with
consultative powers under Article J.9 of the
Maastricht Treaty in regard to measures taken
by the European Union for the common
defence, is an adequate democratic instrument
of supervision? Does it not believe, on the con-
trury,that the WEU Assembly, formed of dele-
gations of the parliaments of the member coun-
iries and with supervisory powers under Article
IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, is in a better
position to exercise true democratic control over
the defence of the Union and to uphold Europe's
defence requirements with the authorities which
have effective power in this field?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
TO QUESTIONS 302 and 303
communicated to the Assembly
on 16th October 1992
l. In view of the fact that the issues
addressed in Written Questions 302 and 303 are
closely related, the Council considers it appro-
priate to give a joint reply to both questions.
2. In its replies to Written Questions 296
and 298, the Council acknowledged that the
Maastricht Treaty on European Union does
attribute " certain powers'to the European Par-
liament in regard to its application. Since the
WEU Council has no competence for defining
the powers attributed to the European Par-
liament, the Council can only give its own inter-
prctation that the provisions of the Maastricht
Treaty on powers attributed to the European
Parliament will not impair the r6le attributed to
the WEU parliamentary Assembly by virtue of
Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty.
In the Maastricht Declaration of the Nine
on the r0le of Western European Union and its
relations with the European Union and with the
Atlantic Alliance, under the heading * Other
measures " (paragraph 8), " WEU notes that, in
accordance with the provisions of Article J.4 (6)
concerning the common foreign and security
policy of the Treaty on European Union, the
Union will decide to review the provisions of
this article with a view to furthering the
objective to be set by it in accordance with the
procedures defined. WEU will re-examine the
present provisions in 1996. This re-examination
will take account of the progress and experience
acquired and will extend to relations between
WEU and the Atlantic Alliance. " [t should be
recalled that Article J.4, paragtaph 6, of the
Maastricht Treaty reads: * With a view to fur-
thering the objective of this treaty, and having in
view the date of 1998 in the context of Article
XII of the Brussels Treaty, the provisions of this
article may be revised as provided for in Article
N (2) on the basis of a report to be presented in
1996 by the Council to the European Council,
which shall include an evaluation of the progress
made and the experience gained until then. "
In the present phase, the Council is not,
understandably, in a position to prejudge the
results of these revisions.
3. The Council takes due note of the issues
raised in paragraphs l-3 of Written Question
302 and paragraph B of Written Question 303.It remains fully aware of the WEU parlia-
mentary Assembly's independence and its
powers, as expressed in the Charter of the
Assembly, which states: " The Assembly carries
out the parliamentary function arising from the
application of the Brussels Treaty. In particular,
the Assembly may proceed on any matter arising
out of the Brussels Treaty and upon any matter
submitted to the Assembly for an opinion by the
Council. "
4. The Council takes due note of the issues
raised in paragraph A of Written Question 303.
The Council's encouragement of closer co'
operation between the parliamentary Assembly
of WfU and the European Parliament is based
on the fact that the Maastricht Declaration of
the Nine on the r6le of Western European
Union and its relations with the European
Union and with the Atlantic Alliance specifies
under the heading * WEU's relations with
European Union " (paragraph 3) : " The
objective is to build up WEU in stages. as the
deience component of the European Union. To
this end, WEU is prepared, at the request of the
European Union, to elaborate and implement
decisions and actions of the Union which have
defence implications. " The " encouragement of
closer co-operation between the parliamentary
Assembly of WEU and the European Par-
liament'; is one of the " measures " which
* WEU will take... to develop a close working
relationship with the Union ".
QUESTION 304
pat to the Council hY Mt. Marten
on 14th September 1992
With reference to the selective embargo
on Serbia and Montenegro decided in United
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Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and
7 57 , to ask the Council:
(a) to list all those vessels challenged by
WEU and other forces in the Adriatic
and which are known to have called at
Montenegrin harbours, giving details
of their port of registry, provenance
and declared destination and, where
possible, also the cargo carried;
(b) to rcport what action has been taken
to alert the United Nations authorities
to any apparent breach of the embargo
at sea;
(c/ to inform the Assembly of approaches
made to WEU by Bulgaria, Greece,
Hungary and Romania concerning the
application of the embargo on the
various relevant land boundaries and
the response given.
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on 16th October 1992
l. The Council regrets that it cannot comply
with the request made in paragraph (a) of
Written Question 304, as the relevant data is
classified. However, the Council would like to
take the opportunity to inform the Assembly
that, as of l5th September 1992, WEU and
NATO forces in the Adriatic had challenged
216l vessels in implementation of United
Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and
757. Of these, 32 were suspected of violating the
embargo.
2. The WEU presidency is keeping the com-
petent United Nations authorities informed
about the progress of operation sharp vigi-
lance.
3. As of l5th September 1992, there had
been no official approaches to the WEU Council
" by Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary and Romania
concerning the application of the embargo on
the various land boundaries ".
QUESTTON 305
pat to the Council by Mr. LoWz Henares
on $th October 1992
The frequent changes in the names of the
organs of WEU make it diflicult for the
Assembly to follow correctly the activities of the
Council.
Could the Council send the Assembly a
full and accurate organogram without delay?
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communicated to tlv Assembly
on 19th November 1992
The Council regrets that - for the time
being 
- 
it cannot comply with the request made
in Written Question 305. Preliminary discus-
sions on an updated comprehensive organ-
isational chart have been taking place in the
Council and its working groups, and the Council
hopes to be able to make available a revised
organisational chart to the Assembly in the very
near future.
QUESTTON 306
pat to the Council by Inrd Finsberg
on 15th October 1992
Does the answer of the Council in para-
graph 16 of its reply to Recommendation 517
mean that it refuses to refer to independent arbi-
tration?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
No reply has yet been received from the
Council.
QUESTTON 307
put to the Council by Mr. Goerens
on l1th October 1992
According to the Petersberg Declaration,
associate member states of WEU'will take part
on the same basis as full members in WEU
military operations to which they commit
forces ".
In view of the fact that the two * bases "
for military action by WEU are Article V and
Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, can
it be considered that these articles may 56 ttre
" basis " for a military commitment by countries
that will not be acceding to the modified
Brussels Treaty? Should it be considered that
WEU military operations might have other
* bases " than the modified Brussels Treaty and,
if so, which?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
No reply has yet been received from the
Council.
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QUESTTON 308
put to the Council by Mr. Goerens
on 15th October 1992
Do the acts of accession of Portugal and
Spain to WEU imply that those two countries
subocribed to Protocols Nos. II, III and IV of the
Paris Agreements? Do those countries assume
all the obligations implied by the said pro-
tocols?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
No reply has yet been received from the
Council.
QUESTION 309
pat to the Council by Mr. Goerens
on 15th October 1992
Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty
draws a clear distinction between the high con-
tracting parties to the treaty which, account
being taken of Article I to Protocol No. I,
include Germany and Italy, and any other state
invited subsequently to " become a party to the
treaty " " on conditions to be agreed between
them and the state so invited ". In these condi-
tions, can the Council say, basing its answer on
serious legal considerations:
1. Whether it is possible to consider
Germany and Italy as high contracting
parties and at the same time claim that
ihe period of lifty years provided for in
Article XII started in 1948?
2. Whether, in the event of Greece
acceding to the modified Brussels
Treaty, it would be entitled, as a state
acceding to the treaty, to participate in
the decision relating to the conditions
for the accession of other countries as
they have to be agreed with the high
contracting parties to Protocol No. I?
3. If the Council is prepared to submit to
recognised experts in international law
the Assembly's well-founded consider-
ations concerning the interpretation of
Article XII of the treaty or whether it
intends to confine itself to its
" opinion " which has never been jus-
tified, even in the answer to Written
Question 297, in order to reject the
Assembly's point of view on this
matter?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
No reply has yet been received from the
Council.
QUESTION 310
pat to the Coancil bY Mr. Caro
on 15th Ocnber 1992
The Petersberg Declaration is an under-
standing between states with a view to creating,
modifying or abolishing a legal relationship
between them in two respects:
1. because it provides for non-application
of a fundamental article of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty (Article V) in the
event of a disPute between a country
acceding to that treaty and a country
having acceded to the North Atlantic
Treaty,
2. because it creates a status of" associate
member " in an organisation set up by
the 1954 Paris Agreements.
Does the Council not consider that the
adoption ofacts having such effects requires the
intervention of constitutional authorities in
member states conversant with the conclusion of
treaties? Can it specify the nature ofthese acts?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
No reply has yet been received from the
Council.
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Document 1350 25th November 1992
Protocol of occession of tlw Hellcnic Republic
to Western European Union
togethq with an anneJE
The High Contracting Parties to the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and
Collective Self-Defence, signed at Brussels on 17th March 1948, as modified and completed by the
Protocol signed at Paris on 23rd October 1954 and the other protocols and annexes which form an
integral part thereof, hereinafter referred to as * the Treaty ", on the one hand,
and the Hellenic Republic on the other,
Reaffrrming the common destiny which binds their countries and in accordance with the under-
taking to complete a European Union made at Maastricht on 7th February 1992 in the Treaty on
European Union;
Convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it
does not include the development of a European security and defence identity;
Determined to strengthen the r6le of WEU, in the longer-term perspective of a common defencepolicy-within the European Union which might in time lead to a common defence, compatible with
that of the Atlantic Alliance;
Noting that the Hellenic Republic, which is fully committed to the process of European con-
struction and is a member of the Atlantic Alliance, has formally stated that it is prepared to accede to
the Treaty;
- 
Noting that the Hellenic Republic accepts the agreements, decisions and rules adopted in con-
formity with the Treaty and the declarations starting with the Rome Declaration of 2TthOCtober 1984;
Noting that the Hellenic Republic undertakes to develop WEU as the defence component of the
Furopean Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the AtlantiC Alliance, in
keeping with the obligation entered into on lfth December l99l in the Declaration on the r6le of
WEU and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance attached to the Treaty
o! European Union, and accepts in full the Petersberg Declaration, in particular its Part III, issued on
19th June 1992;
_Recalling theinvitation issued on 30th June 1992 by the German Minister of Foreign Alfairs
and Chairman-in-Offrce of the Council of Western European Union to the Hellenic Republic to open
discussions with a view to its possible accession to the Treaty;
Noting the satisfactory conclusion of the discussions which followed this invitation;
Noting the invitation to accede to the Treaty issued to the Hellenic Republic on 20th November
1992;
Considering_that the enlargement of Western European Union to include the Hellenic Republic
represents a significant step in the development of the European security and defence identity;
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
By the present Protocol, the Hellenic Republic accedes to the Treaty.
Article II
- 
By its accession to the Treaty, the Hellenic Republic becomes party to the agreements concluded
between the member states, as listed in an annex to the present Piotocol.
Article III
. 
- 
Each of the signatory states shall notify the Belgian Government of the acceptance, approval or
ratification of the present Protocol, which shall enter into force on the day of the rbceipt 'of tire last of
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these notifications. The Belgian Government shall inform the signatory states of each such notification
and of the entry into force of the Protocol.
In witness whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto, have signed the present Pro-
tocol.
Done at Rome this twentieth day of November 1992 in the English and French languages; both
texts biing equally authoritative, in a iingle original, which shall remain deposited in the archives of
the GoverirmLnt 6f ttre Kingdom of Belgium, which shall transmit a certiflred copy to the governments
of the other signatory states.
For the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium:
For the Government of the French Republic:
For the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany:
For the Government of the Hellenic Republic:
For the Government of the Italian Republic:
For the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg:
For the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands:
For the Government of the Portuguese Republic:
For the Government of the Kingdom of Spain:
For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
ANNEX
Agreenents concluded between the member states in fultilment of the Treaty:
l. Agreement on the status of Western European Union, national representatives and international
staff, signed at Paris on llth May 1955'
Z. Agreement drawn up in implementation of Article V of Protocol No. II to the Treaty, signed at
Paris on l4th December 1957.
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Document on associate membership of WEIJ
of the Republic of rceland, the Kingdom of Nontay aid tne Republic of Turrey
l. The ministers of foreign q$eitq of the member states of WEU and the ministers of foreign affairs
of the \epublig oflceland, !!e Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey met in RomE on 20thNovember 1992. They_reaffirmed the commitments which bind their countries aimed at ensuring
peace. and security in Europe. In this connection, they welcomed the development of the Europeai
security and defence identity. Determined, taking inio account the r6le of-WEU as the means to
strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, to put the relationship between WEU and the
other European states of the Atlantic Alliance on a new basis in order to prombte stability and security
in Europe, they recalled the declaration in.which the WEU Council of Ministers invited these states onl0th December l99l in Maastricht to become associate members of wEU.
2. tn this context,,they recalled the invitation issued on 30th June 1992 by the German Minister of
Foreign Af&ltt and the then Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council to the Republic of lceland, the
Kingdom o_f N_orway and the Republic of Turkey to open discussions with a view -to their possible isso.
ciation to WEU. During thes-e exchanges of uieys, it has been confirmed that the Republic of Iceland,
the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey accept the determination of tfie WEU membei
states to strengthen the rOle of WEU in the longer-term perspective of a common European defencepolicy compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance, and that they accept in full Section Aof part III of
the Petersberg Declaration.
Following,these discussions, the ministers of foreign affairs of WEU confirmed their wish to see
the Republic__of_Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey become associate
members of WEU.
Ministers considered, moreoveL that the association of these three countries represents a signif-
icant step i.n th9 strengthening of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, and thus of the traisat-
lantic link itself, in the spirit of the Declaration of Rome on Peace and Co-operation of 8th November
1991.
1. Accordingly, and without the following elements entailing any changes to the modified BrusselsTreaty, the 
-ReP_]r!_lic of lceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republicbf Turkey become associatemembers of WEU. Thel 
-ma1,_glthgugt not being parties to the modified Brussels ireaty, participate
!p_[y in the meetings of the WEU Council - without prejudice to the provisions laid doivn in AriicleVm 
- 
of its working groups and of the subsidiary bodi-es, subject to the following provisions:
. .- 
at the reqgest. of a majority of the member states, or of half of the member states including thepresidency, participation may be restricted to full members;
- 
_they will have the right to speak but may not block a decision that is the subject of consensus
among the member states;
. ; they may.associate themselves with the decisions taken by member states; they will be able toparticipat_e in their implementation unless a majority of the member states, or half of the member
states including the presidency, decide otherwise;
. 
- 
the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Nonvay and the Republic of Turkey will be able to be
associated to the planning cell through a perrnanent liaison arrangement;
they will take part on the same basis as full members in WEU military operations to which
they commit forces;
- 
they will.be connected to the member states' telecommunications system (WEUCOM) for
messages concerning meetings and activities in which they participate;
- 
they will be asked to make a financial contribution to the organisation's budgets.
Fo[ practical reasons, space activities will be restricted to the present members until the end of
the experim.ental phase of the satellite centre in 1995. During this phase the new member and associate
members will be kept informed of WEU's space activities. Appropriate arrangements will be made for
associate members to participate in subsequent space activities afthe same tiire as decisions are taken
on the continuation of such activities.
4: The Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey will have the same
rights and responsibilities as the full members for funitions transferred to wEU from other fora andinstitutions to which they already belong.
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5. The Republic of lceland, the Kingdom of Norway and.the Republic of Turkey will become asso-
ciate me-*teis of WEU o, ihe day ihe Hellenic Republic becomes a member of WEU. In the
;artit";;itrJnep"Uficof Iceland, t'he Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey will be con-
sidered as active observers to WEU.
For the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium:
For the Government of the French Republic:
For the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany:
For the Government of the Republic of Iceland:
For the Government of the Italian Republic:
For the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg:
For the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands:
For the Government of the Kingdom of Norway:
For the Government of the Portuguese Republic:
For the Government of the Kingdom of Spain:
For the Government of the Republic of Turkey:
For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
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Council of Ministers, Rome, 20th November 1992
Presidency declarations extracted from summaries of
discussions between wEU and the three oiher European meiber states
of the Atlantic Alliance
l. Planning cell
- 
".Repllying to the.Turkish representllive, the presidency recalled that the Petersberg Declaration
stated that future associate members would be able to be associated to the planning cel tfirough a per-
manent liaison arrangement.
It follows that an arrangement will be worked out with Turkey and with any other of the asso-
ciate members who so wish. "
2. Information to associate members
_ 
" The presidency, i,n rgnlV to the representatives of the candidates for associate membership,
confirmed that there will be full transparency among the full member states and the associate membii
states and that timely information on restricted sessions will be given to that effect. "
3. Statement on " existing treaties or agreements "
* The presidency, in reply to a question by the lcelandic representative, confirmed that the ref-
erence to * existing treaties or agreements " in the minutes agreed in connection with the document on
associate membership includes the Washington Treaty. "
Document 1351 Addendum 27th November 1992
Minutu,agreed in connection with the document associate membenhip
at the WEU Ministerial Council, on 20th November, in Rome
- 
As associate members-are_not parties to the modified Brussels Treaty, it follows that the ref-
erence to the acceptance in full of Section A of Part III of the Petersberg Deciaration by the associate
members is not related to the provisions of Article X of the Treaty.
- 
The fifth indent of Paragraph 3 of the document on associate membership states that associate
members will take part on the same basis as full members in WEU military opeiations to which they
commit forces. The reference to commitment of forces may cover the proviiion of logistical and othei
{acilities of a significant nature. If associate members partit_ipate in WEU military opirations derivingfrom decisions taken by member.states, the arrangements for the conduct of these bperations will bE
established on a case-by-case basis by the participating states.
- 
The right to speak brings with it the possibility to present proposals.
. 1 FuJl participation will 
_i_nclude participation in caucuses subject to the same rules as for partici-pation in the meetings of the WEU Council and other bodies.
- 
It is understood that the provisions of this document on associate membership are withoutprejudice to the rights and obligations deriving from existing treaties or agreements.
- 
The Council will take fully into consideration associate members' security interests.
- 
The document on associate membership cannot be modified without the assent of the asso-
ciate members.
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INFORMATION LETTER
ftom Mr. van fulscle4 Seuaary-Generul of VEA,
on the activities of thc intergovernmental otgans
Dear President,
WEU is at a crossroads. From the time of the Rome Declaration in October 1984 which set the
course for WEU's reactivation to the Ministerial Council in Rome on 20th November last and whichi"rir-iO the organisation's enlargement to a tenth member - Greece - to two observers - Denmark
anO IretanO and t-o three associate irembers - Iceland, Norway and Turkey - the organisation has done
muctr io st ape the European defence identity. The reactivation of WEU, which may now be considered
ai having been accomplished, is an undenia-ble success in the process of European construction. From
now on, we can e*peit greater cohesion among Europeans within a revamped^ alliance. We are also
.e.ing tfie gradual iuttin-g into place of the instruments for a " Europe de la d6fense ", and our expec-i;id iiit 
"i ttrise instrimenti will 
provide the European integration process with this vital defence
dimension without which it would be unbalanced and stunted.
The successive enlargements of WEU demonstrate that some measure of variable geom^etry com-
bined with the necessary Gxibility have enabled it to move towards the objectives set in 1984, qbjec-
iives-which are still vaiid despite the turn of events. That is true of the definition of a new Euro-
e*iri.un partnerstrip within t'he Atlantic Alliance and also true of-the gradual edification of WEU as
the defence component of the future European Union, and of the enhanced operational rdle of WEU.
The work progr4mme set out by WEU in the Maastricht Declaration has been actively pursued
under the Italianpre-sidency. The orginisation is not in fact affected by either]he.pace or the outcome: ;hi.h i ttrint< ii fauoura6le - of t-he Maastricht ratification process. The Declarations adoptgd on
f %h june last by the WEU Council of Ministers at the Petersberg near Bonn, and the Rome
communiqu{ of 2bttr November provide unambiguous evidence of this fact.
Eschewing futile institutional rivalry, WEU must now, and in future, demonstrate that, having
Ueen reuitatised-and inlarged to embrace its true dimensions, it remains the unique framework for;;;di""iilt the security-and defence policies of its member states with a view to their.genuine
harmonisitio-n. Between now and the 1996 review date,afurthereffort of consolidation and in-depth
debate will therefore be needed.
The transfer of the Permanent Council and its Secretariat to Brussels early in the new year gives
the organisation the opportunity to open a new chapter. Naturally enough, 1992_has been largely domi-;;iJ by inititutional'q^uestioni and idministrative and procedural problems. The. urgent task now for
WiU ir to put back on the Council and working groups- agenda the key_ issues which are dominating
the debate ibout the conditions of European seturity between now and the turn of the century.
(2&h luru 
- 
21rh Norclrr}r;r 1992)
l. Annex III contains the texts published at the Rome Ministerial Council on 20th November 1992
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The prospect of a European Union with its three dimensions, namely_a common foreign and
security poiicy, the gradual eitablishment of a common defence policy and ultimately a common
O*enc6 meani'that 
--within a system of mutually-supporting organisations, Europe could acquire the
-ianr to act by and for itself iir ttris key field of external sovereignty. The total commitment of its
-emUer states io this project is needed if Europe is one day to speak and act in unison principally
within the alliance but-also on the international scene. WEU's future is therefore clearly mapped out
prouiO.O that its ten member states resolutely move forward togethe_r_19 jorge their.common destiny.
i.{o* recognised as the defence arm of the European Community, WEU must equip itself to be the
dynamic defence component of the future European Union '.
i
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Between 20th June and l9th November, the unfolding Yugoslav crisis led to two extraordinary
Ministerial Councils being convened, the first on l0th July in Helsinki, in the margins of the CSCE
summit, and the second on 28th August in London following the London Conference on the former
Yugoslavia 2.
The Permanent Council has met eleven times (24th June, lst, l3th, l6th, 22nd and 29th July,
l6th and 30th September, l4th and 28th October, lOth November).
Its work focused on the implementation of the Petersberg Ministerial decisions and on prepara-
tions for the extraordinary Ministerial Councils in Helsinki and l,ondon and the ordinary Minisierial
Council in Rome.
On l6th July, the Permanent Council, enlarged to include the political directors and their
defence ministry counterparts, met in Rome with the representatives of the other European member
states of the European Union and the other European members of the Atlantic Alliance. This meeting
held under the Italian presidency, officially opened the discussions on enlargement between the WEU
member states and the six candidate states (Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Norway and Turkey).
The procedure initiated on l6th July was pursuant to the decisions taken on lOth December l99l in
Maastricht when the member states of the European Union had been invited to join WEU or become
observers, and when the other European member states of the Atlantic Alliance had simultaneously
been invited to become associate members of WEU. Part II of the Petersberg Declaration, adopted by
the WEU Ministerial Council on l9th June 1992, spelled out the detailed provisions on the status of
future associate members or observers. The Italian Political Director, Ambassador Vanni d'Archirafi,
opened the discussions by stressing the importance of this step in the organisation's development. The
delegations of the member states and the candidate states then formally welcomed the commencement
of this work on WEU enlargement. A work programme and procedures were agreed in accordance with
the aim stated at Maastricht to conclude the negotiations before 3lst December 1992.
On lOth November, the enlarged Council, meeting in London, addressed the preparation of the
agenda for the Ministerial Council on 20th November and in particular the questions concerned with
enlargement, WEU relations with NATO and the European Union, the development of WEU's opera-
tional capabilities and the transfer of the Council and Secretariat to Brusseli.
The Council's Special Working Group (SWG) and Defence Representatives Group (DRG) held
four joint meetings (26th June in London, l Tth July in Rome, 8th September and 23id October in
London) to consolidate the work in hand to implement the Petersberg Declarations. Among the main
topics on the g.roups' agenda were relations with third countries, the Yugoslav conflicts and the various
issues involved in establishing the planning cell.
The SWG also met on 8th and l5th September, 2nd October and 5th November to prepare the
discussions on enlargement and the reports to the Council of Ministers on WEU's future relations with
the IEPG and Eurogroup. It also took stock of the work of the CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation
and developments in the former Yugoslavia.
Four series of meetings under SWG auspices were held in London with the delegations from
those EC member states applying for accession or observer status, on the one hand, and with the dele-
gations from the European member states of the Atlantic Alliance, which were applying for associate
membership, on the other (l5th September, lst and 22nd October,5th and 6ttr-Novernber).
_ 
The Defence Representatives Group (DRG) met six times (25th June, 20th July, 9th and 25th
September, 2nd October and 4th November). In accordance with the Petersberg Declaration of lgth
June 1992, under which'all WEU member states will soon designate which of their military units and
head:-qlarters they would be willing to make available to WEU for its various possible tasks ", the group
considered how these units could be designated and the type of headquarters likely to suit WEU opera-
tions. The DRG also examined in detail all the aspects of setting up the planning cell, which beiame
established in Brussels on lst October. It also examined a presidency document on a proposal for air-
marilime co-operation, which had initially been put forward by the Defence Ministers ofFrance, Italy
and_[P!t! on 7th September. Lastly, the DRG addressed itself to WEU's relations with Eurogroup and
the IEPG.
. 
Thg Cltiefs of Defence-Staff(CHODs) of the WEU member countries held their third meeting of
the year in Rome on l6th October. They exchanged views on the situation in the former Yugoslalia
and in the Commonwealth of Independent States, on the proposal for European air-rnaritime
co-operation, and more generally on all questions relating to the strengthening of WEU's operational
2. An annotated list of the_meetings which took'place in the context of the Yugoslav crisis is given in Annex IV to this infor-
mation letter: WEU's involvement in the Yugoslav crisis and conflict 
- 
Chrori'ology (June l9-91 
- 
October 1992).
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r6le. Mr. Salvo Ando, Italian Defence Minister, addressed the Chiefs of Defence Staff during this
meeting.
The Mediterranean Sub-Group met on 24th July, 2lst September and 30th October. It continued
its discusiions on til; topical questions, i.e.: the- iituation in Algeria, the efforts to resolve the
pi"Ui.rr 
"i ilre weste.n Sahara 
and the Cy'prus que_stion. The group was informed of the preliminary
ie-.iltr"ulready made by the presidencyind the Secretariat-Generalpursuant to the decision taken
by-i-h; Milirt.riif Corncii on tgttr June'1992 progressively to establish a dialogue with the Maghreb
countries.
It continued closely to monitor developments in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and to
unAysi-tte iirrc 
"f an eicalation of the conflict 
to Kosovo and Macedonia in particular. Thegroup
.i-.tingio 
"i.*i on tt " ipi.uo or Islamic fundamentalism and its repercussions for security 
in the
rrri.At."*un.an region, taiing ur its basis a study carried out by the Institute for Security Studies.
The Experts Group on the verification of armq control ag_reements held several wo-rking meelings
on thelmpGrientation 6f itre open"Skies Tr6aty (6th July, 25th Septembe^r^q! 27th october). Since
the tr,tinirf.rial Council had given its agreement in brincipie on l gth June 1992 for a feasibitity study to
6. *rii.O out to determinJ the mosi cost-effective means of implementing the Open 9kies Treaty
within the framewo.[-oi *-operation between the WEU member states, the experts discussed the
;;;rdi6ri-on *tri.t tfr. rtrAy should be based, the definition of options meriting further study, and
ioniiOiteO the study's likely costs and the ways in which it might be funded.
The CFE and the CSBM Verification Experts met on 20th and 29th July and on 9th October.
rrrev coriin"eo iii.ir-*orr. * ihe prlctical arrangements for furop-ean co-operation.to implement the
ci# ii."1r operating rutis ioi it ,i rn"ltinationaiteams,.training o-f inspectors and bilateral inspection
e*.rcGs. tt eir e*ctra'nliiof ,i.* on the 1992 vienna document focused on visits to air bases, obser-;;ii;;, ilpictions anl evaluation visits in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
The ad hoc Group on Space met at the Secretariat on 9th, l0th-and 30th July and 9n^9.th
November to take .toit -oftt. ivorr< of the team tasked with medium and long-term studies and of the
aciinitiesof the wEti sateilG centre. Experts concerned with the setting-up of_the-centre met, in turn,
"ii6iiljO. o, Ztttr aiA Zqtn July, 17t[ and 18th September and from 4th-6th November.
The publ'ic Administration commitree met in London on 8th and 9th october. Its exchanges of
views centred on the .o-*iit."" future and on administrative developmen-tl in^the member countries.
Tlie pAC members riiiir"J ttr. value of their informal meetings within this framework, which gave
tt i- tt* 
"pportunitv-ioi "i.g"ru. - 
and completely free.and frank - exchange of-information on their
;;;il;i;. ;i*inirtrhtions. T-he pAC's work is often linked to the debate on stabilitv and securitv in
our societies. eccorlffiv, li rrigti well continue to have a place within.WEV. The committee
r*.U.o proposed ttrat-tire PAC{ terms of reference and framework be reviewed in 1996.
***
As regards relations with the governments of WEU member states, it is worth pointing out that,
on Sttr l"iviutit. invliation of Mr]van den B_roek, tLe_Nltherlands Foreign Minister, I accompaniedhiil;; tC bilr; f.o.n floitirOi- to Helsinki for the CSCE meeting..This gave us ax op-portunitv for aGfrl;ild;t; of 
"ii*. piioi io ttre extraordinary y_EU Ministerial Council on 10th Julv 
and on the
piogi.* *ia[ in implementing the Maastricht and Petersberg Declarations.
*
At the invitation of the lcelandic Association for Atlantic Co-operation, I virited. Reykjavik from
grh-gth October. Or-;ir; 5gc;;a d;t of my visit, I met senior officials from the Foreign an-d- Defence
Ministries. rne same o-ai;i;iilfta an opporiunity for talks with the Prime Minister, Mr. David
iNos.o" und with Mr. Jo; Baldvin Hanniblison, the Icelandic Foreign Minister, on the implicationsfilft R.p"bric of lceiano olassociate member siatrs for which it was applying. I was also received by
Mi. gjO., Blarnason, Chairman of the Althing Foreign Affairs Committee.
In the wake of Maastricht and Petersb.rr, ,lis vital to keep the American and Canadian lead-
ership and the n.*rp"p.i;i;6iri"; ;no a.uo.".iric circles of these two countries regularly informed of
WEU,s activiries. Dirf;d;-;;;eni trip to the United States, I took every. opportunity to explain to a
;."y 
"il;a e..r.*-piUfi. ifil i-rio,tun". of strengthening WEU and the European 
pillar of the
alliince for the future of transatlantic relations:
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- 
on 19th October in Waslington, I had talks with Mr. Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State,
Mr. Niles, Assistant Secretary of State and Mr. Gumpert, Special Asiistant to President Bush foi
European Affairs;
- that same day in Washington, I met the Ambassadors of the WEU member states at a
luncheon given in my honour by Mr. Boris Biancheri, Italy's Ambassador to Washington; in the
9ye_ning, during a dinner-debate organised by the European Institute in Washington, I Jpoke about
" Meeting European security challenges: the r6le of European institutioni and tiansatlantic
co-operation " ;
- 
on 20th October in Cincinnati, I spoke to members of the Executive Committee of the Council
of World Affairs on " The future of European security and the rOle of intergovernmental
organisations ";
- on 2lst October, still in Cincinnati, I gave an address on the same subject to members of the
International Studies Academy;
- 
thanks to an initiative by the New York Council on Foreign Relations, I was able to meet that
91m_e_ day in Minneapolis members of the Mondale Fellows Program under the auspices of the HubertH. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs (University of Minneiota);
- 
still on 2lst October, I gave a talk on "The European pillar of the Alliance" as part of a
workslop 
.o1 " European security. ald transatlantic relationships after the cold war: winning thepeace "; t_his had been organised jointly by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Mondale P=olicy
Forum of the University of Minnesota.
- 
Turning to WEU's relations with the.orn,rrl. of Central Europe, the first meeting of the Forum
of Consultation took place in London on l4th October. On the agenda for discussion between the
members of the Permanent Council and the Ambassadors of the eight partner countries of Central
E=u1ope were the expansion of this dialogue, the development of the CSCE and in particular the post-
Helsinki Forum on Security Co-operation and also topical questions, including the withdrawal of
Russian troops from the Baltic countries and the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.
In this connection, you will find annexed to this letter a chronology of the main decisions and
activities concerning WEU's relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe covering the
period April 1990 to October 1992 (Annex V).
,r
Since Maastricht and Petersberg, the EFTA countries have shown much interest in a dialogue
with WEU representatives on the problems of European security. Accordingly, on 29th Octobei in
Vienna, I took part in a seminar on " Security and democracy in East-Cential and South-Eastern
E_ur.one 
- 
political developments and possible solutions of ethnic conflicts ", organised jointly by the
University oI Vienna and the Austrian Defence Academy. During my stay, I mei Mr. -Werner
Fas{abend, The Austrian Defence Minister and Ambassador W. Schallenberg, Secretary-General at
the Foreign Ministry.
. 
On_ 9th July, in the margins of the CSCE summit in Helsinki where I was a special guest of the
Finnish Government, I had the opportunity to meet Mr. Paavo Vayrynen, the Foreign Minister. I went
back to Finland from l5th and l Tth November at the invitation of the Finnish Government. I had a
number of talks with Mr. Koivisto, President of the Finnish Republic, Mr. P. Vayrynen, Foreign Min-
ister, Mr. J. Blomberg, Director-General of the Political Directorate ai the Minisiry of Foreign-Affairs,
Lieutenant-General A. Pajunen, Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence and Lieutenant-
General G. Hagglund, Acting Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. I also gave a talk on the devel-
opment of WEU.
*
Together with a representative of the presidency, I paid an official visit to Moscow from 2nd-4th
November. We were received in turn by the Vice-President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Rutskoi;
lne firs! leputy Minisler of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Adamishin; the First Deputy Minister of Defence,
V.. A, Kokoshin; the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee on DeftnCe and Security, Mr. S.
_Stepashin, and Marshall E. Shaposhnikov, Commander-in-Chief of the CIS High Command. On 3rdNovember, I was invited to give a talk on WEU at the Moscow State Institute of Foreign Relations(MGIMO). The same day, I met members of the Russian Academy of Sciences at the-Institute of
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Europe. On 4th November, the presidency representative and I gave a press conference at the press
centre of the Foreign Ministry. The same day, I briefed the WEU member states' Ambassadors to
Moscow on our talks.
These recent months have been marked by a number of meetings between the Council and repre-
sentatives of the WEU parliamentary Assembly:
- 
on 24th June in London, the Permanent Council received the President of the Assembly, Mr.
H. Soell, and the Chairman of the Committee for Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Mr. T.
Rathbone, who had come to present the Assembly budget for 1993. Prior to this meeting there was a
working breakfast attended by Mr. Soell and Mr. Rathbone, H. E. Baron von Richthofen, German
Ambassador, H. E. Mr. G. Attolico, Italian Ambassador, Ambassador H. HoltholI, Deputy Secretary-
General and myself;
- 
on 25th June in Bonn, Ambassador H. Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, represented the
Secretariat at a meeting at which the presidency was able to brief the Assembly's Presidential Com-
mittee on the outcome of the Council of Ministers on l9th June;
- on 24th September in London, the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and
Administration, Mr. T. Rathbone, and Mr. R. Cannizzaro, Clerk Assistant for Administrative and
Financial Affairs, took part in the discussions of the Budget and Organisation Committee on the
Assembly's budget for 1993;
- 
on 6th November, at a hearing organised at the House of Commons in London, I gave a
progress report on the work of WEU to the members of the Assembly's Political Committee;
- 
on l8th November in Rome, Mr. P. Casardi, Director for Political Affairs, represented the
Secretariat-General at the usual meeting between the presidency and the Assembly's Presidential Com-
mittee with a view to the Ministerial meeting on 20th November.
*
**
In the field of public relations and information on the r6le and current activities of WEU, my
colleagues and I attended the following events:
- 
on 25th June, at the Secretariat-General, Mr. P Casardi, Director for Political Affairs, and Mr.
A. Jacomet, Head of the Policy and Planning Section, gave a presentation on WEU to a group of
officers from the Netherlands Naval Staff College;
- 
from lst-3rd July, Ambassador H. Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, represented the
Secretariat-General at a seminar on " The problems of European security in the 1990s " organised by
the WEU Institute for Security Studies in Pultusk (Poland);
- 
on 6th July, I gave an address on the European pillar of the alliance as part of a programme
organised by the Royal Military Academy at Camberley;
- 
on l4th July in London, I spoke on " The former Yugoslavia and international security " at a
seminar on " The war in former Yugoslavia " organised at the House of Commons by Mr. Bruce
George MP and the editorial staff of " YugoFax ";
- 
the same day in London, I gave a talk on " Western European Union and arms co-operation "
during the Fifth Annual Seminar on Armaments Co-operation organised by the Defence Systems Man-
agement College of the United States Department of Defence;
- 
on 23rd July, I gave an address on " The security ofthe new Europe " to students on the course
for Central and Eastern European diplomats at keds University;
- 
from 20th-24th July, Ambassador Holthoff took part in the SHAPE Crisis Management
Course at Oberammergau. On the 20th, he gave a talk on ' WEU and crisis management ";
- 
on 3rd August in Breda (Netherlands), I attended the 45th Congress of the'Inter-Allied Con-
federation of Reserve Officers (CIOR) " on the subject " Security 2000 and the reservists ". I gave an
address on the same subject;
- 
on 4th August, I gave a lecture on " Security in a changing Europe " at the 35th International
Seminar for Younger Diplomats organised in Salzburg by the Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs;
- 
the same day at the Secretariat-General, Mr. P. Casardi, Director for Political Affairs, and Ms.
Valleix, Committee Secretary, received a $oup of students from the French National School of
Administration (ENA);
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- 
on lst September, Ambassador Holthoffgave a presentation on WEU at a symposium on the
problems of European security, organised at Skive (Denmark) by the Information Department of the
Danish armed forces;
- 
from lTth to lgth September in Rhodes, I took part in the seminar on * Security challenges in
South Eastern Europe' organised jointly by the WEU Institute for Security Studies and the Hellenic
Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy;
- 
on22nd September in London, I gave a lecture to the Royal Institute for International Affairs
on " WEU 
- 
on the way back to Brussels ";
- 
on 25th September in Brussels, I took part in a meeting of the " Petit Comitd pour I'Europe "
and described WEU developments since the Petersberg meeting;
- 
on 29th September in Paris, I attended the opening of a symposium on * A new strategic
debate " organised by the Ministry of Defence under the patronage of the President of the French
Republic;
- 
on 5th October in Paris, I took part in a seminar organised by the Akademie (ur Sicherheit
und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (ASZE) on the subject " The development of security structures and
co-operation in Europe ";
- 
on lOth October, Ambassador Holthoffgave a talk on WEU at a symposium organised by the
" Freie Demokratische Partei 
- 
Bayern " in Wurzburg;
- 
on l2th October in Bracknell, I took part in a "Seminar on peacekeeping" organised by
members of the Royal Air Force Advanced Staff Course. I spoke about " WEU's r6le in European
security ";
- 
on l5th October in Ebenhausen, I took part in a symposium organised by the " Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik * on the subject " The interlocking of institutions ";
- 
on 21st October in Brussels, Ambassador Holthoffgave an address on the r6le of WEU after
Maastricht and Petersberg to the Security and Defence Committee of the European People's Party
(PPE);
- 
on 26th October, I took part in the " Conference on the integration of security policy in
Europe 
- 
the challenge for Switzerland " organised by the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. I
spoke about the prospects for WEU after Maastricht and Petersberg;
- 
on27th October, I gave a speech on the r6le of WEU at the Royal College of Defence Studies
in London;
the same day, at the Secretariat-General, I received a delegation of Swedish and Finnish jour-
- 
on 28th October in Soesterberg (Netherlands), I gave a talk to the * Nederlandse Officieren
Vereniging " on the subject of * European defence in a changing world ";
- 
on 29th October in Villach (Austria), Ambassador Holthoffgave a talk on " The r6le of WEU
after Maastricht and Petersberg " as part of the symposium on " Security for the Europe of tomorrow'
organised by the " Osterreichische Volkspartei';
- 
on 3fth October in Rome, I took part in a joint meeting of the European Strategy Group and
the Aspen Institute on the subject " Proliferation in the 1990s ";
- 
on 3lst October in Madrid, I attended a seminar organised by the WEU Institute for Security
Studies in conjunction with the * Centro Espafiol de Relaciones internacionales " on the subject
" Security and co-operation in the Western Mediterranean ". I spoke on " Prospects for co-operation in
the Western Mediterranean ";
- 
from 7th-8th November, I took part in a symposium in Brussels of the Centre for European
Policy Studies on the subject of transatlantic relations;
- 
on l2th November in Bonn, I gave a lecture on * WEU in the 2lst century " as part of a
seminar on " The prospects for European security " organised by the Bundesakademie fur
Sicherheitspolitik;
- 
the same day in Bonn, I took part in the European Round Table on Security Policy organised
by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation;
- 
on l3th November in Amsterdam, I gave a talk on the r6le of the European security and
defence identity to members of the Netherlands Officers' Association;
natistq
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- 
on lSth and lgth November in Brussels, Mr. A. Jacomet took part in the " United States
Mission Workshop for Central and Eastern Europeans " on the subject " Towards a European security
architecture ". He spoke about " WEU and the European security architecture ".
***
Over this period, I have continued to have regular contacts with the press, radio and television
both in London and on the occasion of other engagements.
At the request of the Permanent Council, the Secretariat prepares notes on how the international
press has reacted to WEU's activities and the debates about its future. Summarised below are the notes
for June, July/August and September 1992.
I. At the beginning of June, journalists paid much attention to the ordinary session gf the
Assembly of Western Euiopean Union, held from lst-4th June. The German press paid pa_rticular
attention to the election to the Assembly presidency of Mr. H. Soell (MdB - member of the German
Bundestag). Commentators reacted favourably to the speech given by the WEU Secretary-General and
by various foreign and deflence ministers.
The press took great interest in the meeting of the WEU Ministerial Council in Bonn on l9th
June. The -Petersberg Declaration prompted exhaustive and generally positive reports. Comment
focused on the new vitality of WEU and the strengthening of its operational capability and the prospect
of its enlargement and iti relations with the countries of Central Europe. Journalists R11d particular
attention to the establishment of the planning cell and the question of the availability of forces in the
event of a crisis. Several journalists iook the view that the intense consultation within WEU would
pave the way for concerted European action in the Yugoslav crisis.
There was frequent mention in the press of relations between WEU and NATO and Franco-
American relations. Several articles referred to WEU in connection with the multinational airJand and
naval exercise known as " Farfadet ", which was seen as a move towards giving WEU an operational
capability.
II. WEU's involvement in the Yugoslav crisis in July was widely reported in the international
press. Journalists underlined the importance of the WEU Council of Ministers held in Helsinki on lOth
iuly in the margins of the CSCE summit at which it was decided to deploy a naval monitoring force off
the coast of the former Yugoslavia.
NATO. SomeSeveral in-depth articles were published on co-operation between WEU and . 
articles touched only generally on the question of the complementarity between WEU, NATO and the
CSCE while others focused oi the role of the CSCE in co-ordinating a possible peace-keeping operation
under WEU or NATO auspices. Following the announcement of co-ordination between the WEU fleet
monitoring the Strait of Otlanto and the NefO fleet operating offthe Monte_negrin coast, opinion was
more divided. Most journalists took note of this co-ordination provided by Italy, but some were con-
cerned at the prospect of an imbroglio in what they described as a clear example of rivalry between
WEU and NATO.
Finally, the press monitored the work of WEU enlargement, principally on ttr.e occasion of the
meeting on i Ottr July in Rome between the WEU member states and the six candidate countries.
IIL During September, press attention focused on the follow-up to the extraordinary Ministerial
Council on 28th August, which had taken place after the London Conference on Yugoslavia, and more
specifically on the contributions made available to the United Nations Uy jlg nine WEU member
cbuntries [o protect humanitarian aid convoys; it was also underlined that WEU was prepared t-o take
part in a strengthening of the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro ifa dgcisionrrere to be taken to
ihat effect by the united Nations Se-urity council' Some commentators highlighted the fact that wEU
had supplied contingency plans to the United Nations.
The Yugoslav crisis is still prompting many questions about transatlantic relations and the
rivalry betweei WEU and NATO, ieen by some as a uguerre d'dtiquettes " (war of labels)..According
to the media, there is some confusion in-the public mind about the respective responsibilities of the
two organisafions. In view of some analysts, the Yugoslav conflict has highlighted the fragile credibility
of a common European security and defence policy.
During the referendum campaign for the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the sec5ity
dimension oT the European Union wai scarcely mentioned other than in speeches by some political
leaders and in analytical comment by defence eiperts. Finally, there was considerable press reaction to
the speech given on 29th Septemberby the FrenCh Defence Minister, Mr- Pierre Joxe, in which he sug-
geste-d incr6ased participation by France in the activities of the Atlantic Alliance.
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ANNEX I: Extraordinary meeting of WEU Council of Ministers on the situation in Yugoslavia,
Helsinki, l0th July 1992: This text has been published in Document 1324.
ANNEX II: Communiqud issued after the meeting of the extraordinary Council of Ministers,
London, 28th August 1992: This text has been published in Document 1327.
ANNEX III: Declaration on WEU observers issued after the meeting of the WEU Council of Min-
isters, Rome,20th November 1992: This text has been published in Documents 1348
and 1345.
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ANNEX IV
WEU's involvement in the Yugosbv crisis and conflict
Chronologt
(lune 1991-Ocnber 1992)
27.6
r.7
5.7
tt.7
25.7
7.8
23.9
26.9
r9.9
30.9 Second extraordinary Ministerial
meeting devoted to Yugoslavia in
Brussels.
7.10 Third Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia
meeting in Bonn. Consideration of
implications of implementation of
United Nations Resolution 7L3
(embargo on arms) by WEU member
states.
7-8.10 Meeting of the Military Experts Group
and the Embargo GrouP.
11.10 Meeting of the Cost-sharing Working
Group.
15.10 Meeting of a Joint Contingency Study
Group in Metz.
29.10 Extraordinary Ministerial meeting on
the rdle of WEU. The opportunitY is
1991
Ministerial Council meeting (Vianden,
Luxembourg). First WEU public
statement on the Yugoslav situation.
START OF
DENCY
GERMAN PRESI-
Permanent Council meeting in London
mainly devoted to the Yugoslav situ-
ation.
rbid.
rbid.
Permanent Council exclusively devoted
to the Yugoslav situation in the wake of
the EPC extraordinary Ministerial
meeting at The Hague.
First extraordinary Ministerial meeting
on Yugoslavia in The Hague. The EPC
communiqud made a reference to
WEU. Ministers decided to reconvene
the * Ad Hoc Group " created in the
context of the Gulf conflicts to review
the politico-military implications of the
Yugoslav situation. The group com-
prises of high level experts from both
Defence and Foreign Affairs national
ministries.
First meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on
Yugoslavia in Bonn.
Second Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia
meeting in Bonn.
seized to review and discuss the
Yugoslav situation on the basis of a
report drawn up by the presidency.
I l.l I The enlarged Council noted the reports
and studies of the Ad Hoc Group on
Yugoslavia and decided not to
reconvene it or the Joint Contingency
Study Groups unless warranted by new
developments arising from the decision
to impose economic sanctions.
l8.ll Ordinary Ministerial meeting in Bonn.
A declaration on the Yugoslav situation
is issued, taking note of the failure of
the Yugoslav anny to comply with
agreed ceasefires or its own under-
takings.
22.11 Fourth Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia
meeting in Bonn.
*
**
1992
The evolution of the Yugoslav conflict
was monitored by the WEU Council on a per-
manent basis during the first five months of
1992. The former Yugoslavia in fact figured on
all its agendas under " Topical questions ". The
same was true of the Special Working Group
and Defence Representatives Group, as well as
the Mediterranean Sub-Group, which analysed
the different aspects of the developments of the
conflict.
After its active contingency planning
exercise in the summer and fall of 1991, WEU
directed its action along two lines:
- 
preparing for the deployment of Blue
Helmet contingents on the basis of
Security Council resolutions, a
deployment to which member states
might contribute;
- 
Stepping up member states' efforts to
create humanitarian corridors.
In this context, the Ad Hoc Group's
r6le was to consider practical arrange-
ments for the possible implementation
of the required contingency plans.
***
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4.6
19.6
Meeting of the Permanent Council
mainly devoted to the Yugoslav con-
flict.
Ministerial meeting in Petersberg,
Bonn, followed by an extraordinary
Ministerial meeting with the Central
European countries. In both meetings,
the situation in the former Yugoslavia
was reviewed and discussed. A special
statement was issued condemning the
ongoing use of force, urging humani-
tarian aid, reaffirming full support for
the United Nations operations and res-
olutions as well as for the Conference
on Yugoslavia.
Meeting of military experts on Yugo-
slavia.
Meeting of the Ad Hoc Sub-Group on
Yugoslavia.
START OF ITALIAN PRESIDENCY
Meeting of naval experts in Rome.
Meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on Yugo-
slavia in Rome.
First extraordinary Ministerial meeting
in the margins of the CSCE Helsinki
meeting. Ministers took note of the Ad
Hoc Group on Yugoslavia report and
decided:
25.6
26.6
1.7
2.7
3.7
to.7
l. to implement the monitoring at sea
operations proposed by the Ad Hoc
Group on Yugoslavia for the surveil-
lance of the embargo set up by
United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 713 and 757 (off the
Yugoslav coast, in international waters
and under Italian co-ordination).
2. to make an inventory of WEU
member states' contributions to the
competent United Nations author-
ities in the field of humanitarian aid.
14.7 Meeting in Rome of the naval points
of contact, mainly devoted to
WEUAIATO co-ordination of naval
operations of surveillance.
17.7 Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia meeting
in Rome.
23.7 Meeting of naval experts on embargo
and Humanitarian Group in Rome.
30.7 Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia meeting
in Rome.
13.8 Meeting of Ad Hoc Group on Yugo-
slavia and Humanitarian Group in
Rome.
17-21.8 Meetings of the Contingency planning
Group in Rome.
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I24.8
26.8
27.8
28.8
Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia meeting
in Rome.
Opening of London Conference on
Yugoslavia.
Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia meeting
in London.
Second extraordinary Ministerial
meeting on Yugoslavia in London. A
communiqud was issued. Ministers dis-
cussed the contribution WEU could
make to the peace process in former
Yugoslavia on the basis of the Ad Hoc
Group on Yugoslavia report and the
conclusions of the London Conference.
They stressed the importance of
strengthening the effectiveness of the
United Nations embargo and sanctions.
They noted contributions which WEU
and its member states were already
making and were prepared to make for
humanitarian aid and supervision of
heavy weapons. The Presidency would
liaise with the United Nations as well as
the EC, NATO and CSCE. It wrote to
the United Nations Secretary General
to send a document listing member
states' contributions. The United
Nations Secretary General conveyed to
WEU officials his appreciation for the
quality of WEU's planning work, which
greatly helped the preparation of
United Nations Secretariat and HCR
decisions.
8.9 Meeting in London, the Special
Working Group reviewed the follow-upto the extraordinary Ministerial
Council.
14.9 In its Resolution 7'76, the Security
Council authorised the enlargement of
UNPROFOR's mandate and strength.
Among the countries participating in
the UNPROFOR are 6 WEU member
states: Belgium (with a contingent from
Luxembourg), France, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain and the United
Kingdom.
14.9 Meeting of the Contingency Planning
Group in London on anticipated
requirements and updates of proposed
contributions.
16.9 Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia meeting
in London.
30.9 Meeting of the Contingency Planning
Group in London.
1.10 Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia meeting
in London.
14.10 Meeting of the Contingency Planning
Group in Rome.
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(April 1990 - Octoher 1992)
23rd April ree0: lxi.y,:y" ..r".'$?1,,,:l#J:Tft.ff.Jil-r",.1*rfil.::,:il]iill:"xl*?l
for two-way information ivittr ttre democratically elected ggvernments in
Central and Eastern Europe ". (Paragraph 8 of the Brussels Communiqu6).
After subsequent discussions in the Permanent Council, it was agreed that
these contaCts should take the form of fact-finding missions by a repre-
sentative of the French Presidency and the Secretary-General. Hungary,
Czechoslovakia and Poland would be the first countries to be visited.
22nd-23rd October 1990: French Presidency - Secretary-General fact-finding mission to Hungary.
Talks with Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky and First Deputy Defence
Minister, Lt. Gen. Antal Annus, and representatives of the Hungarian Par-
liament.
5th-6th November 1990: French Presidency - Secretary-General fact-finding 4ission to Czechoslo-
vakia. Talks wittr- Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier, First Depulr Foreign
Minister Robert Hareicar, Deputy Foreign Minister Zdenko Pirek,
Deputy Defence Minister Mr. Rasek and representatives of the Federal
Assembly.
l0th December 1990: The WEU Council of Ministers meeting in Paris ?greed to develop the-
contacts and " took up the idea of multilateral meetings under-the aegis of
the wEU Institute ior Security Studies " (Paragraph 4 of the Paris
Communiqud.
7th-8th March l99l: French Presidency - Secretary-General fact-finding mission to Poland.
Talks with Minist'ers and officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs
and Defence and from the President's office as well as with representa-
tives of both houses of the National Assembly.
llth-l2th March l99l: Seminar under the aegis of the WEU Institute for Security ltudies
bringing together the ofrrcials responsible Qr politico-military afflirg i.nit. Foi.igri and Defence Ministries of WEU member states and their
counterparts from Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland.
27th June l99l: Ministers meeting in Vianden endorsed a series of measures to give
WEU's dialogue *ittr ttre countries of Central and Eastern Europe more
depth and breadth (see Vianden communiqu6):
ANNEX Y
Chrunology of main decisions and activities concerning
WEU's relations with countrtes of Central Europe
- 
ad hoc contacts with Hungary, czechoslovakia and Poland at Minis-
terial level on specific subjects of common interest;
- 
information links between the Secretariat-General and the Embassies of
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland and between these three govern-
menis and the Embassy of the Presidency;
- 
Secretary-General - Presidency fact-finding missions to Bulgaria and
Romania;
- 
WEU Institute study awards to be granted to young researchers from
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe;
- 
exchanges of views among exp€rtg on subj.ects.of coTmon interest
includiig further seminars for officials organised by the WEU Institute
for Security Studies.
The Secretary-General, with representatives of the German Presidency,
inaugurates the information links between the Embassies of Czechoslo-
vakii, Hungary and Poland and the Secretariat-General in separate
meetings wiltr itre three Ambassadors on 9th, loth and 3lst July respec-
tively.
July l99l:
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3lst Oct.-lst Nov. l99l: German Presidency 
- 
Secretary-General fact-finding mission to Bulgaria.
Talks with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Valkov, President Zhelev, Defence Minister Mustavchiev, Prime Minister
Popov, Chairman of the UDF Co-ordination Committee Dimitrov.
3rd-4th November 1991: German Presidency 
- 
Secretary-General fact-finding mission to Romania.
Talks with Foreign Minister Nastase, representatives of the Romanian
Parliament, Defence Minister Spiriou, Prime Minister Stolojan and Pres-
ident lliescu.
l8th November l99l: Meeting in Bonn, Ministers reaflirm their intention to help consolidate
peace and stability in Europe by enhancing the dialogue on security and
co'operation between WEU and the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe, including the Baltic states and the Soviet Union. Ministers
resolved that the next measures should be as follows:
2lst January 1992:
- 
the Foreign and Defence Ministers of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland and Romania will be invited to participate in a special
meeting with the members of the Council;
- 
seminars in these countries organised by the WEU Institute for Security
Studies;
- 
expansion of the WEU Institute scholarship programme;
- 
fact-finding visits by the Presidency and Secretary-General to the Soviet
Union and to the Baltic States, if the latter are interested.
(see Bonn Communiqu6).
l99l: Second seminar under the aegis of the WEU Institute for Security Studies
bringing together the officials responsible for politico-military affairs in
the Foreign and Defence Ministries of WEU member states and their
counterparts from Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and
Poland.
German Presidency 
- 
Secretariat-General fact-finding mission to Estonia.
Talks with Foreign Minister Meri, Chairman of the Supreme Council
Ruutel, Minister of State for Defence Questions Vare, Deputy Prime Min-
ister and Minister of the Economy Leimann.
22nd Jantary 1992:
,i
,!
'l
28th-29th November
23rd-24th January 1992:
llth-l2th May 1992:
l9th June 1992:
German Presidency 
- 
Secretariat-General fact-finding mission to Latvia.
Talks with Minister of State Dinevics, Minister of Defence Jundzis,
Chairman of the Defence and Internal Affairs Commission of the
Supreme Council Simonis, Minister of Foreign Affairs Jurkans, Deputy
Foreign Minister Virsis, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of
the Supreme Council Berzins, Chairman of the Supreme Council
Gorbunovs.
German Presidency 
- 
Secretariat-General fact-finding mission to Lith-
uania. Talks with Foreign Minister Saudargas, Defence Minister
Butkevicius, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council Kuzmickas,
Deputy Prime Minister Vaisvila.
Third WEU Central and East European seminar under the aegis of the
WEU Institute in Budapest.
Extraordinary Meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with eight states
of Central Europe (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania) in Petersberg (Bonn).
The Foreign and Defence Ministers adopted the following concrete mea-
sures:
- 
Foreign and Defence Ministers will meet once a year. Additional
meetings at ministerial level may be convened if circumstances
requlre.
- 
A forum of consultation will be established between the WEU Per-
manent Council and the Ambassadors of the countries concerned. It
will meet at the seat of the WEU Council at least twice a year.
- 
These meetings will provide an opportunity to monitor the implemen-
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tation of the measures adopted and, where appropriate, to make pro-
posals for the inclusion of other f,relds of co-operation.
- 
Consultations at ministerial and WEU Permanent Council/
Ambassador level on security issues may be complemented by meetings
with an ad hoc WEU troika at senior official level.
- 
The following initiatives will be continued and encouraged:
o Regular exchanges of documents and information;
. Growing co-operation between WEU Institute for Security Studies
and the corresponding bodies in the countries concerned. An
increasing number of seminars and colloquia will be organised. The
programme of scholarships will be continued.
Ministers advocated the development of relations between the WEU
Assembly and the parliaments of the states concerned.
These m-easures, conducted in the framework of WEU with the states of
Central Europe, and similar endeavours conducted in the alliance
framework, will be mutually complementary and reinforcing.
In a " Declaration on Nagorny-Karabakh " of the extraordinary Meeting
of the WEU Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe, Ministers
reiterate their appeal to the parties to the conflict to establish immediately
an effective ceas-efire and to take additional steps, including withdrawal
from occupied areas.
First meeting of the forum of consultation (consisting of Permanent Rep-
resentatives io the WEU Council and Heads of Mission in London of the
eight Central European countries) at the WEU Secretariat-General,
London.
As of early October lgg2, the WEU Institute for Security Studies had offered I 2 study. aw_ards to s]]l-
dents from the following'Central European countries: Bulgaria (2), Czechoslovakia (1), Hungary (4),
Poland (5).
l4th October 1992:
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The situation in East Timor
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
'
tabled by Mr. Brito and others
under Rule 44 of the Rulcs of Pmcedure
with a request for urgent procedure
In the spirit of its resolution of 3rd December 1991, the Assembly of Western European Union:(l) Considering the 
-imprisonment by Indonesia of the East Timor resistance leader, XananaGusmao, on the eve of the United Nations negotiations for obtaining a political solution with due
respect for the United Nations Charter and relevant resolutions;(ii) Considering.that the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and many
other international organisations still do not to accept the occupation of East Timor,
Pnoresrs at the detention, without legal assistance and with no possibility of visits from the
International Red Cross, of the Timor leader Xanana Gusmao
and Uncss rnr INooNrsrnN GowRNMENT to release him immediately.
_ . 
Signed: B.rito, Borderas, Martinez, De Decker, Lentz-Cornette, Finsberg, Caro, Smith, Mackie of
Benshie, Agnelli, Cuco, Roseta, Fernandes Marques, Aguiar, Curto, Pinto
Request for urgent procedure:
Signed: Brito, Pogas Santos, Curto, Martinez, Nuftez, Cuco, Pistre, Roman, Masseret, pinto
1. See l2th sitting, 2nd December 1992 (urgent procedure agreed to).
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l. See 13th sitting, 3rd December 1992 (urgent procedure agreed to).
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2nd December 1992
Acts of violence in camps, crimes against humanity
and war crimes in former Yugoslavia
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
'
tabled by Mr. Pdcriaux and othen
under Rule 44 of the Rules of Procedure
with a request for argent procedure
Thousands of women and children are victims of the most brutal acts of violence. They are phys-
ically and morally humiliated and forced to have " Chetnik " children. Reports by women who have
bein raped proue that they are aggressed in an incredible sexual manner and totally humiliated. Each
O"iit Ji are ill-treated by'several-iren - sometimes at the same time - and are forced to watch acts of
ui6ten.6 committed ot those close to them. The psychological consequences are difficult to imagine.
These women can expect no help from their compairiots, who believe that the women who have been
rupeO t ur. lost theif honour. Those responsible for the rape wish to reduce the M!.slim population,
*tiict is tantamount to ethnic cleansing. Women and girls are held in " rape camPs " where each day
they are humiliated and tortured repeatedly and by groups and are often even killed.
The parliamentary Assembly of WEU considers that these acts and war crimes are in the context
of the policy of violence by armies at war and urges
1. the governments of member countries to endeavour to ensure that these tortures and war
crimes are brought to an immediate end;
2. governments to examine the question of including rape as a war crime in conventions of
international law;
3. the governments of member countries to earmark financial means for counselling and
assisiing women and girls who have been raped;
4. the European Community to take effective steps to put an end to the war, extend aid pro-
grammes, 
"isrr-e 
joint iesponsibility for assisting -refugees and examine guarantees for
receiving the women concerned;
5. international organisations such as the Red Cross and the United Nations High_Commission
ioi n.iugees to-strengthen their assistance to the women concerned in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
establish-true areas oT protection and increase their medical and psychological assistance to
the victims of torture.
Signed: Pdcriaux, Fischer, Caro, De Decker, Lenzer, Antretter, Marten, Tummers, Borderas,
Brito, S/eed, Dimmer, Newall, Aarts, De Hoop Scheffer, Filsb_erg, Jung,-Fry,.Hooper, H-unt, Ghesquiire,
Fabra, Alrarer, Martinez, Stoffelen, Lopez Henares, Soell, Dundee, Alloncle, Durand, Thompson
Document 1355 3rd December 1992
Aas of rope and castration,_crimes against humanity and war crimes
in former Yugoslavia
DRAFT RESOLUTION 
'
submitted on behalf of the Political Committee2
by Mr. Cam, Rapponeur
The Assembly has been informed that on the territory of former Yugoslavia:
l. thousands of women and children, sometimes concentrated in special camps, are victims ofbrutal rape;
2. women are being forced to complete the resulting pregnancies;
3. men are being castrated.
. lt q Assembly-condemns most strongly these sexual aggressions perpetrated as acts of humili-
ation of the human being and used as a weipon of war.
The Assembly urges the governments of member countries:(a) to intervene immediately to bring about an immediate end to these tortures and war crimes;(b) to bring to trial those responsible for these crimes against humanity;(c) to assist the victims by all the means at their disposal.
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. 
.Members-of the committee: Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman); Lord Finsberg, Nlr. P. D.egkgr (vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Agnelli(4lErnjtte; !os9o), A\:sr9 (Alternate: i[rs. lsuiar), Andieotti, (Alternaii: oe ciitii,s"i*,'Br;;;;;;;:ilowden (Alternate: sirKeith S_peed), Caro, De Hogp Scheffer, Fabia_(diernate_: Miriinez), Fetdmann, eo,i:ri, roicni, coiiii,r fart"iiti ui. oil,Homs I Ferret (Alternate: Dia),.Sir Russell Jbhnston (Alternate:'ilusllesj,l.rirA Kirkhill, MM. Kittelmann, Koehl, Maroni(Alternal.e; Caldolo), Moya,M.d,ller..Pdcriaux, de Puig,'Reddemann, ft;d;igrrn, Rosela, S""uwi,-s*rr tAri.-.ti;-;r1;;i;;;,Ward, Wintgens (Alternate: De Decker).
N.B. Tfte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Docrment 1356
Emergency assistance to Somalia
MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION 
'
tabled by Mr. Fourri and others
l. See 13th sitting, 3rd December 1992 (motion referred to the Political Committee)'
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3rd December 1992
The dramatic situation in Somalia and the growing difliculty of taking in humanitarian
assistance are making the international community take urgent action in ^that country.^ Theinnoon..-ent of the lmminent deployment of a United States expeditionary folce and the forth-
io*irg adoption of a United Nations -security Council resolution raise the question of a European
presence in this humanitarian action.
WEU, which, during the Gulf war, showed that it was capable of swift.implementation of the
appropriate'operational mEans, must, on behalf of Egro_pe, make its contribution to restoring normal
c6irAifions foi distributing humanitarian assistance in Somalia.
Answering a question put by Mr. Fourr6 in the WEU Assembly on 2nd December 1992, Mr.
Andd, Italian Minisier of Defenc6, said that if several WEU countries wished to take part in this
action, WEU would have to define a joint operational position.
THp AssrMsly THEREFoRE RECoMMENDS THAT rnr CouNctI-
l. Examine as a matter of urgency the conditions for implementing joint action 9y YfV -ember
iountries in the context of the op6ratibn carried out in Somalia under the aegis of the United Nations;
2. Instruct the chiefs of defence staff to define the logistic means necessary for such an inter-
vention.
Signed: Fourrb, Fischer, Pogas Santos, Antretter, Tummers, Roseta, Newall, De Decker, Hunt
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